that we can determine the individual and total picture, and where we can possibly work with and help individual plants. We have no direct line of control over any of our plant operations; we provide strictly staff, safety advisory and consultant services.

The sixth point is the *safe operating practices requirement.* Each department, each supervisor will develop his own safe operating practices in conjunction with his safety committee at the location. These then become most practical; they are operating practices which the supervisor himself has had a part in making and something with which he can live, train his employees and enforce.

The seventh point is *safe plant and equipment* and the eighth is *industrial health and medical services*—both adequate and satisfactory for the individual location as needed.

Our ninth point provides for proper orientation of supervision, as well as the personnel department, in workmen's compensation *claims control.*

And, finally, getting to our tenth point, *staff services,* we consider here the corporate, division and plant levels. These services should provide a practical minimum, for otherwise we are then doing the supervisor's job for him and defeating our purpose.

However, these services involve technical advice and consultation to aid in the set-up and administration of all of the involvements of an effective safety activity. We have prepared, and are at the present moment circulating among our divisions and plants, three basic policies. They are safety services, medical and workmen's compensation policies. These three policies state our philosophy and provide basic activities which we require of our divisions and plants. I can best describe these policies as umbrellas under which the individual plant can live and operate, because of their varying needs and situations, but which provide for and require the basics which I have outlined here, placing these responsibilities on local plant management and their supervision.

This we consider to be a basic and minimum accident prevention program.

Huntington: Companies with scattered operations over the country are faced with special problems in organizing for safety and need a guide to follow in setting up an overall safety program so that such operations adhere to the program insofar as local conditions will permit. My idea of the essentials for a multi-plant accident-prevention program are:

1. First of all, top management must be sold on the idea and the reasons for a sound accident-prevention program to include all of its operations, regardless of size.

2. The selling job is best done by those closest to the over-all problem and by whoever is in charge of the company's or corporation's safety activities. This may be a safety engineer, safety director, safety supervisor, or the like.

3. From my personal experience and observations, and knowing what other large companies are doing along this line, there appears to be a common pattern set up by all.

(a) A staff safety department at the main office or plant is set up and acts in an advisory capacity.

(b) A central safety committee, or governing body, made up of operating and staff people is needed to lay the ground rules for all to follow. This group should meet quarterly or as often as there is adequate business to be conducted.

(c) A statement of policy is adopted by top management to provide a general plan for all plants and operations to follow.

(d) Local management at the various operations have the prerogative to determine how they can best adhere to the policy. After all, it is their plant and they should run their own show.

(e) Depending on the size of the operation, someone must be delegated by the plant manager to the safety responsibility, whether it be on a full or part-time basis —safety supervisor, safety engineer, or the industrial relations manager. In my own company a safety supervisor handles this program at most of our operations; however, the industrial relations manager in some of our smaller plants also serves as safety supervisor.

(f) A local safety committee, consisting of equal representation from management and the union, I feel is an essential part of the program, for by having them as a part of the act you are more apt to get greater cooperation in your safety program and in carrying out the company's policy. Minutes of the various meetings held by this committee at each operation should be sent to your top safety man so he can analyze them and feel the pulse of the safety program at the particular operation.

(g) Last, but not least, follow-up must be made at the local plant level by the head of safety for the company, or his assistant, on a periodic basis to see that the safety policy and the general safety rules of the company are being complied with and to give whatever help he can on all matters pertaining to safety.

Then, too, where you have multi-plant operations it is advisable to get all of your safety men together on an annual basis to talk over their various problems, and this affords the top safety man the opportunity to review the various policies, introduce new programs, discuss the results of his plant inspections, etc.

Stuffing: Now you have heard two different answers to this question from two highly successful safety engineers who work for vastly different types of industry. Undoubtedly there are other opinions on this question, but in the interest of saving time, let's proceed to the second question.

Question 2: What minimum field data is needed to conduct a multi-plant accident prevention program from an Accident Prevention Director's point of view, as distinguished from an Accident Prevention Supervisor of a division who may have multi-plant operations?

Harvey: I'd like to tell you at the beginning that our policy on safety in the company is written into a manual that goes to all locations, called our Safety Program Guide. We ask our people at all locations —they are full-time safety engineers at all assembly and manufacturing plants, but even in a parts depot somebody is responsible for safety—to follow the instructions given in Section 200 of the Guide. In general, we insist on enough data coming in through standard forms which we supply so that we can follow all of the requirements in the two American Standards Association codes in compiling work injury experience.

This doesn't constitute an endorsement of those codes—I think they should be rewritten. There are lots of things wrong with them. But as long as they exist, that's what we have to follow in order to get industry-wide comparison. There is one addition—that is, that in a fatal, critical or serious injury we insist on immediate notification so that we can take whatever action we deem necessary from a staff standpoint.

Beyond that, we ask all of our locations to compile all sorts of statistics. We want them to compile them, but all that we need in this area is that they let us know what they are compiling. We may have a branch that compiles statistics on cable life and breakage; non-injury accidents. That's fine; we may want to pass it on to other plants if we agree with it; but our basic statistics are simply the necessary reports to compile our frequency, severity and causes under the ASA Code.

De Reamer: Concerning how much data is needed by a corporate safety manager or director to conduct a multi-plant safety program varies from one end of the pole to the other. I don't think we particularly need any.

I've advocated for a long time that a safety program has to be run following the same basic management principles that we apply to any other function of the business. And one of the principles of management that certainly applies to safety is the principle which states that a staff function is in place to perform a service to operating management.

It has the authority of facts well marshalled rather than the power to command or direct. A staff function teaches; it advises and appraises. Frankly, about the only information that we insist upon from operating plants is that if any one of our operating plants discovers an unsafe condition, an unsafe act, unsafe material or unsafe procedure that they feel might exist in another plant or in another division, then they communicate such information to the corporate staff. We in turn can decide whether or not other divisions in the company need to be told about it. Now, how about accident statistics?

Again, we are performing a staff function. The only accident statistics that we want are accident statistics that operating managers ask us for. But it is a staff job to educate them as to what they need. And I mean that very frankly . . . at IBM we are in the process of trying to decide what kind of accident statistics our general man-