PLANT MANAGER'S SAFETY BOARD MEETING
MINUTES
October 19, 1977

SC 14111

Present:

G. W. Bostick
P. E. Brubaker
G. A. Danner
G. W. Daues
J. B. Cook (for Fuller)
J. A. Glass
M. L. Owens (for Lane)
R. Medina (for Martini)
C. M. McCullough
D. W. Metten
R. Hernandez (for Ryan)
R. L. Stuart
J. G. Trafton

1. REVIEW OF STATISTICS -- GLASS

TEXAS CITY SAFETY PERFORMANCE SUMMARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1977

		1977	1976
Year-to-Date through July	TIF	84.6	93.1
	SIF	3.0	7.1
Year-to-Date through August	TIF	86.7	95.8
	SIF	6.1	7.1
Year-to-Date through September	TIF	87.1	95.7
	SIF	5.9	6.7

Through September:

24 recordable cases this year as follows:
15 classified serious
21 medical treatment only
7 lost workday cases (limited duty)
4 days away from work case (lost time)
1 fatality

	1977	1976	YTD SEPT 1977 MCIC
TRR - Total Recordable Case Rate	2.26	3.70	5.82
TLWR - Total Lost Workday Case	.55	1.09	1.10
DAWR - Days Away from Work Case Rate	.31	0	0.33

TLWR Target: 1.45 (1/2 Chem. Ind. Average)

2. REPORT OF SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SAC) -- G. W. Daues

a. Emergency Communication System

The Safety Advisory Committee reviewed several proposals for back-up systems for emergency communications. The PMSB approved the principal of installing two back-up radio network consoles. One would be redundant for the radio networks currently wired into the emergency control center and would be installed in the EPP

room. The other would be remotely installed in the west gate house or in the main gate house. The plant manager called for a MA decision analysis of this proposal. Greg Daues will appoint a task force for this analysis.

b. Super-hazardous Materials

The recommendations from the report of the recent fatality were reviewed by SAC. The committee proposed an outline of the key elements of a proposed procedure for handling super-hazardous material including the definition and proposals for breaking connections, sampling and handling of toxic materials. A task force under the chairmanship of Jack Trafton will develop a more detailed and comprehensive P-Bulletin for handling super-hazardous materials.

c. Open Area Permits

Revisions to P-0119 procedure for open area permits were made to clarify and improve the approved system. The revised procedure will be previewed with the PMSB and, if approved, will be reissued.

d. Ground Fault Protection

A task force to study and make recommendations to overcome problems involving electrical ground faults has been formed with Mike McCullough as chairman.

e. Vehicle Control - Bicycle

The need for a P-Bulletin on the use and storage of bicycles in the plant was questioned since most important rules concerning bicycles are already in the Plant Safety Guide.

f. Guards for Smooth Rotating Shafts

Different views on the need for guarding smooth rotating shafts were presented to SAC by the Loss Prevention Department and the Engineering Department. The issue could not be resolved at this meeting and additional information from S&PP and other Monsanto locations was requested.

g. Lockout Lock Color Coding

The idea of color coding lockout locks to make identification of those crafts and operations involved in the lockout was approved by the Board.

3. REPORT OF SAFETY HOUSEKEEPING AND ACTION COMMITTEE -- R. L. Stuart

At a special meeting Friday, October 14, implementation plans for the new safety program were presented by SHAC. A special committee was set up by Phil Brubaker to deal with unresolved questions. The committee included P. E. Brubaker, W. Juhl (W. Lane), D. Metten, J. Clark, A. Glass, and R. Stuart. The committee met at 3:00 p.m. Resolutions to the questions raised follow:

(a) Involvement of non-exempts - All non-exempt personnel will receive the basic plant rule training. Only the safety inspectors will participate in the STOP program initially.

(b) Involvement of office and staff exempt personnel:

Accounting - Only D. Metten will participate in STOP. All other exempts will receive plant safety rule training.

Personnel - All exempts will participate in STOP program except N. Wilbanks.

Purchasing/Stores - L. Miller and J. Richards will participate in STOP. Other exempts are to receive plant safety rule training.

Marketing - Exempt personnel will receive plant safety rule training.- no STOP participation.

Distribution - All exempts will participate in STOP except P. Trost's group, W. Delaney and W. T. Anderson. These exempts will receive plant safety rule training.

MISD - Only G. Bostick will participate in STOP, all other exempts will receive plant safety rule training.

(c) Involvement of CED/Capital Projects exempt - all exempt personnel will participate in STOP program with emphasis on contractors' unsafe acts.

(d) Involvement of PT exempt personnel - all PT exempts will participate in STOP program.

(e) Non-exempt and hourly notification - announcement of program will be through the administrators organization. J. Clark will notify Union Hall prior to STOP kick off.

(f) Plantwide data reporting system - initially no plantwide data collection and reporting system will be used. Method of reporting will be up to the individual administrator's line of supervision. The administrator will be the highest level that cards will travel; administrators will swap cards to allow each administrator to review cards from his own area.

(g) Coordinator - W. Fuller was appointed coordinator of the STOP program by P. Brubaker. The coordinator will oversee the total program.

(h) Schedule - implementation should move as quickly as is reasonably possible. Flexibility should be a part of the schedule. The schedule proposed by SHAC will be reviewed and adjusted as necessary to insure program success.

(i) Chiefs/Leadmen - chiefs and leadmen will not be included at this time. Plans will be developed after the initial STOP program is underway to involve chiefs, leadmen and all hourly personnel. Further involvement of non-exempt personnel will be reviewed at a later date as well.

4. REVIEW OF INCIDENTS

a. 9/9 Pruitt carpenter injured in fall (phenol tank job) Cause: Lack of control of backing truck.

b. 9/15 Dept. 53 operator sprained right knee when he slipped in distillation area. Cause: Foot slipped on curb.

c. 9/20 Pumper gauger received chemical burn while transferring acetic acid. Cause: Jury rigging transfer lines.

d. 9/21 Truck driver received chemical burn when H_2SO_4 from Dept. 19 dripped on him. Cause: Internal corrosion of acid line since several patches had been installed on this line. It was necessary to replace a section of it. Cause of incident: Acid corrosion. The line will require more frequent inspections.

e. 9/21 Younger Brothers' acetic acid tank truck spill. Cause: Leaking valve will require carrier to supply better equipment system set-up for easier detection of leaking equipment.

f. 9/26 Electrical power failure. Cause: Sudden reaction of contract electricians to loud noise in area. New plans are being developed to provide trained Monsanto electricians for work in critical areas.

g. 9/27 Boilermaker cut by electrical conduit. Cause: A section of conduit was dropped from pipe rack. It should have been tied off and lowered to the ground level.

h. 9/27 13P15 fire. Cause: Pump seal failure.

i. 9/29 Pipefitter injured in bicycle accident at railroad track north of Dept. 44. Cause: Inattention of injuried--violation of posted bicycle rules for the area.

j. 10/6 Pipefitter's eye injured by blowing rust particle. Cause: Failure to wear protective equipment. There will be a goggle requirement in the future.

k. 10/9 Powder spill in HDPE. Cause: Failure of coupling bolts. Clamps will be installed and more frequent inspections of the connections will be made.

l. 10/12 Ironworker's arm cut when hydroblast hose broke in tube. Cause: Incorrect adaptor used to connect mole with flexible hose.-- threads stripped out. Corrective action included double checking of connections prior to use.

m. 10/14 Explosion in Dept. 33 incinerator. Cause: Fuel present when relighting. Detailed investigation is in progress.

n. 10/14 Organic spill in Dept. 13. Cause: Operator error. 500 gallons of alkylated liquor was spilled into the construction ditch. An opened valve allowed process liquid to flow into an unheaded exchanger.

o. 10/17 Morrison Construction worker fall (N-68). Cause: Unsafe act of worker walking a pipe over a ditch. He slipped and fell into the ditch and, luckily, landed on a soft pad of mud. Corrective action: Avoid this type of exposure unless wearing a safety harness.

NEAR MISSES

9/19 Chemical burns to three non-Monsanto men at Dock 1. Cause: Drain valve left open -- allowed acrylonitrile into the sump. Torrential rain overflowed the sump. Safety action prevented extensive chemical burns which could have resulted. Corrective actions include proposed revisions on docks, improved drainage systems, control of non-Monsanto personnel in and around the docks -- review of the incident with the pumper gaugers.

9/26 Sight glass gasket failure on acetic acid high temperature slipstream test reactor (Dept. 50). Cause: Error in gasket installation. Corrective action: Repair and install a cover on the sight glass, checking of the fittings in this unit and review of the test unit for potential problems.

10/6 ACY found in nitrogen hose in Dept. 29. Cause: Incorrect line up of process by-pass valve. A detailed managerial analytics review of this deviation was held and a report issued.

5. OTHER ITEMS

The Safety and Property Protection Survey by Tom W. Lawrence will be the week of November 14, 1977.

SC 14115 J. A. Glass

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