

Region 6 - Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Division
INSPECTION REPORT

Inspection Date(s):	06/05/2023	
Media Program:	Water	
Regulatory Program(s)	AWIA/SDWA	
Facility Name:	Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System	
Facility Physical Location:	5306 N Arkansas Ave	
(city, state, zip code)	Russellville, AR 72802	
Mailing address:	P.O. Box 4030	
(city, state, zip code)	Russellville, Arkansas 72811	
County/Parish:	Pope County	
Facility Phone Number	479-968-6268	
Facility Contact:	John Choate	System Manager
	jchoate@tcrw.org	
FRS Number:	N/A	
Identification/Permit Number:	AR0000782	
Media Identifier Number:	N/A	
NAICS:	N/A	
SIC:	N/A	
Personnel participating in inspection:		
John Choate	Tri-County Water	System Manager
Danny O'Connell	PG Environmental	EPA Contract Inspector
Jake Okun	PG Environmental	EPA Contract Inspector
Thomas Johnson	Arkansas Department of Health	District Engineer
EPA Lead Inspector: Danny O'Connell		
Signature/Date	Danny O'Connell	Date: 7/26/2023

Section I – INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTION

On June 5, 2023, U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 6 contract inspectors from PG Environmental (hereinafter, the EPA Inspection Team) conducted an announced American Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) Risk and Resiliency Assessment (RRA) and Emergency Response Plan (ERP) program/document inspection of the Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System (System), ID No. AR0000782. The inspection process began at approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 5, 2023, and finished at approximately 3:30 p.m. Thomas Johnson, a district engineer from the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH), was also present for the inspection.

Danny O’Connell and Jake Okun of PG Environmental presented their SDWA inspector credentials to the System representative upon arrival. They informed him that this was an inspection to observe compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Section 1433(a) and (b), which requires community water systems that serve more than 3,300 people to complete a RRA and develop an ERP. To facilitate the inspection process, a checklist outlining the requirements of SDWA Section 1433(a) and (b) was used during the document review (refer to Appendix 1, Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Sections 1433(a) and (b) Checklist). The EPA Inspection Team met with John Choate, the System Manager, for the opening conference.

As a component of the RRA and ERP document review, the following field assets were also observed:

Pump Stations:

- Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station
- Central Pope Pump Station
- High Service Pump Station (finished water, at Hector Water Treatment Plant (WTP))

Finished Water Storage Tanks:

- Gum Log Storage Tanks (2)
- Clearwell Tank #1 (at Hector WTP)

Surface Water Treatment Plant:

- Hector WTP (0.72 million gallons per day (MGD))

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System both treats and purchases water for distribution and serves a population of approximately 21,250. The Hector WTP is the System’s surface water plant. The WTP is operated by two operators and supported by a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Treatment includes raw water pumping from an intake in the Illinois Bayou, followed by sodium permanganate and caustic soda injection, flocculation, clarification, filtration, and finally sodium hypochlorite and hydrofluorosilicic acid (fluoride) injection.

The System has the ability to purchase water from Russellville Waterworks and Atkins Waterworks. The System also has three consecutive systems, including Dover, East Johnson County, and Dardanelle. Tri-County generally only does the billing for Dardanelle rather than selling them water, but Dardanelle has purchased water from Tri-County in the past during major flood events (as was the case in 2019). The distribution system includes 21 storage tanks and 22 pumping facilities.

ASSET WALKTHROUGH

As a component of the RRA and ERP document review, several assets were observed to cross-reference the information listed in the documents with what was actually being implemented in the field. First, the Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station was observed. The exterior of the pump station was surrounded by a locked and posted security fence topped with barbed wire. There were four variable frequency drive (VFD) pumps inside the pump station. Two of the pumps were redundant, and one of the redundant pumps was being serviced. The station was equipped with a backup generator. The pumps were wired to communicate with the System's SCADA system, enabling WTP representatives to monitor and track pump activity (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 3](#)). The SCADA control cabinet was located in a separately air conditioned room to protect the instrumentation from over-heating.

Following the Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station, the EPA Inspection Team observed the two, 256,000-gallon Gum Log storage tanks, and the Central Pope Pump Station (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 4](#)). These assets were contained within the same posted security fence which was locked and contained barbed wire. Both tanks contained overflow pipes that were covered with 24-inch mesh and emptied onto splash pads (refer to [Appendix 2, Photographs 6 and 7](#)). WTP representatives stated that the interior and exterior of the tanks were routinely inspected and painted as needed. At the time of the inspection, the tanks had been recently sandblasted for resurfacing.

The Central Pope Pump Station contained a backup generator which was capable of providing power to the pump station in the event of an outage (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 8](#)). The four VFD pumps (two of the pumps were redundant) that were present within the pump station were wired to communicate with the System's SCADA system, enabling WTP representatives to monitor and track pump activity (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 9](#)).

Lastly, the Hector WTP was observed, starting with the intake within the Illinois Bayou (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 10](#)). The land surrounding the intake was purchased by the System, creating an additional layer of security and source protection. The area surrounding the WTP was protected by a locked security fence topped with barbed wire (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 11](#)). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
chemical storage and day tanks for caustic soda, sodium hypochlorite, and coagulant were observed within secondary containment (refer to [Appendix 2, Photographs 13 and 14](#)).

The three WTP treatment trains were observed. Each train included a flocculator, a clarifier, and a filter. The water level in the tank containing Train #2 was approximately two inches below the top of the tank when the EPA Inspection Team arrived. WTP representatives stated that the water level was higher than normal (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 15](#)). A filter backwash, including an air scour was observed as a component of the inspection (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 17](#)).

The fluoride injection point and a finished water storage tank (Clearwell #1, 354,187 gallons) were observed outside of the Hector WTP (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 18](#)). Finally, the High Service Pump Station, consisting of four VFD pumps (two of the pumps were redundant) to send finished water into the distribution system was observed (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 20](#)).

SYSTEM SECURITY AND MONITORING

The System utilizes a SCADA system to monitor and track trends in the distribution system, including water usage and pressures. Computer access to the SCADA system is restricted to authorized users only,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition to monitoring assets remotely through SCADA, operators conduct daily rounds of the various assets and complete daily monitoring reports.

When employees are terminated or quit, they are required to return all company property. This includes photo IDs, keys, access codes, and any other security related items. Storage tanks and pump stations are surrounded by locked perimeter fences and barbed wire to prevent trespassing.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Chemicals

used in the treatment process are stored in a secured location.

RRA AND ERP GENERATION

The System purchased a software titled "SEMS Technologies" (now part of Cartograph) from Arkansas Rural Water Association (ARWA) to complete their RRA and ERP. The software contains RRA and ERP templates that are designed to be compliant with SDWA 1433(a) and (b). The System also consulted with ARWA to complete their RRA and ERP documents.

RISK AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXAMPLES

As a component of the RRA and ERP document review, and to provide an example of emergency response and risk assessment, the EPA Inspection Team asked System representatives to describe their

response to three specific challenges that many/all of the systems in Arkansas have faced within the last few years:

The “deep freeze” event of February 2021 which impacted much of the American south and southeast region. During this event, temperatures were below freezing for a prolonged period of time causing water related infrastructure to freeze. Tri-County System representatives stated that they responded to the freeze by shutting off several meters in the distribution system to prevent lines from freezing. However, this response was not formally documented anywhere and there were no standard operating procedures (SOPs) generated to document how an event like this should be responded to in the future.

Tornados, which are a common occurrence in Arkansas. Tri-County had no formal plans or SOPs written to respond to a tornado. However, tornados were the only threat to System assets described in the ERP document. They were listed as a “Moderate, Tier 3” threat.

The transfer of knowledge from experienced System representatives to new staff members after experienced staff members are no longer employed by the System. Tri-County representatives stated that operational knowledge was not formally written down anywhere in the form of SOPs. Therefore, institutional operator knowledge was relied on for operating the System, leaving it vulnerable if an experienced operator were to no longer be employed by the System for any reason.

Section II - OBSERVATIONS

The following observations pertain to the SDWA Section 1433(a), Risk and Resilience Assessments.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(i), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include an assessment of the risk to the system from malevolent acts and natural hazards.”

Observation 1. During a review of the System’s RRA document, the EPA Inspection Team observed that the assessment of the risk to the system and its various assets from malevolent acts and natural hazards was incomplete. The only threat that was listed to the System’s critical assets was a tornado threat, and the threat was listed as a “Moderate, Tier 3” threat. No assets were listed as “high” or “very high” risk. The only assets that were listed in the RRA document were the Hector WTP and the main office. Both assets that were listed were categorized as “low priority.” Distribution system assets were not included.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(ii), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include the resilience of the pipes and constructed conveyances, physical barriers, source water, water collection and intake, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution facilities, electronic, computer, or other automated systems (including the security of such systems) which are utilized by the system.”

Observation 2. The resilience and security of individual assets such as pipes, intakes, distribution facilities, and storage facilities were not discussed in the RRA. Rather, the overall risk to the Hector WTP was discussed in general terms in the RRA document. Additionally, the security measures for the various assets were not included in the RRA. WTP representatives stated that the assets were patrolled and inspected daily, and

customers were encouraged to call to report suspicious activity. They also stated that assets were protected by physical barriers such as locked security fences with barbed wire.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(iii), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include an assessment of the monitoring practices of the system.”

Observation 3. The RRA document stated that the system is “monitored per ADH requirements,” but did not elaborate further. WTP representatives stated that treatment processes were monitored through the SCADA system, and that operators conducted daily inspections of the various treatment units. They also stated that community members were encouraged to report any suspicious activity observed at the assets.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(iv), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include an assessment of the financial infrastructure of the system.”

Observation 4. A generic financial consequence scale was observed within the RRA, and it displayed the financial impact of possible threats to the system. It appeared that the scale was universal to the SEMS software template. However, the financial impact of threats to specific assets and infrastructure in the Tri-County system were not discussed in the RRA document.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(v), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include an assessment of the use, storage, or handling of various chemicals by the system.”

Observation 5. Hypochlorite delivery was outlined in the RRA, but storage was not discussed. WTP representatives stated that hypochlorite was stored securely [REDACTED] but the details of chemical storage were not included in the RRA document.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(a)(1)(A)(vi), states that “Risk and resilience assessments shall include an assessment of the operation and maintenance of the system.”

Observation 6. The RRA did not include discussion of threat impact to WTP operation and maintenance (O&M). WTP representatives stated that they did not have any formal O&M documents. The RRA stated there was an O&M manual that “had not yet been completed” at the time that the document was written. WTP representatives indicated that the O&M manual had still not been completed at the time of the inspection, and that operators relied on their institutional knowledge to operate the treatment systems rather than on written procedures such as SOPs.

The following observations pertain to the SDWA Section 1433(b), Emergency Response Plan.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(b)(4), states that “The emergency response plan shall include strategies that can be used to aid in the detection of malevolent acts or natural hazards that threaten the security or resilience of the system.”

Observation 7. WTP representatives stated that daily inspections are conducted to help detect threats to the treatment system. Operators are asked to report any suspicious activity;

however, this procedure is not outlined in the ERP. The ERP does outline a damage assessment procedure to determine whether damage that has already occurred was malevolent, but this procedure does not support the detection/prevention of malevolent threats.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(b)(3), states that “The emergency response plan shall include actions, procedures, and equipment which can obviate or significantly lessen the impact of a malevolent act or natural hazard on the public health and the safety and supply of drinking water provided to communities and individuals, including the development of alternative source water options, relocation of water intakes, and construction of flood protection barriers.”

Observation 8. The ERP document indicates that there is no alternative water source in the event that a threat to their water quality occurs. However, WTP representatives stated that this was inaccurate. They stated that they could purchase water from their purchase connections (Russellville Waterworks and Atkins Waterworks) if their treated water became compromised.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(b)(2), states that “The emergency response plan shall include plans and procedures that can be implemented, and identification of equipment that can be utilized, in the event of a malevolent act or natural hazard that threatens the ability of the community water system to deliver safe drinking water.”

Observation 9. Plans, procedures, and the identification of equipment that can be utilized in response to a malevolent act or natural hazard that threatens the ability of the System to deliver safe drinking water were not developed in the ERP.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(c), Coordination, states that “Community water systems shall, to the extent possible, coordinate with existing local emergency planning committees established pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq.) when preparing or revising an assessment or emergency response plan under this section.”

Observation 10. The emergency coordination section of the ERP document stated that the System would coordinate with Pope County sheriff’s office in the event of an emergency, but the section was lacking any additional detail describing the protocol.

The Safe Drinking Water Act, Section 1433(b)(1), states that “The emergency response plan shall include strategies and resources to improve the resilience of the system, including the physical security and cybersecurity of the system.”

Observation 11. Details regarding the System’s cybersecurity resilience measures were not discussed in the ERP document [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] They also stated that when an employee was terminated, their access to the System’s network was disabled. In terms of physical security, WTP representatives stated that daily checks were conducted of the various assets throughout the treatment system. Community members are also encouraged to report suspicious activities. During the

field component of the review, the EPA Inspection Team observed locked perimeter fences with barbed wire around the assets that were visited.

The following observations pertain to the field assets that were observed during the walkthrough component of the review.

Observation 12. [REDACTED]

Observation 13. There were multiple threaded hose taps within the Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station without backflow prevention (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 2](#)).

Observation 14. Erosion was visible around the concrete splash pad beneath the overflow line at one of the Gum Log Storage Tanks (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 4](#)). Additionally, sandblasting media from the last time the tanks were resurfaced was visible on the ground surrounding the Gum Log Storage Tanks.

Observation 15. [REDACTED]

Observation 16. When the EPA Inspection Team arrived at the Hector WTP, there was no label on the coagulant tank (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 13](#)). WTP representatives stated that the tank was new, and the label had not been added yet. When WTP representatives became aware of this, a label was added. Additionally, the caustic soda tank was on cinderblocks, and therefore was elevated above the secondary containment wall that it was surrounded by (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 14](#)).

Observation 17. The water level in the tank containing Train #2 at the Hector WTP was approximately two inches below the top of the tank when the EPA Inspection Team arrived (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 15](#)). WTP representatives attributed this to a malfunction with the tank's level indicator. Due to the high-water level, water was overflowing into the backwash basin, which is ordinarily used to transport filter backwash product to an onsite backwash pond (refer to [Appendix 2, Photographs 11 and 16](#)). While the EPA Inspection Team was onsite, an operator was able to reset the level indicator, and the water level in the tank returned to normal.

Observation 18. The flapper at the end of the overflow pipe of the Clearwell #1 storage tank had fallen off and was laying on the ground (refer to [Appendix 2, Photograph 19](#)). In addition, there was no mesh protecting the overflow line from insect intrusion.

Section IV – CLOSING CONFERENCE

On June 5, 2023, the EPA Inspection Team met with the System Manager for a closing conference at approximately 3:00 p.m. Danny O'Connell and Jake Okun reviewed observations with the System representatives and explained that all observations were preliminary and did not constitute any formal compliance determination.

Section V – FOLLOW UP

No additional information was received by EPA after the conclusion of the review on June 5, 2023.

Section VI – LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Sections 1433(a) and (b) Checklist

Appendix 2 – Photograph Log

Appendix 2

Photograph Log




UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 1

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas






UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 2

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 2. Threaded Hose Tap, Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station View of a threaded hose tap without backflow prevention extending off of the pump line within the Gum Log (Center Valley) Pump Station.




UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 3

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas





UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 4

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 4. Gum Log Storage Tank View of one of the two, 256,000-gallon Gum Log storage tanks. In this image, erosion can be seen beneath the overflow line, and black sandblasting media from the resurfacing of the tank can also be observed.




UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 5

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas





UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 6

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 6. Splash Pad, Gum Log Storage Tank View of the splash pad beneath the overflow line at one of the Gum Log Storage Tanks. The second tank contained a splash pad that was similar to this one.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 7

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas




Photograph 7. Overflow Line, Gum Log Storage Tank View the end of the overflow line at one of the Gum Log Storage Tanks. The opening was covered by a 24-inch mesh screen, as well as an additional coarse screen. The second tank contained an overflow line and a screen that was similar to this one.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Photograph Log

Photo No. 8

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas






UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Photograph Log

Photo No. 9

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas





UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 10

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 10. Pump Structure, Hector WTP Intake View of the pump structure at the intake for the Hector WTP. The intake is located in the Illinois Bayou. Tri-County owns the land surrounding the intake, which is a protection barrier for the surface water quality and an extra layer of security for the water plant intake structure.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 11

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 11. Perimeter Fence, Hector WTP View of the locked perimeter fence with barbed wire that surrounds the Hector WTP property. Also pictured is the pond that filter backwash product is sent to.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Photograph Log

Photo No. 12

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 12. Raw Water Chemical Feed Building, Hector WTP View of the inside of the raw water chemical feed building [REDACTED]



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Photograph Log

Photo No. 13

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 13. Coagulant Tank, [REDACTED] View of the Coagulant storage and day tanks [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The coagulant tank did not have a label when the EPA Inspection Team arrived onsite, but a label was placed on the tank once operators became aware of this.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Photograph Log

Photo No. 14

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 14. Sodium Hypochlorite and Caustic Soda Storage Tanks, [REDACTED] View of the sodium hypochlorite and caustic soda storage tanks and the sodium hypochlorite day tank [REDACTED]



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 15

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 15. Treatment Train #2 Tank, Hector WTP View of the Train #2 treatment tank at the Hector WTP. When the EPA Inspection Team arrived, the water level was approximately two inches below the edge of the tank. Once operators reset the level sensor, the water level lowered.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 16

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 16. Treatment Train #2 Tank, Hector WTP View of the water overflowing into the backwash basin due to a high water level in the tank.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 17

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 17. Filter Backwash, Hector WTP View of the air scour that took place during the filter backwash in treatment Train #2.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 18

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



**Clearwell Tank
#1**

Photograph 18. Clearwell Tank #1, Hector WTP View of Clearwell Tank #1 at the Hector WTP, where finished water is stored prior to distribution.




UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 19

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 19. Clearwell #1 Storage Tank Flapper Valve View of the Clearwell #1 storage tank flapper valve at the end of the overflow line. The flapper valve was on the ground and in a state of disrepair. No screen was observed on the overflow line.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Photograph Log

Photo No. 20

Location: Tri-County Regional Water Distribution District Public Water System		
City: Russellville	County/Parish: Pope	State: Arkansas



Photograph 20. High Service Pump Station, Hector WTP View of the four VFD pumps at the HS Pump Station. This pump station delivers finished water to the distribution system following treatment at the Hector WTP.