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Subject: notes on WW1

This isn't finished, but I'm not sure if I'll get the chance to finish this so I'm sending this to you now.

Some say Trump's election was the biggest intelligence coup of all time, but I think something bigger was going on in World War I:

<https://pastebin.com/GrSveXXw>

<https://ia800104.us.archive.org/24/items/ww1-bibliography/ww1-bibliography.html>

https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.276141/2015.276141.Three-Who_djvu.txt

Though less ruthless and thorough in the suppression of opponents, and enormously less numerous than the GPU to which we have become accustomed, the Okhrana was second to no other secret political police of its day. Where peasant risings and mutinies gave it the pretext, it proclaimed martial law and used gallows and firing squad. In other provinces, it made use of the power of administrative deportation without trial, up to a maximum of five years in Siberia. But a roster of millions of prisoners in concentration camps would have seemed an incredible nightmare to this little band of routine-incrusted police officials. According to the testimony of its chief, Vasiliev, at the height of its power it never had more than one thousand secret agents in all Russia, nor more than one hundred in the capital. He complains that he had "very few" operatives abroad and, every time a congress was held in foreign parts, had to further debilitate his Moscow and Petersburg forces by sending some of his best agents.

But, with its years of political experience, the Okhrana sensed earlier than Lenin the nature of the new political situation, and prepared, too, to "go underground" once more. With forces that seem numerically so modest today, it now developed a system of espionage that eclipsed even the Zubatov and Gapon experiments. If, at every stage of our story so far we have found a police agent in the midst of each fairly numerous gathering, now we shall find them penetrating into the topmost secret hierarchies of the Social Revolutionary

Party and the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party.

<https://books.google.com/books?id=6BAWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA209>

Upon assuming the directorship of Fontanka, Beletskii ordered a massive penetration of Russian society by his field bureaus especially among the peasantry, railway workers, high school students and Russia's military and naval forces 'without delay' ...Like Plehve, he wished no nook nor cranny of possible dissent to escape his attention. However, Beletskii was not satisfied with simply spying on society, he wanted to control it as well. The relationship between public opinion (the Duma and the press) and the workers' movement became the focus of Beletskii's experiment in social control.

...Fontanka devised a strategy to manipulate the Bolshevik movement into disrupting moderate social democracy. Bolshevism by its very nature offered the perfect vehicle for this strategy. Historians have noted that the decision to adopt this strategy was a grossly ill-considered one. After all what did Beletskii and the Special Section accomplish? As Laura Engelstein and Victoria Bonnell (among others) have pointed out, Fontanka's strategy ensured the demise of moderate social democracy in Russia by producing frustration and anger amongst young workers, the potential leaders of their class. Beletskii's strategy drove these young men and women into the arms of the radical intelligentsia, who promised that by rejecting moderation in favour of extremism the workers would attain the economic and political goals they so desired. The end result contributed, therefore, to placing Lenin and his Bolsheviks at the forefront of the labour movement.

<https://books.google.com/books?id=V3IeAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA418&lpg=PA418>

New Lights on the Russian Revolution

June 14, 1919

...Mr. Spargo traces the intricate history of the Russian revolutionary parties and shows how the Socialists in 1902 slit in two, the majority (Bolsheviki) following Lenin, and the minority (Mensheviki) following Plechanov. At first the Bolsheviks were nursed by the Czar, later by the Kaiser. The most violent of the Bolshevik leaders in the Duma, Malinovsky, a close friend of Lenin, turned out to be a police spy and provocateur, and his fiery speeches attacking the Government and the bourgeoisie were written for him by Beletzky of the Police Department.

...The charge that the Bolshevik movement was secretly encouraged by the Russian Government before the war is confirmed by Serge Persky in the latest volume of his journalistic articles, From Nicholas II to Lenin. He has a photograph of notes of a speech delivered by Malinovsky in the Duma which had been OK'd and annotated by the Minister Maarof. Pravda ("Truth"), the official organ of the Bolsheviks, was subsidized by the Okhrana (secret police), and Lenin himself in 1910 or 1911 had relations with them. When this was exposed Lenin defended himself in the same fashion as when charged with receiving German aid:

"It was not the Okhrana that made use of us but on the contrary we that made use of the Okhrana. Without doubt the Okhrana has rendered great services to our party without ever obtaining anything from us."

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/jun/29b.htm>

V. I. Lenin

Prophetic Words

...Travail may be light or severe. Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific socialism, always said that the transition from capitalism to socialism would be inevitably accompanied by prolonged birth pangs.

...Clearly realising this, Engels speaks with great caution of socialism being brought to birth by a capitalist society which is perishing in a world war. "Only one result [of a world war]," he says, "is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the establishment of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class."

...". . . At the end of the tragedy you (the capitalists and landowners, the kings and statesmen of the bourgeoisie) will be ruined and the victory of the proletariat will either be already achieved or at any rate inevitable."

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/aug/28.htm>

Vladimir Lenin

...The Russian revolution has shown that the war is inevitably leading to the disintegration of capitalist society in general, that it is being converted into a war of the working people against the exploiters. Therein lies the significance of the Russian revolution.

<https://archive.org/details/fallofthedynasti012755mbp>

... To neutralize the chronic protest of French Socialists and Liberals against its operations on French soil, the Okhrana bribed French newspapers and journalists of the right who were willing to follow a pro-Russian line. According to an exposé of the Okhrana written in 1919 by one of its former senior officials, V. K. Agafonov, it financed a journalists' club in Paris and paid regular subsidies to several important French newspapers, including the *Echo de Paris*, the *Gaulois*, and the *Figaro*. The last-named organ, according to Agafonov, for a while received 24,000 rubles—about \$10,000—monthly from the Okhrana.

When Izvolsky took over the Russian Embassy in Paris he promoted an arrangement with the French government for influencing French opinion that was more official, but hardly less conspiratorial, than the crude undercover operations of the Okhrana: the Russians would open a special credit, drawn upon the Czar's secret funds, for the French government, which would then undertake to buy up the consciences—and the pens—of its own journalists in behalf of joint objectives. A letter sent by the Russian Prime Minister in October 1912 to his French opposite number—at that time Poincaré—pointed out one of the advantages of the proposed system: It would help keep within bounds "certain appetites and certain rivalries" in the French press which the Russians had learned from bitter experience were apt to be stirred up when they approached foreign journalists directly.

There was another advantage that the Russian communication did not spell out but which Poincaré may have been able to read between the lines. Izvolsky looked upon the dry, little Lorrainer, with his implacable irredentism, as the heaven-sent instrument of Russian foreign policy in France—"If Poincaré were defeated it would be a catastrophe for us," he warned St. Petersburg before the French presidential elections of 1913—and one of the secret objectives of the press campaign that Russia was proposing to finance was to combat the "pacifist"—we would say today "appeasement"—and therefore anti-Poincaré, elements in French public life. "Do not forget," Izvolsky once wrote his nominal chief in St. Petersburg, "that Poincaré has to struggle with very influential elements in his own party which are generally hostile to Russia and openly preach that France must not be dragged into any war arising out of Balkan affairs."

<https://archive.org/details/fallofthedynasti012755mbp>

...For a long time, not only the Russian military attache but the Ambassador, Hartwig, were in intimate contact with Apis. There is no suggestion that he personally pocketed any Russian funds, but the Russians looked upon him as their particular friend, if not quite their agent, and quite naturally tried to build him up in influence.

...Artamonov, the military attache, continued, however, to see his Serbian colleague and friend nearly every day. It was natural enough: they were conducting a joint secret-service operation across the nearby Austrian border, with the help of a chain of Serbian customs inspectors and frontier guards who had been recruited as secret operatives of Apis. Artamonov's contribution to the operation had been to furnish some \$1600--an impressive sum by contemporary Balkan standards--toward financing the clandestine network that Apis was setting up on Austro-Hungarian soil, particularly in Bosnia.

The deepest unresolved mystery of Sarajevo is the degree of direct Russian guilt in the assassination. Did Hartwig, the Russian minister, or Artamanov, his military attache, know in advance what Apis was plotting? Albertini demonstrates convincingly that it is most unlikely Hartwig was informed of the murder plot. Artamanov is another story a very queer and confused stoic. There is some testimony that he not only knew Apis was organizing the assassination, but that he asked St. Petersburg for approval and got it.

...There may be one man still alive who knows the whole story; the Russian assistant military attaché, Captain Alexander Werchovski, who replaced Artamanov during his absence. A friend of Werchovski, a Polish nobleman named Louis de Trydar-Burzynski, stated in his memoirs, published in Italy in 1926, that "the assassination [at Sarajevo] was perpetrated with the support of the Russian military attaché at Belgrade, Captain Werchovski..." Werchovski, he continued, "was later War Minister in the Kerensky government; he was a young man whom I had known very well for years, and he told me quite frankly the truth about the origins, preparations and execution of the plot." Unfortunately, Werchovski, if he is living today, is not likely to tell any more about the case; when last heard of, he held a high command in the Red Army—a curious detail in itself.

This is a work in progress, but I've found this:

- The Tsarist secret police infiltrated revolutionary organizations, the press, and governments not only in Russia but around the world. France is the most well documented--there, Okhrana agents like Rachkovsky ingratiated themselves with French Leadership and secured the French-Russian military alliance that made World War I possible. The Okhrana also had an extensive operation to buy off journalists in the French press, who helped keep President Poincare in power with his knowledge and support. Elements in the Russian government saw Poincare as reliable should Russia get involved in a war arising from "Balkan affairs."
- The Okhrana had infiltrated the Bolsheviks to the point where the Okhrana felt they could control them and ordinary revolutionaries were constantly paranoid. Multiple members of Lenin's "inner circle" were Okhrana agents, and Lenin would act to defend them from charges of their duplicity. Reportedly, Lenin himself had relations with the Okhrana and claimed he "used them" for his ends.
- Lenin and the Bolsheviks envisioned a global revolution and used the war to "further the revolution." The war was disastrously unpopular among citizens and soldiers and naturally pit them against their governments. At the same time, the Bolsheviks distributed huge amounts of propaganda among citizens and soldiers blaming the war on their Capitalist and "imperialist" governments. As the war took its toll, these governments became increasingly unstable and more ripe for revolution.
- The revolution wasn't just intended for Russia: during and after the war, Bolshevik-inspired rebellions and revolutions took place in Italy, France, Hungary, and Germany.
- The Bolsheviks' allies were often at the forefront of anti-war movements, such as Bela Kun in Hungary or Rosa Luxemburg in Germany. Luxemburg organized anti-war protests since before the war started, and Kun led a propaganda campaign preluding the formation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Kun received direction from Lenin over radio for the Soviet revolution in Hungary, and the underground socialist "Shop Stewards" received funds and weapons from the Soviets for the The November revolution in Germany.

- Often times, high-level leadership in these countries did inexplicable things to make these revolutions possible. In France, Poincare's minister of the interior ignored pleas to stop Bolshevik propaganda from being spread among the army, and was found responsible in part for the French army mutinies of 1917. In Germany, as the government was negotiating the war's end, German Admiralty, without knowledge of the government, ordered a "suicide mission" to attack allied fleets (see <http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/kiel-mutiny/>, <https://books.google.com/books?id=xXOxCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA186>). The sailors promptly mutinied, and this sparked the November revolution.

- In Russia, the war's unpopularity was precisely the reason the Tsar abdicated, yet Kerensky, as head of the provisional government, ordered a massive push while simultaneously letting the Soviets "propagandise" and "democratize" the army as to make them ineffectual. When General Kornilov marched on the Soviets (with the full knowledge and agreement of Kerensky, according to some investigations, see: <https://books.google.com/books?id=5Y7UDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA193&lpg=PA193>), Kerensky armed the Bolsheviks against Kornilov. These would form the Red Army, who Kerensky would do more or less nothing to stop in the October revolution. Later, during the Russian civil war, Kerensky spoke out against Finnish independence at a key moment when the Whites needed their support to take Petrograd.

- Likewise, many officials who acted to start and prolong the war went on to help the Bolsheviks in other ways. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov encouraged the Tsar to mobilize the army after Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia and even directed an official to smash his telephone when the Tsar got cold feet. During the Russian civil war, while ostensibly working for the Whites, Sazonov would sabotage the White Army's opportunity to secure Finnish support to take Petrograd.

- Many members and associates of the German Foreign Ministry, such as Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, acted suspiciously to start the war. Hollweg and Jagow supported writing a "blank cheque" of support for Austria-Hungary, and at a key time in the crisis sabotaged a mediation proposal by deleting lines in a forwarded telegram (among other ways). Later, the German Foreign Ministry would run a decisive campaign to support the Bolsheviks, including funds, propaganda, and securing passage to Russia for Lenin over German territory, even as Bolshevik propaganda undermined German military and society. Even though the Foreign Ministry became synonymous with imperialism, the Bolshevik-armed revolutionaries in Germany left the old Germany Foreign ministry largely intact after the November revolution.

- During Germany's initial push, some German commanders, such as Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch and Field Marshall Bulow, acted inexplicably to stop the German's push and retreat at the battle of Marne. This was a turning point in the war that converted it from a "war of movement" to trench warfare. After General von Moltke was fired for this, his replacement, General Falkenhayn, ignored opportunities to defeat Russia decisively in order to focus his forces in a war of attrition and costly battles on the Western Front, most famously at Verdun. The effect of this was to keep Russia in the war while prolonging the war in general.

There's more to be done, but my best guess at what's going on so far is this: Before the war, the Bolsheviks already had allies in high places across European governments and the Russian secret police, or the Bolsheviks were themselves a project of an overly ambitious secret police. They started the war deliberately with hopes of channeling the resulting anti-government sentiment into revolutions where they could put themselves in power, with a system of government that would let them take power more absolutely. After the war, the Soviets continued this pattern of using war and revolution to spread their influence throughout the globe during the cold war (here's some notes on their involvement in starting the Korean war: <https://pastebin.com/3yq1y5yj>).

This is important for today, since it looks like this same group might still be around today (see: my previous emails). To stop this kind of thing from happening again, we need to know their scope, how they work, and what they're capable of. If today they are anything like they were then, they don't care about any particular

country (they certainly didn't care about Russia during World War One)--I think it's more like an international organization loyal to themselves instead of loyal to any one country. Instead, they use countries and misguided forms of "patriotism" to "divide and conquer" the rest of the world.