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JASON ROBARDS: "In Nitro, West Virginia, site of the 1949 explosion, some workers who made and handled 245T are now in an epidemiology study sponsored by their union, the United Steel Workers, in cooperation with New York's Mount Sinai Hospital."

MAN: "Okay, take a deep breath - in....and blast it out.
Keep going.....keep going.....keep going.....move, move, move..."

JASON ROBARDS: "Their lungs are tested to learn if exposure to 245T has affected them."

MAN: "Keep going.....keep going.....keep going.....push, okay, stop."

JASON ROBARDS: "The nervous system is examined for possible damage. It is the first public American study of 245T workers. And in this case, Monsanto is cooperating with the union by providing records of the employees. Conducting the study are a team of Mount Sinai specialists, headed by Dr. Marion Moses."

DR. MARION MOSES: "They made this chemical from 1948 to 1969 at the plant here in Nitro. The union approached us, they were concerned about - what they had been hearing about dioxin, 245T is contaminated with dioxin; they knew the EPA was in the process of possibly suspending this chemical. They were concerned - are there health effects? We've got a lot of workers who were sick from this. They had what they call skin poisoning or (reed) bumps. It's very difficult to know what is related to this, what's related to other chemicals."

"The only way you find out is to try to get information from a group of workers that have had this chronic exposure. It's a very, very dangerous chemical. Whether or not it's dangerous under these kinds of exposure - is it bad to have (chlor) acne most of your life? Will you die of cancer? The workers want to know. What's going to happen to me? We'd like to try to get the answers to some of the questions. We may not. We may not."

JASON ROBARDS: "Two groups are being studied. Employees who worked with 245T on a regular basis and a clean up crew that went into the unit after the 1949 accident. Some men were in the unit four hours after the incident."

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The above transcript has been edited for readability eliminating verbal hesitations. Unintelligible phrases are enclosed in parentheses. Proper names are spelled phonetically.

ALVIE LANG: "There was none of us knew what we was going in to at that time. Then about three days later I was broke out with this they call it the acne, or dermatitis or something, I don't know just what they did call it. But I was off from work for eight weeks. And they was many others that had the same thing. (sic)

"After we seen what the effects it had on all of us, I really got scared, but at the time that I went in there to clean it up, I thought no more about it than I would to take and run a sweeper over this floor. Because I didn't realize that it affected you like it has. I've had pains practically ever since I left Monsanto. My legs, my back and my arms. Right now, my hands is just stiff and sore. They're really sore - the joints are sore - and they've been that way ever since I got that poison."

OMAR CUNNINGHAM: "People protested going into this unit to work. We even had a walkout because of it. The company and the union got together and they - we set it up on a voluntary basis to work in there. And if they did this they would get a four cent per hour premium pay for working in 245T. Wherever it was processed - the (dye), (and then the packaging, probably). You processed () they were given a four cents premium pay for this particular work."

JOHN MONTGOMERY: "I asked to be transferred out of there, because I was broke out pretty bad and it just seemed like (these) blackheads, just formed all over you. I even had them in my hair, eyebrows and hands, arms, legs. The only place I don't think I had them was the bottom of my feet."

DR. MARION MOSES: "There's a tremendous movement through the labor trade union^{movement} now to start dealing with these hazards. As more and more people in the labor movement become aware of this, as there is more and more worker education, I think this is how these problems are going to be solved because the workers....and that's clout from another side. I think that's going to be one of the ways that this problem is going to be solved. I think it's going to be the most important way. It's going to come from workers themselves."

ANTHONY MAZZOCCHI: "Humans are the most replaceable item in the productive process. If a machine breaks down, people can get awfully exercised, ~~and~~ money ~~can~~ repair it and replace it. There are millions of human beings out there who will replace any of us doing what we're doing, very easy. Once you move that human out the door you never even think about him anymore, or her."

ROBERT ROLAND: "Why kill workers? I mean, this makes no sense at all. That's the most difficult thing to replace.... is a skilled, trained person. Allright. So even from an economic standpoint that makes no sense. From a humanistic standpoint, it makes absolutely no sense. And I do not accept the fact that corporations or people who work in corporations are not humanistic. I think they are."

ANTHONY MAZZOCCHI: "Industries claim that they don't wish

to hurt people is just a pious platitude. Sure, a guy doesn't wake up in the morning and say, I'm going to go out and (snuff out) a half a dozen people. No one prefers to think in those terms. But when they enter that factory, or they enter a corporate office the bottom line is profit.

"The fact of the matter is, that with a very sophisticated medical establishment with a rather large government apparatus, a large corporate apparatus, none of these entities ever discover the (). Workers discover them. In fact, I suggest that the sophisticated apparatus is there to disguise. And to obfuscate and to conceal. The scientific establishment, generally, is one where something is discovered but it's never discussed with the potential victim or the victims. That's why we're very suspicious and we're very cynical about the ability of science to protect us. Science in service of people would be protective but science in service of corporations can never protect, it can only conceal."

JASON ROBARDS: "The current dispute with 245T and silvex is this: thirty percent of their use continues on range land and rice crops. The EPA ban is neither total nor permanent. Dr. Epstein believes his Commission's recommendations are still pertinent."

DR. EPSTEIN: "I would suggest that there's ample basis for developing restrictions--against the whole class of phenoxy herbicides. As indeed, was recommended by the (Mirac) Commission of 1969, where the panel unanimously recommended that any agent or any pesticide which has unequivocally been shown to produce birth defects in experimental animals or humans, should be banned or suspended."

JASON ROBARDS: "Dioxin not only causes birth defects, it also causes cancer. A University of Wisconsin study reports that tumors developed in a significant percentage of rats that were fed dioxin at levels as low as five parts per trillion. There may be a vital connection between the tumor findings and reports that dioxin accumulates in the fat of cattle grazing on land sprayed with these herbicides."

DR. MATTHEW MESELSON: "Speaking as an individual, I certainly do not want the members of my family to eat beef from range land which has been sprayed with 245T. And if I can vote on that issue, that's how I would vote. But as a scientist, I think my responsibility is to present a reasonable estimate of the numerical factors involved and let other people make their own decisions."

"The amounts of dioxin getting into the American diet are near the upper range of what I estimate is possible. Then you could say that if the rat data can be extrapolated to people that thousands of Americans die every year from tumors, which are induced because of their exposure to dioxin."

JASON ROBARDS: "There is a crucial public health question

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in this. The congressional mandate for EPA herbicide regulation is not zero risk. Must this mean that EPA has to wait for human health affects as they did in the (Alice) miscarriage study? Before action is taken to permanently ban chemicals already proven toxic for animals? If there has to be a human body count, then who is the government protecting?

"Coming up in one minute, NOVA turns from dioxin to a chemically similar product, PCB, the most widespread contaminate on this planet. And we look at citizens in North Carolina, Illinois and New York's Love Canal, battling with life and death problems of regulating and disposing of toxic wastes."

WOMAN: "Since Love Canal has begun, my child has developed asthma, liver problems, kidney problems. What's going to happen in the next six months? I love my son. I don't want to see him dead."

COMMERCIAL

JASON ROBARDS: "In the mid 1960's, Dr. Robert Risebrough was at Bodega Bay, California working on a scientific problem. Why was the peregrine falcon disappearing as a species? Initially it was thought that the herbicide DDT was responsible.

"A peregrine falcon egg found in Baha, California was brought to the University of California Marine Laboratory at Bodega Bay, for examination."

DR. ROBERT RISEBROUGH: "There were very high levels of the DDT compound in that egg, which was surprising because it was a remote area of Baha, California, but there were also high levels of these other chemicals which we'd been seeing up until that time in other species of birds, fish up and down the coast, without knowing what they were. Because this particular species was disappearing, apparently for environmental reasons, caused by pollution it became very important to find out what these other chemicals were and that led us to the discovery that they were PCB's."

JASON ROBARDS: "Like DDT and dioxin, PCB is another petro-chemical based on the benzene ring. It is derived from the binding together of two such rings. The rings are changed with heat and bind together to become a biphenyl. Varying amounts of chlorine are added to make a polychlorinated biphenyl. Otherwise known as PCB."

BARRY COMMONER: "PCB is a kind of case history for many of the mistakes that the petro-chemical industry has made. In this case, we've got pretty good records. The first plant that began to produce PCB began to operate around 1930, in Anniston, Alabama. One company, now, manufactured PCB: Monsanto. We now know that within the first two years after that plant operated, twenty-three out of the twenty-four workers in the plant, were seriously ill

with chlor-acne. By 1933 or so. The Monsanto Company knew from the effects on their own workers that they were dealing with a very dangerous substance. Ten years later, they were told by a health agency that human contact with PCB should be avoided--thirty years ago, it would have been prudent for Monsanto to give up the manufacturing of PCB. They did not and in that time, enormous amounts of it were disseminated in the environment, and I think that the industry failed to respond to the signal of the toxicity of their material."

JASON ROBARDS: "Despite its dangers, the manufacturer of PCB grew to gigantic proportions. A total of a billion and a half tons from the time it was first made. The main use, initially, was for power transformers. Heat and fire resistant properties of PCB made it of special value for such devices. Later, PCB was found useful in entirely new ways. In making flourescent light bulbs in TV sets. Through large scale manufacture it also was able to replace existing products such as carbon paper.

"(Kyashu), Japan, was the location of the first incident involving PCB's in public health. In early 1968, PCB was accidentally mixed with (yusho), the rice oil used for cooking in that part of Japan. At least thirteen hundred people were affected with problems ranging from chlor-acne to swelling of eyes, eyelids and body joints. The same types of problems reported to industry thirty-five years earlier.

"There has been an abnormal incidence of miscarriages and stillbirths in that part of Kyashu. Babies born of victims, have had some of the same problems as their parents. One baby may have gotten the disease from milk nursed from its mother, who had eaten the poisoned oil.

"Halfway around the world: New York's Long Island, and more evidence of the widespread danger. In the early 1970's scientists began to find PCB's in terns, which they concluded may be responsible for the deformities in newly hatched birds, and the failure of some eggs to hatch at all."

RICHARD JOHNSON: "One thing we've learned from PCB is that the world has become very, very small. We've been measuring PCB in the Artic, we've gone to Antarctica, to measure it in snows; we've been measuring it in oceans over the world. Twenty years ago when we went to these places they were remote from human activities and that's not true anymore. And all parts of the world are now subject to pollution that may come from any industrialized country."

JASON ROBARDS: "PCB has become so widespread it is now found in the milk of nursing mothers throughout the world. Scientists in North Carolina are studying how much PCB passes from mother to child and to see how dangerous that may be for the child's health. In other human milk studies, seven times more PCB has been found than what is permitted in cow's milk for human consumption. The milk samples are

sent from North Carolina to Raltech, a Wisconsin laboratory, where the contents are analyzed. Raltech is able to detect trace amounts, minute quantities of the substance, by using new scientific techniques and instruments which have helped spur the detection of dangerous toxics in people's bodies."

DR. JAMES ALLEN: "In most human beings, you run about ten parts per million PCB's in the fatty tissue. That's a rough guess. If they were to analyze fatty tissue, from you right now, it would run about ten parts per million. No if's, and's, but's or maybe's."

JASON ROBARDS: "The effects of small quantities of PCB's in babies is not yet known, but the North Carolina scientists have started to look into that, also. They are examining new born babies, to see if the presence of PCB in their bodies may be connected to any abnormalities in their motor abilities and response to external stimuli.

"The infants are checked periodically up to six years old, to try to learn if new abnormal developments occur that might be attributed to PCB which may accumulate in their bodies over the years. The study is scheduled for completion in 1986, but there are other results from Dr. Allen's studies."

DR. JAMES ALLEN: "Although we are not aware of any serious complications in the general population as a result of this exposure, there are strong indications that it is a carcinogenic agent. And possibly a (mutagenic) agent. In addition, there are indications of reproductive abnormalities. These are subtle affects, and would not be obvious unless one were looking for them. In our studies with monkeys, we have not found a safe level in the polychlorinated biphenyl mixtures. We have fed levels as low as 5/10 parts per million in one particular group and twenty-five parts per billion in another group. Three times per week in the diet over a period of years and found (dilatarius) effects."

JASON ROBARDS: "One way people get PCB into their bodies is through food. In 1972, New York state scientists found alarmingly high levels of PCB in Hudson River fish normally eaten by people. The PCB was coming from Hudson Falls in Fort Edwards, in upstate New York. General Electric plants there discharged a total of a half a million pounds of PCB into the river over several years.

"Through leakage or spills. GE was eventually fined four million dollars, although the current estimate is that the total cost to remove PCB from the river will be over two hundred million dollars. This incident led to congressional action. The sale and manufacturing of PCB was banned as of 1979."

BARRY COMMONER: "The action was taken far too late. PCB is stable and most of the PCB that's been produced is in the environment, contaminating every living thing. Every way you look, there is PCB. You have to understand, for example, you go fishing in the Great Lakes now, you've got to be sure if you want to avoid eating PCB,

to cut the fat out of the fish. And the fact of the matter is, that the Monsanto Company, by manufacturing PCB and disseminating it for forty years or so in the United States, without being aware of what they're really doing to the environment, and to every living thing in that environment, have caused the problem the answer to which they don't know and we don't know."

JASON ROBARDS: "PCB has not only been an environmental problem, it has also created major economic disruption. At Monsanto headquarters in St. Louis, Dan Bishop."

DAN BISHOP: "When we were convinced that they were indeed, bio-accumulating in the environment, we began a system of restricting sales of the products to only the electrical industry, where they were used in (sealed) systems for capacitors and transformers and offered the very real safety requirements that were needed in areas where you have large populations of people."

BARRY COMMONER: "PCB was manufactured by Monsanto when they discovered that they could sell it. They discovered they could sell it, because it invaded markets of previous substances. You can go down the list of the major products of the petro-chemical industry, and you discover in almost every instance they do not provide a new service, but substitute for pre-existing material that provided the service of clothing or furniture or construction material."

"Now there's a very good reason for that. The economy of synthetic materials such as plastics, synthetic fibers, detergents; they are economical only when they're produced in very large amounts. They're made by automated processes, a whole series of pipes, very few workers. So, you have to spend a great deal of money to build a petro-chemical plant. And you don't get your money back unless you sell an awful lot of synthetic fibers, detergents, plastics."

JASON ROBARDS: "The economic advantages of mass production can eliminate competition. This traps both the public and the producer with the substituted product."

DAN BISHOP: "We would have liked to have gotten out of the business in the late sixties, because once you cut back production as we did, to restrict it only to the electrical uses, there really wasn't any viable business to speak of. Plants () operate at maximum efficiency and when you reduce the amount of material being made by fifty percent, which is what we did, you reduce the economics, the realities of the manufactured products substantially."

"We stayed in the business because we really didn't have any choice. We would have unilaterally withdrawn--there would have been widespread power blackouts in the country. There would have been transportation disruptions, even the EPA recognized this. And Russell (Tranc) the then administrator, asked us to continue

to manufacture the products 'till the industry could find a suitable replacement products."

BARRY COMMONER: "Now, I don't know, that there are economic difficulties that are caused by the necessity of withdrawing petrochemical agents such as PCB from the market. But I'd like to point out, there were economic difficulties for the manufacturers of the goods that the PCB substituted for. In other words, both times, coming in and going out, the market is disrupted. And I think what this tells us is, that the economic force of the petrochemical industry is so large that we should certainly examine each new product well in advance, to find out if it is going to be acceptable, from the environmental and health point of view, before we allow the industry to disrupt the economy of their competitors in the first instance - then disrupt the economy of the people who are using their product, when later on, it has to be withdrawn."

JASON ROBARDS: "General Electric's PCB problem helped precipitate passage of a landmark law called TSCA. The Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976. The first thing TSCA has done is to make an inventory of all the chemicals already in commercial use. Fifty thousand of them. Now, EPA is required to decide which of these chemicals should be given top priority for safety tests. How can this enormous job get done?"

DR. BRUCE AMES: "There are fifty thousand or so chemicals that have been introduced in commerce that we're using, and very few of these have been tested to see if they're carcinogens or mutagens. And to test those chemicals is practically impossible if we do it by just measuring cancer in people, because there are twenty to thirty year (lags), and very hard to establish cause and effect in people after this long time period. And if twenty-five percent of us are getting cancer.....so it's just very hard to track down in people, and by the time you've tracked it down, it's () too late.

"And to do it in animals is important, but we can only do about a hundred and fifty or two hundred animal cancer tests a year, because it's so expensive."

JASON ROBARDS: "Dr. Ames has developed a new test. Instead of taking two or three years and spending two hundred and fifty thousand dollars on an animal cancer test, he developed a simple test that can be done in a day or two and cost less than five hundred dollars. The chemical in question is mixed with a special strain of bacteria and incubated overnight. Examining the way the bacteria develop can then show if the chemical has the ability to cause mutations. If it does, there is a strong chance the chemical could cause cancer.

"TSCA could use short term tests like this. But to date, three years after passage of the law, the testing program has not started."

DR. BRUCE AMES: "There's no question that we're going to keep reading about the carcinogen of the week, for a long time, because there's all these backlogs of chemicals that have never been tested. So, now people are much more aware of--the chemical companies are aware that they just can't make ten billion pounds a year of a chemical and not know whether it's a carcinogen."

JASON ROBARDS: "TSCA is also supposed to regulate new products. Industry is required to notify EPA before going on the market. EPA then has ninety days to object if it finds the product unreasonably dangerous. Can EPA properly evaluate dangers of a new chemical in that time, particularly when all data on hazards come from industry's own tests?"

DAN BISHOP: "The chemical industry knows more about their products than anyone else does. They have the best equipment. They have the best qualified people. And it is in their interest to market safe products. It is good business to market safe products. It is not good business to market dangerous or hazardous products in an irresponsible way. And the company, I submit, that does that isn't going to last very long in our current society."

ANTHONY MAZZOCCHI: "You can't leave it up to the person whom might profit from something to conduct a test. Experience has proven that the test results will be what the person conducting them wants them to be. But, it's not big complicated problem to have the federal government set up an apparatus where we know the test results, and where they're done under very controlled circumstances."

ROBERT ROLAND: "It's going to be a considerable burden. And when I say burden, I'm not talking just about financial--I think probably the most serious burden that will be felt by the consumer and by the industry and by the economy is not one of dollars expended in order to do testing, but rather the impact of innovation. Which is the lifeblood of industry (is) based on technology like the chemical industry."

STEVE JELLINECK: "There's a lot of rhetoric in that. And very little facts. We're concerned about innovation. The congress was concerned about innovation. In fact, congress was concerned that we as bureaucrats do not inadvertently stifle innovation. They wanted us to stifle innovation of dangerous chemicals and to keep dangerous chemicals off the market or to restrict their use in some way. So if that's the kind of innovation we're stifling, that's fine. But they didn't want us to inadvertently stifle innovation of useful chemicals that people in our society need and think are worthwhile."

"And I have yet to see hard, factual examples from the industry or firm data on how we could be stifling innovation."

JASON ROBARDS: "Environmentalists contend all new chemicals should be proven safe before used. But when TSCA was passed, congress essentially mandated that new chemicals are safe until proven

dangerous by EPA. The result today - long delays before EPA decisions will be implemented."

STEVEN JELLINEK: "It takes time to build a case against chemicals. And we know that in every instance, virtually every instance, we're going to be sued on whatever we do and we want to win. Federal regulatory programs have been plagued by a history of losing in court and therefore wasting a lot of work that went into their regulatory efforts and having to go back and do things over again. We're faced with tens of thousands of chemicals, with dozens of major companies and hundreds of minor companies and with a seemingly endless supply of high paid Washington lawyers facing us on the other side."

ANTHONY MAZZOCCHI: "Essentially, the industry is a very powerful industry and certainly compared to the United States Congress, I mean, it's like, lilliputians, I mean, the Congress will always back off, and so will any - and so will the White House in dealing with the oil and chemical industry. I mean, it's just not even a match - don't belong in the same ballpark."

"The Congress will always back down in any confrontation with stringent enforcement (of) the chemical industry. When you're dealing with global corporations I think it's the-you have to be extremely naive to think that a state apparatus could meaningfully intervene in the operations of corporations."

BARRY COMMONER: "It's a good thing that TSCA's passed. But what has to happen now is it has to be enforced. And it's been moving very slowly. There are enormous numbers of chemicals that have to be reviewed, rules made, procedures established and very little of that has been done. And it's also clear, that TSCA is not going to clean up situations like PCB that have already occurred and have contaminated the environment."

"If the chemical industry really openly collaborated with the government in developing good procedures for enforcing the rules, I think TSCA could have a very big effect, soon. But as far as I can tell, the industry is going to squeeze every loophole out of that situation that they can. And it's going to take a long time before TSCA becomes effective, I think."

JASON ROBARDS: "Meanwhile we are left with a legacy of fifty thousand already produced chemicals and a fundamental problem of how to dispose of them safely. Ninety percent now, go into unsafe sites or are dumped illegally. PCB is one example."

DR. JOSEPH HIGHLAND: "The PCB problem is far from solved. As a matter of fact, it may actually get worse as the years go on because although, laws have been passed which would allow us to take care of some of the PCB problems, the government hasn't taken effective steps to implement those laws. Consequently, the use of PCB's continues - the disposal continues in ways which are not proper. The levels in food which have been permitted to be high for years

have never been reduced. There is no standard that limits the presence of PCB's in your drinking water. No standard that limits air pollution from PCB's. In fact, our environment continues to be contaminated with PCB's. And people continue to be exposed."

JASON ROBARDS: "This is what happened with PCB last summer in North Carolina. Ernest Fuller."

ERNEST FULLER: "At approximately 11:15 the night of August the second, I was travelling a rural highway similar to this one, when I discovered a very distinct odor. Similar to moth balls, very pungent, very strong, very irritating to the eyes and to the nose. I also could see a strange substance glistening in the headlights along the side of the road, similar to a very heavy dew."

JASON ROBARDS: "Fuller took some grass clippings to a state government laboratory in Raleigh."

ERNEST FULLER: "No one at that point, had any knowledge of what the substance might be. No one that I talked to had ever encountered such a substance. We had the substance analyzed and it turned out to be PCB, polychlorinated biphenyls."

JASON ROBARDS: "Between fifteen and thirty thousand gallons of PCB oil had been dumped along two hundred and twelve miles of rural North Carolina roads. Part of it was dumped on a highway that goes past the house and farm owned by T. Mitchell Langdon."

T. MITCHELL LANGDON: "On the morning of August the second we got up and noticed one of the worst odors that I've ever been in contact with. It was a nauseous, sweet (death) kind of smell. We had about twenty-five or thirty (migrant) workers that working in the tobacco fields. We started about seven o'clock and by ten o'clock that morning, every single one of the folks that were working for me were sick, without an exception."

"(They) were vomiting and nauseous, the folks who--the criminals really, cause that's exactly what they are, they're criminals of the lowest caliber--who perpetrated this act, just committed a little bit of murder against each resident who lives along the contaminated areas. They have done irreversible harm to the health of those residents who live along the highways where this chemical was dumped and also they have damaged the health of the unborn. The (posterity) of the community."

JASON ROBARDS: "One mile of the PCB oil was scraped off the side of the road and gathered up by state officials. That left two hundred and eleven miles still contaminated. Since no one in the state wanted any of this material, an argument developed over where all of it could be put. The first mile was piled into a temporary fenced off site in Warren County. EPA intended to allow the rest to be put into a nearby landfill, even though it would be only ten

feet from the nearest underground water. Thus violating the government's own recommended safety margin of fifty feet."

MR. WHITE: "This hearing is being sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency. You in the audience may make..."

JASON ROBARDS: "EPA held a hearing in Warren County in cooperation with the state of North Carolina. Over a thousand people showed up at the local armory."

MR. WHITE: "...I ask that you observe the five minute rule that we have (publicized) for the meeting."

WOMAN: "I'm here to give you evidence of how the state and the EPA have discredited themselves, and shown themselves to be unworthy of our trust. Since the beginning of what has become this PSC horror, neither the state nor the EPA can be commended for the way it has handled the dealing in this matter."

REVEREND BROWN: "The EPA estimates that three to four hundred million..."

JASON ROBARDS: "Every one of the local residents who testified objected to the (plant)."

REVEREND BROWN: "...environments. And I think that every member of this community and this county are those who would not favor PCB to be dumped on Warren County because of these specific facts that we have right here before us tonight. Because of the health of us today, and of your children's tomorrow, we need to protect our children from this source of PCB."

"And in behalf of my membership, the (Cole de Spring) Baptist Church, which consists of more than four hundred members, we are bitterly against PCB. And we will go to the letter of the law to keep PCB from coming into the Warren County community. Thank you, sir."

JASON ROBARDS: "Despite all the local opposition, on May twenty-fifth, 1979, the federal EPA approved the landfill site in Warren County. Wilsonville, a tiny community in southern Illinois, was one place where it seemed PCB could be disposed of both legally and safely. A firm called Earthline bought Wilsonville's park land and started hauling in chemical wastes. Local people were alarmed when they found out."

"Not only were PCB's being driven up their town's one major street, they also knew that they dump site was on top of abandoned and possible unstable mine shafts. Nevertheless, EPA evaluated and approved the site at the request of the state of Illinois."

FR. GIERUT: "Therefore, when Senator Vince Demuzio brought to

our attention that Earthline Corporation was burying five thousand drums of polychlorinated biphenyls, PCB, the cancer-causing factor, and other hazardous, toxic waste in the landfill here in Wilsonville, there was no alternative for us but to speak out and demonstrate against the social injustice manifested against the people of Wilsonville."

DOUGLAS ANDREWS: "Most of the scientific information that we've had made available to us, as well as that we put together ourselves in making our application for permit, and when the permits were granted to this site by the controlling agents is--leads us to believe the site is as safe as one can be. I would hope that the people who object to the site would make the same type of investigation. I think they'll be convinced that their fears are unfounded."

JOHN LEHMAN: "The industrial production of the United States just a matter of course, produces industrial waste, some of which is toxic, some of which is hazardous. We've got to deal with that issue. We've got to have facilities that are designed and operated properly to handle those wastes. The public, which perceives this as a threat, with good reason--they don't want to have a site like that next to them. And I don't blame them. I would want to have such a site near me either."

WOMAN: "These people that think this is so great, why don't they put it in their own yard--take a trip to the peanut farmer over there, put it in his place."

VINCE DEMUZIO: "No one was ever told that hazardous or dangerous or toxic materials were to have a lasting and final burial here in Wilsonville. We weren't told that the U.S. EPA and the state EPA has considered this site was one of the two, I think, as I recall correctly, in the nation for the burial of such materials."

MAN: "Why weren't we told?"

UNIDENTIFIED: "I don't know. For one thing it's very difficult when you're in that business to know in advance what type of materials will be handled there. The case of PCB's going to Wilsonville, for example, was a rather urgent situation. There was a PCB spill in another state. The EPA cleaned up that spill on a rather emergency basis. You now have the material that you cleaned up and you have to take that somewhere."

JASON ROBARDS: "Wilsonville went to court and won. The judge ruled all the wastes already brought in had to be removed, because the townspeople had not been involved in the initial decision to place the dump site in their community. The decision is being appealed."

MAN: "I think that the most important point that came about through the efforts of the village of Wilsonville and the court case, is that we now point up to the nation, to industry, to the public officials the fact that we no longer will accept the princi-

ple that some must suffer for the benefit of the majority."

MAN: "I was sure glad to find out that a small group like Wilsonville, that was mislead by a big corporation, that we were able to fight them and whip them. So far, we haven't got them whipped, but we're still fighting them."

JASON ROBARDS: "New EPA rules will require public hearings before a hazardous waste site permit can be issued. But government can still override local opposition."

JOHN LEHMAN: "We have a situation that is somewhat of an impasse right now. I think the public has to be convinced that the technology for managing hazardous waste properly does exist, and that the risk, which is always there, is very low."