

Comments at 23 (citing PM CEMS Technical Memo at 5). EPA was, thus, forced to address these issues in the final MATS RTR by loosening the QA criterion and correlation procedures. *See* 89 Fed. Reg. at 38,528-29. However, it has not yet been shown that these changes are enough to address the fundamental issue that PM CEMS has difficulty reliably measuring such low fPM levels due to the error rates of the instrument. *See* PGEN Comments at 23 (finding insurmountable the “uncertainties inherent the in the measurement device” and the “problems associated with relative size of the uncertainty to the limited data range of fPM concentrations and the confidence levels and tolerances”); *see also* Class of ’85 Comments at 18. And, in reality, units would need to target emissions below 0.010 lb/MMBtu in order to ensure continuous compliance. *See* Pet’rs’ Brief at 72. Therefore, the CEMS technology to demonstrate compliance with the revised fPM standard is unavailable.

Second, there are significant costs and market limitations associated with PM CEMS, which make it “not available.” Installing and operating CEMS is more costly than stack testing. *See* PGEN Comments at 25-26. Costs include purchasing and installation of CEMS, as well as potential modifications to the units to accommodate CEMS, extended correlation testing, and annual operational costs. *See id.* at 26; *see also* Class of ’85 Comments at 18 (estimating \$180,000 to \$400,000 for “site preparation and engineering analysis, analyzer equipment and installation costs, and initial PS-11 correlation testing”). This does not include the costs of maintaining a full-time employee to operate PM CEMS and the costs of lost generation during testing events for CEMS. Luminant Comments at 16-17. There are also market factors which limit the availability of installing and operating CEMS by the compliance deadline. There are a limited number of vendors for CEMS, as well as a limited number of professionals certified to install and test CEMS. Currently, two-thirds of facilities utilize stack testing and would need to install CEMS by July 2027, which would overwhelm the current supply of CEMS and the availability of professionals certified to inspect and test the newly installed systems. *See* Class of ’85 Comments at 16.

III. It is in the Interest of National Security to Issue an Exemption for the Rule

The requested exemptions from the MATS RTR are in the national security interests of the United States. The Rule adversely affects the nation’s energy generation capacity and threatens grid stability and the supply of affordable, reliable energy. The Rule’s stringent limits and the high costs associated with compliance, particularly in combination with other rulemakings impacting coal-fired EGUs, places a considerable burden on the operation of Miami Fort. And MATS rules have historically resulted in the loss of generation capabilities—the 2012 MATS rule resulted in the retirement of approximately 60,000 MW of coal-fired capacity. Pet’rs’ Brief at 23. As explained in Luminant’s Comments, coal plants “continue to be of paramount importance for grid reliability during the transition to renewables.” *Id.* at 29.

Energy generation and grid reliability have been identified by the President as issues of national security and it is, therefore, in the interest of the nation to exempt sources from compliance with the MATS RTR. As set forth in President Trump’s Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14156, *Declaring a National Energy Emergency*, the “generation capacity of the United States [is] . . . far too inadequate to meet our Nation’s needs” and “a reliable, diversified, and affordable supply of energy” is necessary to ensure “military preparedness.” 90 Fed. Reg. 8,433, 8,433 (Jan. 29, 2025). The E.O. continues, “integrity . . . of our Nation’s energy infrastructure—from coast to coast—is