

CHEMICAL EXPOSURE INDEX AUDIT

CHLOR-ALKALI II

LOUISIANA DIVISION

JULY 1992

REFERENCE #9

QUESTION #21

Bob Bartholomew
July 1992

DO A 046963
CONFIDENTIAL

PRO-ACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

Pro-active investigations program will be one of the focal points for 1991. Each shift and the day group will be responsible for generating pro-active investigations. The pro-active investigation should focus on a potential or hypothetical accident/incident. A thorough description of the incident along with causes and follow-up actions to prevent recurrence should be written on a pro-active investigation of accident/incident form (orange sheet). A copy of the form should be sent to the safety committee and area engineer.

Any group or person generating pro-active investigations will be responsible for the follow-up and correction of the potential problem. This will be included in the voting for the best quarterly pro-active investigations.

See also - Quarterly, Potential & Follow-up

EMERGENCY DRILLS

Quarterly emergency drills are to be conducted by each operating shift.

Each shift will discuss the drill and submit a written report to the designated shift no later than the 15th of the second month. The designated shift will use all of the shifts input and put together a finalized version which will be distributed to all shifts no later than the end of the second month. Each shift will take the final version and conduct a group discussion and walk-through by the end of the quarter. The designated shift also needs to give the final version to the secretary to put on CRT, and a copy to the safety coordinator along with each shifts written report to show participation by all.

1ST QUARTER - C SHIFT

2ND QUARTER - D SHIFT

3RD QUARTER - A SHIFT

4TH QUARTER - B SHIFT

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EMERGENCY DRILL
11/19/90
"A" SHIFT
9:38 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

Observers: Chip Troxclair - Control Room
Dale Crochet - D-316 Area
Joe Crescienne - D - 316 Area

Cherry Picker Operator moved picker into position between D-316 B/C. He was instructed of the emergency drill and that he was to inform the control room that he had just hit the line between B-316 B/C, causing a large caustic leak. The Board Operator was informed of the drill with a note one minute prior to the start of the drill and that the following scenario would shortly unfold:

A water flow was started through a dye tablet showing the leak in a bright green color (only about 30 GPM). After notification of the Board Operator at 9:38 a.m., he announced at 9:39 a.m. that there was a caustic leak in Area 2 and that all vehicles should be moved from the parking lot. The SS was called to the control room. At 9:41 the Board Operator notified Security, stating that this was a drill, (using 8889) (message not repeated) of the spill, stating that it was contained by sand bags (not so at this time). Security personnel said they would notify Environmental. Spill lights were activated in the Block to help. Security was called again at 9:44 and asked to close the road to keep vehicles from entering the block. Two operators passed by the leak location at the start of the drill. They were handed leak description (attached). They looked over the situation and decided to sandbag the ditch at the southwest corner.

About this time, the Shift Supervisor and A Shift arrived on the scene. They were given the leak description. They started pumping the contents of D-316 C out of the vessel to lessen the spill. The spill area was roped off. Since it took a while for the dye to reach the ditch east of the block entrance roadway, there was momentary confusion regarding the route the spill would take although the ditch was diked at the southwest corner, and the Shift Supervisor said they would use a portable pump for caustic removal. The leak was communicated to the Board Operator as bad. The extent of the leak was not communicated very well. Outside the area was swept by the Day Supervisor who then reported to the conference room for a head

count. All Day Personnel were called to the conference room, but some had moved to the warehouse because Area 2 had been cleared. The cooling tower crew did not hear the page but saw the spill lights and called the control room seven minutes into the drill. One vehicle entered the block through the flashing spill lights. There were a few craftsmen not sure where Area 2 was. Also, some confusion as to what extent these people should participate. An all clear was given at 10 a.m. Drill time was 22 minutes.

PROBLEM AREAS

1. Should announce situation at least twice over P. A.
2. Should not remove vehicles from the spill area.
3. Not enough communication between outside personnel and control room.
4. Should Day Personnel leave the building area when Area 2 is cleared?
5. Area sweeps should make verbal contact with all crews left in the working areas.
6. Spill should be contained as much as possible. Sandbag channel to drain.
7. Accountability list not in the conference room.
8. Do we have portable pump available for emergencies?
9. Should use 333 for emergency communications with updates following on 8889.

GOOD AREAS

1. All personnel wearing proper safety gear.
2. Reactions were quick and decisive.

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3. D-316 C was pumped out to help eliminate the spill proportions.
4. Ditches were sandbagged to contain the spill.
5. It should be noted that Plant problems were also a factor in this drill. Problems at T-505 and in the Power Area with condensate feed to the boilers caused distractions and shifts in priorities.

Over all, the drill went very well with spill containment being recognized as the top priority.

12-90/lww

2ND QUARTER, 1990 EMERGENCY DRILL (COMPOSITE)

"C"

DRILL

Anticipating a motor power feeder failure, resulting in an auto power swap from H-28 to H-10:

1. Power Plant communicates possible H-28 failure within the hour. Auto swap to H-10 is a likely possibility.
2. CA-2 is requested to not make any changes on motor load until further notice.

(This eliminates swapping pumps to unaffected power feeders).

3. Approximately one hour exists to prepare for an auto swap.

NOTE: Auto swap will result in the loss of C-201, CKT 1 & 2, H2 Recovery, GT-1 & 2, possibly; and assorted equipment in CA-2.

ACTIONS

1. Assemble personnel to communicate likely possibilities and assignments.
2. Notify Division Chlorine Plant and Pipeline of pending possibility.
3. Maintain close communication with Power. Request a manual swap to H-10 - or, prior notice to auto swap, in order to slowly de-energize Generators 1 & 2 if H-10 is not available.
4. Evaluate non-essential personnel as necessary.
5. Confirm T-1 and T-2 are in auto swap position. T-2 must be swapped to manual for C-201 start following an auto swap.