Page 245

lot of firms are complicated organizations; they have lots of purposes.
Q. Their prime purpose is to survive economically?
A. Their essential purpose is to survive economically.
Q. It was the essential purpose of the advocates on the other side of the OSHA debate, those advocating for worker protection, to protect workers regardless of economic realities; do you agree with?
A. Not entirely, but close. That wasn't a major theme. So you had on the one side -- that's a major theme. Emphasizing that.
Q. And OSHA regulations were a balancing act between these two interests?
A. Balancing was involved in the passage of OSHA for sure. Although I don't want to think about balancing meaning exactly equal on both sides because I think that labor got more of what it wanted than the business side got of what it wanted, but the Congress heard both sides.
Q. Do you think that that debate

Page 246

over OSHA, which you've studied, and the reporting of that debate to the general public was sensational in nature and somehow skewed the logic of asbestos toxicology?
MS. ROSENBERG: Objection to the form.
A. I think the debate was very heated and the report of the debate was very heated. What that had to do with, as you put it, skewing toxicology, I don't know. I don't see the connection there.
Q. Well, Union Carbide says that the debate -- I'm paraphrasing -- did little to place asbestos toxicology in logical perspective, which means to me that it did something to make it illogical, to skew the perspective.
MS. ROSENBERG: I object again. You've taken the document away from the witness. Put it in front of him.
A. I think the crucial thing about this document is that it reports an uneasiness among Union Carbide's customers. It claims that the uneasiness in part comes from the publicity given to the dangers of asbestos and

Page 247

highlights what they think to be the controllability of those. So, all three are at work here.
They have a claim, as I would expect, if you believed, as they did, that it was possible to have reasonably safe levels of asbestos use, then you would use words like logical perspective by saying, "can't we have both this process and" and then go on to say "we believe customers can live within the rules of protection".
So, it is a multi-purpose set of claims here. I wouldn't pick one out of it and say I agree with it, but not the others.
I'm perfectly comfortable saying that that's what I would expect for them to do that believed that long exposure to heavy doses of asbestos was the main problem to be dealt with and they had an answer for that.
Q. So you would expect this type of statement out of a firm that was of the opinion that the industry with shared knowledge could police itself and did not need OSHA regulations as were enacted?
A. I think all of these economic

Page 248

regulations firms would prefer to do it voluntarily. That is the typical position.
Q. The involuntary nature of it ends up costing them economically; is that correct?
A. I think that's what they fear, but I don't think that's what they experience. What they experience is a fear of excessive tightening that makes it more difficult for them to innovate and what we have in lots of regulatory context is precisely that; enthusiasm for a product and concern about troubles and dangers in the regulatory period and tightening up and recalculations. So that's what I think was going on.
Q. To follow up on that, your answer is that they fear economic repercussions, however, in reality it's more of a constraint on their innovation, ability to innovate?
A. A drag on their capacity to do what they think is right. So it's an autonomy question particularly for firms like Union Carbide which thought that they were responsible. They were not the bad actors.
Q. As a student of these issues throughout your entire academic career, do you