HISTORICAL STUDIES OF URBAN AMERICA
A series edited by James R. Grossman and Kathleen N. Conzen

oldering City: Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871–1874
ren Sawislak

rish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth-Century
ban North
n T. McGreevy

MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA

Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era

Gail Radford

The University of Chicago Press ▪ Chicago and London

FOUR

The PWA Housing Di

In the 1920s, supporters of the new
later publicized by Catherine Bau
using private capital. For example,
developed Sunnyside and Radburn, and the A
Union built cooperative apartments in the Br
tiatives, however, were only small-scale dem
of the approach Bauer advocated, which i
commercial housing sector, coordinated and
ment. While labor unions or privately funded
experiments, only the national government
the states) had the resources and power to f
tial landscape.[2]

In Europe, many social democratic gove
commercial housing in the twenties. But th
the United States was far different, particular
turned sour and the residential real estate m
Depression came a political upsurge, sweeping
sevelt, but the most urban-oriented Congres
made possible the first direct federal interven
the United States during peacetime. This was
sion of the Federal Emergency Administrati
monly known as the Public Works Administ

When the PWA housing program was est
cates of the new housing theories thought it
orous noncommercial housing sector that th
U.S. housing policy. Key to this strategy wa
urban dwelling acceptable to the majority of
class alternative for the poor. Many of those
ing Division shared these hopes, and the ag
and in some cases truly innovative work. As
bring what Bauer described as "modern ho
years, the temporary, experimental PWA pr
those who have studied the PWA residential
ally better designed and built than later publi

sions, better even than commercially developed properties. Why this program was so different from later publicly funded housing in the United States has to do with a variety of unique factors that came together in the early 1930s.

The Crisis in Residential Real Estate

In the spring of 1933, when the Roosevelt administration took office, the economy was in shambles. The housing sector was in particularly bad shape, as residential construction had been slumping for several years before the stock market crash in 1929. The building boom had peaked in 1925, setting an all-time record of 937,000 new nonfarm homes started in a single year. Each year thereafter housing starts were down, not only from the 1925 mark, but from the year before.[3] The continuing erosion of the market took its toll on the confidence as well as on the pocketbooks of groups connected to homebuilding. Even those not directly involved were worried, since the ripple effects of residential construction spread over many industries. In addition, the sector was economically important in and of itself. Between 1922 and 1926, the building of nonfarm dwellings accounted for 38 percent of net capital formation.[4]

The collapse of financial institutions that followed the stock market's crash exacerbated pre-existing problems in the housing industry, because builders were so dependent on lenders for capital. As one government official put it, credit operated as the industry's "throttle."[5] Moreover, the dependence went both ways, and the soaring rates of mortgage foreclosures threatened the entire financial structure of the country. Runs on banks and other lenders left them short of cash and unable to renew the short-term home mortgages common at the time. Even when families were lucky enough to hold onto mortgages, rapidly escalating unemployment threatened their ability to keep up payments. The result was that financial institutions rapidly acquired properties for which there were few buyers. Caught in the squeeze, lenders not only were unable to advance money for new construction, they also faced bankruptcy themselves.[6] In response to the increasingly grave situation, President Hoover called for a meeting of leaders in home finance and construction from all over the country.

This meeting, called the President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, took place in Washington early in December of 1931. Almost four thousand people attended. Many were prominent industry figures. The atmosphere at the conference was charged with anxiety, since only 254,000 housing units were started in 1931, which was about one-third of the average for the 1920s as a whole.[7] Worried about the level of desperation, Hoover urged the delegates to consider the housing problem "in its long view rather than its emergency aspects."[8] The president wanted them not to

lose sight of the importance of preserving private enterprise in housing, even though many of them faced personal financial ruin.

In his address to the conference, the president invoked what he termed the "immortal ballads" of "Home Sweet Home" and "My Old Kentucky Home" to demonstrate his allegiance to traditional values, but he simultaneously called for a major change in conventional practices.[9] Hoover proposed legislation to create a system of federally supervised banks for mortgage lenders as a way of expanding the supply of housing capital. Essentially, Hoover's Federal Home Loan Bank bill was the same plan first put forward after the war by the League of Building and Loans. A policy proposal that had seemed too extreme to make it out of committee a decade before was enthusiastically endorsed by the conference. Although the margin was narrow, the bill passed the following summer, becoming the first permanent piece of federal housing legislation.[10]

By the time of the President's Conference, residential construction was so depressed that many people, along with Hoover, were ready to experiment. Secretary of Commerce Robert Lamont, like his boss, was no wild-eyed radical. Indeed, so strongly did Lamont believe in the essential correctness of traditional real estate practices that he was at a loss to account for the crisis except to assume that working people had lost respect for the home. For Lamont, the cure to the problem was simple: Americans should buy homes even though they might seem too expensive, since "thrift is a virtue that can work miracles."[11]

Despite Lamont's seeming complacence, he was shocked by what he learned at the conference. The grimmest data had been compiled by the Committee on Negro Housing, which documented the ways in which segregation multiplied the deleterious effects of poverty on blacks. After reading this report, the Secretary of Commerce was moved to conclude that the terrible living conditions endured by African Americans stemmed from the "shortcomings of our individualistic theory of housing, and the failure which grows out of expecting each person in our highly complex industrial civilization to provide his own housing as best he may."[12] Such sentiments were startling enough coming from a cabinet-level official in a Republican administration, but they were all the more surprising given the particularly conservative assumptions with which Lamont started.

Liberal economist Richard Ely, who served on one of the conference's working committees, tried to ease the tension at the gathering by assuring the many businessmen in attendance that the people on his committee were "unanimous in their opposition to the construction of homes with public funds."[13] But just as Hoover feared, many of those in the real estate business seemed more preoccupied with their own survival than with supporting any particular political principle. The Republican Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilber, turned out to be a better judge of the possibilities inherent in the situation than the more liberal Ely. Wilber predicted that if private capital did not soon respond to the challenge of housing for the majority by investing in technically innovative, large-scale residential building operations, then "housing by public authority is inevitable."[14]

Such heretical statements by important officials in a Republican administration and Hoover's willingness to initiate the first program of federal intervention into the housing sector during peacetime—limited though it was—signaled the degree to which confidence in the private market in real estate had deteriorated by 1931. The double messages of speakers such as Hoover, who paid tribute to the old verities while at the same time suggesting new policies, reflected a situation of fluidity created by the crisis.

Despite Hoover's legislative initiatives, which included, along with the Home Loan Bank Board System, authorization in 1932 for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans for low-rent housing and slum clearance, the market continued downward.[15] Housing starts in 1932 were only half of what they had been in the already bad year of 1931. By 1933, when Roosevelt began his first term, the situation had grown even more critical. Starts for the year were down again, by now to only 93,000, a sickening one-tenth of what they had been at the height of the boom in 1925, and only one-seventh of the average for the 1920s. In addition, half of all home mortgages were technically in default, and foreclosures were sweeping the country like a tidal wave. In Philadelphia alone, there were an average of 1,300 sheriff's sales a month during the first half of the year.[16]

These trends meant that when Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, a large proportion of the middle class was facing the loss of its most important single investment, the family home. Meanwhile, mortgage lenders throughout the country were facing ruin, a possibility that threatened the entire financial system. It is against this background of catastrophe that we can begin to understand how it was that Congress supported a variety of federal interventions into the housing sector during the New Deal. More specifically, we can understand how, in the first spurt of emergency legislation, a program as previously off-limits as federal financing and even outright ownership of low-rent housing could be created. This temporary program, set up within the Public Works Administration, was significantly influenced by those who hoped to initiate a single, broad policy approach, aimed at the majority of Americans. Ultimately, the PWA disappointed the hopes of these reformers. Yet, at the same time, the activities of the PWA represented a more profound break from a market-based housing system than programs passed later in the

New Deal when private interests were stronger and able to exert more influence in Congress.

The Political Origins of the PWA Housing Program

As the new Democratic administration under Franklin Roosevelt scrambled to develop legislation to revive the collapsed economy, it encountered no powerful political coalition pushing for programs for low- and moderate-rent housing. Those who believed in the idea of federal support for residential building programs were relatively few in number, although highly articulate and committed. One was the prominent New York settlement worker Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, who headed the National Public Housing Conference. In the early days of the new administration, Simkhovitch traveled to Washington to visit New York Senator Robert Wagner, a principal architect of Roosevelt's key initial recovery measure, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Along with Father John O'Grady, Secretary of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, Simkhovitch pleaded with Wagner to include a provision for urban housing in the legislation. The senator agreed and included a brief section on housing in the public works section of the bill.

The NIRA consisted of two main parts. Title I, the more controversial, aimed at halting the spiraling deflation by setting aside antitrust regulations and allowing business leaders to cooperate in organizing markets. With prices and wages stabilized by this program, the administration hoped to "prime the pump" with a large public works program. This is where the housing program fit in. Title II called for "a comprehensive program of public works," and specified a program of "construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repair under public regulation or control of low-cost housing and slum-clearance projects" to be included along with more traditional kinds of government building projects such as highways and public buildings. With the president's approval, states, municipalities, or other public bodies undertaking public works could be given capital grants. Congress appropriated $3.3 billion dollars to pay for the program.[17]

The NIRA, with its provision for a government housing program, was sent to a body very different than had previously gathered on Capitol Hill. Sentiment in the House of Representatives shifted quite sharply toward the concerns of working people in the nation's cities after the elections of 1932. Two factors explain the change: reapportionment and the political mobilization of previously inactive urban groups.

Reapportionment had a dramatic impact on the character of the Seventy-Third Congress, because none had occurred in two decades, during which time the population shifted dramatically. Throughout the 1920s the House and Senate bickered over the reapportionment issue. The process was never easy, but this was the first time since the initial census in 1790 that Congress had not been able to come to some agreement on a formula by which to reapportion representation in the House within two years. The unusual deadlock after 1920 occurred for a variety of reasons, but a large part of the problem was that whatever the specifics, any plan put forward would, in the words of Mississippi Representative John E. Rankin, "increase the power of the large alien-congested centers of this country by reducing the number of Representatives from agricultural sections of the United States." After years of wrangling, a compromise was finally reached in 1929 by which the House would be reapportioned on the basis of the 1930 census. Thus, the House of Representatives elected in November 1932 reflected twenty years of demographic change, rather than the usual ten, and this was the period during which the country had become predominantly urban.[18]

The second reason the Seventy-Third Congress was so different from its predecessors was that it included so many northern, urban, liberal Democrats. The children of the last great wave of immigrants were reaching voting age by the late 1920s, and they were overwhelmingly city dwellers. As they had begun to do in 1928, these new voters rallied behind the Democrats in 1932. The party gained ninety seats in the house and thirteen in the Senate. Even more significant, from the standpoint of potential support for urban programs, was that non-Southern Democrats represented a working majority in the House for the first of what would be only a few times in the twentieth century. Roosevelt's political instincts paralleled the mood of Congress, and he sought policies to tie the party's new urban supporters into a permanent majority coalition behind the Democratic Party. Federal urban housing was one such policy.[19]

When Roosevelt sent Congress his National Industrial Recovery bill with its provisions for a housing program in May 1933, he stressed that it should be passed immediately with no changes so he could move forward straightaway with his recovery program. Probably an even more compelling reason for insisting on no changes was that, since the NIRA was a complicated bundle of compromises, he knew it might totally unravel once Congress started tinkering. The deteriorating economic situation along with the new president's enormous popularity enabled him to achieve essentially what he wanted. The NIRA passed through both chambers virtually unchanged in less than a month.[20]

Since Congress was under great pressure to act quickly, there was little debate on the proposed legislation. Even in the crisis atmosphere of early 1933, direct government entrance into residential real estate was a radical

step, so it is noteworthy that no one protested this portion of the bill, if only for the record. Previously, only the pressure of the wartime emergency had made this kind of policy acceptable and, even then, debates about building housing for defense workers turned emotional. In 1918, Senator Albert Fall characterized the effort to establish federal housing programs "an insidious, concerted effort" to "overturn the entire government of the United States."[21] That there were no comparable hysterical outbursts against the NIRA's provision for a housing program, and in fact no congressional opposition expressed at all, reflects the crisis mentality of the time. Quite likely, the different reaction was also due in part to the Congress itself having changed significantly from the body it had been in Senator Fall's days.

Despite the lack of drama, authorization for a federal housing program in 1933 was historically significant, as it can be argued that publicly built and owned low-rent housing was in some respects the most radical aspect of the New Deal. Except for the Tennessee Valley Authority, which mixed private with public enterprise, public housing was unique in involving actual government ownership, rather than merely intervention in the economy.[22] Thus, the usual interpretation of the creation of the PWA housing program that focuses almost completely on chance and effective legislative maneuvering by liberals, like Simkhovitch and Wagner, seems inadequate. While such factors were important, two others allow a fuller understanding of how and why the program was enacted. The first is the impact on Congress of the broad political mobilization of urban working-class constituencies. The second is the length and severity of the crisis in residential real estate, which so eroded the material and psychological resources of real estate entrepreneurs that they failed to oppose the housing section of the NIRA in the way they had previously tried to block direct federal entrance into the housing market. These two factors were significant in allowing some form of housing legislation to succeed in 1933. They were especially crucial in creating the opening that made it possible for the Housing Division to advance, albeit tentatively, a program that was far more challenging to private enterprise in the housing field than any previous or later federal policies.

After Roosevelt signed the NIRA into law in June 1933, the Public Works Administration was organized under Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. To implement the section of the bill pertaining to the construction of dwellings, Ickes established the Housing Division as a quasi-independent agency within the PWA. The division faced tremendous opposition over the four years of its existence but did manage to finance or directly build a total of fifty-eight housing developments containing approximately 25 thousand dwelling units around the country.[23] (Tables 4.1 and 4.2 give specific information on Housing Division projects.)

The First Months of the Housing Division

The Housing Division began its official life almost immediately after Ickes took over as administrator of the PWA in early July of 1933. To direct the agency, he appointed Robert Kohn, a distinguished New York architect. Kohn had been in charge of housing production for the Emergency Fleet Corporation during World War I and was therefore one of the few people in the country with any experience at running a government housing program. A past president of the American Institute of Architects and former head of the Building Congress of New York, he was also an influential figure in his profession. Kohn was strongly committed to the cause of direct federal support for low-rent housing. As a longtime friend of Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, and Lewis Mumford, he had participated in discussions with the Regional Planning Association of America, and he shared the general perspective on housing that Bauer publicized in her book.[24]

Shortly after the Housing Division was established, Ickes announced it would begin by expanding a program already established by Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC had offered loans to privately organized, state-regulated "limited-dividend" corporations, which were low-profit enterprises established to provide housing to people who could afford only modest rents. When Hoover started the RFC program, reformers had welcomed it as a step toward recognition of federal responsibility in the housing field, but when they tried to use it they found its stringent provisions "a legislative straight-jacket."[25] Before the RFC turned its housing files over to the PWA, the agency had approved only two housing loans in the thirteen months of its existence. One, for approximately $150,000, financed rural homes in Kansas. The other, for slightly over $8 million, went to Knickerbocker Village, a massive complex containing 1,593 apartments built on the infamous "lung block" of New York City's Lower East Side. Critics found the project depressingly dense. The apartments were small, the buildings were tall (twelve stories), and the land coverage was high. Even so, the financial setup was so stringent that rents were too high for former residents of the area to afford.[26]

Under the Housing Division, the RFC program was liberalized. Interest rates were lowered from five to four percent and the loan period lengthened from ten to thirty-five years. Loans could be secured for up to 85 percent of the estimated final cost of the project. Grants as well as loans were offered to local public entities legally empowered to build and own low-rent housing, but since no such bodies existed, this part of the program was only theoretical. Soon the new agency was inundated with applications, over 500 in all. The small technical staff worked past midnight seven days a week for months re-

TABLE 4.1 PWA LIMITED-DIVIDEND PROJECTS

City / Name	Units	Kind*	Race	Site†	Funding‡
Altavista, VA					
[no name]	50	rows	white	vacant	$ 84
Bronx Borough, NY					
Hillside Homes	1,416	apts	white	vacant	$ 5,060
Euclid, OH					
[no name]	100	rows	white	vacant	$ 500
Philadelphia, PA					
Carl Mackley Houses	284	apts	white	vacant	$ 1,039
Queens Borough, NY					
Boulevard Gardens	967	apts	white	vacant	$ 3,071
Raleigh, NC					
Boyland	54	apts	white	vacant	$ 199
St. Louis, MO					
Neighborhood Gardens	252	apts	white	slum	$ 640
TOTAL	3,123				$10,593

* Rowhouses ("rows"), apartments, flats, or some combination.
† Slum, if slum clearance involved; vacant, if built on empty land.
‡ In $1,000 (thousands of dollars); this is the amount loaned for each project.
Note: This information is derived from Harold L. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works," report submitted to Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 75th. Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), Hearings on S. 1685 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1937).

viewing them. The work was fairly tedious, because few submissions merited serious consideration. Most fell in two predictable categories. The first, which were obviously not appropriate, comprised efforts by investors to salvage something from failed commercial ventures begun before the Depression. The second group came from organizations sincerely devoted to trying to expand the supply of good low-rent housing in their locales, but their plans, for the most part, were either poorly conceived or underfunded (often both). As a break from the monotony, the staff did encounter some entertainingly far-fetched proposals, such as a plan from a group of musicians requesting a loan to build themselves a clubhouse on the roof of a skyscraper. Ultimately, only seven limited-dividend projects were approved before the division made what Ickes termed "almost a right-about face" and turned to a program of direct development.[27] (Information about the limited-dividend developments can be found in table 4.1.)

Why was the initial PWA housing program abandoned? This is a question worth examining in some depth, because variations of this approach had been employed with success in Europe, where labor unions and building societies constructed shelter for their members with loans and other aid from the government. Moreover, advocates of affordable shelter in the United States have been pushing increasingly for this kind of policy since the 1970s.

In theory, working with local low-profit or completely noncommercial developers had a number of advantages. Projects sponsored by such organizations would have been more in keeping with the American ideology of grassroots initiative than ones originated and owned by a federal agency. At a practical rather than ideological level, the limited-dividend program allowed for groups with greater knowledge of potential tenants and local circumstances than the national government to develop housing in their locales. In addition, there was more possibility for residents to participate in the design and administration of the place in which they lived than if their housing was organized by a large professionally staffed bureaucracy based in Washington, DC. Despite these potential strengths, the strategy foundered in the 1930s. For different reasons, all of the major participants had problems with the limited-dividend program.

Ickes blamed the greed of commercial developers for the program's difficulties. "It quickly became obvious," he wrote in 1935, "that our much vaunted private initiative, as so often happens when the goal is a social good instead of private profit, was unable or unwilling to undertake the job." In fact, Ickes was probably always lukewarm about what he described as "fussing around with limited-dividend projects." Trying to carry out a housing program by responding to ad hoc plans from whatever groups around the country happened to get themselves organized was antithetical to his whole philosophy of public administration. Ickes was deeply committed to making decisions on the basis of a conception of long-run national purposes, as was illustrated by his creation of the National Planning Board as an agency to advise the PWA on public works. This was the first general planning operation ever set up in the executive branch. With regard to housing specifically, his actions indicate that he thought of the decentralized RFC program primarily as a stopgap measure to give himself time to develop his own program.[28]

A program that could be up and running immediately was extremely useful given the pressure for action that Ickes was under from the moment Roosevelt chose him to direct the Public Works Administration in July 1933. Particularly at the beginning, he lacked the administrative capacity to mount any kind of coherent program, even if he had had a clear plan in mind. Although he announced formation of the Housing Division almost immediately, in reality it was only a skeletal operation for some time. In February of 1934, six months after Ickes told the country the agency was up and running, *Fortune* magazine described the division's Washington headquarters as "a half-dozen devoted men sitting in small offices noisy with typewriters." Operating "without [a] waiting room, without secretarial space, without facilities of any kind,"

the agency was less organized than "the administrative offices of the country's smallest business," according to the business periodical.[29] Especially in the first weeks after it was formed, the PWA could not have handled a housing program that required more than responding to applications. By announcing that the Housing Division was continuing along the same lines as the RFC, Ickes gave himself time to work out his own approach and assemble a unit to implement it. Also, this strategy allowed him to maintain, in the words of his public relations office, that "the first decision of PWA in regard to exercising the authority of the housing provision in the act was that private enterprise should be given a chance to do everything it could." Thus, the limited-dividend program met a variety of needs, even though it did not generate very much housing.[30]

Unlike Ickes, Kohn and some of the other staff had greater expectations for the limited-dividend phase of the division's work. From their standpoint, the problems stemmed from there not being enough good applications on which to base a national program. They attributed the paucity of plausible proposals to the country not yet being "housing conscious."[31] The bulk of would-be "sponsors had no conception of the purpose of the housing program and no capacity to visualize it," according to Michael Straus and Talbot Wegg, two PWA employees who later wrote a history of the division.[32]

To rectify the perceived lack of knowledge, Housing Division representatives traveled around the country on "barnstorming trips" to "preach the gospel of housing" to civic groups, realtors, financial institutions, and architects.[33] In the words of Straus and Wegg, this gospel was that housing

> should not be regarded as an aggregation of houses but as complete neighborhoods, planned at one time and carried out to the mutual benefit of every neighbor. Homes should be located as to have adequate sun and air and plenty of protected play space for children. They should be isolated from and yet quickly available to transportation. They should be within easy and protected walking distance of schools and shops. Buildings should be low and well built and supplied with at least the minimum of mechanical equipment. These communities must be regarded as long term investments with wise and kindly management and not as speculative developments whose sponsors care only for quick sale and getting out from under.[34]

As this articulation of agency principles makes clear, division personnel were part of the same community of discourse as Catherine Bauer and the European planners and architects whose work she described, although the reference to "wise and kindly management" shows how ideas associated with the international mass housing movement were capable of being given a more paternalistic interpretation than Bauer gave them.

The Housing Division staff believed that comprehensively designed residential districts—what they described as "complete communities"—would be superior living environments and at the same time more economical. As noted earlier, this had been a key tenet of the new housing ideas in America and Europe since before the First World War. Many of those affiliated with the program also believed that a more physically integrated residential environment would encourage a livelier and more solidary local community. Straus and Wegg optimistically predicted that "the very nature of the large-scale housing project fosters natural group action, which in turn leads to community strength."[35]

Later, these same architectural principles would be pursued solely for their economy, with the result that much American public housing had a bleak and immediately identifiable style. At this time, however, many design professionals and others believed these concepts could be used to create something better than what the private real estate market offered even affluent families: neighborhoods that combined the lower densities, trees, and green spaces characteristic of the suburban fringe with the convenience of living near the metropolitan core. (May's garden suburbs of Römerstadt and Praunheim near Frankfurt, as shown in figures 3.4 and 3.5, embodied these same ideas.)

The division's publicity campaign did little to increase the pool of strong applications, because lack of money and inability to put together plausible financial plans were the critical barriers to participation. At the depth of the depression, few groups with the desire to sponsor low-rent housing developments had the necessary 15 percent equity the PWA required. With returns capped at 6 percent and no guarantee as to the safety of capital, private investors tended to shy away from the program, just as they had from earlier attempts to get them to put their money into model tenements. Normally, real estate investors expected a substantially higher amount to compensate for the considerable risks of investing in rental properties–18 percent or better, according to one authority.[36] Another problem related to financing was that little concrete information existed about building and operating costs for good quality, low-rent residential properties that groups could use to develop convincing plans.[37]

Yet even a group with substantial resources and information would have faced almost insurmountable difficulties given the contradictions and ambiguities at the core of the program. One of these was the requirement that projects combine high-quality design and construction with low rents, all without any real subsidy except for low-interest loans. The inability of noncommercial local groups to submit proposals that inspired confidence within these guidelines is hardly surprising. Speculative developers had never been able to provide housing on this basis, and when Ickes later began direct building, he did

not try to proceed within these limits. (Projects built by the Housing Division were subsidized with grants for 45 percent of construction costs.[38])

At a more general level, the housing program faced a basic tension found in all public works activity: the desire to construct things of long-term value while at the same time creating a great many jobs as quickly as possible.[39] When housing was defined as a public works activity, more difficulties arose, such as the thorny question of which groups would live in the housing built with public money.

In general, Ickes's strategy for coping with competing, sometimes inherently conflicting, objectives was to pledge to achieve them all. Thus, in response to the question of which groups were being targeted, the administrator said that the Housing Division was building for "those in the lowest income classes." This goal was the easiest to justify on humanitarian grounds as well as least threatening to real estate investors, since the very poor were not a lucrative market segment even in prosperous times.[40] The limited-dividend program failed, he told Congress, because "of the inability of limited-dividend companies to provide housing at rentals within the financial reach of families of low income."[41]

The problem with this line of reasoning was that providing shelter at rents the very poor could afford required deep subsidies, and such subsidies were not available. Ickes used the fact that rent levels at the limited-dividend projects were too high for the very poor to justify direct federal construction. But here, intentionally or not, he conflated two issues: the question of who would construct and own housing developments and the question of whether and how much to subsidize housing. It was expedient to argue that the PWA had to mount a more centralized program because that was the only way to provide for the very poor, since this was the direction that Ickes wanted to go anyway. The tactic had a downside, however, because the housing the PWA itself built—despite significant subsidies—was also too expensive for the very poor. By promising results that predictably could not be delivered, Ickes created expectations that later could be used to judge his programs as failures. Yet, without such promises, Ickes probably feared that he would not have the political support necessary to move ahead at all.

Kohn, the Housing Division's first director, was under less political pressure and was therefore in a position to be more candid with the public. In the fall of 1933, he readily acknowledged that the limited-dividend program was not even attempting to meet the needs of the very poor. He told the press that the Housing Division was aiming at the "middle third" of the market, not the most needy. For Kohn, this policy was not only realistic but desirable. Providing housing for the very poor was not in the cards, he explained, because it would require substantial subsidies, and the division did not have that kind of money at its disposal. Moreover, the director was not interested in supplying specialized housing for poor people. His objective, which he shared with his colleagues in the Regional Planning Association of America, was to upgrade the overall character of American housing. Trying to provide for the poor, without making more general changes in the larger patterns of physical development and financing, made no sense to him. In Kohn's mind, the value of the PWA housing program was as a laboratory for developing better and cheaper ways of building urban residential environments. The savings achieved could provide the resources to supply decent housing for those unable to afford it on their own. In this way, the least affluent could be aided without being isolated.[42]

The Attempt to Establish a Federal Housing Corporation

Ickes gave the first public indication that he planned to move the Housing Division in another direction in October 1933, when he filed a certificate of incorporation for a federal housing corporation under the laws of Delaware. The action was, he said, "an outgrowth of our recent experiences" that demonstrated "we may not depend upon private enterprises or limited-dividend corporations to initiate comprehensive low-cost housing and slum-clearance projects." He explained that the purpose of the corporation was to encourage the creation of state and local public housing authorities, but the fact that he largely ignored these entities after they came into existence suggests that his primary objective was gaining the ability to advance a program from Washington.[43]

Ickes was clearly anxious to mount an ambitious housing program. On one occasion he told the press that he saw PWA housing as comparable to government-run electric power facilities and indicated that he believed that public enterprise could legitimately compete with private capital in both fields.[44] He wanted to avoid trying to work through the Housing Division, because any construction work undertaken directly by the agency would be bound by the federal government's complex procedural rules. All bids for contracts and materials would be subject to review beyond the agency, and the already complicated task of land acquisition for large urban sites would become even more slow and unwieldy, with the Justice Department pulled into even the smallest legal detail.[45]

Ickes's attempt to create a public corporation through which to mount a national housing program was part of an ongoing search by the executive branch to develop new methods of wielding administrative authority that would prove acceptable within traditional conceptions of American government. Some of these innovations succeeded, as in the case of the Federal Land Banks in which the government held part of the stock. Established in 1916

and declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1921, the land banks served as the model for a myriad of other federal credit agencies, including the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.[46] But other attempts to create new mechanisms—such as Roosevelt's Executive Reorganization Bill of 1937, with its provision for a permanent planning board—were perceived as too much of a break with traditions of American representative democracy.[47]

At first it looked as if Ickes's attempt to create a more flexible and efficient vehicle through which to work was going to succeed. Roosevelt agreed to order $100,000,000 of PWA funds transferred to the new corporation. However, the transfer was blocked by the rigidly conservative Comptroller General John Raymond McCarl, an appointee of President Warren Harding. McCarl refused to move the money on the grounds that the charter of the corporation gave it powers that went beyond the vaguely worded housing section of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Having a fixed term of office, the comptroller general was independent of the president. Furthermore, as one legal scholar observed, many members of Congress had the "jitters" when it came to corporations created by the administration. The political fallout seemed too high, and Roosevelt withdrew his support. Reluctantly, Ickes abandoned the plan.[48]

The Housing Division as a Direct Builder

In February of 1934, Ickes announced his decision to suspend the limited-dividend program and begin production through the Housing Division. This was the basis on which the PWA housing program operated for its remaining three years of existence. While previously the limited-dividend companies had functioned as developers, now the Housing Division itself undertook this role. The division used local architectural firms and building contractors, but closely supervised all phases of work. It acquired sites in its own name and retained title to land and structures after construction was completed. Under the terms of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the PWA could make capital grants to public bodies for 30 percent of the cost of a project. To public or private developers, it could offer loans for up to 70 percent of the cost of a project at 4 percent interest amortized over thirty-five years. (No outright grants were allowed to private developers, even if they were state-supervised limited-dividend corporations.) After careful analysis, Ickes and his staff decided that it was unrealistic to try to produce low-rent housing on this basis, and they successfully lobbied Congress for permission to raise the limit for grants to 45 percent, cut the interest rate to 3 percent, and lengthen the amortization period to sixty years.[49] When the Housing Division began operations, no public entities existed that were legally empowered to build, own, and operate low-rent housing, but as they came into existence, the Housing Division

E 4.2 PWA DIRECT-BUILT PROJECTS

	Name	Units	Kind*	Race	Site†	Funding‡
nta, GA	Techwood Homes	718	apts/rows	white	slum	$2,969
nta, GA	University Homes	675	flats/rows	black	slum	$2,592
ntic City, NJ	Smithfield Court	277	flats/rows	black	slum	$1,550
ingham, AL	Stanley S. Holmes Village	544	rows	black	slum	$2,500
on, MA	Old Harbor Village	1,016	apts/rows	white	vacant	$6,636
ras, PR	Caserio La Granja	75	rows	native	vacant	$ 275
bridge, MA	New Towne Court	294	apts	white	slum	$2,500
den, NJ	Westfield Acres	515	apts	white	vacant	$3,176
leston, SC	Meeting St. Manor/ Cooper River Court	212	rows	both	vacant	$1,350
ago, IL	Jane Addams Houses (1st part)	723	apts	white	slum	$5,119
ago, IL	Jane Addams Houses (2d part)	304	apts/rows	white	vacant	$1,800
ago, IL	Julia C. Lathrop Homes	925	all	white	vacant	$5,942
ago, IL	Trumbull Park Homes	462	all	white	vacant	$3,038
innati, OH	Laurel Homes	1,039	apts	both	slum	$7,086
eland, OH	Cedar-Central Apartments	650	apts	white	slum	$3,384
eland, OH	Outhwaite Homes	579	all	black	slum	$3,564
eland, OH	Lakeview Terrace	620	apts/rows	white	slum	$3,800
mbia, SC	University Terrace	122	all	both	slum	$ 706
s, TX	Cedar Springs Place	181	all	white	vacant	$1,020
oit, MI	Brewster	699	all	black	slum	$5,200
oit, MI	Parkside	779	all	white	vacant	$4,500
, OK	Cherokee Terrace	80	rows	white	slum	$ 557
sville, IN	Lincoln Gardens	191	flats/rows	black	slum	$1,000
napolis,IN	Lockfield Garden Apartments	748	apts/rows	black	slum	$3,207
onville, FL	Durkeeville	215	rows	black	vacant	$1,000
awanna, NY	Baker Homes	268	rows	white	vacant	$1,500
ngton, KY	Blue Grass Park/Aspen Dale	286	rows	both	vacant	$1,704
ville, KY	LaSalle Place	210	rows	white	vacant	$1,370
ville, KY	College Court	125	flats/rows	black	vacant	$ 758
phis, TN	Dixie Homes	633	flats/rows	black	slum	$3,400
phis, TN	Lauderdale Courts	449	apts/rows	white	slum	$3,128
ni, FL	Liberty Square	243	rows	black	vacant	$ 970
aukee, WI	Parklawn	518	apts/rows	white	vacant	$2,600
neapolis, MN	Sumner Field Homes	451	all	both	slum	$3,500
tgomery, AL	Riverside Heights	100	rows	white	vacant	$ 403
tgomery, AL	William B. Patterson Courts	156	rows	black	slum	$ 522
ville, TN	Cheatham Place	314	rows	white	slum	$2,000
ville, TN	Andrew Jackson Courts	398	flats/rows	black	slum	$1,500
York, NY	Wiliamsburg Houses	1,622	apts	white	slum	$13,569
York, NY	Harlem River Houses	574	apts	black	vacant	$4,219
homa City, OK	Will Rogers Courts	364	rows	white	vacant	$2,000
ha, NE	Logan Fontenelle Homes	284	flats/rows	both	slum	$2,000

TABLE 4.2 CONTINUED

City	Name	Units	Kind*	Race	Site†	Funding
Philadelphia, PA	Hill Creek	258	flats/rows	white	vacant	$2,11
San Juan, PR	Caserio Mirapalmeras	131	rows	native	vacant	$ 50
Schenectady, NY	Schonowee Village	219	apts	white	slum	$1,50
Stamford, CT	Fairfield Court	146	apts/rows	white	vacant	$ 92
Toledo, OH	Brand Witlock Homes	264	all	black	slum	$2,00
Virgin Islands	Bassin Triangle/Marley Homes/H. H. Berg Homes	141	rows	native	both	$ 25
Washington, DC	Langston	274	all	black	vacant	$1,84
Wayne, PA	Highland Homes	50	flats/rows	black	slum	$ 34
TOTAL		21,121				$129,08

* Rowhouses ("rows"), apartments, flats, or some combination.
† Slum, if slum clearance involved; vacant, if built on empty land.
‡ In $1,000 (thousands of dollars), as of 15 March 1937.
Note: This information is derived from Harold L. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works," report submitted to Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 75th. Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), Hearings on S. 1685 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1937).

worked with them. During this second phase of the program, the PWA constructed fifty-one projects in thirty-six cities in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. (See table 4.2 for information about the housing developments directly constructed by the PWA.)

Slum clearance became a controversial issue for the division during this period. Ickes, as he began outlining his plans for the Housing Corporation, described clearing slums as a central purpose. Bauer, Mumford, and other allies of Kohn protested this emphasis in a series of sharply critical magazine articles, arguing that resources should be used for producing new housing at the lowest cost rather than for the expensive and (from their perspective) less urgent process of urban redevelopment. Bauer maintained that undeveloped land was not only much cheaper, it was better because of the absence of already-established street patterns.

Mumford gloomily concluded that the turn toward slum clearance meant that "the government has temporarily given in completely to the demands of the financial and the realty interests and has no serious intention of lending money for any modern community housing whatever." Instead of making concessions that seriously compromised the creation of good housing in order to satisfy political opponents, Bauer believed that the government should aim high. A thoroughgoing solution to the American housing problem, which "goes so deep into the social and economic structure of the nation," was not in the cards in the near future, she argued. Therefore "a mere handful of examples of good modern planned housing would be more effective than any number of slum areas replaced at terrific expense by near or 'reform' slums."

Such examples might give "incipient radicals a more concrete idea of what they are fighting for." She proposed that "if we are going through our own experiment in social democracy—or even if we are not—let us at least use it to make clearer to ourselves what we really do want."[50]

Ickes was not persuaded by such arguments. Slum clearance was popular, and he was confident that he would be able to find ways to keep inner-city land costs down. Calling his critics "disappointed idealists," he charged that they wanted to use the PWA to experiment with "immature or ill-conceived ideas."[51] By the following summer, he had forced Kohn out. Although Ickes implied that the reason for the director's departure had to do with unspecified financial improprieties, it seemed clear that the actual problem was disagreements over policy.[52]

Ickes replaced Kohn with Colonel Horatio B. Hackett, an architect and administrator with the large Chicago architectural firm of Holabird and Root and an old friend. The two worked well together. Hackett, an able administrator with experience coordinating large building projects, was less theoretically oriented than his predecessor. Thus, he never opposed the general direction that Ickes set or expressed opinions at odds with those of his boss the way Kohn had. To carry out the new program, Hackett vastly expanded the staff and transformed the Housing Division into a large production office. Later he moved up in the administration of the PWA, and there were subsequently two more directors, but these personnel changes did not involve new policy directions.[53]

Land acquisition was the most difficult aspect of the direct-building program. To help resolve the conflict between the expense of clearing slums and pressure to keep development costs low, the agency periodically invoked the right of eminent domain. The federal government's power to condemn land for public purposes had been upheld by the courts since 1875, and it was specifically granted by the legislation that authorized the Public Works Administration. Nevertheless, Ickes knew that condemnation was politically risky, and he actively worked to keep public opinion on his side by talking about "recalcitrant owners who are unwilling to sell at a fair price" and the difficulties of land assembly in slum districts. Indeed, it was a daunting task to acquire the sometimes hundreds of small, individually owned parcels in deteriorated and largely abandoned urban areas that were required to make up large building sites. Many times it was a challenge just to locate owners, and even then titles were often defective. In Birmingham, Alabama, the division found that a key piece of property belonged to a branch of the Sons-and-Daughters-of-I-Will-Arise Lodge, a 200-member organization that had never been incorporated. No sale was possible without the approval of every member, and many members had moved away or simply disappeared.[54]

Ickes maintained that condemnation was used only "as a last resort," and even then mostly to save time by clearing titles rather than forcing down prices. Most transactions were achieved through what he described as "friendly negotiations" rather than condemnation. Of course, some owners undoubtedly felt less than friendly as they bargained with federal negotiators who could always fall back on condemning their property should the discussion reach an impasse. In other words, the very fact that the Housing Division was known to invoke eminent domain gave the agency enormous power vis-à-vis individual property owners even when it did not employ this legal mechanism.[55]

As it worked out, the agency was only able to use condemnation for a few months. In January of 1935, the U.S. District Court for Western Kentucky upheld the petition of a disgruntled Louisville landowner who maintained that it was unconstitutional for the Housing Division to use the power of eminent domain to take his property. The judge, an avid anti-New Dealer, agreed, declaring that the low-rent dwellings that the PWA proposed to construct were not going to be "devoted to a public use." He construed the idea of public use narrowly, as including only things available to all citizens on an equal basis, such as parks, roads, or government office buildings. Federally subsidized housing would not be public in the same way, he reasoned, because it would be available only to certain people. This ruling brought all land acquisition activities to a halt while the division's legal staff, together with the Justice Department, prepared an appeal. In July, the Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati upheld the lower court's decision on a two to one vote. The division appealed to the Supreme Court, but at the last minute withdrew the case, presumably for fear of a decision that might have wide negative implications for the whole New Deal.[56]

The Louisville decision effectively blocked the use of condemnation, thus undermining the division's strategy of combining new building with slum clearance. Later site acquisition had to rely on willing sellers, which, in practice, meant buying undeveloped land on the urban periphery from property owners who owned large parcels. Of the PWA's fifty-one federal projects, twenty-seven were built on the sites of former slums and twenty-four on raw land. (One of the seven limited-dividend projects was constructed on the site of a former slum, while the other six used undeveloped land.)[57]

Just as Bauer and her allies had predicted, this change in policy made land assembly easier and cheaper. But as Ickes had seen from the beginning, the new focus cost the Housing Division significant political support. In the words of an agency publication, slum clearance, rather than housing, "had been the more dramatic and popular practice." Influential local business leaders liked slum clearance programs, because they rebuilt, at public expense, run-down parts of cities that often threatened their own property investments. Also, when slum clearance was linked to a building program, the total number of housing units available in a city often stayed in equilibrium. This pleased rental property owners, who regarded an expansion in the supply of rental housing as a threat, especially given the glut left over from the building boom of the 1920s. Arguments that federal housing would not siphon away potential tenants, because PWA developments were aimed at an entirely different market segment, were never completely reassuring (nor should they have been, since even the federal projects were not affordable to the poorest families).[58]

The Housing Division's Record on Race

The PWA allotted slightly more than one-third of its housing units to African Americans. Twenty-one developments were built for blacks only, and six others had both black and white tenants. Funding levels for construction were the same regardless of the intended occupants, and because of unpredictable factors like the talent of different architectural teams, some developments intended for blacks actually turned out better than ones built for whites (as was the case with the Harlem River Houses, discussed in chapter 6.)

With regard to employment opportunities for African Americans, Ickes was inclined to take an activist stance. At the point he had taken over as head of the nation's public works in the summer of 1933, he found only eleven blacks in a work force of over four thousand engaged in building Boulder Dam. Despite such occurrences, individual cases of discrimination were difficult to prove. Therefore, Ickes and his aide for Negro Affairs, Robert Weaver, were anxious for the Housing Division to move beyond the procedure of putting nondiscrimination clauses in contracts with private companies when it began its own building program. They came up with a plan for a minimum percentage quota system, by which contractors were required to pay skilled black workers a proportion of the total payroll amounting to at least half of their percentage in the local work force. The system worked well. In Birmingham, Alabama, for instance, blacks—who made up 23 percent of all skilled workers in the city—received 20 percent of the payroll that went to skilled workers who put up PWA housing. Reviewing the program in *Opportunity* magazine, Weaver concluded its success was due to the fact that it put the burden of proof on employers, rather than on blacks or the government. "Instead of the Government's having to establish the existence of discrimination," he wrote, "it is the contractor's obligation to establish the absence of discrimination."[59]

One important drawback to the Housing Division's record on race, however, was the agency's decision not to disrupt pre-existing racial patterns of neighborhoods. In effect, this meant building housing for African Americans in deteriorated sections of cities where they already lived. The purpose of the

strategy was to avoid white backlash, but the practice reinforced existing patterns of residential segregation, sometimes even creating more highly concentrated racial ghettos than had previously existed.[60]

Controversy over Centralization

The PWA housing program was one of the most controversial innovations of the entire New Deal. Not surprisingly, it aroused hostility from anti-New Dealers and real estate owners, but it also provoked the ire of liberals and radicals who supported public housing. The emphasis on slum clearance disappointed Bauer and other advocates of the new housing theories. Local officials, whatever their policy preferences, generally felt ignored by the Housing Division. In general, supporters of public aid to low-rent housing deplored the "conflict, delay, and confusion" that marked the PWA program and were disappointed at how little was actually built. Many left-liberal critics concluded that these problems stemmed from too much centralization of power in Washington, which they attributed largely to Ickes's "ironhanded" style of administration.[61]

The critique had significant plausibility, because the PWA did not accept much outside advice. As the public exchange over slum clearance made clear, the strong-minded but personally sensitive Ickes set his own course and lashed out angrily when criticized. Even local housing authorities, formed originally at the urging of the Housing Division, had little impact on decisions in their own cities. Charles Abrams, who served as legal counsel to the New York City Housing Authority from 1934 to 1937, maintained that citizens lost interest in serving on the boards of local housing authorities as the role of these agencies "sank with successive PWA bulletins from entrepreneur to co-venturer, from co-venturer to adviser, from adviser to functionless entity."[62] In 1937, a Housing Division official conceded publicly that the PWA had in fact treated local housing authorities as though they were "intelligently interested bystanders," offering the rationale that it was the PWA that had been placed in charge of the controversial new program and therefore the federal agency had to assume final responsibility along with the "grief which accompanies any pioneering work."[63]

Nor did Ickes allow much latitude within the agency itself. Even his admirers described the internal workings of the division as overly rigid and centralized. Ickes, despite being responsible for running the entire Public Works Administration as well as the Department of Interior, still scrutinized "every detail of the Housing Division's operations." He insisted on making the final decision on every project and signed every contract the Housing Division made.[64]

In Ickes's defense, it needs to be emphasized that while his penchant for personal control was extreme, his fear of graft was not unwarranted. Real estate transactions had traditionally provided opportunities for corruption at every level of government. With his political roots in Progressive Era campaigns for clean government, Ickes knew that a scandal like Teapot Dome would undercut support for federal public works for years.[65] More important, his management style was not the fundamental cause of the "delay and red tape" decried by those who worked with the agency.[66] The "Old Curmudgeon" had far less power than liberals imagined and conservatives feared. Looking back, it becomes obvious that the Housing Division was a small, fragile operation trying to find ways to introduce new and threatening activities with few resources, little experience, widespread and powerful enemies, and no mobilized mass support. This larger reality, rather than specific problems with its bureaucratic structure or the personality of its administrator, goes furthest to explain the agency's slowness and inflexibility.[67]

When Ickes was first given responsibility for launching a national housing program in the summer of 1933, he inherited no pre-existing administrative apparatus beyond a few boxes of files from the RFC. Starting almost completely from scratch, he confronted both longstanding tendencies toward weak and easily permeated federal structures and almost a vacuum of experience with direct public intervention in the housing sector. Except for a few months in 1918, there had never been any kind of direct federal effort to stimulate residential construction, and only a very few programs had been attempted at the state or municipal level. This historical background meant a dearth of pre-existing institutional structures with which to work or experienced administrative talent to employ. Like other New Deal administrators, Ickes was forced to draw heavily from the private sector for his personnel. Although many of his appointments were, like Hackett, technically and administratively skilled, they had not been socialized into believing that they could analyze national economic and social problems and use government power to solve them.[68] In contrast, when European nations launched their ambitious housing initiatives after World War I, they built on decades of experimentation with direct programs at the local level and extensive legal precedents for public control of land use.[69]

Nor were the difficulties of a purely historic character. Pressures that had made for weak federal administrative structures in the past were still very much alive in the 1930s, as Ickes experienced when he tried to create the Housing Corporation as a way of freeing the housing program from the ponderous procedural rules under which federal agencies operated. In addition, the Housing Division was always uncertain about its funding, which significantly impeded efficiency. Roosevelt, who had been lukewarm from the first about large public works expenditures, continually used PWA funds for other emergencies. The

biggest single financial shock to the Housing Division came in December 1934 when the president impounded $110 million for direct relief purposes out of the division's original allotment of slightly over $135 million. Practically all work in progress stopped and all long-range planning was disrupted until the following July when money started flowing to the division again.[70]

Thus, despite the always confident and sometimes blustering tone of its administrator, the PWA Housing Division was actually a frail operation. Indeed, it may have been Ickes's frustration with the lack of what Theda Skocpol has called "state capacity" as much as his legendary fear of corruption that led him to try to control so many of the details of the program himself.[71] Perhaps, possessing so few other resources, he thought he could advance some kind of coherent national housing program in good part through sheer force of personality. As scholars have noted in relation to other leading government figures in this era, such as Hugh Johnson, Jesse Jones, and Roosevelt himself, there were strong pressures to try to substitute "charismatic" or "heroic" styles of leadership for the weak administrative power that these leaders actually wielded.[72]

Conclusion

The crisis of the real estate industry in the early 1930s, the mobilization of urban voters behind the Democratic Party, and the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act with its provision for a federal housing program created a political opening that made possible the first direct federal intervention into the housing sector during peacetime. While real, the opportunity was limited, given the absence of both government administrative machinery and a nationally organized constituency.

Despite the obstacles, the PWA Housing Division, with its faith in public enterprise and in the positive role that architecture could play socially, did manage to achieve some impressive results. Consistent with his stance on everything the Public Works Administration built, Ickes insisted on high quality work. While not himself particularly inspired by the new residential design theories, he nevertheless employed many architects who were and allowed them budgets generous enough to achieve handsome results. Most important, Ickes was skeptical about the ability of private enterprise alone to provide for the public welfare in fields like housing, and he had an expansive conception of the role government could play. In a fundamental sense, therefore, Ickes and Bauer were much closer than either of them probably ever realized. Under Ickes's guidance, the Housing Division's program represented the most thoroughgoing challenge to a market-based housing system ever attempted in the United States, showing what a broadly oriented federal program to aid noncommercial housing could look like.

In terms of architectural design, the work of the Housing Division was critically well received, and this positive assessment continues to the present. Architect Richard Plunz, writing in the 1970s, noted that: "In general apartment design standards were very high, with sizes, light, and ventilation equal to the best of the 1920s garden apartments." According to architectural historian Richard Pommer, "The early work of the PWA . . . remained for many decades the finest urban housing in America."[73]

Popular acceptance, not just critical success, greeted the agency's work. Ordinary citizens expressed their approval by moving into the federal developments—even when they might have afforded other accommodations. Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts drew attention to this fact when he complained in 1936 that "the houses which have been constructed [by the PWA] in New York, Cleveland, and Boston and elsewhere are really in competition with private property."[74]

That some moderate-income people not only found PWA housing appealing but were allowed to move in points to one of the best features of the PWA program in its first years: that it was not "means-tested." While using scarce public resources only for the most needy might seem fair and logical, programs limited to only the poorest turn out to have debilitating long-range problems. Their narrow constituency makes them more susceptible to budget cuts, and participants are often stigmatized. Only universal programs such as social security seem able to survive politically while not demeaning recipients.[75] Initially, PWA housing was open to anyone who cared to apply. This situation ended in 1936 when Congress passed the George-Healey Act, which retroactively set income ceilings for the PWA housing projects directly built and owned by the government. Where PWA apartment complexes did not become part of the housing stock of public authorities, and hence subject to income restrictions, white-collar workers were regular residents (as was the case of the Carl Mackley Houses in Philadelphia, which will be discussed in the next chapter).[76]

Although the Housing Division had a life span of only four years, it still proved a fruitful laboratory for the development of a new kind of urban shelter that might have been the basis for a majority-oriented noncommercial federal housing program. Architect Oskar Stonorov, who was involved with the design of two PWA complexes, articulated the objectives that he and other participants shared:

> . . . the purpose of low-cost housing is, at its present state of infancy in the United States, not only to house slum-dwellers or poor people but also to establish standards of living in a new mode . . . quite different from what individual speculative activity has created.[77]

With the resources of the Housing Division behind them, a number of visionaries like Stonorov did make progress in developing a different kind of urban residential pattern. The next two chapters will investigate what these "standards of living in a new mode," in Stonorov's words, meant for those who experienced them in two developments, each built in one of the two different phases of the Housing Division's work.

44. Bauer, "Prize Essay," 110.

45. Bauer, "Own Words," 27.

46. Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 106.

47. Miller, *Lewis Mumford*, 323. Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 118, Mumford quote from letter to Cole, 8 Aug. 1972, 125.

48. Miller, *Lewis Mumford*, 323–24; quote from letter from Bauer to Frederick Gutheim, 19 Nov. 1932, in Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 127, see also 120–23. Editors of *Fortune*, *Housing America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), quotes from 21. Lewis Mumford, "Taxes Into Houses," *Fortune* 7 (May 1933): quotes from 89.

49. Quotes from letters from Bauer to Frederick Gutheim, n.d. and 19 Nov. 1932, cited in Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 127.

50. Letter from Mumford to Bauer, 7 June 1933, quoted in Miller, *Lewis Mumford*, 333, see also 330–40.

51. Letter from Bauer to Mumford, 1933, quoted in Miller, *Lewis Mumford*, 332.

52. Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 130.

53. William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940* (1963; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 53.

54. This was Edith Elmer Wood's *Housing Progress in Western Europe* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1923).

55. Resume in Papers of Executive Secretary of the Labor Housing Conference, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, file: National Resources Board; Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 131; Quotes from letter from Bauer to Frederick Gutheim, 21 Mar. 1933, and from Ferris Greenslet to Bauer, 15 Mar. 1933, both cited in Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 131–32.

56. Bauer to Lovell Thompson, 24 Apr. 1934, cited in Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 261, note 3.

57. Bauer, *Modern Housing*, xv, 199–204.

58. Ibid., quotes from 147 and 124–25.

59. Ibid., 124, 126–27.

60. Ibid., 125, 132–34.

61. Ibid., 130–31.

62. Ibid., 176–87, 200, 207–10.

63. Ibid., 149–50, quote from 150.

64. Ibid., 150–52, quote from 152.

65. Ibid., 136.

66. Ibid., 242.

67. Ibid., 78–91, 253. Recent scholarly investigation supports Bauer's conclusion. Historians credit improvements in housing quality in late nineteenth-century Britain solely to increasing real wages starting in 1850. Philanthropic reforms are seen as having had negligible effect. Contemporary scholarship is reviewed in Richard Rodger, *Housing in Urban Britain, 1780–1914* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 9–12, 47.

68. Bauer, *Modern Housing*, 87–91, 93–94. For a discussion of the role of housing societies in Germany, see Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany*, 88–89, 104. Helen Searing describes working-class housing associations in the Netherlands and especially the role of these organizations in supporting the development of the Amsterdam School of Architecture in "With Red Flags Flying: Housing in Amsterdam, 1915–1923," in *Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics*, edited by Henry A. Millon and Linda Nochlin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 230–69.

69. Friedrich Engels, "How Proudhon Solves the Housing Question," originally published 1872, reprinted in Engels, *The Housing Question* (1954; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 18.

70. Bauer, *Modern Housing*, 96. Leonardo Benevolo discusses this issue in *The Origins of Modern Town Planning*, translated by Judith Landry (1963; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Paperback, 1971), 105–47.

71. Bauer, *Modern Housing*, 87, 133, quote from 254.

72. Ibid., 122.

73. Ibid., 122.

74. Ibid., 252–3.

75. Ibid., 255.

76. Ibid., 255, 254.

77. Quotes from Newman in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 181 (Sept. 1935): 203; and Haskell, "Housing and America," *The Nation* 140 (20 Feb. 1935): 228.

78. Haskell, "Housing and America," 228; and Langdon W. Post, "The Exploitation of Land and People," *Saturday Review of Literature* 11 (26 Jan. 1935): 442.

79. For discussions of how such structural factors facilitated the creation of noncommercial housing sectors in Britain, see Steve Schifferes, "The Dilemmas of British Housing Policy," in *Critical Perspectives on Housing*, edited by Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 533; and Martin J. Daunton, "Introduction" to Daunton, ed., *Councillors and Tenants: Local Authority Housing in English Cities, 1919–1939* (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1984), 1–33. For Vienna, see Peter Marcuse, "A Useful Installment," 581–83; and Marcuse, "The Housing Policy of Social Democracy: Determinants and Consequences," in Rabinbach, *The Austrian Socialist Experiment*, 201–21.

80. Bauer, *Modern Housing*, 254.

81. Bauer to Dale Warren, 9 May 1934, cited in Cole, "Catherine Bauer," 264.

No MS Sources

Chapter Four

1. For Sunnyside and Radburn, see chapter 3. The apartments of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers are discussed in chapter 5.

2. Cities could not accomplish a great deal on their own, given their limited resources and their lack of authority over land-use decisions throughout the metropolitan region in which they were located.

3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics, Bicentennial Edition*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), N156, 640. Hereafter: Census, *Historical Statistics*.

4. Census, *Historical Statistics*, Series F79 and F89, 231.

5. John H. Fahey, "The Resumption of Home Building," *Real Estate Record and Builders' Guide* 134 (29 Sept. 1934): 5.

6. Gertrude S. Fish, "Housing Policy During the Great Depression," in *The Story of Housing*, edited by Gertrude Sipperly Fish (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 183.

7. Census, *Historical Statistics*, N156, 640.

8. Herbert Hoover, "Address," in *Housing Objectives and Programs*, vol. 11 of *President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership*, edited by John M. Gries and James Ford (Washington, DC: President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, 1932), 1.

9. Hoover, "Address," 2–5.

10. 47 Stat. 725 (1932). Gries and Ford, "Introduction" to *Housing Objectives and Programs*, edited by Gries and Ford, 21. William Linous Cody Wheaton, "The Evolution of Federal Housing Programs," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1953, 21–37.

11. Robert P. Lamont, Foreword to *Home Ownership, Income and Types of Dwellings*, vol. 4 of *President's Conference*, edited by Gries and Ford, viii.

12. Robert P. Lamont, "Foreword" to *Negro Housing*, vol. 6 of *President's Conference*, edited by Gries and Ford, vii—viii.

13. Richard T. Ely, "Economic Factors Underlying Housing, and Experience of Limited Dividend Companies," in *Slums, Large-Scale Housing and Decentralization*, vol. 3 of *President's Conference*, edited by Gries and Ford, 155.

14. Ray Lyman Wilber, "Foreword" to *Slums, Large-Scale Housing, and Decentralization*, vol. 3 of *President's Conference*, edited by Gries and Ford, xii.

15. *Emergency Relief and Construction Act*, 47 Stat. 709 (1932). Gilbert A. Cam, "United States Government Activities in Low-Cost Housing, 1932–38," *Journal of Political Economy* 47 (June 1939): 358.

16. Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 193; Census, *Historical Statistics*, N156, 640; William Leuchtenburg, *Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 53.

17. Timothy L. McDonnell, *The Wagner Housing Act: A Case Study of the Legislative Process* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1957), 54–55, 29. Citations from *The National Industrial Recovery Act*, Public Law 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).

18. John H. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 58. Charles W. Eagles, *Democracy Delayed: Congressional Reapportionment and Urban-Rural Conflict in the 1920s* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 31, 11–124, Rankin quoted on 82.

19. Mollenkopf, *Contested City*, 54–72. Mollenkopf calculates that non-Southern Democrats also had working majorities in the House after the congressional elections of 1934, 1936, 1964, 1974, 1976, and 1978. See also Kristi Anderson, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), esp. 19–42; Zane L. Miller and Patricia M. Melvin, *The Urbanization of Modern America*, 2d ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 158–62. The analysis in this section assumes a strong relationship between voting and policy formation but also acknowledges the importance of institutional structures in the emphasis on reapportionment. For discussions of the connections between electoral behavior and pubic policy, see Barbara Deckard Sinclair, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925–1938," *American Political Science Review* 71 (Sept. 1977): 940–53; and Benjamin Ginsberg, "Elections and Public Policy," *American Political Science Review* 70 (Mar. 1976): 41–49. For arguments as to why institutional structures are significant in shaping public policy, see Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3–37; and Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Summer 1962): 255–78.

20. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal*, 44–62; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), vol. 2 of *The Age of Roosevelt*, 98–102.

21. Senator Albert Fall, quoted in Harry C. Bredemeier, *The Federal Public Housing Movement: A Case Study of Social Change*, (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 44.

22. Leonard Freedman, *Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 160.

23. Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works [hereafter FEAPW], *Urban Housing: The Story of the PWA Housing Division, Bulletin No. 2*, (Washington, DC: ~~Government Printing Office, 1936), 37; Miles L. Colean, *American Housing*~~: *Problems and Prospects* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1944), 276–77; Harold L. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works," report submitted to Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), *Hearings on S. 1685* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1937), 20. Different authors calculate the total number of projects in different ways. Statistics given here conform to the data published in Ickes's 1937 congressional testimony.

24. Michael W. Straus and Talbot Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 31–31; "Housing Upheaval," *Architectural Forum* 61 (July 1934): 67; Roy Lubove, "Homes and 'A Few Well Placed Fruit Trees': An Object Lesson in Federal Housing," *Social Research* 27 (Winter 1960): 478.

25. James Stuart Olson, *Herbert Hoover and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 1931–1933* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977), 88–89; Cam, "United States Government Activities in Low-Cost Housing," 357–59; Jack F. Isakoff, "The Public Works Administration," *University of Illinois Bulletin* 36 (18 Nov. 1938): 127–28; Ernest M. Fisher, "Housing Legislation and Housing Policy in the United States," *Michigan Law Review* 31 (Jan. 1933): 320–21, quote on 320.

26. Jack Levin, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, "Your Congress and American Housing: Actions of Congress on Housing from 1852 to 1951," *House Documents*, vol. 18, Miscellaneous, 82d Cong., 2d Session, H. Doc. 532 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952), 6; Cam, "United States Government Activity," 358; Richard Plunz, *A History of Housing in New York City: Dwelling Type and Social Change in the American Metropolis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 210.

27. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 31–43; "The New Deal's Housing Activities," *Congressional Digest* 15 (Apr. 1936): 110; Cam, "Government Activity in Low-Cost Housing," 357–60; Horatio B. Hackett, "Problems and Policies of the Housing Division of the P.W.A.," in *Housing Officials' Year Book, 1935*, edited by Coleman Woodbury (Chicago: National Association of Housing Officials, 1935), 1; FEAPW, *Urban Housing*, 28–30; Harold L. Ickes, *Back to Work: The Story of PWA* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), quote from 183.

28. Ickes, *Back to Work*, 183; Barry Dean Karl, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900–1939* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 200–202.

29. "State Housing: American Style," *Fortune* 9 (Feb. 1934): 114.

30. Public Works Administration, *America Builds: The Record of the PWA* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 209.

31. FEAPW, *Urban Housing*, 30.

32. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 35.

33. Ibid., 56.

34. Ibid., 36.

35. Ibid., 55–79, quote on 57.

36. Eugene H. Klaber, "Limited Dividend Corporations Under the National Housing Act," *Architectural Record* 77 (Feb. 1935): 78; Charles Abrams, *The Future of Housing* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), 234.

37. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 42. The bulk of the data on financial aspects of limited-dividend housing that did exist at this time came from projects supervised by the New York State Board of Housing in New York City. These data were not generally applicable, however, since costs in New York were much higher than for other urban areas.

38. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division," 21.

39. Barry D. Karl, *The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915–1945* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 123–24, 164–65.

40. Harold L. Ickes, "The Federal Housing Program," *New Republic* 81 (19 Dec. 1934): 155.

41. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division," 21.

42. "Kohn Explains Housing Views," *Real Estate Record and Builders' Guide* 132 (7 Oct. 1933): 3.

43. "Housing Corporation to Hasten Slum Clearance," *Architectural Record* 74 (Dec. 1933): 1.

44. Isakoff, "Public Works Administration," 129.

45. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 44–50; Cam, "United States Government Activity in Low Cost Housing," 360.

46. John Thurston, "Government Proprietary Corporations," *Virginia Law Review* 21 (Feb. 1935): 354–56.

47. Otis L. Graham, Jr., *Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 49–64.

48. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 47–50. Isakoff, "Public Works Administration," 60–61; Cam, "United States Government Activity in Low-Cost Housing," 360; McDonnell, *The Wagner Housing Act*, 36–38. Quote from Harvey Pinney, "The Legal Status of Federal Government Corporations," *California Law Review* 27 (Sept. 1939): 736.

49. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 124–25; *George-Healey Act*, 49 Stat. 2025 (1936).

50. Lewis Mumford, "New Homes for a New Deal, III: The Shortage of Dwellings and Direction," *New Republic* 78 (28 Feb. 1934): 69–72, quote on 71; Catherine Bauer, "'Slum' Clearance or 'Housing,'" *Nation* 137 (27 Dec. 1933): 730–31, quotes from 731. See also, Catherine Bauer, "Slums Aren't Necessary," *American Mercury* 31 (Mar. 1934): 296–305; Albert Mayer, "New Homes for a New Deal, I: Slum Clearance—But How?" *New Republic* 78 (14 Feb. 1934): 7–9; Henry Wright, "New Homes for a New Deal, II: Abolishing Slums Forever," *New Republic* 78 (21 Feb. 1934): 41–43; Albert Mayer, Henry Wright, and Lewis Mumford, "New Homes for a New Deal, IV: A Concrete Program," *New Republic* 78 (7 Mar. 1934): 91–94.

51. Harold L. Ickes, "The Federal Housing Program," *New Republic* 81 (19 Dec. 1934): 155.

52. "Housing Upheaval," 61.

53. FEAPW, *Urban Housing*, 32; "Housing Upheaval," 67.

54. Isakoff, "Public Works Administration," 130–31; Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division," quote on 32; Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 81.

55. Ickes's quotes from "PWA Pledges Action on Low-Cost Housing and Slum Clearance," *American City* 49 (Sept. 1934): 99; and Ickes, *Back to Work*, 185.

56. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, 86–88, court opinion cited on 88; Isakoff, "Public Works Administration," 130–31.

57. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division," 26–28, 32.

58. Nathaniel S. Keith, *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930* (New York: Universe Books, 1973), 28; FEAPW, *Urban Housing*, quote from 32; Rosalie Genevro, "Site Selection and the New York City Housing Authority, 1934–1939," *Journal of Urban History* 12 (Aug. 1986): 336–38; Hackett, "Problems and Policies," 5.

59. Richard Sterner, *The Negro's Share: A Study of Income, Consumption, Housing and Public Assistance* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), 316–17; Robert C. Weaver, "An Experiment in Negro Labor," *Opportunity* 14 (1936): 297, quote from 298; Raymond Wolters, "The New Deal and the Negro," in *Women and Minorities during the Great Depression*, edited by Melvyn Dubofsky and Stephen Burwood (New York: Garland, 1990), 31–32.

60. Christopher G. Wye, "The New Deal and the Negro Community: Toward a Broader Conceptualization," *Journal of American History* 59 (Dec. 1972): 625–26. See also, John B. Kirby, "The Roosevelt Administration and Blacks: An Ambivalent Legacy," in *Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations*, edited by Barton Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 276.

61. Abrams, *The Future of Housing*, 249–58, quotes from 255 and 251.

62. Ibid., 257.

63. Howard A. Gray, "The Housing Division's Third Year," *Housing Officials' Year*

Book, edited by Coleman Woodbury (Chicago: National Association of Housing Officials, 1937), 3.

64. Straus and Wegg, *Housing Comes of Age*, quotes from 122. Straus and Wegg dedicated their book to Ickes, "whose social vision led public housing from theory to fact in the United States. . . ."

65. William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–40* (1963; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 70–71.

66. Abrams, *The Future of Housing*, 257.

67. The analysis of the Housing Division presented here relies heavily on Karl, *The Uneasy State*; and Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," 3–37.

68. The importance of an "interventionist role definition" for effective public administration is discussed in Skocpol and Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," 275–76.

69. Paul F. Wendt, *Housing Policy—The Search for Solutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 111–13.

70. Ickes, "Activities of Housing Division," 21–24. For Roosevelt's ambivalence toward public works spending, see Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 71; Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) 430–32.

71. See for example, Skocpol and Finegold, "State Capacity and the Early New Deal," 260–61.

72. For a discussion of Johnson in this regard, see Skocpol and Finegold, "State Capacity," 264–65; for Jones, see Graham, *Toward a Planned Society*, 47–49; for FDR, see Karl, *Uneasy State*, 154.

73. Richard Plunz, "Institutionalization of Housing Form in New York City, 1920–1950," in *Housing Form and Public Policy in the United States*, edited by Richard Plunz (New York: Praeger, 1980), 178. Richard Pommer, "The Architecture of Urban Housing in the United States during the Early 1930s," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 37 (Dec. 1978): 262–63. For another positive assessment of PWA housing, see Carl W. Condit, *Chicago, 1930–70: Building Planning and Urban Technology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 39–43.

74. *Congressional Record*, 3 Apr. 1936, 4890, cited in McDonnell, *Wagner Housing Act*, 166.

75. R. Allen Hays, *The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology and Change in Public Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 92–93.

76. *George-Healey Act*, 49 Stat. 2025 (1936).

77. Stonorov to unspecified federal official, 15 Nov. 1935, in papers of the Labor Housing Conference at the Wisconsin Historical Society, Box 2, File: Stonorov.

Chapter Five

1. Catherine Bauer, "Housing Project Number One!" *Hosiery Worker*, 18 Jan. 1935.

2. John W. Edelman, *Labor Lobbyist: The Autobiography of John W. Edelman*, edited by Joseph Carter (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974), 98; Peter Marcuse, "A Useful Installment of Socialist Work: Housing in Red Vienna in the 1920s," in *Critical Perspectives on Housing*, edited by Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 573; Joachim Schlandt and O. M. Ungers, "The Vienna Superblocks," translated by Sima Ingberman, *Oppositions* 13 (Summer 1978): 88.

3. Edelman, *Labor Lobbyist*, 12–16, 37, 3, 39–41; Donald D. Egbert and Paul E. Sprague, "In Search of John Edelman, Architect and Anarchist," *AIA Journal* 45 (Feb. 1966): 35–41. The union was affiliated to the AFL through the United Textile Workers of America. In 1933, the union assumed jurisdiction over the seamless hosiery industry and changed its name to the American Federation of Hosiery Workers (Lawrence Rogin, *Making History in Hosiery: The Story of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers* [Philadelphia: American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 1938], 5–7, 25).

4. "Biographical Sketch of Emil Rieve," Sept. 1934, Textile Workers Union of America Archives, Box 16, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin (hereafter TWUAA); "American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers," *Fortune* 5 (Jan. 1932): 50; Interview with Larry Rogin, who followed John Edelman as research and education director for the union, 8 June 1984, George Meany Center for Labor Studies, Silver Spring, Maryland; quotes from Rogin in letter to author, 9 May 1985.

5. David J. Pivar, "The Hosiery Workers and the Philadelphia Third Party Impulse, 1929–1935," *Labor History* 5 (Winter 1964): 23; Edelman quote from "The Reminiscences of John W. Edelman" (1960), Oral History Collection of Columbia University, 94, cited in Mary Susan Cole, "Catherine Bauer and the Public Housing Movement, 1926–1937," Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1975, 221. For Philadelphia politics, see articles by Arthur P. Dudden and Margaret B. Tinkcom in *Philadelphia: A 300-Year History*, edited by Russell F. Weigley (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), esp. 581–87, 619–28.

6. George W. Taylor, *The Full-Fashioned Hosiery Worker: His Changing Economic Status* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), 6, 13; "American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers," 50; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics, Bicentennial Edition*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), Series D804, p. 170.

7. "American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers," 50–53; Rogin, *Making History in Hosiery*, 19.

8. "American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers," 53, 104, 107; "Intelligent Unionism," *New Republic* 62 (26 Mar. 1930): 141; Rogin, *Making History in Hosiery*, 20.

9. Paul Blanshard, "Class Struggle in a Ball-Room," *New Republic* 26 (4 May 1921): 283.

10. For the basic features of the ACW approach, see Steve Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents, Political Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers," in *Working-Class America: Essays on Labor, Community, and American Society*, edited by Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz