



Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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April 4, 2025

The Honorable Sean Duffy
Secretary
United States Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Secretary Duffy,

I write to bring to your attention to an opportunity that could significantly benefit the transportation systems and critical infrastructure sectors. I urge the Department of Transportation (DOT) to build on the first Trump Administration's efforts to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure and enhance the Nation's ability to resist efforts to interfere with telecommunication systems.

The Global Position System (GPS) is critical to our national security and economy. This invisible utility provides its essential Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities to every American. Disruption to GPS would cause devastating harm to the United States economy. This is particularly true for its timing capabilities: a single point of failure across every sector of our economy and critical infrastructure, including transportation systems, the power grid, telecommunications, and emergency first responders.¹

Hostile states have developed unique capabilities to attack American GPS services. Compounding this challenge, jamming and spoofing of GPS is becoming widespread. The first Trump Administration recognized these concerns, and issued Executive Order 13905, to strengthen the Nation's resilience through PNT services, which is still in effect.² The availability of secure, reliable, accurate, domestic, and resilient timing and complimentary PNT capabilities to back up GPS are vital to protect our transportation systems and critical infrastructure sectors.

¹ See e.g. Nate Hegyi, Wailin Wong, *Losing GPS would cost the U.S. \$1 billion a day. So why is there no backup?*, NPR, (Sept. 27, 2024), available at <https://www.npr.org/2024/09/27/nx-s1-5127737/losing-gps-would-cost-the-u-s-1-billion-a-day-so-why-is-there-no-backup>; Kathleen McTigue, *Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System to the U.S. Private Sector*, NIST, (Oct. 2, 2019), available at <https://www.nist.gov/news-events/nes/2019/10/economic-benefits-global-positioning-system-us-private-sector>; Dan Glass, *What Happens if GPS Fails?*, THE ATLANTIC, (June 13, 2016), available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/what-happens-if-gps-fails/486824>.

² Exec. Order 13905, *Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation and Timing Services*, (Feb. 12, 2020) available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/18/2020-03337/strengthening-national-resilience-through-responsible-use-of-positioning-navigation-and-timing>.

Additionally, President Trump issued guidance to complement Executive Order 13905. Specifically, this guidance highlighted existing vulnerabilities and directed the Federal Government to "... identify and implement, as appropriate, alternative sources of PNT for critical infrastructure, key resources, and mission-essential functions."³ This was one of several actions the White House identified as the Federal Government pushed to strengthen the Nation's PNT services.

Congress acted on the issue in 2018, directing DOT, through the *National Timing Resilience and Security Act*, to develop, construct, and operate a land-based backup timing system.⁴ Both the Trump Administration and Congress entrusted DOT with the pivotal role of leading the deployment of a backup to GPS timing. Subsequent Congresses have consistently supported this directive through funding for the department's role.⁵ Unfortunately, the Biden Administration failed to act, while jamming, spoofing, and anti-satellite technology only improved.⁶

DOT has the opportunity to resume the mantle of leadership, and engage in efforts to create a more resilient network. One system DOT recommended in its GPS Backup Demonstration Capabilities report was eLoran.⁷ eLoran is a simple, inexpensive system that can provide the Nation with an additional layer of protection for America's GPS signals against attacks by China or other adversaries. It does not require government funding to build, but it does require the use of government spectrum. I understand the Department's PNT Office is ready to take the critical step of facilitating a private sector deployment of this complementary eLoran PNT system. Therefore, I urge you to expedite the deployment of this backup system, and look forward to supporting the Department's efforts.

Sincerely,



Sam Graves
Chairman
Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure

³ Presidential Memorandum, THE WHITE HOUSE, *Memorandum on Space Policy Directive 7*, (Jan. 15, 2021) available at <https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2023-11/Memorandum%20on%20Space%20Policy%20Directive%207.pdf>.

⁴ *Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018*, Pub. L. No. 115-282, § 514.

⁵ See e.g. *Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024*, Pub. L. No. 118-42.

⁶ See e.g. Sean Gorman, *Global Navigation Jamming Will Only Get Worse. The U.S. Needs to Move Fast*, SPACE NEWS, (May 21, 2024), available at <https://spacenews.com/global-navigation-jamming-will-only-get-worse-us-needs-move-fast/>.

⁷ DOT, COMPLEMENTARY PNT AND GPS BACKUP TECHNOLOGIES DEMONSTRATION REPORT at 195 (Jan. 2021), available at <https://www.transportation.gov/administrations/assistant-secretary-research-and-technology/complementary-pnt-and-gps-backup>.