To: Eric T. Schneiderman[nysag@ag.ny.gov]
Cc: Pruitt, Scott[Pruitt.Scott@epa.gov]; Amanda Hopper[ahopper@co.sutter.ca.us]; piu@doj.ca.gov[piu@doj.ca.gov]; Martinez Michael C. (ENRD)[michael.c.martinez@usdoj.gov]; Erica Zilioli[Erica.Zilioli@usdoj.gov]; brian.leahy@cdpr.ca.gov[brian.leahy@cdpr.ca.gov]; sectyrodriquez@calepa.ca.gov[sectyrodriquez@calepa.ca.gov]; secretary@resources.ca.gov[secretary@resources.ca.gov]; Ron Sullenger[rsullenger@co.sutter.ca.us]; Assemblymember Gallagher[assemblymember.gallagher@assembly.ca.gov]; laura.nicholson@sen.ca.gov[laura.nicholson@sen.ca.gov]; Harold Kruger[hkruger@appealdemocrat.com]; Steve Miller[smiller@appealdemocrat.com]; Judicialwatch Info[info@judicialwatch.org]; Sutter Buttes Tea Party[sbtp@syix.com]; Jim Whiteaker[jwhiteaker@co.sutter.ca.us]; Larry Munger[lmunger@co.sutter.ca.us]; Judicial Watch[jw@pr.judicialwatch.org]; Lou Binninger[loubinninger@gmail.com]; State of California[senator.nielsen@outreach.senate.ca.gov]; Bowles, Jack[Bowles.Jack@epa.gov]; Davis, Patrick[davis.patrick@epa.gov]; Hope, Brian[Hope.Brian@epa.gov]; Minoli, Kevin[Minoli.Kevin@epa.gov]; Estrada, Fabiola[Estrada.Fabiola@epa.gov]; Rodriguez, Roberto[Rodriguez.Roberto@epa.gov]; Richardson, RobinH[Richardson.RobinH@epa.gov]; Wagner, Kenneth[wagner.kenneth@epa.gov]; Jackson, Ryan[jackson.ryan@epa.gov]; britt@nasda.org[britt@nasda.org]; Dudley Hoskins[dudley@nasda.org]; amanda@nasda.org[amanda@nasda.org]; Sherman Bill (ATG)[bill.sherman@atg.wa.gov]; Nick Persampieri[nick.persampieri@vermont.gov]; Watson Laura (ATG)[lauraw2@atg.wa.gov]; andrea.baker@maryland.gov[andrea.baker@maryland.gov]; Goldberg Andy (AGO)[andy.goldberg@state.ma.us]; efernandez@ufwfoundation.org[efernandez@ufwfoundation.org]; Christine Hall[christine.hall@cei.org]; mebell@cei.org[mebell@cei.org]; Ty Cobb[ty.cobb@hoganlovells.com]; Contact[contact@aclj.org]; Chuck and Pat Miller[chucknpat@comcast.net]; headquarters@earthjustice.org[headquarters@earthjustice.org]; radcock@croplifeamerica.org[radcock@croplifeamerica.org]; willr@fb.org[willr@fb.org]; Tom Stenzel[tstenzel@unitedfresh.org]; Paul Towers[ptowers@panna.org]; pests@pesticidereform.org[pests@pesticidereform.org]
From: will rogers
Sent: Fri 9/1/2017 2:20:52 PM
Subject: Requesting Investigation of PG&E Listed on NYSE
BrownsDirtyHands.pdf
ltrpuc-aes06-23-17 Brown-China Trip.pdf
JW-v-EPA-Clean-Power-win-01217.pdf
35percentfullreport PG&E Taxes.pdf
PG&E Corporate Tax Dodgers.pdf
Immigration Global Warming.pdf

Dear AG Schneirderman,

I am respectfully requesting a investigation in activities that PG&E has been participating in with former President Obama , Gov. Brown, Gov. Brown staff who have ties to PG&E, California State Agencies / Regulators and the Democrat Party which may be impacting PG&E stock prices at the New York Stock Exchange in New York State.

PG&E participated in the Paris Climate Conference / Agreement as part of Gov. Brown delegation and encouraged President Trump to participate in it after it was signed into effect using false / misleading data / material from NOAA.

Basically Paris Climate Agreement is nothing more than a business contract (fraudulent contract, deception, scam, crony capitalism) based on false / misleading material which is designed to defraud the US Government and US Taxpayers and benefit / profit PG&E which may of had a impact on their stock at the NYSE.

So it should be investigated if the Paris Climate Conference and Agreement signing had any impact on PG&E stock prices.

It similar to the Obama Administration lying about the Clean Power Act (fraudulent contract, deception, scam, crony capitalism) would prevent thousands of deaths by cutting CO2 emissions and using the false / misleading material to get public support for the Clean Power Act which appears was supported / congratulated by PG&E because it would have a positive impact on their stock prices at the NYSE.

So it should be investigated if the Clean Power Act had any impact on the PG&E stock prices.

Please see- Judicial Watch v EPA Clean Power-win.

Please read the attached report: "Brown's Dirty Hands" by Consumer Watchdog.

The report list out the corruption / fraud involving Gov. Brown, his staff, the State of California, the Democrat Party, PG&E and other corporations which some appear to be listed on the NYSE.

This kind of high level corruption / fraud between investor owned companies on the NYSE, Gov. Brown, his staff, his family, state agencies / regulators and the Democrat Party which you belong to would obviously have a impact on the stock prices of PG&E and the other corporations listed on the NYSE in your state.

If Global Warming / Climate Change is caused by CO2 emission then why is Gov. Brown and the Democrat Party helping to increase CO2 levels which this type of fraud / corruption and actions ?

It appears that PG&E may have received funds for clean / green energy projects while being accused by Democrats / Liberals of being corporate tax dodgers who pay a -17% rate while giving large campaign donations to the Democrat Party which you belong to so may be the Democrat Party should be included in the investigation which becomes evident from the attached report.

Receiving millions of taxpayers dollars for clean / green energy projects, while paying a -17% tax rate while giving millions of dollars campaign donations to Gov. Brown / the Democrat Party would obviously have a positive impact on PG&E stock prices at the NYSE.

With Gov. Brown, the State of California and Democrat Party being involved in this kind of corruption and fraud then I do see how they could have any credibility in a lawsuit against the EPA regarding Chlorpyrifos.

If you ignore this kind of fraud / corruption which is linked to NY and the Democrat Party then I don't see how you can have any credibility in any civil and/or law enforcement action.

Also read attached report: "Immigration to the United States and Worldwide Greenhouse Gas Emissions" By Center for Immigration Studies.

Partially States: " Immigration to the United States produces estimated four times more CO2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin."

I totally believe this to be true because I have traveled the world, visited approximately 15 countries and lived in approximately 5 including India which has been greatly increasing CO2 emissions while participating in the Paris Climate Conference and Agreement and encouraging or basically demanding that the United States decrease theirs.

Have you been one of the ones stating that Global Warming / Climate Change is a National Security Issue because if you are then you are helping create National Security Risks with your Sanctuary State and City policies which means that you lack credibility and especially integrity including with any law enforcement activities / investigation and those that you may participate in especially if you ignore corruption linked to Gov. Brown and the Democrat Party ?

How can you claim to be law and order on one hand while being lawless and disorder on the other !

Sincerely- Will Rogers

The 35 Percent Corporate Tax Myth

Corporate Tax Avoidance by Fortune 500 Companies, 2008 to 2015

Matthew Gardner
Robert S. McIntyre
Richard Phillips

March 2017

The **Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP)** has engaged in tax policy research for over thirty years. ITEP is best known for its unique microsimulation tax model, an important tool that produces critical analyses to help the public and federal, state and local lawmakers understand how current and proposed tax laws affect taxpayers at different income levels.

Since the 1980s, ITEP and its sister organization Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) have collaborated on a series of studies about the taxes paid or not paid by America's largest and most profitable corporations. Those eye-opening reports played an important role in educating lawmakers about the tax issues that were ultimately addressed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. That path-breaking federal legislation curbed tax shelters for corporations and the well-off and cut taxes on low- and middle-income families. *The Washington Post* called the reports a "key turning point" in the tax reform debate that, "had the effect of touching a spark to kindling," and "helped to raise public ire against corporate tax evaders." *The Wall Street Journal* said that the studies, "helped propel the tax-overhaul effort," and the Associated Press reported that they, "assured that something would be done . . . to make profitable companies pay their share." More recently these reports have brought the issue of offshore tax avoidance to the forefront of the public debate.

This new report provides a detailed examination of what has happened to corporate taxation in recent years. It is intended to provide context about the current state of corporate taxes as lawmakers consider another major overhaul of the tax code in the coming year.

The authors thank Kayla Kitson, Aaron Mendelson, Kelsey Kober, Grace Smith, Traci Xu, and J.P. Martínez for helping to gather the data behind this report.

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Profitable corporations are subject to a 35 percent federal income tax rate on their U.S. profits. But many corporations pay far less, or nothing at all, because of the many tax loopholes and special breaks they enjoy. This report documents just how successful many Fortune 500 corporations have been at using loopholes and special breaks over the past eight years. As lawmakers look to reform the corporate tax code, this report shows that the focus of any overhaul should be on closing loopholes rather than on cutting tax rates.

It's important to note a key piece of this report's methodology. The report only includes corporations that were consistently profitable over the eight-year period from 2008 to 2015. In other words, if a firm had a loss in even one year, it is excluded from this report. By leaving out corporations that had losses (which means they wouldn't pay any tax), this report provides a straightforward picture of average effective tax rates paid by our nation's biggest and consistently profitable companies. Two hundred and fifty-eight Fortune 500 companies were consistently profitable in each of the eight years between 2008 and 2015. Most of these companies were included in our February 2014 report, *The Sorry State of Corporate Taxes*, which looked at the years 2008 through 2012. There are new companies in the report, including Netflix, which entered the Fortune 500 after 2013. In addition, some companies were excluded from the study because they lost money in 2013, 2014 or 2015.

Some Key Findings:

- As a group, the 258 corporations paid an effective federal income tax rate of 21.2 percent over the eight-year period, slightly over half the statutory 35 percent tax rate.

- Eighteen of the corporations, including General Electric, International Paper, Priceline.com and PG&E paid no federal income tax at all over the eight-year period. A fifth of the corporations (48) paid an effective tax rate of less than 10 percent over that period.

- Of those corporations in our sample with significant offshore profits, more than half paid higher corporate tax rates to foreign governments where they operate than they paid in the United States on their U.S. profits.

These findings refute the prevailing view inside the Beltway that America's corporate income tax is more burdensome than the corporate income taxes levied by other countries, and that this purported (but false) excess burden somehow makes the U.S. "uncompetitive."

Other Findings:

- One hundred of the 258 companies (39 percent of them) paid zero or less in federal income taxes in at least one year from 2008 to 2015.

- The sectors with the lowest effective corporate tax rates over the eight-year period were Utilities, Gas and Electric (3.1 percent), Industrial Machinery (11.4 percent), Telecommunications (11.5 percent), Oil, Gas, and Pipelines (11.6 percent), and Internet Services and Retailing (15.6 percent). Each of these industries paid, as a group, less than half the statutory 35 percent tax rate over this eight-year period.

- The tax breaks claimed by these companies are highly concentrated in the hands of a few very large corporations. Just 25 companies claimed $286 billion in tax breaks over the eight years between 2008 and 2015. That's more than half the $527 billion in tax subsidies claimed by all of the 258 companies in our sample.

- Five companies — AT&T, Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Verizon, and IBM — enjoyed more than $130 billion in tax breaks during the eight-year period.

Recommendations for Reform:

- Congress should repeal the rule allowing American multinational corporations to indefinitely "defer" U.S. taxes on their offshore profits. This reform would effectively remove the tax incentive to shift profits and jobs overseas.

- Limit the ability of tech and other companies to use executive stock options to reduce their taxes by generating phantom "costs" these companies never incur.

- Having set "bonus depreciation" on a path toward expiration at the end of 2019, Congress should take the next step and repeal the rest of accelerated depreciation, too. At a minimum, lawmakers should resist calls to expand these tax breaks by allowing for the immediate expensing of capital investments.

- Reinstate a strong corporate Alternative Minimum Tax that does the job it was originally designed to do.

- Increase transparency by requiring country-by-country public disclosure of company financial information, including corporate income and tax payments, through filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

INTRODUCTION

For the first time in more than three decades, comprehensive corporate tax restructuring is a serious possibility in Washington. Republican leaders in Congress and President Donald Trump have each put forward corporate tax plans that would cut the corporate tax rate by as much as half. This misguided consensus is largely the result of a long-term aggressive push by corporate lobbyists on Capitol Hill to reduce the federal corporate income tax rate, based on the claim that our corporate tax is uncompetitive and high compared to other developed nations.

This study takes a hard look at federal income taxes paid or not paid by 258 of America's largest and most profitable corporations in the eight years between 2008 and 2015 — and compares those tax payments to the foreign taxes that a multinational subset of these same companies pay on their activities in the rest of the world. The companies in our report are all from Fortune's annual list of America's 500 largest corporations, and all of them were profitable in the United States in each of the eight years analyzed. Over eight years, the 258 companies in our survey reported total pretax U.S. profits of more than $3.8 trillion.

While the federal corporate tax law ostensibly requires big corporations to pay a 35 percent corporate income tax rate, the 258 corporations in our study on average paid slightly more than half that amount: 21.2 percent over the 2008 to 2015 period. Many companies paid far less, including 18 that paid nothing at all over the entire eight-year period.

We also find that for most of the multinationals in our survey — companies that engage in significant business both in the United States and abroad — the U.S. tax rates these companies paid are lower than the rates they faced abroad. More than half of the multinationals in our survey enjoyed lower U.S. tax rates on their U.S. profits than the foreign tax rates they paid on their foreign profits.

There is wide variation in tax rates paid by the companies surveyed. A quarter of the companies in this study paid effective federal income tax rates on their U.S. profits close to the full 35 percent official corporate tax rate. But almost one-fifth paid less than 10 percent. One hundred of these profitable companies found ways to zero out every last dime of their federal income tax in at least one year during the eight-year period.

There is plenty of blame to share for today's sad situation. Corporate apologists will correctly point out that loopholes and tax breaks that allow corporations to minimize or eliminate their income taxes are generally legal, and stem from laws passed over the years by Congress and signed by various presidents. But that does not mean that low-tax corporations bear no responsibility. The tax laws were not enacted in a vacuum; they were adopted in response to relentless corporate lobbying, threats and campaign support.

The good news is that the corporate income tax can be repaired. The parade of industry-specific and even company-specific tax breaks that weaken the corporate tax can — and should — be repealed. This includes tax giveaways as narrow as the NASCAR depreciation tax break and as broad as the manufacturing deduction. High-profile multinational corporations that have shifted hundreds of billions of their U.S. income into tax havens for tax purposes, without engaging in any meaningful activity in those tiny countries, will stop doing so if Congress acts to end indefinite deferral of U.S. taxes on their offshore profits. As Congress considers these steps, lawmakers and the Securities and Exchange Commission should act to ensure that they, and the public, have access to basic information about how much big companies are paying in taxes and which tax breaks they're claiming.

This study is the latest in a series of comprehensive corporate tax reports by Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, beginning in 1984. Our most recent prior report, issued in 2014, covered corporate taxes in 2008 through 2012. The methodological appendix at the end of the study explains in more detail how we chose the companies and calculated their effective tax rates. The notes on specific companies beginning on page 56 add more details.

PREVIOUS CORPORATE TAX STUDIES

- *Corporate Income Taxes in the Reagan Years* (CTJ 1984)
- *The Failure of Corporate Tax Incentives* (CTJ 1985)
- *Corporate Taxpayers and Corporate Freeloaders* (CTJ 1985)
- *Money for Nothing* (CTJ & ITEP 1986)
- *130 Reasons Why We Need Tax Reform* (CTJ & ITEP 1986)
- *The Corporate Tax Comeback* (CTJ & ITEP 1986)
- *It's Working, But...* (CTJ & ITEP 1989)
- *Corporate Income Taxes in the 1990s* (ITEP 2000)
- *Corporate Income Taxes in the Bush Years* (CTJ & ITEP 2004)
- *Corporate Taxpayers and Corporate Tax Dodgers* (CTJ & ITEP 2011)
- *The Sorry State of Corporate Taxes* (CTJ & ITEP 2014)

WHO'S PAYING CORPORATE TAXES — AND WHO'S NOT

On paper at least, federal tax law requires corporations to pay 35 percent of their profits in federal income taxes. In fact, while some of the 258 corporations in this study did pay close to the 35 percent official tax rate, the vast majority paid considerably less. And some paid nothing at all. Over the eight years covered by this study, the average effective tax rate (that is, the percentage of U.S. pretax profits paid in federal corporate income taxes) for all 258 companies was only 21.2 percent.

Overview:

The table on this page summarizes what the 258 companies paid (or didn't pay) in effective U.S. income tax rates on their pretax U.S. profits.

- 30 companies paid effective eight-year tax rates between zero and 10 percent. Their average effective tax rate was 6.9 percent.

- Even worse is that 18 companies paid less than 0 percent over the eight-year period. Their effective tax rate averaged -4 percent.

- 66 companies (about a quarter of the companies in this report), paid effective eight-year tax rates of more than 30 percent. Their average effective tax rate was 33.6 percent.

Summary of eight-year tax rates for 258 companies, 2008-2015

Effective tax	# of	% of	2008-15 ($-billion)			Ave. 8-yr profit ($-mill.)	
rate group	cos.	cos.	Profits	Tax	Ave. Rate	Pre-tax	After-tax
Less than 17.5%	83	32%	$1,274.2	$107.5	**8.4%**	$15,352	$14,057
17.5% to 30%	109	42%	1,627.2	393.7	**24.2%**	14,929	11,317
More than 30%	66	26%	909.2	305.7	**33.6%**	13,775	9,143
All 258 companies	**258**	**100%**	**$3,810.6**	**$806.9**	**21.2%**	**$14,770**	**$11,642**
48 Ultra-low tax companies:							
Zero or less	18	7%	$178.0	$–7.2	**–4.0%**	$9,889	$10,289
0% to 10%	30	12%	584.0	40.5	**6.9%**	19,467	18,117

A more detailed look:

During the 2008-2015 period, eight-year effective tax rates for the 258 companies ranged from a low of -27.9 percent for PEPCO Holdings to a high of 47.3 percent for Molina Healthcare. Here are some startling statistics:

18 Corporations Paying No Total Income Tax in 2008-2015			
Company ($-millions)	08-15 Profit	08-15 Tax	08-15 Rate
Pepco Holdings	$ 3,022	$ –843	–27.9%
PG&E Corp.	10,843	–1,569	–14.5%
Wisconsin Energy	5,894	–592	–10.0%
NiSource	4,399	–352	–8.0%
International Paper	5,010	–386	–7.7%
FirstEnergy	8,842	–465	–5.3%
Priceline.com	698	–31	–4.4%
Atmos Energy	2,826	–114	–4.0%
General Electric	40,057	–1,369	–3.4%
American Electric Power	17,170	–464	–2.7%
Ryder System	2,045	–55	–2.7%
Duke Energy	19,767	–422	–2.1%
NextEra Energy	21,518	–313	–1.5%
Xcel Energy	10,291	–111	–1.1%
Ameren	7,243	–48	–0.7%
CMS Energy	4,666	–26	–0.6%
Sempra Energy	7,000	–34	–0.5%
Eversource Energy	6,703	–11	–0.2%
TOTAL	**$ 177,995**	**$ –7,205**	**–4.0%**

- 100 of the 258 companies paid zero or less in federal income taxes in at least one year from 2008 to 2015. Fifty-eight of these companies enjoyed multiple no-tax years, bringing the total number of no-tax years to 246. In the years they paid no income tax, these 100 companies earned $336 billion in pretax U.S. profits. But instead of paying $118 billion in federal income taxes, as the 35 percent corporate tax rate requires, these companies generated so many excess tax breaks that they reported negative taxes (often receiving tax rebate checks from the U.S. Treasury), totaling $32.1 billion. These companies' "negative tax rates" mean that they made more after taxes than before taxes in those no-tax years.[1]

- 18 of these corporations paid less than nothing in aggregate federal income taxes over the 2008-15 period. These companies, whose pretax U.S. profits totaled $178 billion over the eight years, included: Pepco Holdings (–27.9%), PG&E (–14.5%), International Paper (-7.7%), Priceline.com (–4.4%), General Electric (–3.4%), and Ryder System (–2.7%).

- In 2015, 29 companies paid no federal income tax, and received $1.46 billion in tax rebates. In 2014, 28 companies paid no income tax, and received $1 billion in rebates. In 2013, 32 companies paid no income tax, and got $3.9 billion in rebates. (See Appendices with year-by-year results.)

- 83 of the 258 companies paid less than half the 35 percent statutory corporate tax rate for the eight-year period. And more than two-thirds of the companies, 181 of the 258, paid effective tax rates of less than half the 35 percent statutory corporate income tax rate in at least one of the eight years.

[1] Corporations can receive outright rebates by "carrying back" excess tax breaks to earlier years, and thereby getting a cash refund from the IRS for taxes paid in the past. In addition, companies sometimes obtain favorable settlements of tax disputes with the IRS covering past years. Companies then recognize tax breaks that they did not disclose in their prior financial reports to shareholders because they expected that the IRS would not allow them to keep the money. These settlements can produce what are essentially tax rebates, as the appendix on page 29 explains. In reporting their "current" income taxes paid, companies do not distinguish between the two types of tax breaks.

100 Companies Paying Zero Tax or Less in at Least One Year, 2008–2015

	In No-Tax Years			# of zero		In No-Tax Years			# of zero
Company ($-millions)	Profit	Tax	Rate	tax years	Company ($-millions)	Profit	Tax	Rate	tax years
PG&E Corp.	$10,843	$–1,569	–14.5%	8	AGL Resources	852	–101	–11.8%	2
Pepco Holdings	2,641	–852	–32.3%	7	Constellation Brands	1,525	–176	–11.6%	2
Wisconsin Energy	5,245	–681	–13.0%	7	Domtar	189	–21	–10.9%	2
NiSource	3,859	–384	–9.9%	7	Fifth Third Bancorp	1,856	–162	–8.7%	2
Duke Energy	18,209	–482	–2.6%	7	Public Service Enterprise Group	4,473	–371	–8.3%	2
FirstEnergy	5,916	–821	–13.9%	6	Southwest Airlines	838	–69	–8.2%	2
Atmos Energy	2,258	–122	–5.4%	6	Principal Financial	1,986	–156	–7.8%	2
NextEra Energy	15,081	–334	–2.2%	6	Devon Energy	5,321	–389	–7.3%	2
Priceline.com	420	–38	–9.1%	5	MDU Resources	677	–35	–5.2%	2
PPL	3,303	–224	–6.8%	5	FedEx	3,914	–173	–4.4%	2
Ameren	4,526	–257	–5.7%	5	PNC Financial Services Group	7,982	–317	–4.0%	2
Boeing	20,783	–1,021	–4.9%	5	Air Products & Chemicals	1,162	–31	–2.7%	2
Ryder System	1,275	–60	–4.7%	5	Spectra Energy	1,293	–32	–2.5%	2
Sempra Energy	4,584	–175	–3.8%	5	Time Warner	6,646	–100	–1.5%	2
CMS Energy	3,063	–33	–1.1%	5	SpartanNash	101	–1	–1.1%	2
Reinsurance Group of America	1,963	–276	–14.0%	4	HollyFrontier	12	–24	–196.9%	1
American Electric Power	7,751	–806	–10.4%	4	Phillips-Van Heusen	34	–44	–130.9%	1
Interpublic Group	1,270	–63	–5.0%	4	Eli Lilly	202	–208	–102.9%	1
Consolidated Edison	6,601	–252	–3.8%	4	Sonic Automotive	27	–14	–51.0%	1
Xcel Energy	5,533	–195	–3.5%	4	Eastman Chemical	204	–82	–40.2%	1
Dominion Resources	7,038	–176	–2.5%	4	Insight Enterprises	15	–5	–32.3%	1
Cablevision Systems	1,211	–11	–0.9%	4	Texas Instruments	321	–81	–25.2%	1
Corning	2,637	–14	–0.5%	4	Health Net	34	–8	–24.9%	1
International Paper	1,599	–1,024	–64.0%	3	Yum Brands	294	–70	–23.7%	1
General Electric	10,460	–4,737	–45.3%	3	Pitney Bowes	386	–88	–22.7%	1
Facebook	1,062	–429	–40.4%	3	Group 1 Automotive	53	–11	–20.2%	1
State Street Corp.	2,854	–891	–31.2%	3	Wells Fargo	21,141	–3,967	–18.8%	1
Trinity Industries	918	–127	–13.8%	3	Goldman Sachs Group	4,894	–801	–16.4%	1
RR Donnelley & Sons	743	–75	–10.1%	3	Travelers Cos.	1,230	–191	–15.5%	1
Verizon Communications	22,731	–1,513	–6.7%	3	Darden Restaurants	191	–28	–14.6%	1
DTE Energy	3,129	–191	–6.1%	3	Community Health Systems	228	–29	–12.7%	1
Oneok	1,582	–58	–3.7%	3	Andersons	34	–4	–12.7%	1
Qualcomm	9,731	–291	–3.0%	3	Capital One Financial	1,259	–152	–12.1%	1
Westrock	1,146	–26	–2.3%	3	DuPont	949	–109	–11.5%	1
Eversource Energy	3,446	–43	–1.2%	3	J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	12,486	–1,429	–11.4%	1
Williams	4,075	–26	–0.6%	3	Mosaic	223	–25	–11.2%	1
Paccar	148	–136	–91.7%	2	Scana	533	–47	–8.8%	1
ExxonMobil	2,666	–1,036	–38.8%	2	Time Warner Cable	2,330	–188	–8.1%	1
Windstream	644	–125	–19.4%	2	Reliance Steel & Aluminum	199	–15	–7.4%	1
Honeywell International	2,966	–510	–17.2%	2	McKesson	1,153	–85	–7.4%	1
Entergy	3,287	–481	–14.6%	2	UGI	229	–15	–6.5%	1
Netflix	255	–37	–14.4%	2	HCA Holdings	3,198	–182	–5.7%	1
CBS	2,262	–316	–14.0%	2	International Business Machines	5,787	–321	–5.5%	1

(Continued on next page)

Companies Paying Zero Tax or Less in at Least One Year, 2008–2015 (cont'd)

Company ($-millions)	In No-Tax Years: Profit	Tax	Rate	# of zero tax years	Company ($-millions)	In No-Tax Years: Profit	Tax	Rate	# of zero tax years
CenturyLink	992	–49	–4.9%	1	Harris	1,091	–27	–2.5%	1
Southern	3,662	–177	–4.8%	1	Danaher	1,183	–27	–2.3%	1
Casey's General Stores	149	–7	–4.5%	1	Alliance Data Systems	126	–3	–2.2%	1
Rockwell Automation	145	–6	–4.4%	1	Arthur Gallagher	159	–3	–1.8%	1
Praxair	870	–36	–4.1%	1	Merck	5,766	–55	–1.0%	1
DISH Network	973	–36	–3.7%	1	ABM Industries	81	–0	–0.3%	1
AT&T	11,994	–422	–3.5%	1	Deere	907	–1	–0.1%	1
					Totals, these 100 companies	**$336,277**	**$–32,122**	**–9.6%**	**246**

25 Companies with the Largest TOTAL Tax Subsidies, 2008-15 ($-millions)

Company	2008-15 Tax breaks
AT&T	38,068
Wells Fargo	31,428
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	22,213
Verizon Communications	21,130
International Business Machines	17,806
General Electric	15,389
Exxon Mobil	12,942
Boeing	11,863
PNC Financial Services Group	8,809
Procter & Gamble	8,515
NextEra Energy	7,844
Twenty-First Century Fox	7,630
Duke Energy	7,341
Devon Energy	7,224
Comcast	7,172
Time Warner	6,720
Southern	6,569
American Electric Power	6,473
Union Pacific	6,333
United Technologies	6,001
Qualcomm	5,934
Exelon	5,898
Time Warner Cable	5,692
Intel	5,521
Goldman Sachs Group	5,455
Total these 25 companies	**$ 285,969**
Other 233 companies	240,791
All companies	**$ 526,760**

THE SIZE OF THE CORPORATE TAX SUBSIDIES

Over the 2008 to 2015 period, the 258 companies earned more than $3.8 trillion in pretax profits in the United States. Had all of those profits been reported to the IRS and taxed at the statutory 35 percent corporate tax rate, then the 258 companies would have paid $1.3 billion in income taxes over the eight years. But instead, the companies as a group paid just more than 60 percent of that amount. The enormous amount they did not pay was due to hundreds of billions of dollars in tax subsidies that they enjoyed.

- Tax subsidies for the 258 companies over the eight years totaled a staggering $527 billion, including $50 billion in 2008, $65 billion in 2009, $74 billion in 2010, $79 billion in 2011, $65 billion in 2012, $72 billion in 2013, $70 billion in 2014, and $52 billion in 2015. These amounts are the difference between what the companies would have paid if their tax bills equaled 35 percent of their profits and what they actually paid.
- More than half of the total tax-subsidy dollars over the eight years — $286 billion — went to just 25 companies, each with more than $5.4 billion in tax subsidies.
- AT&T topped the list of corporate tax-subsidy recipients, with more than $38 billion in tax subsidies over the eight years.
- Other top tax subsidy recipients included Wells Fargo ($31.4 billion), J.P. Morgan Chase ($22.2 billion), Verizon ($21.1 billion), IBM ($17.8 billion), and Exxon Mobil ($12.9 billion).

TAX RATES (AND SUBSIDIES) BY INDUSTRY

The effective tax rates in our study varied widely by industry. From 2008 to 2015, effective industry tax rates (for our 258 corporations) ranged from a low of 3.1 percent to a high of 32.7 percent.

- Gas and electric utility companies enjoyed the lowest effective federal tax rate over the eight years, paying a tax rate of only 3.1 percent. This industry's taxes declined steadily over the eight years, from 12.8 percent in 2008 to 1.8 percent in 2015. These results were largely driven by the ability of these companies to claim accelerated depreciation tax breaks on their capital investments. None of the 25 utilities in our sample paid more than half the 35 percent statutory tax rate during the 2008 to 2015 period.

- Other low-tax industries, paying less than half the statutory 35 percent tax rate over the entire 2008 to 2015 period, included: Industrial Machinery (11.4%), Telecommunications (11.5%), Oil, Gas & Pipelines (11.6%), and Internet Services & Retailing (15.6%).

- Only two of the industries surveyed paid an effective tax rate of 30 percent or more over the full eight-year period.

Effective tax rates also varied widely within industries. For example, over the eight-year period, average tax rates on oil, gas & pipeline companies ranged from 1.2 percent for Oneok up to 33.3 percent for CVR Energy. Among aerospace and defense companies, eight-year effective tax rates ranged from a low of 5.4 percent for Boeing up to a high of 27 percent for General Dynamics. Pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly paid only 17 percent, while its competitor Biogen Idec paid 35.3 percent. In fact, as the detailed industry table starting on page 36 of this report illustrates, effective tax rates were widely divergent in almost every industry.

The difference in tax rates between companies, even within the same industry, demonstrates how loopholes in our tax code can create huge economic distortions by giving some companies a tax advantage over their competitors.

See Effective Corporate Tax Rate for Companies by Industry on Next Page

Effective Corporate Tax Rates for 258 Corporations by Industry, 2008–15

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry	**Profit**	**Tax**	**Rate**	**Profit**	**Tax**	**Rate**	**Profit**	**Tax**	**Rate**	**Profit**	**Tax**	**Rate**	**Profit**	**Tax**	**Rate**
Utilities, gas and electric	**$ 269,367**	**$ 8,217**	**3.1%**	$ 39,364	$ 706	1.8%	$ 37,104	$ 500	1.3%	$ 31,955	$ 1,590	5.0%	$ 160,944	$ 5,420	3.4%
Industrial Machinery	**91,179**	**10,429**	**11.4%**	6,817	3,050	44.7%	14,350	2,426	16.9%	16,105	2,664	16.5%	53,908	2,288	4.2%
Telecommunications	**334,261**	**38,578**	**11.5%**	60,512	11,499	19.0%	50,466	6,889	13.6%	47,304	6,549	13.8%	175,979	13,642	7.8%
Oil, gas & pipelines	**117,722**	**13,635**	**11.6%**	4,672	412	8.8%	19,755	1,929	9.8%	15,346	1,636	10.7%	77,950	9,657	12.4%
Internet Services & Retailing	**15,486**	**2,409**	**15.6%**	2,831	1,478	52.2%	4,991	251	5.0%	3,235	605	18.7%	4,428	75	1.7%
Publishing, printing	**1,611**	**290**	**18.0%**	226	113	49.9%	6	50	859.7%	66	–15	–23.3%	1,314	143	10.9%
Aerospace & defense	**200,483**	**36,698**	**18.3%**	26,072	6,282	24.1%	29,895	5,865	19.6%	26,841	4,838	18.0%	117,674	19,714	16.8%
Financial	**632,651**	**125,807**	**19.9%**	100,509	25,715	25.6%	102,654	21,056	20.5%	92,589	15,041	16.2%	336,899	63,996	19.0%
Transportation	**105,032**	**21,255**	**20.2%**	17,976	4,654	25.9%	17,364	3,894	22.4%	15,126	3,634	24.0%	54,566	9,073	16.6%
Computers, office equip, software, data	**244,399**	**49,608**	**20.3%**	27,910	5,111	18.3%	33,762	7,809	23.1%	29,830	6,498	21.8%	152,896	30,190	19.7%
Chemicals	**76,800**	**15,730**	**20.5%**	10,699	2,289	21.4%	12,464	3,104	24.9%	11,304	2,051	18.1%	42,333	8,286	19.6%
Household & personal products	**83,255**	**18,304**	**22.0%**	9,843	2,077	21.1%	10,949	2,822	25.8%	11,156	2,137	19.2%	51,307	11,268	22.0%
Miscellaneous services	**298,589**	**68,503**	**22.9%**	42,701	10,769	25.2%	46,935	9,337	19.9%	42,083	10,249	24.4%	166,870	38,147	22.9%
Miscellaneous manufacturing	**123,173**	**28,494**	**23.1%**	20,622	5,247	25.4%	19,796	5,315	26.9%	18,297	3,305	18.1%	64,458	14,626	22.7%
Financial data services	**97,962**	**26,398**	**26.9%**	18,188	5,245	28.8%	20,007	5,815	29.1%	12,156	3,617	29.8%	47,612	11,722	24.6%
Pharmaceuticals & medical products	**69,858**	**19,324**	**27.7%**	6,648	2,542	38.2%	19,070	8,385	44.0%	8,218	1,467	17.9%	35,921	6,930	19.3%
Food & beverages & tobacco	**192,203**	**54,167**	**28.2%**	26,857	9,930	37.0%	22,545	7,931	35.2%	26,865	6,935	25.8%	115,936	29,370	25.3%
Engineering & construction	**10,274**	**2,964**	**28.8%**	1,411	417	29.6%	1,396	435	31.2%	1,542	500	32.4%	5,924	1,611	27.2%
Retail & wholesale trade	**643,990**	**199,925**	**31.0%**	95,177	30,971	32.5%	92,232	30,239	32.8%	88,516	29,571	33.4%	368,064	109,145	29.7%
Health care	**202,285**	**66,206**	**32.7%**	32,663	12,773	39.1%	29,072	10,713	36.8%	25,813	8,267	32.0%	114,737	34,454	30.0%
ALL INDUSTRIES	**$ 3,810,577**	**$ 806,942**	**21.2%**	**$ 551,698**	**$ 141,281**	**25.6%**	**$ 584,814**	**$ 134,763**	**23.0%**	**$ 524,346**	**$ 111,138**	**21.2%**	**$ 2,149,719**	**$ 419,759**	**19.5%**

2008-15 Effective Tax Rates & Total Tax Subsidies, by Industry $-millions				
Industry & Company	**Effective Tax Rate**	**Total Tax Subsidies**	**% of total Subsidies**	**% of total U.S. Profits**
Financial	19.9%	95,620	18.2%	16.6%
Utilities, gas and electric	3.1%	86,062	16.3%	7.1%
Telecommunications	11.5%	78,413	14.9%	8.8%
Miscellaneous services	22.9%	36,003	6.8%	7.8%
Computers, office equip, software, data	20.3%	35,932	6.8%	6.4%
Aerospace & defense	18.3%	33,471	6.4%	5.3%
Oil, gas & pipelines	11.6%	27,568	5.2%	3.1%
Retail & wholesale trade	31.0%	25,471	4.8%	16.9%
Industrial Machinery	11.4%	21,484	4.1%	2.4%
Transportation	20.2%	15,506	2.9%	2.8%
Miscellaneous manufacturing	23.1%	14,616	2.8%	3.2%
Food & beverages & tobacco	28.2%	13,104	2.5%	5.0%
Chemicals	20.5%	11,150	2.1%	2.0%
Household & personal products	22.0%	10,836	2.1%	2.2%
Financial data services	26.9%	7,888	1.5%	2.6%
Pharmaceuticals & medical products	27.7%	5,126	1.0%	1.8%
Healthcare	32.7%	4,594	0.9%	5.3%
Internet Services & Retailing	15.6%	3,011	0.6%	0.4%
Engineering & construction	28.8%	632	0.1%	0.3%
Publishing, printing	18.0%	273	0.1%	0.0%
ALL INDUSTRIES	**21.2%**	**$ 526,760**	**100%**	**100%**
Financial, Utilities, Telecommunications and Oil, gas & pipelines	**10.5%**	**287,663**	**54.6%**	**35.5%**

Tax Subsidies by Industry:

We also looked at the size of the total tax subsidies received by each industry for the 258 companies in our study. Among the notable findings:

• 55 percent of the total tax subsidies went to just four industries: financial, utilities, telecommunications, and oil, gas & pipelines — even though these companies only enjoyed 35.5 percent of the U.S. profits in our sample.

• Other industries receive a disproportionately small share of tax subsidies. Companies engaged in retail and wholesale trade, for example, represented 17 percent of the eight-year U.S. profits in our sample, but enjoyed less than 5 percent of the tax subsidies.

It seems rather odd, not to mention highly wasteful, that the industries with the largest subsidies are ones that would seem to need them least. Regulated utilities, for example, make investment decisions in concert with their regulators based on needs of communities they serve. Oil and gas companies are so profitable that even President George W. Bush said they did not need tax breaks. He could have said the same about telecommunications companies. Financial companies get so much federal support that adding huge tax breaks on top of that seems unnecessary.

HISTORICAL COMPARISONS OF TAX RATES AND TAX SUBSIDIES

How do our results for 2008 to 2015 compare to corporate tax rates in earlier years? The answer illustrates how corporations have managed to get around some of the corporate tax reforms enacted in 1986, and how tax avoidance has surged with the help of our political leaders.

By 1986, President Ronald Reagan fully repudiated his earlier policy of showering tax breaks on corporations. Reagan's Tax Reform Act of 1986 closed tens of billions of dollars in corporate loopholes, so that by 1988, our survey of large corporations (published in 1989) found that the overall effective corporate tax rate was up to 26.5 percent, compared to only 14.1 percent in 1981-83.[2] That improvement occurred even though the statutory corporate tax rate was cut from 46 percent to 34 percent as part of the 1986 reforms.[3]

In the 1990s, however, many corporations began to find ways around the 1986 reforms, abetted by changes in the tax laws as well as by tax-avoidance schemes devised by major accounting firms. As a result, in our 1996 to 1998 survey of 250 companies, we found that their average effective corporate tax rate had fallen to only 21.7 percent. Our September 2004 study found that corporate tax cuts adopted in 2002 had driven the effective rate down to only 17.2 percent in 2002 and 2003. The eight-year average rate found in the current study is only slightly higher, at 21.2 percent.

As a share of GDP, overall federal corporate tax collections in fiscal 2002 and 2003 fell to only 1.24 percent. At the time, that was their lowest sustained level as a share of the economy since World War II. Corporate taxes as a share of GDP recovered somewhat in the mid-2000s after the 2002-enacted tax breaks expired, averaging 2.3 percent of GDP from fiscal 2004 through fiscal 2008. But over the past five fiscal years (2011 to 2015) that this study examines, total corporate income tax payments fell back to only 1.6 percent of GDP on average.

Corporate taxes paid for more than a quarter of federal outlays in the 1950s and a fifth in the 1960s. They began to decline during the Nixon administration and remained low in the Reagan era. By fiscal year 2015, corporate taxes paid for a mere 10.6 percent of the federal government's expenses.

In this context, it seems odd that anyone would insist that corporate tax reform should be "revenue neutral." If we are going to get our nation's fiscal house back in order, increasing corporate income tax revenues should play an important role.

[2] The 1986 Tax Reform Act was expected to increase corporate tax payments by about a third. It may have done even better than that.

[3] The statutory rate was increased to 35 percent in President Bill Clinton's 1993 deficit reduction act.

U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAXES VS. FOREIGN INCOME TAXES

Corporate lobbyists relentlessly tell Congress that companies need tax subsidies from the government to be successful. They promise more jobs if they get the subsidies, and threaten economic harm if they are denied them. A central claim in the lobbyists' arsenal is the assertion that their clients need still more tax subsidies to "compete" because U.S. corporate taxes are allegedly much higher than foreign corporate taxes. But the figures that most of these corporations report to their shareholders indicate the exact opposite, that they pay higher corporate income taxes in the other countries where they do business than they pay here in the U.S.

U.S. Profits & U.S. Federal Income Taxes versus Foreign Profits & Foreign Income Taxes, 2008-15 for companies with significant foreign profits, $-million							
	US profits & federal income taxes			Foreign profits & for. income taxes			US rate
	US profit	US tax	US rate	For. profit	For. tax	For. rate	– For rate
64 with lower US rate (60%)	$754,370	$130,312	17.3%	$568,543	$151,937	26.7%	-9.45%
43 with lower foreign rate (40%)	822,034	253,513	30.8%	442,220	94,272	21.3%	+9.5%
Totals for 107 companies	**$1,576,404**	**$383,825**	**24.3%**	**$1,010,763**	**$246,209**	**24.4%**	–0.0%
% that average foreign effective tax rate exceeds average US tax rate (107 cos.):							+0%

We examined the 107 companies in our survey that had significant pretax foreign profits (i.e., equal to at least 10 percent of their total worldwide pretax profits), and compared their 2008-15 U.S. (federal & state) effective tax rates to the foreign effective tax rates they paid. Here is what we found:

• About 60 percent of these U.S. companies paid higher foreign tax rates on their foreign profits than they paid in U.S. taxes on their U.S. profits.

• Overall, the effective foreign tax rate on the 107 companies was roughly equal to their U.S. effective tax rate.

A table showing U.S. and foreign tax rates for each of the 107 companies begins on page 53.

How do these figures square with the well-known practice of corporations shifting their profits to countries like the Cayman Islands where they are not taxed at all? The figures here show what corporations report to their shareholders as U.S. profits and foreign profits, and therefore are likely to reflect profits genuinely earned in the U.S. and those genuinely earned offshore, respectively. But many of these corporations are likely to report something very different to the IRS by using various legal but arcane accounting maneuvers. Some of the profits correctly reported to shareholders as U.S. profits are likely to be reported to the IRS as profits earned in tax-haven countries like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, where they are not taxed at all. Indeed, this partly explains the low effective U.S. income tax rates that many corporations enjoy. This "profit-shifting" problem will exist so long as our tax laws allow corporations to "defer" paying U.S. taxes on their "offshore" profits, providing an incentive to make U.S. profits appear to be earned in offshore tax havens.

The figures make clear that most American corporations are paying higher taxes in other countries where they engage in real business activities than they pay in U.S. taxes on their true U.S. profits.

One might note that paying higher foreign taxes to do business in foreign countries rather than in the United States has not stopped American corporations from shifting operations and jobs overseas over the past several decades. But this is just more evidence that corporate income tax levels are usually not a significant determinant of what companies do. Instead, companies have shifted jobs overseas for a variety of non-tax reasons, such as low wages and weaker labor and environmental regulations in some countries, a desire to serve growing foreign markets, and the development of vastly cheaper costs for shipping goods from one country to another than used to be the case.

HOW COMPANIES PAY LOW TAX BILLS

Why do we find such low tax rates on so many companies and industries? The company-by-company notes starting on page 56 detail, where available, reasons why particular corporations paid low taxes. Here is a summary of several of the major tax-lowering items that are revealed in the companies' annual reports — plus some that aren't disclosed.

Offshore tax sheltering. The high-profile congressional hearings on tax-dodging strategies of Apple and other tech companies over the past couple of years told lawmakers and the general public what some of us have been pointing out for years: multinational corporations and their accounting firms have become increasingly aggressive in seeking ways to shift their U.S. profits, on paper, to offshore tax havens to avoid their U.S. tax obligations. This typically involves various artificial transactions between U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, in which revenues are shifted to low- or no-tax jurisdictions (where these corporations are not actually doing any real business), while deductions are created in the United States.[4]

The cost of this tax-sheltering is difficult to determine precisely, but is thought to be enormous. In November 2010, the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that international corporate tax reforms proposed by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) would increase U.S. corporate taxes by about $70 billion a year.[5] Other analysts have pegged the cost of corporate offshore tax sheltering as even higher than that. Presumably, the effects of these offshore shelters in reducing U.S. taxes on U.S. profits are reflected in bottom-line U.S. corporate taxes reported in this study, even though companies do not directly disclose them.

Sadly, most Republicans in Congress, along with some Democrats, seem intent on making the problem of offshore tax sheltering even worse by replacing our current system, under which U.S. taxes on offshore profits are indefinitely "deferred," with a so-called "territorial" system in which profits that companies can style as "foreign" are permanently exempt from U.S. taxes. This terrible approach, along with its cousin, a "repatriation holiday," would encourage even more offshore tax avoidance.

[4] These artificial transactions (often called "transfer pricing" abuses) are particularly available to companies with valuable "intangible property," such as brand names, secret formulas for soda or drugs, and so forth. By transferring such intangibles to subsidiaries set up in offshore tax havens, companies can then have those foreign subsidiaries "charge" the U.S. parents big fees to use the brand names and so forth, thereby shifting U.S. profits to the havens for tax purposes.
[5] Wyden's international tax reforms are part of a larger tax overhaul bill that he co-sponsored with then-Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH) and later with Sen. Dan Coats (R-IN).

Accelerated depreciation. The tax laws generally allow companies to write off their capital investments faster than the assets actually wear out. This "accelerated depreciation" is technically a tax deferral, but so long as a company continues to invest, the tax deferral tends to be indefinite. While accelerated depreciation tax breaks have been available for decades, temporary tax provisions have increased their cost in the past eight years. In early 2008, in an attempt at economic stimulus for the flagging economy, Congress and President George W. Bush dramatically expanded depreciation tax breaks by creating a supposedly temporary "50 percent bonus depreciation" provision that allowed companies to immediately write off as much as 75 percent of the cost of their investments in new equipment right away.[6] This provision has been repeatedly extended and is set to phase down and then expire at the end of 2019. These changes to the depreciation rules, on top of the already far too generous depreciation deductions allowed under pre-existing law, certainly did reduce taxes for many of the companies in this study by tens of billions of dollars. But limited financial reporting makes it hard to calculate exactly how much of the tax breaks we identify are depreciation-related tax breaks.

Even without bonus depreciation, the tax law allows companies to take much bigger accelerated depreciation write-offs than is economically justified. This subsidy distorts economic behavior by favoring some industries and some investments over others, wastes huge amounts of resources, and has little or no effect in stimulating investment. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service, reviewing efforts to quantify the impact of depreciation breaks, found that "the studies concluded that accelerated depreciation in general is a relatively ineffective tool for stimulating the economy."[7]

Combined with rules allowing corporations to deduct interest expenses, accelerated depreciation can result in very low, or even negative, tax rates on profits from particular investments. A corporation can borrow money to purchase equipment or a building, deduct the interest expenses on the debt and quickly deduct the cost of the equipment or building thanks to accelerated depreciation. The total deductions can then make the investments more profitable after-tax than before-tax.

Stock options. Most big corporations give their executives (and sometimes other employees) options to buy the company's stock at a favorable price in the future. When those options are exercised, companies can take a tax deduction for the difference between what the employees pay for the stock and what it's worth.[8]

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[6] Under "bonus depreciation," in the first full year that most equipment is placed in service, the depreciation write-offs include: a 20 percent regular write-off for the first half of the year, plus 50 percent bonus depreciation, plus a 6 percent write-off for the second half of the first full year.

[7] Gary Guenther, "Section 179 and Bonus Depreciation Expensing Allowances: Current Law, Legislative Proposals in the 112th Congress, and Economic Effects," Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31852.pdf

[8] Employees exercising stock options must report the difference between the value of the stock and what they pay for it as wages on their personal income tax returns.

Stock options are also attractive because companies don't have to reduce the profits they report to their shareholders by the amount that they deducted on their tax returns as the "cost" of the stock options. It does not make sense for companies to treat stock options inconsistently for tax purposes versus shareholder-reporting or "book" purposes. This non-cash "expense" should not be deductible for either tax or book purposes. Because of the complaints about inconsistency, rules in place since 2006 now require companies to lower their "book" profits to take some account of options. But the book write-offs are still usually considerably less than what the companies take as tax deductions. That's because the oddly-designed rules require the value of the stock options for book purposes to be calculated — or guessed at — when the options are issued, while the tax deductions reflect the actual value when the options are exercised. Because companies low-ball the estimated values for book purposes, they usually end up with bigger tax deductions than they deduct from the profits they report to shareholders.[9]

Top 25 Tax Savings from Stock Options, 2008-15

Company ($-millions)	2015	2014	2013	2008-12	8 yrs
Facebook	$1,721	$1,869	$609	$1,581	**$5,780**
Goldman Sachs Group	407	782	98	1,589	**2,876**
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	—	407	137	1,313	**1,857**
Wells Fargo	453	453	271	543	**1,720**
Qualcomm	103	280	231	883	**1,497**
Oracle	124	244	250	857	**1,475**
Exxon Mobil	2	115	48	1,082	**1,247**
Amazon.com	119	6	78	1,014	**1,217**
Walt Disney	313	255	204	373	**1,145**
Nike	281	218	132	334	**965**
Comcast	282	267	205	199	**953**
HCA Holdings	235	134	113	351	**833**
PepsiCo	133	114	117	450	**814**
McDonald's	51	71	93	581	**796**
General Mills	94	75	69	475	**713**
CBS	88	243	148	198	**677**
Time Warner	151	179	179	116	**625**
3M	154	167	92	203	**616**
Intel	159	122	49	283	**613**
United Technologies	64	103	115	324	**606**
Boeing	157	114	128	205	**604**
Monsanto	44	72	79	362	**557**
Union Pacific	62	118	76	298	**554**
Time Warner Cable	92	141	93	148	**474**
Yum Brands	50	42	44	336	**472**
These 25 companies	**$5,339**	**$6,590**	**$3,658**	**$14,099**	**$29,686**
Other 233 companies	3,893	3,832	3,575	10,673	21,974
All 258 companies	**$9,233**	**$10,423**	**$7,233**	**$24,771**	**$51,660**

Note: figures include both federal and state tax savings.

Some members of Congress have taken aim at this remaining inconsistency. In February of 2013, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced the "Cut Unjustified Loopholes Act," which includes a provision requiring companies to treat stock options the same for both book and tax purposes, as well as making stock option compensation subject to the $1 million cap on corporate tax deductions for top executives' pay.

[9] The value of these "excess tax benefits" from stock options is reported in corporate annual reports, and we take it into account in calculating the taxes that companies actually pay. See the Methodology at the end of this study for more details.

Levin calculates that over the past eight years U.S. companies have consistently taken far higher stock-option tax write-offs than they reported as book expenses.

199 corporations in the sample disclosed their "excess stock-option tax benefits" for at least one year in the 2008-15 period, which lowered their taxes by a total of $51.6 billion over eight years. (Some other companies enjoyed stock option benefits, but did not disclose them fully.) The tax benefits ranged from as high as $5.8 billion for Facebook over the eight years to only tiny amounts for a few companies. Just 25 companies enjoyed 57 percent of the total excess tax benefits from stock options disclosed by all of our 258 companies, getting $29.7 billion of the $51.6 billion total.

Industry-specific tax breaks. The federal tax code also provides tax subsidies to companies that engage in certain activities. For example: research (very broadly defined); drilling for oil and gas; providing alternatives to oil and gas; making video games; ethanol production; maintaining railroad tracks; building NASCAR race tracks; making movies; and a wide variety of activities that special interests have persuaded Congress need to be subsidized through the tax code.

One of these special interest tax breaks is of particular importance to long-time tax avoider General Electric. It is oxymoronically titled the "active financing exception" (the joke is that financing is generally considered to be a quintessentially passive activity). This tax break allows financial companies (GE has a major financial branch) to pay no taxes on foreign (or ostensibly foreign) lending and leasing, apparently while deducting the interest expenses of engaging in such activities from their U.S. taxable income. (This is an exception to the general rule that U.S. corporations can defer their U.S. taxes on offshore profits only if they take the form of active income rather than passive income.) This tax break was repealed in 1986, which helped put GE back on the tax rolls. But the tax break was reinstated, allegedly "temporarily," in 1997, and has been periodically extended ever since, at a current cost of more than $5 billion a year. We don't know how much of this particular tax subsidy goes to GE, but in its annual report, GE has singled out the potential expiration of the "active financing" loophole as one of the significant "Risk Factors" the company faces.[10]

Notably, the "active financing" loophole is one of dozens of narrowly-targeted temporary tax giveaways that were made permanent at the end of 2015. These tax breaks, known collectively as the "extenders," have been routinely renewed temporarily for decades. Perhaps the most significant step toward tax

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[10] GE's 2012 Annual Report states: "GE's effective tax rate is reduced because active business income earned and indefinitely reinvested outside the United States is taxed at less than the U.S. rate. A significant portion of this reduction depends upon a provision of U.S. tax law that defers the imposition of U.S. tax on certain active financial services income until that income is repatriated to the United States as a dividend. … In the event the provision is not extended after 2013, … we expect our effective tax rate to increase significantly after 2014."

fairness that Congress could take would be to reverse course and eliminate those tax extenders that it made permanent and allow the rest of the extenders to expire once and for all.

'MANUFACTURING' DOES NOT MEAN WHAT YOU THINK IT MEANS

When Congressional tax writers signaled their intention to enact a new tax break for domestic manufacturing income in 2004, lobbyists began a feeding frenzy to define both "domestic" and "manufacturing" as expansively as possible. As a result, current beneficiaries of the tax break include mining and oil, coffee roasting (a special favor to Starbucks, which lobbied heavily for inclusion) and even Hollywood film production. The Walt Disney corporation has disclosed receiving $1.48 billion in tax breaks from this provision over the past eight years, presumably from its film production work. World Wrestling Entertainment has disclosed receiving tax breaks for its "domestic manufacturing" of wrestling-related films. And we were surprised to find that Silicon Valley-based OpenTable, which "manufactures" only online restaurant reservations, has somehow found a way to claim this tax break.

President Obama sensibly proposed scaling back the domestic manufacturing deduction to prevent big oil and gas companies from claiming it, but a better approach would be to simply repeal this tax break. At a minimum, Congress and the Trump Administration should take steps to ensure that the companies claiming this misguided giveaway are engaged in something that can at least plausibly be described as manufacturing.

What about the AMT? The corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was revised in 1986 to ensure that profitable corporations pay some substantial amount in income taxes no matter how many tax breaks they enjoy under the regular corporate tax. The corporate AMT (unlike the much-maligned personal AMT) was particularly designed to curb leasing tax shelters that had allowed corporations such as General Electric to avoid most or all of their regular tax liabilities.

But laws enacted in 1993 and 1997 at the behest of corporate lobbyists sharply weakened the corporate AMT, and now hardly any companies pay the tax. In fact, many are getting rebates for past AMT payments. In late 2001, U.S. House of Representatives leaders attempted to repeal the corporate AMT entirely and give companies instant refunds for any AMT they had paid since 1986. Public outcry stopped that outrageous plan, but the AMT remains a shell of its former self that will require substantial reform if it is to once again achieve its goal of curbing corporate tax avoidance.

WHO LOSES FROM CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE?

Low- and no-tax companies may be happy about their ability to avoid huge amounts in taxes every year, but our current corporate income tax mess is not good for the rest of us. The losers under this system include:

The general public. As a share of the economy, corporate tax payments have fallen dramatically over the last quarter century. So one obvious group of losers from growing corporate tax avoidance is the general public, which has to pay more for — and/or get less in — public services, or else face mounting national debt burdens that must be paid for in the future.

Disadvantaged companies. Almost as obvious is how the wide variation in tax rates among industries, and among companies within particular industries, gives relatively high-tax companies and industries a legitimate complaint that federal tax policy is helping their competitors at their expense. The table on page 8 showed how widely industry tax rates vary. The detailed industry tables starting on page 36 show that discrepancies within industries also abound. For example:

- Honeywell International and Deere both produce industrial machinery. But over the 2008-15 period, Deere paid 31 percent of its profits in U.S. corporate income taxes, while Honeywell paid a tax rate of only 14.9 percent.

- Aerospace giant Boeing paid an eight-year federal tax rate of 5.4 percent, while competitor General Dynamics paid 27.0 percent.

- Household products maker Kimberly-Clark paid an eight-year rate of 16.9 percent, while competitor Clorox paid 28.1 percent.

- Pharmaceutical firm Eli Lilly paid 17 percent of its eight-year U.S. profits in federal income taxes, while Biogen IDEC paid 35.3 percent.

- Time Warner Cable paid 7.8 percent over eight years, while its competitor Comcast paid 23.9 percent.

The U.S. economy. Besides being unfair, the fact that the government is offering much larger tax subsidies to some companies and industries than others is also poor economic policy. Such a system artificially boosts the rate of return for tax-favored industries and companies and reduces the relative rate of return for those industries and companies that are less favored. To be sure, companies that push for tax breaks argue that the "incentives" will encourage useful activities.

But the idea that the government should tell businesses what kinds of investments to make conflicts with our basic economic philosophy that consumer demand and free markets should be the test of which private investments make sense.

To be sure, most of the time, tax breaks don't have much effect on business behavior. After all, companies don't lobby to have the government tell them what to do. Why would they? Instead, they ask for subsidies to reward them for doing what they would do anyway. Thus, to a large degree, corporate tax subsidies are simply an economically useless waste of resources.

Indeed, corporate executives (as opposed to their lobbyists) often insist that tax subsidies are not the basis for their investment decisions. Other things, they say, usually matter much more, including demand for their products, production costs and so forth.

But not all corporate tax subsidies are merely useless waste. Making some kinds of investments more profitable than others through tax breaks will sometimes shift capital away from what's most economically beneficial and into lower-yield activities. As a result, the flow of capital is diverted in favor of those industries that have been most aggressive in the political marketplace of Washington, D.C., at the expense of long-term economic growth.

State governments and state taxpayers. The loopholes that reduce federal corporate income taxes cut state corporate income taxes, too, since state corporate tax systems generally take federal taxable income as their starting point in computing taxable corporate profits.[11] Thus, when the federal government allows corporations to write off their machinery faster than it wears out or to shift U.S. profits overseas or to shelter earnings from oil drilling, most states automatically do so, too. It's a mathematical truism that low and declining state revenues from corporate income taxes means higher state taxes on other state taxpayers or diminished state and local public services.

The integrity of the tax system and public trust therein. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to be suspicious and even outraged about a tax code that seems so tilted toward politically well-connected companies. In a tax system that by necessity must rely heavily on the voluntary compliance of tens of millions of honest taxpayers, maintaining public trust is essential — and that trust is endangered by the specter of widespread corporate tax avoidance. The fact that the law allows America's biggest companies to shelter almost half of their U.S. profits from tax, while ordinary wage-earners have to report every penny of their earnings, has to undermine public respect for the tax system.

[11] Over the past decade, companies have been extremely aggressive at avoiding state taxes by shifting profits not only offshore, but also from states that would tax them into states that don't. In addition, most states also provide their own set of business tax breaks or abatements beyond the federal ones, although these often involve taxes other than corporate income taxes.

A PLEA FOR BETTER DISCLOSURE

Determining tax rates paid by the nation's biggest and most profitable corporations shouldn't be hard. Lawmakers, the media and the general public should all have a straightforward way of knowing whether our tax system requires companies like General Electric to pay their fair share. But in fact, it's an incredibly difficult enterprise. Even veteran analysts struggle to understand the often cryptic disclosures in corporate annual reports. And many amateurs come up with (and unfortunately publish) hugely mistaken results. The fact that it took us so much time and effort to complete this report illustrates how desirable it would be if companies would provide the public with clearer and more detailed information about their federal income taxes.

The best way to provide the media, lawmakers and the public the information they need to make informed decisions about our nation's tax code would be to require companies to publicly disclose key financial data on a country-by-country basis. Ideally, this would include the disclosure of total revenues, profit, income tax paid, tax cash expense, stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees on a full-time basis, and book value of tangible assets on a country-by-country basis. For many companies that will already have to file country-by-country reports to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the coming years, providing this information in financial statements would represent little to no additional cost.

At a minimum, we need a straightforward statement of what they paid in federal taxes on their U.S. profits, and the reasons why those taxes differed from the statutory 35 percent corporate tax rate. This information would be a major help, not only to analysts but also to policymakers.

A Minimum Benchmark for Corporate Tax Disclosure in Annual Financial Reports

1	**Pretax profits as reported to shareholders**	**U.S. profits**		**Foreign profits**		
2	**Income taxes on those profits—**	**On US profits**		**On foreign profits**		
(a)	Income taxes paid or payable on return for year, including effects of carrybacks	To US govt	To state govts	To foreign govts	To US govt	To state govts
(b)	Income taxes deferred (not yet paid and not payable on return for year)	By US govt	By state govts	By foreign govts	By US govt	By state govts
3	**Details on income taxes paid and not paid**	**On US profits**		**On foreign profits**		
(a)	List of all significant items reducing or increasing taxable income compared to profits reported above (with dollar amounts)	US federal	state	Foreign govts	US federal	US state
(b)	Taxable income (profits less items listed above)	US federal	state	Foreign govts	US federal	US state
(c)	Tax paid or payable on return for year before credits, including the effects of carrybacks	US federal	state	Foreign govts	US federal	US state
(d)	Credits taken on return for taxable year (listing details and dollar amounts) including the effects of carrybacks	US federal	state	Foreign govts	US federal	US state
(e)	Tax after credits (should equal line 2(a) above)	US federal	state	Foreign govts	US federal	US state

Notes: "Significant" means any item that reduces or increases taxable income by more than 3 percent, or in the case of credits reduces tax before credits by more than 1 percent. Items not listed separately because they are not "significant" should be reported in the aggregate. Tax items that under current reporting are not listed in the tax footnote, for example, tax benefits from stock options, should be included in the tax figures reported under the rules outlined above.

TAX REFORM (& DEFORM) OPTIONS

More than thirty years after major loophole-closing corporate tax reforms were enacted under Ronald Reagan in 1986, many of the problems that those reforms were designed to address have re-emerged — along with a dizzying array of new corporate tax-avoidance techniques. But these problems can be resolved. The discussion of tax giveaways elsewhere in this report provides a clear roadmap to the types of reforms lawmakers should consider:

- Repealing the rule allowing U.S. corporations to "defer" their U.S. taxes on their offshore profits so there would be no tax incentive to shift profits to offshore tax havens or jobs to lower-tax countries. Relatedly, companies should be required to immediately pay what they owe on their unrepatriated earnings.

- Limiting the ability of tech and other companies to use executive stock options to reduce their taxes by generating phantom "costs" these companies never actually incur.

- Having set "bonus depreciation" on a path toward expiration at the end of 2019, Congress could take the next step and repeal the rest of accelerated depreciation, too. At a minimum, lawmakers should not expand these tax breaks by allowing for the immediate expensing of capital investments.

- Reinstating a strong corporate Alternative Minimum Tax that really does the job it was originally designed to do.

- Increase transparency by requiring country-by-country public disclosure of company financial information, through filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. (see page 20)

Sadly, these sensible proposals bear little resemblance to the "reform" ideas put forth by some members of Congress. Corporate tax legislation now being promoted by many on Capitol Hill seems fixated on the misguided notion that as a group, corporations are now either paying the perfect amount in federal income taxes or are paying too much. Many members of Congress seem intent on making changes that would make it easier and more lucrative for companies to shift taxable profits, and potentially jobs, overseas. Lawmakers should reject the push to a territorial tax system or the implementation of border adjustment, both of which would likely increase, not decrease, offshore tax avoidance.

Real, revenue-raising corporate tax reform is what most Americans want and what our country needs.[12] Our elected officials should stop kowtowing to the loophole lobbyists and stand up for the majority of Americans.

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[12] CTJ's comprehensive plan for fair, revenue-raising tax reform can be found at www.ctj.org/pdf/taxreformdetails.pdf.

YEAR-BY-YEAR DETAILS ON COMPANIES PAYING NO INCOME TAX

29 Corporations Paying No Income Tax in 2015							
Company ($-millions)	2015 Profit	2015 Tax	2015 Rate	Company ($-millions)	2015 Profit	2015 Tax	2015 Rate
Netflix	97	–28	–28.7%	ExxonMobil	159	–2	–1.0%
Andersons	34	–4	–12.7%	Dominion Resources	2,746	–26	–1.0%
Devon Energy	1,861	–236	–12.7%	Pepco Holdings	435	–3	–0.7%
PG&E Corp.	850	–89	–10.5%	State Street Corp.	1,025	–6	–0.6%
Wisconsin Energy	962	–97	–10.1%	DTE Energy	954	–3	–0.3%
Constellation Brands	599	–57	–9.6%	Reinsurance Group of America	493	–1	–0.3%
International Business Machines	5,787	–321	–5.5%	Ameren	946	–2	–0.2%
Qualcomm	2,993	–166	–5.5%	Eversource Energy	1,382	–2	–0.1%
Consolidated Edison	1,760	–86	–4.9%	Atmos Energy	504	—	—
Southern	3,662	–177	–4.8%	CMS Energy	772	—	—
Sempra Energy	1,135	–49	–4.3%	Duke Energy	3,840	—	—
PPL	943	–26	–2.8%	Nisource	334	—	—
Harris	1,091	–27	–2.5%	Spectra Energy	359	—	—
Xcel Energy	1,525	–36	–2.4%	Williams	87	—	—
AGL Resources	556	–11	–2.0%	TOTAL	$37,891	$–1,456	–3.8%

28 Corporations Paying No Income Tax in 2014							
Company ($-millions)	2014 Profit	2014 Tax	2014 Rate	Company ($-millions)	2014 Profit	2014 Tax	2014 Rate
Phillips-Van Heusen	34	–44	–130.9%	Air Products & Chemica	548	–6	–1.1%
FirstEnergy	243	–132	–54.3%	Sempra Energy	941	–10	–1.1%
Pepco Holdings	406	–137	–33.7%	Dominion Resources	1,748	–11	–0.6%
Darden Restaurants	191	–28	–14.6%	Time Warner	4,616	–26	–0.6%
CBS	1,790	–235	–13.1%	Consolidated Edison	1,601	–9	–0.6%
Community Health Systems	228	–29	–12.7%	Ryder System	270	–1	–0.3%
Priceline.com	73	–9	–12.3%	Williams	3,267	–9	–0.3%
Wisconsin Energy	872	–44	–5.1%	Eversource Energy	1,273	–3	–0.3%
Xcel Energy	1,536	–73	–4.8%	State Street Corp.	1,097	–1	–0.0%
PG&E Corp.	1,836	–84	–4.6%	Atmos Energy	471	—	—
Ameren	1,001	–37	–3.7%	CMS Energy	703	—	—
Qualcomm	3,213	–98	–3.1%	Duke Energy	3,544	—	—
Interpublic Group	365	–6	–1.6%	Nextera Energy	3,674	—	—
DTE Energy	1,251	–16	–1.3%	Nisource	830	—	—
				TOTAL	$37,623	$–1,048	–2.8%

32 Corporations Paying No Income Tax in 2013

Company ($-millions)	2013 Profit	2013 Tax	2013 Rate	Company ($-millions)	2013 Profit	2013 Tax	2013 Rate
International Paper	489	–697	–142.5%	Netflix	158	–9	–5.7%
Domtar	35	–15	–41.0%	Duke Energy	3,357	–123	–3.7%
PPL	195	–75	–38.5%	Spectra Energy	934	–32	–3.4%
Pepco Holdings	438	–128	–29.2%	Boeing	5,946	–199	–3.3%
Priceline.com	38	–9	–24.6%	Xcel Energy	1,425	–46	–3.2%
FirstEnergy	500	–118	–23.6%	Williams	721	–17	–2.4%
R.R. Donnelley & Sons	66	–15	–23.3%	American Electric Power	2,081	–45	–2.2%
PG&E Corp.	1,122	–218	–19.4%	Westrock	614	–13	–2.2%
Ameren	804	–118	–14.7%	NiSource	762	–16	–2.1%
Windstream	228	–27	–11.9%	Verizon Communications	12,282	–197	–1.6%
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	12,486	–1,429	–11.4%	Ryder System	299	–4	–1.3%
Mosaic	223	–25	–11.2%	Principal Financial	1,090	–10	–0.9%
Reinsurance Group of America	473	–52	–11.0%	Cablevision Systems	197	–1	–0.6%
Sempra Energy	883	–70	–7.9%	Oneok	427	–1	–0.3%
Wisconsin Energy	840	–50	–6.0%	Atmos Energy	365	—	—
NextEra Energy	2,452	–145	–5.9%	CMS Energy	720	—	—
				TOTAL	**$ 52,651**	**$ –3,905**	**–7.4%**

34 Corporations Paying No Income Tax in 2012

Company ($-millions)	2012 Profit	2012 Tax	2012 Rate	Company ($-millions)	2012 Profit	2012 Tax	2012 Rate
Facebook	1,062	–429	–40.4%	Eversource Energy	792	–38	–4.8%
Dominion Resources	392	–125	–32.0%	Praxair	870	–36	–4.1%
Texas Instruments	321	–81	–25.2%	Oneok	571	–22	–3.8%
Health Net	34	–8	–24.9%	Entergy	1,296	–48	–3.7%
Principal Financial	896	–146	–16.3%	DISH Network	973	–36	–3.7%
Pepco Holdings	480	–76	–15.8%	Westrock	369	–13	–3.5%
NiSource	620	–95	–15.3%	American Electric Power	1,787	–52	–2.9%
Wisconsin Energy	786	–113	–14.3%	Duke Energy	1,792	–46	–2.6%
Cablevision Systems	43	–6	–12.9%	Ryder System	230	–5	–2.3%
Public Service Enterprise Group	2,013	–204	–10.1%	Trinity Industries	369	–6	–1.7%
FirstEnergy	1,295	–122	–9.4%	Corning	495	–4	–0.8%
Sempra Energy	404	–36	–8.9%	Interpublic Group	363	–3	–0.8%
MDU Resources	344	–27	–7.8%	Qualcomm	3,525	–27	–0.8%
McKesson	1,153	–85	–7.4%	Consolidated Edison	1,712	–13	–0.8%
PG&E Corp.	1,034	–74	–7.2%	Priceline.com	84	–1	–0.7%
Southwest Airlines	673	–45	–6.7%	NextEra Energy	2,589	–4	–0.2%
UGI	229	–15	–6.5%	PPL	996	—	—
				TOTAL	**$ 30,593**	**$ –2,039**	**–6.7%**

32 Corporations Paying No Income Tax in 2011

Company ($-millions)	2011 Profit	2011 Tax	2011 Rate	Company ($-millions)	2011 Profit	2011 Tax	2011 Rate
Wisconsin Energy	715	–228	–31.9%	Air Products & Chemicals	614	–25	–4.0%
AGL Resources	296	–90	–30.3%	Atmos Energy	306	–11	–3.7%
Windstream	417	–98	–23.5%	AT&T	11,994	–422	–3.5%
Pitney Bowes	386	–88	–22.7%	Ameren	834	–27	–3.2%
First Energy	1,440	–243	–16.9%	NiSource	468	–14	–3.0%
Travelers Cos.	1,230	–191	–15.5%	MDU Resources	333	–8	–2.5%
Boeing	5,105	–641	–12.6%	Danaher	1,183	–27	–2.3%
Priceline.com	139	–15	–10.6%	Duke Energy	1,759	–37	–2.1%
International Paper	893	–78	–8.7%	Interpublic Group	407	–6	–1.5%
R.R. Donnelley & Sons	131	–10	–7.9%	Reinsurance Group of America	453	–7	–1.4%
PG&E Corp.	1,146	–77	–6.7%	NextEra Energy	2,441	–35	–1.4%
Oneok	583	–35	–6.1%	SpartanNash	50	–0	–0.8%
HCA Holdings	3,198	–182	–5.7%	Dominion Resources	2,153	–13	–0.6%
FedEx	2,706	–135	–5.0%	Cablevision Systems	401	–2	–0.4%
CenturyLink	992	–49	–4.9%	Westrock	163	–0	–0.2%
Devon Energy	3,459	–154	–4.4%	Corning	966	–2	–0.2%
				TOTAL	**$47,362**	**$–2,950**	**–6.2%**

Appendix 1: METHODOLOGY

This study is an in-depth look at corporate taxes over the past eight years. It is similar to a series of widely-cited and influential studies by Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, starting in the 1980s and most recently in 2014. The new report covers 258 large Fortune 500 corporations, and analyzes their U.S. profits and corporate income taxes from 2008 to 2015. Over the eight-year period, these companies reported $3.8 trillion in pretax U.S. profits, and, on average, paid tax on just over half that amount.

1. Choosing the Companies

Our report is based on corporate annual reports to shareholders and the similar 10-K forms that corporations are required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We relied on electronic versions of these reports from the companies' web sites or from the SEC web site.

As we pursued our analysis, we gradually eliminated companies from the study based on two criteria: either (1) a company lost money in any one of the eight years; or (2) a company's report did not provide sufficient information for us to accurately determine its domestic profits, current federal income taxes, or both. This left us with the 258 companies in our report.

Some companies did not report data for all of the eight years between 2008 and 2015, either because their initial public offering occurred after 2008 or because they were spun off of parent companies after 2008. We included these companies in the sample only if they reported data for at least 6 of the 8 years.

The total net federal income taxes reported by our 258 companies over the eight years amounted to 40 percent of all net federal corporate income tax collections in that period.

2. Method of Calculation

Conceptually, our method for computing effective corporate tax rates was straightforward. First, a company's domestic profit was determined and then current state and local taxes were subtracted to give us net U.S. pretax profits before federal income taxes. (We excluded foreign profits since U.S. income taxes rarely apply to them, because the taxes are indefinitely "deferred" or are offset by credits for taxes paid to foreign governments.) We then determined a company's federal current income taxes. Current taxes are those that a company is obligated to pay during the year; they do not include taxes "deferred" due to various federal "tax incentives" such as accelerated depreciation. Finally, we divided current U.S. taxes by pretax U.S. profits to determine effective tax rates.[13]

[13] The effective federal income tax rates we report in this study should not be confused with an item that companies include in their annual reports with the unfortunately similar name "effective tax rate." This latter number is a conglomeration of U.S., state and foreign income taxes, including income taxes paid and income taxes not paid (i.e., deferred). It is meaningless for understanding what companies actually pay in U.S. taxes.

A. Issues in measuring profits.

The pretax U.S. profits reported in the study are generally as the companies disclosed them. In a few cases, if companies did not separate U.S. pretax profits from foreign, but foreign profits were obviously small, we made our own geographic allocation, based on a geographic breakdown of operating profits minus a prorated share of any expenses not included therein (e.g., overhead or interest), or we estimated foreign profits based on reported foreign taxes or reported foreign revenues as a share of total worldwide profits.

Many companies report "noncontrolling interest" income, which is usually included in total reported pre-tax income. This is income of a subsidiary that is not taxable income of the parent company. When substantial noncontrolling income was disclosed, we subtracted it from U.S. and/or foreign pretax income.

Where significant, we adjusted reported pretax profits for several items to reduce distortions. In the second half of 2008, the U.S. financial system imploded, taking our economy down with it. By the fourth quarter of 2008, no one knew for sure how the federal government's financial rescue plan would work. Many banks predicted big future loan losses, and took big book write-offs for these pessimistic estimates. Commodity prices for things like oil and gas and metals plummeted, and many companies that owned such assets booked "impairment charges" for their supposed long-term decline in value. Companies that had acquired "goodwill" and other "intangible assets" from mergers calculated the estimated future returns on these assets, and if these were lower than their "carrying value" on their books, took big book "impairment charges." All of these book write-offs were non-cash and had no effect on either current income taxes or a company's cash flow.

As it turned out, the financial rescue plan, supplemented by the best parts of the economic stimulus program adopted in early 2009, succeeded in averting the Depression that many economists had worried could have happened. Commodity prices recovered, the stock market boomed, and corporate profits zoomed upward. But in one of the oddities of book accounting, the impairment charges could not be reversed.

Here is how we dealt with these extraordinary non-cash charges, plus "restructuring charges," that would otherwise distort annual reported book profits and effective tax rates:

1. Smoothing adjustments

Some of our adjustments simply reassign booked expenses to the years that the expenses were actually incurred. These "smoothing" adjustments avoid aberrations in one year to the next.

a. *"Provisions for loan losses"* by financial companies: Rather than using estimates of future losses, we generally replaced companies' projected future loan losses with actual loan charge-offs less recoveries. Over time, these two approaches converge, but using actual loan charge-offs is more accurate and avoids year-to-year distortions. Typically, financial companies provide sufficient information to allow this kind of adjustment to be allocated geographically.

b. "Restructuring charges": Sometimes companies announce a plan for future spending (such as the cost of laying off employees over the next few years) and will book a charge for the total expected cost in the year of the announcement. In cases where these restructuring charges were significant and distorted year-by-year income, we reallocated the costs to the year the money was spent (allocated geographically).

2. "Impairments"

Companies that booked "impairment" charges typically went to great lengths to assure investors and stock analysts that these charges had no real effect on the companies' earnings. Some companies simply excluded impairment charges from the geographic allocation of their pretax income. For example, Conoco-Phillips assigned its 2008 pretax profits to three geographic areas, "United States," "Foreign," and "Goodwill impairment," implying that the goodwill impairment charge, if it had any real existence at all, was not related to anything on this planet. In addition, many analysts have criticized these non-cash impairment charges as misleading, and even "a charade."[14] Here is how we treated "impairment charges":

a. Impairment charges for goodwill (and intangible assets with indefinite lives) do not affect future book income, since they are not amortizable over time. We added these charges back to reported profits, allocating them geographically based on geographic information that companies supplied, or as a last resort by geographic revenue shares.

b. Impairment charges to assets (tangible or intangible) that are depreciable or amortizable on the books will affect future book income somewhat (by reducing future book write-offs, and thus increasing future book profits). But big impairment charges still hugely distort current year book profit. So as a general rule, we also added these back to reported profits if the charges were significant.

c. Caveat: Impairments of assets held for sale soon were not added back.

All significant adjustments to profits made in the study are reported in the company-by-company notes.

[14] One article describes goodwill impairment charges as "a ludicrous charade" "which everyone and their brothers and sisters dismiss as merely the result of an arbitrary recalculation of an arbitrary calculation."

B. Issues in measuring federal income taxes.

The primary source for current federal income taxes was the companies' income tax notes to their financial statements. From reported current taxes, we subtracted "excess tax benefits" from stock options (if any), which reduced companies' tax payments but which are not reported as a reduction in current taxes, but are instead reported separately (typically in companies' cash-flow statements). We divided the tax benefits from stock options between federal and state taxes based on the relative statutory tax rates (using a national average for the states). All of the non-trivial tax benefits from stock options that we found are reported in the company-by-company notes.

3. Negative tax rates

A "negative" effective tax rate means that a company enjoyed a tax rebate. This can occur by carrying back excess tax deductions and/or credits to an earlier year or years and receiving a tax refund check from the U.S. Treasury Department. Negative tax rates can also result from recognition of tax benefits claimed on earlier years' tax returns, but not reported as tax reduction in earlier annual reports because companies did not expect that the IRS would allow the tax benefits. If and when these "uncertain tax benefits" are recognized, they reduce a companies reported current income tax in the year that they are recognized. See the appendix on page 30 for a fuller discussion of "uncertain tax benefits."

4. High effective tax rates

Ten of the companies in our study report effective eight-year U.S. federal income tax rates that are slightly higher than the 35 percent official corporate tax rate. Indeed, in particular years, some companies report effective U.S. tax rates that are much higher than 35 percent. This phenomenon is usually due to taxes that were deferred in the past but that eventually came due. Such "turnarounds" often involve accelerated depreciation tax breaks, which usually do not turn around so long as companies are continuing to increase or maintain their investments in plant and equipment. But these tax breaks can turn around if new investments fall off (for example, because a bad economy makes continued new investments temporarily unprofitable).

5. Industry classifications

Because some companies do business in multiple industries, our industry classifications are far from perfect. We generally, but not always, based them on Fortune's industry classifications.

APPENDIX 2:
Why the "current" federal income taxes that corporations disclose in their annual reports are the best (and only) measure of what corporations really pay (or don't pay) in federal income tax

Some analysts and journalists, along with some corporations, have complained that the "current income taxes" reported by corporations under oath in their annual reports are not a true measure of the income taxes that corporations actually pay. This complaint is mostly incorrect. In fact, "current income taxes," with a sometimes important downward adjustment that we make for "excess stock option tax benefits," are a good assessment of companies' tax situations, and are the only available measure of what corporations pay in income taxes broken down by payments to the federal government, state governments and foreign governments.

Our report focuses on the federal income tax that companies are currently paying on their U.S. profits. So we look at the current federal tax expense portion of the income tax provision in the financial statements. The "deferred" portion of the tax provision is tax based on the current year income but not due yet because of the differences between calculating income for financial statement purposes and for tax purposes. When those timing differences turn around, if they ever do, the related taxes will be reflected in the current tax expense.[15]

The federal current tax expense is just exactly what the company expects its current year tax bill to be when it files its tax return. If the calculation of the income tax provision was done perfectly, the current tax expense (after adjusting for excess stock option tax benefits) would exactly equal the total amount of tax shown on the tax return. But the income tax provision is calculated in February as the company is preparing its 10-K for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the company's tax return isn't usually filed until September. While the company's tax return is prepared over those several months, things will be found that weren't accounted for in the financial statement income tax provision, and numbers that were estimated in February will be refined for the actual return. Those small differences will be included in the following year's current tax expense, but the impact on our calculations is minimal (especially because we look at the rates over a period of years). If the differences in any one year were material, accounting rules would require the company to restate their prior year financials.

[15] Companies also explain in their tax footnote why the income tax provision isn't exactly 35% (the U.S. statutory rate) in their "rate reconciliation." It might show, for example, that "U.S. Business Credits" reduced their total worldwide effective tax rate by 4.4% or that "Tax on Global Activities" reduced their total worldwide effective tax rate by 19.7%. But this disclosure is a reconciliation of their worldwide effective rate, based on the total of current and deferred taxes, and doesn't tell you much, if anything, about what they are currently paying in U.S. taxes.

The complaints that "current income taxes" are not an accurate measure of taxes actually paid make two main points:

A. Excess stock option tax benefits: The first, easily dismissed complaint is that "current income taxes" do not include some of the tax benefits that corporations enjoy when employees exercise stock options. That is certainly true. But our study does subtract those "excess stock option tax benefits" from current income taxes in the tax results we report.

B. Dubious tax benefits: A more interesting, but also flawed argument against the use of current income taxes (less stock option tax benefits) involves the accounting treatment of dubious tax benefits that companies claim on their tax returns but are not allowed to report on their books until and if these claimed tax benefits are allowed.

Dubious tax benefits, officially known as "uncertain tax positions" and "unrecognized tax benefits," are tax reductions that corporations claim when they file their tax returns but which they expect the IRS (or other taxing authority) to disallow.

For example, suppose a corporation on its 2013 tax return tells the IRS that it owes $700 million in federal income tax for the year. But the corporation's tax staff believes that on audit, the corporation will most likely owe an additional $300 million, because $300 million in tax benefits that the company claimed on its tax return are unlikely to be approved by the IRS. As a result, the corporation's current income tax for 2013 that it reports to shareholders (and that we calculate in our reports) will be $1,000 million, the amount that the corporation expects to actually owe in income taxes.[16]

After that, two things, in general, can happen:

1. More often than not. Suppose that, as the corporation's tax staff predicted, the IRS in 2015 disallows the $300 million in dubious tax benefits claimed on the company's 2013 tax return. In this case, the $1,000 million in reported current income tax for 2013 will turn out to have been correct. In 2015, when the dubious tax benefits are disallowed, the company will have to pay back the $300 million (plus interest and penalties) to the IRS. Reasonably enough, the corporation will not report that 2015 payback in its 2015 annual report to shareholders, since it had already reported it as paid back in 2013.

[16] Dubious tax benefits are not booked as either a current or a "deferred" tax benefit until and if they lose their dubiousness. In its 2012 annual report, Amgen offers a concise explanation of how dubious tax benefits are treated in financial statements: "We recognize the tax benefit from an uncertain tax position only if it is more likely than not that the tax position will be sustained on examination by the taxing authorities based on the technical merits of the position. . . . The amount of UTBs [unrecognized tax benefits] is adjusted as appropriate for changes in facts and circumstances, such as significant amendments to existing tax law, new regulations or interpretations by the taxing authorities, new information obtained during a tax examination, or resolution of an examination." Amgen 2015 10-K, p. 54 (pdf p. 56).

2. Occasionally. Suppose instead that to the surprise of the corporation's tax staff, the IRS in 2015 allows some or part of the $300 million in dubious tax benefits claimed back in 2013. In this case, the corporation will reduce its 2015 "current income tax" reported to shareholders by the allowed amount of the dubious tax benefits previously claimed on the corporation's 2013 tax return.
But, argue some analysts, isn't the right answer to go back and reassign the eventually allowed dubious tax benefits to 2013, the year they were claimed on the corporation's tax return? The answer is no, for two reasons:

First, booking the corporation's tax windfall in 2015, the year it was allowed by the IRS, makes logical sense. That's because until the IRS allowed the dubious tax benefits, it was the judgment of the company's tax experts that the company was probably not legally entitled to those tax benefits. In essence, the IRS's allowance of all or part of the dubious tax benefits claimed on the company's 2013 tax return is the same as the corporation receiving an unexpected tax refund in 2015.

It's as if the company had initially borrowed the money from the IRS, but expected to pay it back (with interest). When and if the IRS "forgives" part or all of the "loan," then the company recognizes the tax benefit. Likewise, suppose you borrow money from you employer with the expectation that you'll pay it back. But later, your employer forgives your debt. You didn't have to declare the loan as income when you borrowed the money, but you do have to declare it as income when the loan is forgiven.

Second, even if one believed that the 2015 tax windfall ought to be reassigned to 2013, there is simply no way to do so. That's because corporations do not disclose sufficient information in their annual reports to make such a retroactive reallocation.[17]

[17] Companies do provide information on the growth or decline in the amount of dubious tax benefits they have outstanding. This info is not provided on a geographic basis, however. Moreover, it does not distinguish between benefits allowed (which reduces the amount of outstanding dubious tax benefits) and benefits not allowed (which also reduced the amount of outstanding dubious tax benefits). For these two reasons, the currently provided information on dubious tax benefits is useless for our goal of measuring U.S. income taxes paid on U.S. profits.

C. A final point here, regarding a potentially useful measure called "cash income taxes paid": In their annual reports to shareholders, corporations also report something called "cash income taxes paid." Cash income taxes paid is net of stock option tax benefits and does not include "deferred" taxes.[18] Unlike current taxes, however, cash income taxes paid subtracts dubious tax benefits that are likely to be reversed later (and adds those dubious tax benefits if and when they are later reversed).

"Cash income taxes paid" is sometimes interesting, but it is useless for purposes of measuring the federal income taxes that U.S. multinational corporations pay on their U.S. profits. That's because "cash income taxes paid" are not broken down by taxing jurisdiction. Instead, this measure lumps together U.S. federal income taxes, U.S. state income taxes, and foreign income taxes. Since most big corporations are multinationals these days, and almost all are subject to both federal and state income taxes, that's a fatal defect.[19]

Even for purely domestic corporations, "cash income taxes paid" is a problematic measure. It often fails to match income in a given year with the taxes paid for that year (since companies don't settle up with the IRS until after a given year is over). The cash payments made during the year include quarterly estimated tax payments for the current year, balances due on tax returns for prior years, and any refunds or additional taxes due as a result of tax return examinations or loss carrybacks.

To be sure, if "cash income taxes paid" were reported by taxing jurisdiction and better linked with the pretax income in a given year, then this measure could be useful. But as of now, it is not, except in one way: it supports our use of current taxes as a measure of how much in taxes corporations are really paying. If you compare a company's total current taxes (after subtracting the excess stock benefits) to cash taxes paid over a period of years, you will see that they are generally very close. The differences, if any, suggest that the effective rate corporations are paying may be even less than what we've calculated.

[18] Both current and cash income taxes also include refunds of taxes paid in the past if a company "carries back" "tax losses" to earlier years and gets a refund of previously paid taxes. This can occur even if a company reports book profits. Current and cash income taxes also automatically include payments of taxes "deferred" in the past in the relatively unusual occasions when those "deferred" taxes actually come due and are not offset by additional tax deferrals. ("Deferred taxes" are taxes that are not paid in the current year, but may or may not come due in future years).

[19] The good news regarding worldwide "cash income taxes paid" is that, over time, they are usually very similar to worldwide "current income taxes" (less stock option tax benefits). In fact, for the 258 corporations in our study, the overall difference between worldwide cash and current taxes over the 2008-15 period was less than 1 percent.

For individual companies, the 8-year current and cash tax figures were also quite similar in most cases. For half of the companies, the eight-year world-wide current and cash effective tax rates were essentially identical (plus or minus 1 percentage point). For 70 percent of the companies, the 8-year worldwide current and cash effective tax rates were within 3 percentage points of each other, and for 84 percent of the companies the 8-year worldwide current and cash effective tax rates were within 5 percentage points of each other. For the handful of outliers, going back a few more years usually brings cash and current taxes back into line with one another. The relatively small exceptions generally seems to involve companies that are very aggressive in claiming dubious tax benefits year after year. Since it takes time for the tax authorities to disallow these dubious tax benefits, worldwide cash taxes paid over time by such companies are typically somewhat lower than "current income taxes" (less stock option benefits).

APPENDIX 3:
Fifteen multinational corporations that do not provide plausible geographic breakdowns of their pretax profits

Noticeably missing from our sample of 258 profitable companies are some well-known multinational corporations, such as Apple and Microsoft. They are excluded because we do not believe the geographic breakdown of their profits between the U.S. and foreign countries that they report to shareholders.

For multinational companies, we are at the mercy of companies accurately allocating their pretax profits between U.S. and foreign in their annual reports. Hardly anyone but us cares about this geographic book allocation, yet fortunately for us, it appears that the great majority of companies were reasonably honest about it. Even companies that are shifting U.S. profits to offshore tax havens generally do not make the implausible claim to their shareholders that such U.S. profits were actually "foreign."

Some companies, however, report geographic profit allocations that we find to be obviously ridiculous. Indicators of ridiculousness include:

- A company reports that all or even more than all of its pretax profits were foreign, even though most of its revenues and assets are in the United States.
- A company reports U.S. taxes that are a very high share of what it calls its U.S. profits, while its foreign taxes are a very low share of what it calls its foreign profits.
- A company admits that it has used tax schemes to move profits to low- or no-tax jurisdictions.
- A company has a large amount of "unrecognized tax benefits" relative to the current income taxes it reports. These "UTBs" are tax reductions that companies have claimed on their tax returns but do not expect to be allowed when their returns are audited (and are thus not allowed to be reported as tax savings to their shareholders). A substantial portion of UTBs involve schemes to shift profits to tax havens.

In our previous corporate studies, we generally left out such suspicious companies. In a few cases, with grave reservations, we included some potential "liar companies" that we highly suspected made a lot more in the U.S. and less overseas than they reported to their shareholders.

In our current report, we have done better. We have left out of our main analysis 15 companies whose geographic allocations we do not trust (and that we highly suspect have shifted a significant portion of their U.S. profits, on paper, into tax havens). We have included in this appendix some information on these 15 companies. In a table on this page, we show the worldwide pretax profits for these suspicious companies over the 2008-15 period, along with their worldwide income taxes and worldwide effective tax rates.

Here are some of the specific reasons why we are suspicious of the 15 multinational companies we excluded from our main study:

15 multinational corporations that do not provide plausible geographic breakdowns of their pretax profits

Company	2008-15 Worldwide pretax profits	Worldwide cash income tax rate
Broadcom	$4.1	3.3%
Western Digital	9.3	4.4%
NetApp	4.3	11.1%
Amgen	43.5	11.8%
eBay	23.6	15.2%
Apple	305.7	16.5%
Google	102.1	16.5%
Celgene	9.7	17.8%
Gilead Sciences	58.1	17.8%
Western Union	8.8	18.1%
EMC	23.1	18.1%
Johnson & Johnson	131.0	18.2%
Abbott Laboratories	38.4	19.5%
Microsoft	188.3	19.8%
Cisco Systems	77.5	20.6%
All 15 companies	**$ 1,027.6**	**17.5%**

NOTE: "Cash" income taxes differ from "current" income taxes primarily because they are net of "unrecognized tax benefits." "UTBs" are tax reductions that companies have claimed on their tax returns (and have reduced their actual tax payments), but are not allowed to be reported as lowering taxes to their shareholders because companies expect that the tax benefits will not be allowed when their returns are audited (e.g., by the IRS). Cash income taxes include U.S. federal & state taxes and foreign taxes. The total "cash" taxes paid by these 15 companies were 11 percent less than the "current" taxes

•Abbott Laboratories says that only 7 percent of its 2008-15 pretax profits were earned in the United States, despite the fact that it says 40 percent of its revenues were in the U.S. The company also says that its current U.S. federal income tax rate on that tiny share of its profits was 98 percent! In contrast, Abbott says its foreign current tax rate on its purported foreign profits was only 16.2 percent.

•Amgen says that only 38 percent of its profits were earned in the U.S., despite the fact that it says 78 percent of its revenues were in the U.S. It claims to have paid a 25.3 percent tax rate in the U.S. on its U.S. profits, while paying a mere 5.3 percent tax rate on its foreign profits.

•Apple claims to have paid a 40 percent U.S. tax rate on its claimed U.S. profits, but only 5.8 percent on its foreign profits. The low "foreign" rate mainly reflects the fact that Apple, for tax purposes, has moved about two-thirds of its worldwide profits to Ireland, where those profits are taxed neither by Ireland nor by the U.S. or any other government.

- Celgene says that 60 percent of its revenues were in the U.S., but only 12 percent of its profits were U.S. Using Celgene's breakdown of profit, its U.S. tax rate on U.S. profits would be 39.5 percent, while its foreign tax rate on "foreign" profits would be only 4.1 percent.

- Cisco says that its U.S. taxes were 57.3 percent of its U.S. profits, while its foreign tax rate was a mere 7.2 percent.

- eBay claims to have paid a U.S. tax rate of 50.1 percent on its U.S. profits, while paying only a 5.1 percent foreign tax rate on its purported foreign profits. (eBay says only a quarter of its worldwide profits were earned in the U.S., even though it says half of its revenues were in the U.S.).

- EMC claims to have paid a 34.5 percent U.S. tax rate on its claimed U.S. profits, versus a foreign tax rate on foreign profits of only 9.4 percent.

- Gilead Sciences claims to have paid a 34 percent U.S. tax rate on its U.S. profits, versus a foreign tax rate of only 1.9 percent.

- Google claims to have paid a U.S. tax rate of 34.3 percent, versus a foreign tax rate of only 5.5 percent.

- Microsoft says that only a quarter of its profits are in the U.S., even though it says that more than half its revenues are in the U.S. Microsoft would like us to believe that its U.S. tax rate on its U.S. profits was 45.7 percent, while it's foreign tax rate on foreign profits was only 9.6 percent.

- NetApp claims to have paid a 53.7 percent tax rate on its U.S. profits, but only 7.0 percent on its purported foreign profits. It says that half of its revenues are in the U.S., but only a sixth of its profits.

- Western Digital claims to have paid a U.S. tax rate of 50.7 percent, versus a foreign tax rate of only 3.0 percent.

- Western Union claims a U.S. tax rate of 75.6 percent on its U.S. profits, versus a foreign tax rate of only 6.6 percent.

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Aerospace & defense															
Boeing	**40,026.7**	**2,146.7**	**5.4%**	6,828.0	1,966.0	28.8%	6,779.7	581.7	8.6%	5,946.0	–199.0	–3.3%	20,473.0	–202.1	–1.0%
United Technologies	**24,421.2**	**2,546.2**	**10.4%**	2,819.0	264.0	9.4%	4,240.8	263.8	6.2%	3,622.9	520.9	14.4%	13,738.5	1,497.5	10.9%
Rockwell Collins	**6,315.0**	**1,134.0**	**18.0%**	826.2	158.2	19.2%	751.0	105.0	14.0%	745.6	143.6	19.3%	3,992.1	727.1	18.2%
L-3 Communications	**7,613.8**	**1,461.6**	**19.2%**	481.6	38.5	8.0%	758.9	72.9	9.6%	855.7	181.7	21.2%	5,517.5	1,168.5	21.2%
Raytheon	**21,037.0**	**4,335.8**	**20.6%**	2,482.0	718.1	28.9%	2,868.0	798.1	27.8%	2,612.0	709.8	27.2%	13,075.0	2,109.7	16.1%
Northrop Grumman	**21,383.0**	**4,712.0**	**22.0%**	2,706.0	207.0	7.6%	2,897.0	620.0	21.4%	2,751.0	760.0	27.6%	13,029.0	3,125.0	24.0%
Precision Castparts	**12,428.8**	**3,001.2**	**24.1%**	1,015.9	265.9	26.2%	2,112.2	515.2	24.4%	2,158.7	491.8	22.8%	7,142.0	1,728.3	24.2%
Lockheed Martin	**35,509.0**	**8,880.6**	**25.0%**	4,966.0	1,817.0	36.6%	5,369.0	2,020.0	37.6%	4,252.0	1,204.0	28.3%	20,922.0	3,839.6	18.4%
SAIC	**4,074.0**	**1,043.1**	**25.6%**	171.0	42.7	25.0%	697.0	63.5	9.1%	171.0	40.0	23.4%	3,035.0	896.8	29.5%
Alliant Techsystems	**2,954.1**	**763.2**	**25.8%**	265.0	27.2	10.2%	143.0	36.8	25.8%	503.5	146.9	29.2%	2,042.5	552.4	27.0%
General Dynamics	**24,720.3**	**6,674.2**	**27.0%**	3,511.3	777.3	22.1%	3,278.4	787.4	24.0%	3,223.0	838.0	26.0%	14,707.7	4,271.5	29.0%
Aerospace & defense	**200,482.7**	**36,698.4**	**18.3%**	**26,072.1**	**6,282.0**	**24.1%**	**29,895.2**	**5,864.6**	**19.6%**	**26,841.3**	**4,837.5**	**18.0%**	**117,674.2**	**19,714.3**	**16.8%**
Chemicals															
Air Products & Chemicals	**4,117.4**	**439.5**	**10.7%**	727.7	149.7	20.6%	548.0	–6.2	–1.1%	428.5	66.2	15.4%	2,413.2	229.8	9.5%
Celanese	**2,857.3**	**326.3**	**11.4%**	221.8	18.8	8.5%	520.2	94.2	18.1%	789.1	61.1	7.7%	1,326.3	152.3	11.5%
Mosaic	**6,814.1**	**912.7**	**13.4%**	668.9	61.9	9.3%	301.1	46.0	15.3%	223.3	–25.0	–11.2%	5,620.8	829.8	14.8%
Eastman Chemical	**5,134.0**	**723.0**	**14.1%**	596.0	87.0	14.6%	621.0	64.0	10.3%	1,407.0	143.0	10.2%	2,510.0	429.0	17.1%
Praxair	**6,142.3**	**1,036.3**	**16.9%**	950.3	189.3	19.9%	974.4	265.4	27.2%	871.0	56.0	6.4%	3,346.7	525.7	15.7%
DuPont	**8,678.0**	**1,602.0**	**18.5%**	1,390.0	218.0	15.7%	2,718.0	778.0	28.6%	939.0	160.0	17.0%	3,631.0	446.0	12.3%
Sherwin-Williams	**7,294.6**	**1,467.2**	**20.1%**	1,488.7	325.5	21.9%	1,208.2	251.5	20.8%	1,052.9	190.7	18.1%	3,544.9	699.5	19.7%
Monsanto	**15,236.3**	**3,241.4**	**21.3%**	2,155.2	638.6	29.6%	2,383.5	588.5	24.7%	2,346.7	366.7	15.6%	8,351.0	1,647.6	19.7%
Ecolab	**4,649.3**	**1,040.2**	**22.4%**	734.9	185.5	25.2%	905.6	256.3	28.3%	710.2	249.1	35.1%	2,298.7	349.4	15.2%
PPG Industries	**4,135.5**	**1,169.0**	**28.3%**	801.2	158.0	19.7%	328.5	128.0	39.0%	505.4	153.0	30.3%	2,500.3	730.0	29.2%
CF Industries Holdings	**11,741.6**	**3,772.2**	**32.1%**	964.5	256.9	26.6%	1,956.0	638.0	32.6%	2,031.0	630.3	31.0%	6,790.0	2,247.0	33.1%
Chemicals	**76,800.4**	**15,729.8**	**20.5%**	**10,699.2**	**2,289.1**	**21.4%**	**12,464.4**	**3,103.5**	**24.9%**	**11,303.9**	**2,051.0**	**18.1%**	**42,332.9**	**8,286.1**	**19.6%**
Computers, office equip, software, data															
Corning	**7,458.0**	**71.0**	**1.0%**	406.0	40.0	9.9%	2,352.0	38.0	1.6%	1,262.0	3.0	0.2%	3,438.0	–10.0	–0.3%
Qualcomm	**20,581.7**	**1,269.7**	**6.2%**	2,993.0	–166.0	–5.5%	3,213.0	–98.0	–3.1%	3,798.0	108.0	2.8%	10,577.7	1,425.7	13.5%
International Business Machines	**64,728.0**	**4,849.0**	**7.5%**	5,787.0	–321.0	–5.5%	6,968.0	1,134.0	16.3%	6,679.0	1,406.0	21.1%	45,294.0	2,630.0	5.8%
Pitney Bowes	**3,408.7**	**796.2**	**23.4%**	485.9	115.6	23.8%	360.5	71.7	19.9%	281.3	78.3	27.8%	2,281.0	530.7	23.3%
Harris	**5,877.6**	**1,492.5**	**25.4%**	1,090.6	–27.0	–2.5%	443.0	150.0	33.9%	723.1	213.0	29.5%	3,620.9	1,156.5	31.9%
Intel	**77,498.3**	**21,603.3**	**27.9%**	8,787.5	2,696.5	30.7%	11,548.1	3,273.1	28.3%	9,314.5	2,689.5	28.9%	47,848.2	12,944.2	27.1%
Oracle	**39,856.5**	**11,643.2**	**29.2%**	3,783.5	1,198.5	31.7%	4,952.5	1,951.2	39.4%	5,103.3	1,406.3	27.6%	26,017.3	7,087.3	27.2%
Texas Instruments	**16,387.1**	**4,954.1**	**30.2%**	3,218.0	1,034.0	32.1%	2,684.0	820.0	30.6%	1,507.0	215.0	14.3%	8,978.1	2,885.1	32.1%
CA	**5,733.2**	**1,913.2**	**33.4%**	679.7	281.7	41.4%	700.5	281.5	40.2%	667.0	185.0	27.7%	3,685.9	1,164.9	31.6%
Cognizant Technology Solutions	**2,869.6**	**1,015.7**	**35.4%**	679.1	258.7	38.1%	540.2	187.8	34.8%	495.0	193.7	39.1%	1,155.2	375.5	32.5%
Computers, office equip, software, data	**244,398.6**	**49,607.8**	**20.3%**	**27,910.3**	**5,110.9**	**18.3%**	**33,761.8**	**7,809.3**	**23.1%**	**29,830.2**	**6,497.8**	**21.8%**	**152,896.2**	**30,189.8**	**19.7%**
Engineering & construction															
NVR	**2,653.0**	**591.6**	**22.3%**	571.1	161.6	28.3%	426.3	140.4	32.9%	391.9	120.6	30.8%	1,263.7	169.0	13.4%
Tutor Perini	**1,065.1**	**298.1**	**28.0%**	70.2	5.3	7.6%	159.5	44.4	27.9%	118.9	28.1	23.6%	716.5	220.3	30.7%
Quanta Services	**2,248.8**	**639.9**	**28.5%**	258.3	85.3	33.0%	286.7	72.9	25.4%	485.6	170.9	35.2%	1,218.3	310.8	25.5%
Emcor Group	**1,782.7**	**558.1**	**31.3%**	243.8	93.0	38.2%	253.9	74.0	29.1%	217.2	56.6	26.1%	1,067.8	334.5	31.3%
Jacobs Engineering Group	**2,524.1**	**876.3**	**34.7%**	267.5	71.8	26.9%	269.9	103.6	38.4%	328.6	124.0	37.7%	1,658.2	577.0	34.8%
Engineering & construction	**10,273.8**	**2,964.0**	**28.8%**	**1,410.9**	**417.1**	**29.6%**	**1,396.2**	**435.4**	**31.2%**	**1,542.2**	**500.1**	**32.4%**	**5,924.5**	**1,611.5**	**27.2%**
Financial															
Reinsurance Group of America	**3,774.3**	**14.1**	**0.4%**	493.3	–1.4	–0.3%	768.9	21.5	2.8%	473.2	–52.0	–11.0%	2,038.9	45.9	2.3%
State Street Corp.	**10,310.2**	**565.2**	**5.5%**	1,025.1	–5.9	–0.6%	1,097.5	–0.5	–0.0%	1,486.7	109.7	7.4%	6,701.0	462.0	6.9%
Principal Financial	**7,790.0**	**514.4**	**6.6%**	1,406.1	169.9	12.1%	1,474.5	99.3	6.7%	1,090.2	–9.8	–0.9%	3,819.2	255.0	6.7%
PNC Financial Services Group	**32,952.7**	**2,724.7**	**8.3%**	5,343.0	903.0	16.9%	5,272.8	1,060.8	20.1%	5,128.0	98.0	1.9%	17,208.9	662.9	3.9%
Loews	**11,055.2**	**1,276.2**	**11.5%**	366.0	79.0	21.6%	1,305.0	370.0	28.4%	1,751.0	171.0	9.8%	7,633.2	656.2	8.6%
Arthur Gallagher	**1,630.0**	**190.8**	**11.7%**	294.4	43.9	14.9%	244.5	38.8	15.9%	218.5	29.0	13.3%	872.6	79.1	9.1%
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	**114,769.5**	**17,956.3**	**15.6%**	22,414.7	3,160.0	14.1%	20,331.0	1,273.4	6.3%	12,486.0	–1,429.3	–11.4%	59,537.9	14,952.2	25.1%
Wells Fargo	**185,024.8**	**33,330.6**	**18.0%**	31,044.4	10,447.4	33.7%	31,475.4	6,946.4	22.1%	29,375.9	4,376.9	14.9%	93,129.1	11,559.9	12.4%
Travelers Cos.	**30,729.0**	**5,870.5**	**19.1%**	4,621.0	1,098.0	23.8%	4,898.9	1,168.9	23.9%	4,804.0	1,014.0	21.1%	16,405.1	2,589.6	15.8%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
BB&T Corp.	**18,531.0**	**3,837.0**	**20.7%**	2,810.0	585.0	20.8%	2,617.0	551.0	21.1%	2,812.0	1,004.0	35.7%	10,292.0	1,697.0	16.5%
Alleghany Corporation	**3,297.4**	**702.2**	**21.3%**	373.6	93.3	25.0%	628.9	115.4	18.3%	611.4	68.4	11.2%	1,683.5	425.1	25.3%
Fifth Third Bancorp	**11,009.0**	**2,387.0**	**21.7%**	2,208.0	662.0	30.0%	1,702.0	424.0	24.9%	2,295.0	494.0	21.5%	4,804.0	807.0	16.8%
W.R. Berkley	**4,411.7**	**1,023.6**	**23.2%**	687.6	177.7	25.8%	906.3	254.7	28.1%	593.5	112.3	18.9%	2,224.3	478.9	21.5%
Goldman Sachs Group	**50,210.4**	**12,118.9**	**24.1%**	3,455.0	709.0	20.5%	6,782.9	1,261.3	18.6%	6,446.0	2,508.0	38.9%	33,526.5	7,640.7	22.8%
U.S. Bancorp	**49,331.0**	**12,191.0**	**24.7%**	7,580.0	1,956.0	25.8%	7,502.0	1,888.0	25.2%	7,527.0	1,885.0	25.0%	26,712.0	6,462.0	24.2%
Capital One Financial	**31,122.5**	**8,602.2**	**27.6%**	6,157.5	1,991.0	32.3%	6,022.5	1,934.0	32.1%	5,322.8	1,360.0	25.6%	13,619.7	3,317.2	24.4%
H&R Block	**5,122.1**	**1,469.1**	**28.7%**	538.5	167.2	31.1%	648.0	245.5	37.9%	718.0	195.3	27.2%	3,217.6	861.1	26.8%
Unum Group	**5,982.4**	**1,897.4**	**31.7%**	690.4	280.5	40.6%	67.3	128.4	190.7%	980.9	277.9	28.3%	4,243.8	1,210.6	28.5%
Discover Financial Services	**22,538.1**	**7,459.6**	**33.1%**	3,469.0	1,245.0	35.9%	3,527.0	1,215.0	34.4%	3,833.0	1,059.0	27.6%	11,709.1	3,940.6	33.7%
Charles Schwab	**12,806.6**	**4,257.5**	**33.2%**	2,180.0	740.0	33.9%	2,043.0	747.0	36.6%	1,648.0	598.0	36.3%	6,935.6	2,172.5	31.3%
Raymond James Financial	**3,800.3**	**1,354.2**	**35.6%**	755.4	273.1	36.1%	687.3	254.4	37.0%	503.0	180.7	35.9%	1,854.5	646.1	34.8%
American Financial Group	**4,698.8**	**1,710.1**	**36.4%**	641.0	216.0	33.7%	571.0	265.0	46.4%	654.0	308.0	47.1%	2,832.8	921.1	32.5%
Franklin Resources	**11,753.6**	**4,354.9**	**37.1%**	1,945.2	724.8	37.3%	2,080.5	793.5	38.1%	1,830.8	682.8	37.3%	5,897.1	2,153.8	36.5%
Financial	**632,650.8**	**125,807.5**	**19.9%**	**100,509.2**	**25,714.5**	**25.6%**	**102,654.2**	**21,055.6**	**20.5%**	**92,588.8**	**15,040.9**	**16.2%**	**336,898.5**	**63,996.4**	**19.0%**
Financial Data Services															
American Express	**41,674.7**	**9,577.2**	**23.0%**	6,427.2	2,092.1	32.6%	7,749.9	2,091.3	27.0%	6,157.6	1,660.5	27.0%	21,340.0	3,733.2	17.5%
MasterCard	**16,648.7**	**4,178.9**	**25.1%**	3,359.3	642.3	19.1%	3,225.3	932.3	28.9%	2,966.3	994.3	33.5%	7,097.8	1,610.0	22.7%
Alliance Data Systems	**3,299.6**	**892.5**	**27.0%**	784.1	305.6	39.0%	691.6	196.4	28.4%	533.5	174.3	32.7%	1,290.4	216.3	16.8%
Fiserv	**6,274.9**	**1,975.9**	**31.5%**	988.6	283.6	28.7%	970.1	316.1	32.6%	816.9	280.9	34.4%	3,499.3	1,095.3	31.3%
Visa	**30,063.9**	**9,774.0**	**32.5%**	6,628.5	1,921.5	29.0%	7,369.6	2,278.6	30.9%	1,681.8	506.8	30.1%	14,384.0	5,067.0	35.2%
Financial Data Services	**97,961.8**	**26,398.5**	**26.9%**	**18,187.6**	**5,245.1**	**28.8%**	**20,006.5**	**5,814.7**	**29.1%**	**12,156.1**	**3,616.8**	**29.8%**	**47,611.5**	**11,721.8**	**24.6%**
Food & beverages & tobacco															
Constellation Brands	**5,590.6**	**414.3**	**7.4%**	599.3	–57.3	–9.6%	475.0	130.5	27.5%	2,043.6	87.6	4.3%	2,472.7	253.5	10.3%
Coca-Cola	**23,845.9**	**4,853.8**	**20.4%**	1,694.8	711.0	42.0%	1,560.3	867.0	55.6%	2,385.4	713.0	29.9%	18,205.5	2,562.8	14.1%
General Mills	**15,295.4**	**3,155.5**	**20.6%**	1,895.0	412.0	21.7%	1,665.4	331.0	19.9%	2,144.4	469.4	21.9%	9,590.6	1,943.1	20.3%
Kellogg	**8,748.3**	**1,971.6**	**22.5%**	497.5	200.4	40.3%	487.4	291.9	59.9%	2,085.3	282.2	13.5%	5,678.1	1,197.1	21.1%
Campbell Soup	**7,279.7**	**1,696.7**	**23.3%**	820.0	241.0	29.4%	967.2	241.2	24.9%	793.1	258.1	32.5%	4,699.3	956.3	20.3%
ConAgra Foods	**7,200.8**	**1,793.4**	**24.9%**	700.7	295.8	42.2%	895.2	281.6	31.4%	1,064.7	360.5	33.9%	4,540.2	855.6	18.8%
Archer Daniels Midland	**11,180.0**	**2,950.0**	**26.4%**	1,138.0	270.0	23.7%	2,167.0	641.0	29.6%	1,495.0	348.0	23.3%	6,380.0	1,691.0	26.5%
PepsiCo	**26,393.4**	**7,432.8**	**28.2%**	2,821.9	1,033.0	36.6%	2,382.1	1,269.7	53.3%	2,968.7	995.2	33.5%	18,220.7	4,134.9	22.7%
Hormel Foods	**5,508.0**	**1,604.3**	**29.1%**	979.2	280.6	28.7%	861.4	244.1	28.3%	750.5	212.0	28.2%	2,916.9	867.6	29.7%
Hershey	**7,623.5**	**2,271.2**	**29.8%**	1,313.9	388.5	29.6%	1,277.7	341.4	26.7%	1,212.6	332.6	27.4%	3,819.3	1,208.6	31.6%
J.M. Smucker	**5,449.9**	**1,841.4**	**33.8%**	922.7	340.3	36.9%	483.8	142.9	29.5%	805.8	259.4	32.2%	3,237.6	1,098.8	33.9%
Altria Group	**47,468.0**	**16,583.0**	**34.9%**	7,627.0	2,516.0	33.0%	7,283.0	2,350.0	32.3%	6,506.0	2,066.0	31.8%	26,052.0	9,651.0	37.0%
Reynolds American	**20,619.0**	**7,599.4**	**36.9%**	5,846.6	3,298.9	56.4%	2,039.6	799.1	39.2%	2,609.6	551.4	21.1%	10,123.3	2,950.0	29.1%
Food & beverages & tobacco	**192,202.5**	**54,167.3**	**28.2%**	**26,856.6**	**9,930.2**	**37.0%**	**22,545.1**	**7,931.4**	**35.2%**	**26,864.7**	**6,935.4**	**25.8%**	**115,936.2**	**29,370.3**	**25.3%**
Health care															
Community Health Systems	**2,683.5**	**237.1**	**8.8%**	303.0	7.0	2.3%	228.0	–29.0	–12.7%	226.3	9.1	4.0%	1,926.2	250.0	13.0%
DaVita	**6,359.3**	**1,475.5**	**23.2%**	745.6	160.0	21.5%	1,146.5	150.9	13.2%	938.8	304.3	32.4%	3,528.5	860.4	24.4%
HCA Holdings	**19,116.4**	**4,696.2**	**24.6%**	3,461.7	1,064.7	30.8%	2,243.6	805.2	35.9%	2,884.3	733.5	25.4%	10,526.8	2,092.8	19.9%
Cigna	**14,436.6**	**4,091.2**	**28.3%**	2,888.9	1,048.7	36.3%	2,907.5	1,052.3	36.2%	902.7	363.0	40.2%	7,737.5	1,627.2	21.0%
Universal Health Services	**5,156.0**	**1,546.6**	**30.0%**	1,003.9	324.6	32.3%	837.7	220.1	26.3%	794.4	239.9	30.2%	2,520.0	762.0	30.2%
Laboratory Corp. of America	**6,109.1**	**1,873.3**	**30.7%**	562.1	207.5	36.9%	729.5	228.7	31.4%	816.2	222.5	27.3%	4,001.3	1,214.6	30.4%
Quest Diagnostics	**7,867.4**	**2,423.5**	**30.8%**	1,021.9	226.9	22.2%	766.0	204.0	26.6%	1,236.7	413.7	33.5%	4,842.8	1,578.9	32.6%
Aetna	**22,564.1**	**7,290.8**	**32.3%**	4,133.0	1,753.1	42.4%	3,423.0	1,198.8	35.0%	2,899.2	832.9	28.7%	12,108.8	3,505.9	29.0%
LifePoint Health	**1,859.7**	**632.8**	**34.0%**	294.6	122.8	41.7%	201.6	47.2	23.4%	202.3	94.0	46.5%	1,161.2	368.8	31.8%
WellPoint	**35,117.2**	**12,167.0**	**34.6%**	4,514.6	1,917.4	42.5%	4,310.3	1,591.0	36.9%	3,762.3	1,201.5	31.9%	22,530.0	7,457.1	33.1%
UnitedHealth Group	**61,900.0**	**22,194.9**	**35.9%**	9,950.0	4,155.0	41.8%	9,385.0	3,883.0	41.4%	8,678.0	3,004.0	34.6%	33,887.0	11,152.9	32.9%
Health Net	**1,685.9**	**630.0**	**37.4%**	433.6	253.9	58.6%	215.2	85.9	39.9%	257.6	78.5	30.5%	779.5	211.8	27.2%
Humana	**14,530.4**	**5,689.7**	**39.2%**	2,343.6	1,054.6	45.0%	2,091.1	996.1	47.6%	1,869.4	588.4	31.5%	8,226.3	3,050.6	37.1%
Centene	**2,010.5**	**836.6**	**41.6%**	691.3	311.3	45.0%	454.3	209.3	46.1%	263.5	115.6	43.9%	601.4	200.4	33.3%
Molina Healthcare	**888.8**	**420.8**	**47.3%**	315.4	165.4	52.4%	132.8	69.6	52.4%	80.8	65.6	81.1%	359.8	120.3	33.4%
Health care	**202,284.9**	**66,206.0**	**32.7%**	**32,663.1**	**12,772.7**	**39.1%**	**29,072.1**	**10,713.0**	**36.8%**	**25,812.6**	**8,266.5**	**32.0%**	**114,737.0**	**34,453.8**	**30.0%**
Household & personal products															

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Kimberly-Clark	**10,685.7**	**1,803.7**	**16.9%**	401.4	192.4	47.9%	1,529.4	319.4	20.9%	1,662.7	308.7	18.6%	7,092.2	983.2	13.9%
Procter & Gamble	**66,989.5**	**14,931.0**	**22.3%**	8,564.0	1,673.0	19.5%	8,611.0	2,272.0	26.4%	8,768.0	1,606.0	18.3%	41,046.5	9,380.0	22.9%
Clorox	**5,579.7**	**1,569.0**	**28.1%**	877.8	211.8	24.1%	808.3	230.3	28.5%	724.9	221.9	30.6%	3,168.7	905.0	28.6%
Household & personal products	**83,254.9**	**18,303.6**	**22.0%**	**9,843.2**	**2,077.2**	**21.1%**	**10,948.7**	**2,821.7**	**25.8%**	**11,155.6**	**2,136.6**	**19.2%**	**51,307.4**	**11,268.2**	**22.0%**
Industrial machinery															
General Electric	**40,057.1**	**–1,369.0**	**–3.4%**	14.9	1,549.0	10,373.0%	5,826.1	51.0	0.9%	6,463.5	85.0	1.3%	27,752.5	–3,054.0	–11.0%
Honeywell International	**16,519.5**	**2,460.5**	**14.9%**	3,297.0	719.0	21.8%	3,318.6	661.6	19.9%	2,927.8	553.8	18.9%	6,976.0	526.0	7.5%
Joy Global	**3,474.3**	**633.1**	**18.2%**	313.1	23.5	7.5%	288.2	80.5	27.9%	525.1	125.6	23.9%	2,347.9	403.5	17.2%
Flowserve	**1,590.0**	**290.8**	**18.3%**	213.6	56.4	26.4%	225.0	55.2	24.5%	225.4	53.3	23.7%	926.0	125.9	13.6%
Dover	**4,584.5**	**1,038.3**	**22.6%**	518.7	114.6	22.1%	783.9	219.4	28.0%	759.6	133.9	17.6%	2,522.4	570.3	22.6%
Parker Hannifin	**5,369.8**	**1,300.5**	**24.2%**	650.3	226.3	34.8%	758.6	166.4	21.9%	1,160.4	349.5	30.1%	2,800.5	558.3	19.9%
Deere	**19,584.2**	**6,074.7**	**31.0%**	1,809.2	361.7	20.0%	3,149.6	1,191.5	37.8%	4,043.2	1,363.1	33.7%	10,582.2	3,158.4	29.8%
Industrial machinery	**91,179.4**	**10,428.9**	**11.4%**	**6,816.9**	**3,050.5**	**44.7%**	**14,350.0**	**2,425.7**	**16.9%**	**16,105.0**	**2,664.3**	**16.5%**	**53,907.5**	**2,288.4**	**4.2%**
Internet Services & Retailing															
Priceline.com	**697.6**	**–30.9**	**–4.4%**	29.0	4.3	14.8%	73.5	–9.0	–12.3%	38.1	–9.4	–24.6%	557.0	–16.8	–3.0%
Facebook	**14,787.9**	**2,439.9**	**16.5%**	2,802.0	1,474.0	52.6%	4,918.0	260.0	5.3%	3,197.0	614.0	19.2%	3,870.9	91.9	2.4%
Internet Services & Retailing	**15,485.5**	**2,409.0**	**15.6%**	**2,831.0**	**1,478.3**	**52.2%**	**4,991.5**	**251.0**	**5.0%**	**3,235.1**	**604.6**	**18.7%**	**4,427.9**	**75.1**	**1.7%**
Miscellaneous manufacturing															
International Paper	**5,010.0**	**–386.0**	**–7.7%**	1,135.0	62.0	5.5%	556.0	175.0	31.5%	489.0	–697.0	–142.5%	2,830.0	74.0	2.6%
Westrock	**3,056.1**	**134.3**	**4.4%**	603.0	23.3	3.9%	652.6	7.4	1.1%	613.8	–13.3	–2.2%	1,186.6	116.8	9.8%
Levi Strauss	**945.8**	**102.6**	**10.8%**	171.5	2.1	1.2%	61.0	14.8	24.2%	82.7	10.0	12.1%	630.7	75.7	12.0%
Trinity Industries	**4,122.1**	**593.9**	**14.4%**	1,223.8	260.2	21.3%	1,036.2	302.5	29.2%	559.0	134.8	24.1%	1,303.1	–103.6	–7.9%
Phillips-Van Heusen	**984.5**	**177.9**	**18.1%**	91.9	2.3	2.5%	34.0	–44.5	–130.9%	46.3	85.2	184.0%	812.4	135.0	16.6%
Ball	**1,952.8**	**354.8**	**18.2%**	43.1	8.5	19.7%	265.0	36.3	13.7%	241.4	37.4	15.5%	1,403.3	272.6	19.4%
Nike	**10,279.0**	**1,911.9**	**18.6%**	933.6	71.6	7.7%	1,924.7	415.7	21.6%	2,984.8	149.8	5.0%	4,435.8	1,274.7	28.7%
Danaher	**9,287.2**	**1,918.9**	**20.7%**	1,386.3	395.8	28.6%	1,408.3	250.4	17.8%	1,640.6	252.0	15.4%	4,852.0	1,020.7	21.0%
Amphenol	**1,293.8**	**279.6**	**21.6%**	137.2	25.0	18.3%	167.0	33.1	19.8%	156.4	25.1	16.0%	833.2	196.4	23.6%
Paccar	**5,453.3**	**1,210.6**	**22.2%**	1,579.1	521.8	33.0%	1,284.0	482.4	37.6%	848.8	191.4	22.5%	1,741.4	15.0	0.9%
Domtar	**1,437.8**	**339.7**	**23.6%**	24.5	59.5	243.1%	81.4	15.4	18.9%	35.5	–14.5	–41.0%	1,296.5	279.4	21.5%
Rockwell Automation	**3,270.8**	**785.1**	**24.0%**	645.6	228.3	35.4%	602.6	194.7	32.3%	503.5	138.1	27.4%	1,519.1	224.0	14.7%
Thermo Fisher Scientific	**6,560.5**	**1,609.8**	**24.5%**	851.7	128.8	15.1%	1,129.6	390.4	34.6%	909.5	204.0	22.4%	3,669.7	886.6	24.2%
3M	**23,794.4**	**5,860.6**	**24.6%**	4,349.7	1,210.6	27.8%	3,735.9	964.9	25.8%	3,118.9	871.9	28.0%	12,589.9	2,813.1	22.3%
VF	**4,955.5**	**1,229.4**	**24.8%**	779.2	147.8	19.0%	603.0	152.3	25.3%	721.3	199.0	27.6%	2,852.0	730.3	25.6%
Packaging Corp. of America	**2,868.0**	**732.4**	**25.5%**	645.0	200.1	31.0%	583.3	175.0	30.0%	404.0	123.2	30.5%	1,235.7	234.1	18.9%
Polo Ralph Lauren	**4,046.2**	**1,065.1**	**26.3%**	278.0	78.0	28.1%	586.4	154.4	26.3%	664.9	182.9	27.5%	2,516.9	649.8	25.8%
Harley-Davidson	**6,562.2**	**1,928.5**	**29.4%**	1,078.8	360.9	33.5%	1,179.1	385.4	32.7%	1,006.5	265.5	26.4%	3,297.8	916.7	27.8%
Illinois Tool Works	**11,211.9**	**3,297.2**	**29.4%**	1,597.5	486.5	30.5%	1,624.7	385.7	23.7%	1,384.2	390.2	28.2%	6,605.6	2,034.8	30.8%
Bemis	**1,658.7**	**488.0**	**29.4%**	252.4	70.2	27.8%	244.1	82.0	33.6%	222.2	65.8	29.6%	939.9	269.9	28.7%
Emerson Electric	**14,422.1**	**4,860.0**	**33.7%**	2,815.0	904.0	32.1%	2,037.0	742.0	36.4%	1,664.0	704.0	42.3%	7,906.1	2,510.0	31.7%
Miscellaneous manufacturing	**123,172.7**	**28,494.1**	**23.1%**	**20,621.9**	**5,247.4**	**25.4%**	**19,796.0**	**5,315.3**	**26.9%**	**18,297.3**	**3,305.3**	**18.1%**	**64,457.6**	**14,626.2**	**22.7%**
Miscellaneous services															
Interpublic Group	**2,360.9**	**122.8**	**5.2%**	432.5	109.4	25.3%	365.2	–5.8	–1.6%	258.3	46.9	18.2%	1,304.9	–27.6	–2.1%
CBS	**13,044.7**	**698.5**	**5.4%**	1,974.4	154.2	7.8%	1,790.0	–235.0	–13.1%	2,451.6	272.6	11.1%	6,828.7	506.7	7.4%
ABM Industries	**696.0**	**84.2**	**12.1%**	57.2	1.8	3.1%	110.1	32.0	29.1%	97.7	15.3	15.7%	431.0	35.0	8.1%
FedEx	**16,977.2**	**2,246.0**	**13.2%**	2,895.8	510.5	17.6%	2,339.9	752.8	32.2%	2,839.4	587.6	20.7%	8,902.0	395.1	4.4%
Darden Restaurants	**3,545.2**	**471.7**	**13.3%**	450.9	74.6	16.5%	191.1	–27.9	–14.6%	185.7	30.5	16.4%	2,717.5	394.5	14.5%
Time Warner	**31,048.4**	**4,147.2**	**13.4%**	4,372.9	719.1	16.4%	4,615.5	–26.0	–0.6%	4,911.9	328.0	6.7%	17,148.0	3,126.1	18.2%
Twenty-First Century Fox	**39,722.0**	**6,273.0**	**15.8%**	3,485.6	466.0	13.4%	9,720.0	891.0	9.2%	5,226.9	1,178.0	22.5%	21,289.5	3,738.0	17.6%
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation	**3,831.1**	**712.7**	**18.6%**	716.9	167.9	23.4%	657.9	147.9	22.5%	540.5	101.6	18.8%	1,915.8	295.2	15.4%
Viacom	**18,261.4**	**4,260.4**	**23.3%**	1,989.4	368.4	18.5%	2,816.5	979.5	34.8%	3,033.8	320.8	10.6%	10,421.7	2,591.7	24.9%
Waste Management	**10,547.4**	**2,642.9**	**25.1%**	936.7	179.6	19.2%	1,804.1	409.9	22.7%	959.9	380.7	39.7%	6,846.7	1,672.8	24.4%
Yum Brands	**3,226.4**	**835.4**	**25.9%**	451.7	245.7	54.4%	506.0	215.0	42.5%	449.6	122.6	27.3%	1,819.1	252.1	13.9%
Walt Disney	**62,566.8**	**17,217.1**	**27.5%**	12,184.9	3,923.1	32.2%	10,835.2	2,721.1	25.1%	8,531.6	2,185.3	25.6%	31,015.0	8,387.5	27.0%
Omnicom Group	**4,753.9**	**1,312.1**	**27.6%**	716.4	319.8	44.6%	638.2	331.6	52.0%	542.8	215.0	39.6%	2,856.4	445.7	15.6%
United Parcel Service	**39,442.2**	**11,005.1**	**27.9%**	6,260.0	1,634.0	26.1%	4,593.5	932.0	20.3%	5,835.0	2,181.0	37.4%	22,753.7	6,258.1	27.5%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Automatic Data Processing	**14,398.8**	**4,342.2**	**30.2%**	1,963.7	522.4	26.6%	1,863.8	535.0	28.7%	1,899.6	653.2	34.4%	8,671.6	2,631.6	30.3%
Discovery Communications, Inc.	**7,031.6**	**2,355.6**	**33.5%**	1,226.1	296.1	24.1%	1,192.2	504.2	42.3%	1,043.6	296.6	28.4%	3,569.7	1,258.7	35.3%
Apollo Group	**5,755.6**	**1,968.2**	**34.2%**	119.0	46.5	39.1%	350.0	113.9	32.6%	521.0	171.7	33.0%	4,765.6	1,636.1	34.3%
McDonald's	**21,379.6**	**7,808.0**	**36.5%**	2,467.1	1,030.0	41.8%	2,545.8	1,066.2	41.9%	2,753.7	1,161.6	42.2%	13,612.9	4,550.1	33.4%
Miscellaneous services	**298,589.1**	**68,503.2**	**22.9%**	**42,701.4**	**10,769.3**	**25.2%**	**46,935.0**	**9,337.4**	**19.9%**	**42,082.7**	**10,249.1**	**24.4%**	**166,869.9**	**38,147.4**	**22.9%**
Oil, gas & pipelines															
Oneok	**3,976.2**	**49.0**	**1.2%**	384.7	13.2	3.4%	467.5	10.2	2.2%	427.1	–1.2	–0.3%	2,696.9	26.8	1.0%
Devon Energy	**21,692.3**	**368.3**	**1.7%**	1,861.4	–235.6	–12.7%	4,297.5	154.5	3.6%	1,784.7	69.7	3.9%	13,748.6	379.6	2.8%
Williams	**8,943.9**	**516.0**	**5.8%**	86.7	—	—	3,267.0	–9.0	–0.3%	721.4	–17.0	–2.4%	4,868.7	542.0	11.1%
Spectra Energy	**6,511.0**	**455.0**	**7.0%**	359.0	—	—	904.0	1.0	0.1%	934.0	–32.0	–3.4%	4,314.0	486.0	11.3%
MDU Resources	**2,953.7**	**277.3**	**9.4%**	175.8	59.5	33.8%	406.6	28.8	7.1%	410.9	45.5	11.1%	1,960.3	143.4	7.3%
Exxon Mobil	**60,481.7**	**8,226.7**	**13.6%**	159.3	–1.7	–1.0%	9,598.9	1,360.9	14.2%	9,357.3	1,033.3	11.0%	41,366.2	5,834.2	14.1%
Consol Energy	**3,550.3**	**544.9**	**15.3%**	330.1	21.4	6.5%	175.7	13.5	7.7%	57.4	4.3	7.5%	2,987.1	505.8	16.9%
HollyFrontier	**7,065.7**	**2,348.4**	**33.2%**	1,074.8	480.4	44.7%	382.5	292.8	76.6%	1,120.7	267.9	23.9%	4,487.7	1,307.2	29.1%
CVR Energy	**2,547.6**	**849.3**	**33.3%**	239.6	75.0	31.3%	255.0	76.2	29.9%	532.9	265.9	49.9%	1,520.2	432.2	28.4%
Oil, gas & pipelines	**117,722.4**	**13,634.8**	**11.6%**	**4,671.6**	**412.2**	**8.8%**	**19,754.7**	**1,928.8**	**9.8%**	**15,346.5**	**1,636.4**	**10.7%**	**77,949.7**	**9,657.3**	**12.4%**
Pharmaceuticals & medical products															
Eli Lilly	**15,117.5**	**2,571.0**	**17.0%**	1,169.3	660.5	56.5%	1,206.5	168.9	14.0%	2,705.0	259.1	9.6%	10,036.8	1,482.5	14.8%
Merck	**41,404.3**	**12,039.0**	**29.1%**	2,117.0	732.0	34.6%	15,355.0	7,136.0	46.5%	3,646.0	568.0	15.6%	20,286.3	3,603.0	17.8%
Biogen Idec	**13,335.9**	**4,713.8**	**35.3%**	3,361.6	1,149.4	34.2%	2,508.9	1,079.8	43.0%	1,867.3	640.1	34.3%	5,598.1	1,844.4	32.9%
Pharmaceuticals & medical products	**69,857.6**	**19,323.8**	**27.7%**	**6,647.9**	**2,541.9**	**38.2%**	**19,070.3**	**8,384.7**	**44.0%**	**8,218.3**	**1,467.2**	**17.9%**	**35,921.1**	**6,929.9**	**19.3%**
Publishing, printing															
RR Donnelley & Sons	**1,610.8**	**290.4**	**18.0%**	225.7	112.5	49.9%	5.8	49.9	859.7%	65.6	–15.3	–23.3%	1,313.7	143.3	10.9%
Publishing, printing	**1,610.8**	**290.4**	**18.0%**	**225.7**	**112.5**	**49.9%**	**5.8**	**49.9**	**859.7%**	**65.6**	**–15.3**	**–23.3%**	**1,313.7**	**143.3**	**10.9%**
Retail & wholesale trade															
Amazon.com	**6,237.5**	**674.5**	**10.8%**	1,969.6	116.6	5.9%	228.0	209.0	91.7%	672.5	34.5	5.1%	3,367.4	314.4	9.3%
Netflix	**1,494.2**	**203.1**	**13.6%**	97.2	–27.9	–28.7%	325.1	7.1	2.2%	158.1	–9.0	–5.7%	913.8	232.9	25.5%
Casey's General Stores	**1,629.4**	**242.1**	**14.9%**	340.2	56.0	16.5%	275.6	46.6	16.9%	201.2	42.6	21.2%	812.4	96.9	11.9%
Wesco International	**2,092.8**	**352.8**	**16.9%**	284.6	44.5	15.6%	320.8	64.8	20.2%	334.0	45.7	13.7%	1,153.5	197.8	17.1%
Andersons	**796.0**	**135.4**	**17.0%**	33.9	–4.3	–12.7%	156.0	31.1	19.9%	135.9	11.0	8.1%	470.2	97.7	20.8%
Sonic Automotive	**799.9**	**137.9**	**17.2%**	138.7	36.2	26.1%	156.0	36.9	23.6%	123.4	33.4	27.0%	381.9	31.4	8.2%
SpartanNash	**432.3**	**82.2**	**19.0%**	97.3	30.4	31.2%	89.8	26.4	29.4%	1.6	3.7	235.7%	243.6	21.7	8.9%
Group 1 Automotive	**1,068.0**	**215.2**	**20.2%**	245.0	65.2	26.6%	175.2	48.1	27.4%	177.8	42.3	23.8%	469.9	59.6	12.7%
McKesson	**11,703.1**	**2,496.0**	**21.3%**	2,407.1	658.0	27.3%	1,803.0	453.0	25.1%	1,453.0	484.0	33.3%	6,040.0	901.0	14.9%
Airgas	**3,689.3**	**800.8**	**21.7%**	514.0	137.4	26.7%	557.5	150.5	27.0%	522.3	173.0	33.1%	2,095.4	339.8	16.2%
Insight Enterprises	**577.2**	**126.8**	**22.0%**	88.0	23.9	27.1%	86.5	26.9	31.0%	93.0	27.0	29.1%	309.7	49.1	15.8%
Core-Mark Holding	**426.4**	**97.5**	**22.9%**	78.2	17.6	22.5%	61.5	19.7	32.0%	62.2	17.0	27.3%	224.6	43.3	19.3%
Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.	**953.3**	**227.5**	**23.9%**	264.0	81.1	30.7%	176.6	40.7	23.0%	161.6	41.3	25.6%	351.1	64.4	18.3%
Kroger	**16,218.4**	**3,945.6**	**24.3%**	3,073.8	642.8	20.9%	2,599.0	804.0	30.9%	2,245.5	611.5	27.2%	8,300.0	1,887.3	22.7%
Arrow Electronics	**2,593.8**	**656.9**	**25.3%**	264.6	77.6	29.3%	334.0	96.0	28.7%	312.4	79.2	25.4%	1,682.8	404.0	24.0%
Staples	**6,160.8**	**1,616.5**	**26.2%**	460.9	49.9	10.8%	508.8	116.8	23.0%	844.8	191.1	22.6%	4,346.4	1,258.7	29.0%
Reliance Steel & Aluminum	**3,446.6**	**948.4**	**27.5%**	425.5	129.5	30.4%	463.3	153.2	33.1%	433.5	120.5	27.8%	2,124.2	545.2	25.7%
Anixter International	**1,271.5**	**350.1**	**27.5%**	160.2	58.3	36.4%	184.3	33.3	18.1%	181.4	35.6	19.6%	745.7	222.9	29.9%
AutoNation	**3,881.3**	**1,074.2**	**27.7%**	691.7	220.2	31.8%	653.2	206.0	31.5%	577.2	181.4	31.4%	1,959.2	466.6	23.8%
LKQ Corporation	**2,470.8**	**688.5**	**27.9%**	455.4	126.5	27.8%	439.7	130.2	29.6%	343.6	100.0	29.1%	1,232.2	331.8	26.9%
Macy's	**12,315.0**	**3,496.0**	**28.4%**	1,611.4	510.4	31.7%	2,302.4	731.4	31.8%	2,191.8	816.8	37.3%	6,209.4	1,437.4	23.1%
Cardinal Health	**11,266.5**	**3,221.3**	**28.6%**	1,981.7	583.7	29.5%	1,659.0	381.0	23.0%	1,620.7	488.7	30.2%	6,005.1	1,767.9	29.4%
Dick's Sporting Goods	**3,103.4**	**891.5**	**28.7%**	505.0	158.5	31.4%	527.8	177.6	33.7%	523.0	133.8	25.6%	1,547.6	421.6	27.2%
Advance Auto Parts	**4,471.8**	**1,288.8**	**28.8%**	670.6	232.0	34.6%	703.9	196.1	27.9%	568.7	189.3	33.3%	2,528.7	671.4	26.6%
O'Reilly Automotive	**6,781.6**	**1,956.1**	**28.8%**	1,424.0	452.4	31.8%	1,187.4	358.6	30.2%	1,025.8	322.8	31.5%	3,144.3	822.2	26.1%
Costco Wholesale	**13,832.0**	**4,020.0**	**29.1%**	2,457.9	694.9	28.3%	2,052.5	626.5	30.5%	1,971.6	521.6	26.5%	7,350.0	2,177.0	29.6%
Genuine Parts	**6,818.6**	**1,993.7**	**29.2%**	920.5	303.6	33.0%	1,248.8	209.9	16.8%	245.3	292.3	119.2%	4,404.0	1,187.9	27.0%
Limited Brands	**8,945.8**	**2,621.7**	**29.3%**	1,583.1	495.1	31.3%	1,422.4	418.4	29.4%	1,231.2	377.2	30.6%	4,709.0	1,330.9	28.3%
TJX	**16,952.0**	**4,994.3**	**29.5%**	2,905.1	938.6	32.3%	2,779.6	818.1	29.4%	2,584.2	747.5	28.9%	8,683.1	2,490.1	28.7%
Publix Super Markets	**17,348.9**	**5,113.1**	**29.5%**	2,831.7	758.1	26.8%	2,491.9	754.2	30.3%	2,380.5	725.5	30.5%	9,644.9	2,875.4	29.8%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Target	**32,087.0**	**9,476.0**	**29.5%**	4,285.0	1,652.0	38.6%	3,276.0	1,074.0	32.8%	3,836.0	1,213.0	31.6%	20,690.0	5,537.0	26.8%
AutoZone	**10,429.1**	**3,103.9**	**29.8%**	1,643.0	482.5	29.4%	1,499.8	497.3	33.2%	1,451.4	411.6	28.4%	5,834.8	1,712.5	29.4%
Henry Schein	**3,130.8**	**946.9**	**30.2%**	533.8	161.1	30.2%	492.8	147.0	29.8%	467.8	132.5	28.3%	1,636.4	506.3	30.9%
AmerisourceBergen	**6,112.5**	**1,863.0**	**30.5%**	29.7	238.0	800.3%	562.6	258.7	46.0%	762.7	225.4	29.5%	4,757.4	1,140.9	24.0%
United Natural Foods	**1,073.1**	**327.4**	**30.5%**	213.8	58.6	27.4%	188.9	64.8	34.3%	153.7	42.5	27.6%	516.8	161.5	31.3%
Dollar General	**9,156.1**	**2,799.4**	**30.6%**	1,764.6	578.8	32.8%	1,596.2	533.0	33.4%	1,527.2	505.1	33.1%	4,268.1	1,182.5	27.7%
Wal-Mart Stores	**139,743.0**	**43,480.0**	**31.1%**	16,063.0	5,562.0	34.6%	17,800.0	6,165.0	34.6%	18,693.0	6,377.0	34.1%	87,187.0	25,376.0	29.1%
Big Lots	**2,098.8**	**655.6**	**31.2%**	216.4	72.3	33.4%	209.7	71.1	33.9%	171.8	81.1	47.2%	1,500.9	431.1	28.7%
W.W. Grainger	**7,481.0**	**2,343.3**	**31.3%**	1,158.8	389.8	33.6%	1,258.2	409.7	32.6%	1,135.4	349.0	30.7%	3,928.6	1,194.8	30.4%
Owens & Minor	**1,357.5**	**425.8**	**31.4%**	156.1	60.2	38.6%	145.4	51.7	35.5%	181.9	57.7	31.7%	874.0	256.1	29.3%
Nordstrom	**7,628.0**	**2,432.0**	**31.9%**	966.6	189.6	19.6%	1,138.8	378.8	33.3%	1,129.0	360.0	31.9%	4,393.6	1,503.6	34.2%
Tractor Supply Company	**3,025.8**	**971.0**	**32.1%**	634.9	202.9	32.0%	565.7	195.8	34.6%	502.5	139.1	27.7%	1,322.7	433.3	32.8%
Dollar Tree	**5,347.1**	**1,726.3**	**32.3%**	433.8	116.3	26.8%	905.8	321.4	35.5%	908.5	296.5	32.6%	3,099.0	992.1	32.0%
CarMax	**5,085.8**	**1,644.3**	**32.3%**	970.3	297.5	30.7%	930.9	287.7	30.9%	762.5	264.4	34.7%	2,422.0	794.6	32.8%
Walgreen	**26,280.0**	**8,503.0**	**32.4%**	2,604.0	846.0	32.5%	3,277.0	1,207.0	36.8%	3,343.0	1,122.0	33.6%	17,056.0	5,328.0	31.2%
GameStop	**4,163.8**	**1,351.3**	**32.5%**	538.0	175.1	32.5%	541.8	153.7	28.4%	469.2	147.9	31.5%	2,614.8	874.6	33.4%
Kohl's	**11,619.8**	**3,792.8**	**32.6%**	1,024.7	388.7	37.9%	1,313.5	397.5	30.3%	1,359.5	466.5	34.3%	7,922.0	2,540.0	32.1%
Gap	**12,003.9**	**3,947.8**	**32.9%**	1,380.8	394.8	28.6%	1,787.6	515.6	28.8%	1,761.7	569.7	32.3%	7,073.8	2,467.7	34.9%
Bed Bath & Beyond	**10,123.0**	**3,357.6**	**33.2%**	1,289.2	380.5	29.5%	1,441.9	492.1	34.1%	1,552.2	499.0	32.1%	5,839.7	1,986.0	34.0%
Home Depot	**48,671.9**	**16,154.9**	**33.2%**	9,741.0	3,228.0	33.1%	8,844.0	2,884.0	32.6%	7,424.0	2,503.0	33.7%	22,662.9	7,539.9	33.3%
Ross Stores	**8,667.6**	**2,893.2**	**33.4%**	1,582.0	462.7	29.2%	1,453.9	474.7	32.6%	1,312.9	464.0	35.3%	4,318.7	1,491.8	34.5%
Tech Data	**961.3**	**321.8**	**33.5%**	189.3	71.3	37.7%	98.7	32.4	32.8%	121.5	41.3	34.0%	551.8	176.8	32.0%
Graybar Electric	**879.7**	**295.7**	**33.6%**	135.1	46.2	34.2%	129.4	44.7	34.6%	120.8	47.8	39.6%	494.4	157.0	31.8%
Synnex	**1,220.6**	**418.9**	**34.3%**	183.6	58.7	32.0%	184.6	77.4	41.9%	190.1	74.3	39.1%	662.3	208.5	31.5%
CVS Caremark	**49,704.8**	**17,274.8**	**34.8%**	8,083.0	2,960.0	36.6%	7,201.3	2,493.3	34.6%	7,101.7	2,571.7	36.2%	27,318.8	9,249.8	33.9%
Whole Foods Market	**4,399.5**	**1,532.5**	**34.8%**	807.9	300.9	37.2%	857.6	351.6	41.0%	815.4	290.4	35.6%	1,918.6	589.7	30.7%
United Stationers	**1,314.4**	**465.3**	**35.4%**	115.0	67.3	58.5%	186.4	72.3	38.8%	190.2	66.9	35.2%	822.9	258.7	31.4%
Coach, Inc.	**6,293.4**	**2,263.6**	**36.0%**	330.1	153.2	46.4%	325.2	147.5	45.4%	760.2	273.9	36.0%	4,877.8	1,689.0	34.6%
Best Buy	**9,702.4**	**3,536.1**	**36.4%**	1,251.5	347.0	27.7%	1,078.0	354.0	32.8%	590.0	306.0	51.9%	6,782.9	2,529.1	37.3%
Lowe's	**26,542.3**	**9,843.4**	**37.1%**	4,171.0	1,688.0	40.5%	4,055.0	1,475.0	36.4%	3,470.0	1,342.0	38.7%	14,846.3	5,338.4	36.0%
Express Scripts	**17,907.7**	**7,109.0**	**39.7%**	3,700.2	1,673.9	45.2%	2,915.9	1,238.1	42.5%	2,872.7	1,448.1	50.4%	8,419.0	2,749.0	32.7%
Retail & wholesale trade	**643,989.9**	**199,925.2**	**31.0%**	**95,177.2**	**30,970.6**	**32.5%**	**92,232.2**	**30,239.1**	**32.8%**	**88,516.4**	**29,570.9**	**33.4%**	**368,064.2**	**109,144.6**	**29.7%**
Telecommunications															
Cablevision Systems	**2,455.1**	**8.6**	**0.4%**	327.8	0.1	0.0%	422.4	5.8	1.4%	196.7	–1.2	–0.6%	1,508.2	3.8	0.3%
Time Warner Cable	**20,926.0**	**1,632.0**	**7.8%**	2,896.9	367.9	12.7%	3,174.4	246.4	7.8%	2,964.1	554.1	18.7%	11,890.6	463.6	3.9%
Windstream	**2,793.5**	**220.8**	**7.9%**	21.4	9.1	42.5%	76.2	0.8	1.0%	227.5	–27.0	–11.9%	2,468.4	237.9	9.6%
AT&T	**141,623.7**	**11,500.4**	**8.1%**	18,953.0	2,496.0	13.2%	17,311.4	1,609.0	9.3%	19,271.7	3,043.0	15.8%	86,087.7	4,352.4	5.1%
CenturyLink	**8,606.8**	**725.1**	**8.4%**	1,212.0	28.0	2.3%	1,072.0	18.0	1.7%	1,215.0	1.0	0.1%	5,107.8	678.1	13.3%
Verizon Communications	**81,518.0**	**7,401.0**	**9.1%**	23,840.0	5,476.0	23.0%	15,193.0	2,657.0	17.5%	12,282.0	–197.0	–1.6%	30,203.0	–535.0	–1.8%
DISH Network	**11,458.2**	**1,554.5**	**13.6%**	1,114.1	145.0	13.0%	1,254.6	180.3	14.4%	1,130.3	162.7	14.4%	7,959.1	1,066.4	13.4%
Comcast	**64,879.2**	**15,535.8**	**23.9%**	12,146.8	2,976.8	24.5%	11,961.8	2,171.2	18.2%	10,016.2	3,013.5	30.1%	30,754.3	7,374.3	24.0%
Telecommunications	**334,260.5**	**38,578.1**	**11.5%**	**60,512.0**	**11,498.9**	**19.0%**	**50,465.8**	**6,888.5**	**13.6%**	**47,303.5**	**6,549.1**	**13.8%**	**175,979.2**	**13,641.6**	**7.8%**
Transportation															
Ryder System	**2,044.6**	**–54.9**	**–2.7%**	402.5	0.8	0.2%	269.6	–0.8	–0.3%	299.4	–4.0	–1.3%	1,073.1	–50.9	–4.7%
CSX	**21,006.5**	**3,530.5**	**16.8%**	3,043.7	615.7	20.2%	2,954.5	726.5	24.6%	2,837.2	660.2	23.3%	12,171.0	1,528.0	12.6%
Norfolk Southern	**20,455.9**	**4,069.9**	**19.9%**	2,383.4	493.4	20.7%	3,029.4	698.4	23.1%	2,873.6	663.6	23.1%	12,169.5	2,214.5	18.2%
J.B. Hunt Transport Services	**3,542.2**	**731.1**	**20.6%**	670.1	149.6	22.3%	587.8	117.0	19.9%	538.6	126.1	23.4%	1,745.7	338.4	19.4%
Union Pacific	**44,615.8**	**9,282.8**	**20.8%**	7,456.7	1,849.7	24.8%	8,124.4	1,931.4	23.8%	6,862.1	1,675.1	24.4%	22,172.6	3,826.6	17.3%
Southwest Airlines	**8,459.0**	**2,006.0**	**23.7%**	3,365.0	1,292.0	38.4%	1,787.0	203.0	11.4%	1,165.0	355.0	30.5%	2,142.0	156.0	7.3%
C.H. Robinson Worldwide	**4,907.6**	**1,689.2**	**34.4%**	654.1	252.7	38.6%	611.6	218.2	35.7%	549.6	157.8	28.7%	3,092.3	1,060.4	34.3%
Transportation	**105,031.6**	**21,254.6**	**20.2%**	**17,975.5**	**4,653.9**	**25.9%**	**17,364.3**	**3,893.7**	**22.4%**	**15,125.5**	**3,633.9**	**24.0%**	**54,566.2**	**9,073.0**	**16.6%**
Utilities, gas and electric															
Pepco Holdings	**3,022.0**	**–843.0**	**–27.9%**	435.0	–3.0	–0.7%	406.0	–137.0	–33.7%	438.0	–128.0	–29.2%	1,743.0	–575.0	–33.0%
PG&E Corp.	**10,843.0**	**–1,569.0**	**–14.5%**	850.0	–89.0	–10.5%	1,836.0	–84.0	–4.6%	1,122.0	–218.0	–19.4%	7,035.0	–1,178.0	–16.7%
Wisconsin Energy	**5,894.3**	**–591.6**	**–10.0%**	961.6	–97.4	–10.1%	872.3	–44.1	–5.1%	839.9	–50.2	–6.0%	3,220.5	–399.9	–12.4%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 by Industry

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Industry & Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
NiSource	**4,399.1**	**–352.2**	**–8.0%**	333.9	—	—	829.8	—	—	762.4	–15.9	–2.1%	2,473.0	–336.3	–13.6%
FirstEnergy	**8,842.0**	**–465.0**	**–5.3%**	863.0	1.0	0.1%	243.0	–132.0	–54.3%	500.0	–118.0	–23.6%	7,236.0	–216.0	–3.0%
Atmos Energy	**2,826.3**	**–114.2**	**–4.0%**	503.5	—	—	471.3	—	—	365.1	—	—	1,486.4	–114.2	–7.7%
American Electric Power	**17,170.4**	**–463.7**	**–2.7%**	2,608.4	107.3	4.1%	2,465.0	51.0	2.1%	2,081.0	–45.0	–2.2%	10,016.0	–577.0	–5.8%
Duke Energy	**19,767.5**	**–422.0**	**–2.1%**	3,840.0	—	—	3,544.0	—	—	3,357.0	–123.0	–3.7%	9,026.5	–299.0	–3.3%
NextEra Energy	**21,518.0**	**–313.0**	**–1.5%**	3,959.0	10.0	0.3%	3,674.0	—	—	2,452.0	–145.0	–5.9%	11,433.0	–178.0	–1.6%
Xcel Energy	**10,290.6**	**–111.4**	**–1.1%**	1,524.9	–36.1	–2.4%	1,535.9	–73.2	–4.8%	1,424.5	–46.2	–3.2%	5,805.3	44.1	0.8%
Ameren	**7,243.0**	**–48.0**	**–0.7%**	946.0	–2.0	–0.2%	1,001.0	–37.0	–3.7%	804.0	–118.0	–14.7%	4,492.0	109.0	2.4%
CMS Energy	**4,666.0**	**–26.0**	**–0.6%**	772.0	—	—	703.0	—	—	720.0	—	—	2,471.0	–26.0	–1.1%
Sempra Energy	**7,000.0**	**–34.0**	**–0.5%**	1,135.2	–49.0	–4.3%	941.5	–10.0	–1.1%	882.6	–70.0	–7.9%	4,040.7	95.0	2.4%
Eversource Energy	**6,703.2**	**–11.1**	**–0.2%**	1,381.9	–1.7	–0.1%	1,272.5	–3.5	–0.3%	1,229.1	13.3	1.1%	2,819.7	–19.3	–0.7%
Consolidated Edison	**12,329.0**	**103.0**	**0.8%**	1,760.0	–86.0	–4.9%	1,601.0	–9.0	–0.6%	1,387.0	285.0	20.5%	7,581.0	–87.0	–1.1%
FPL	**7,106.0**	**87.0**	**1.2%**	943.0	–26.0	–2.8%	1,127.0	43.0	3.8%	195.0	–75.0	–38.5%	4,841.0	145.0	3.0%
DTE Energy	**7,478.0**	**253.0**	**3.4%**	954.0	–3.0	–0.3%	1,251.0	–16.0	–1.3%	906.0	74.0	8.2%	4,367.0	198.0	4.5%
Entergy	**12,461.7**	**824.0**	**6.6%**	1,147.0	77.2	6.7%	1,685.7	90.1	5.3%	1,277.1	88.3	6.9%	8,351.9	568.4	6.8%
AGL Resources	**3,680.2**	**279.2**	**7.6%**	556.0	–11.0	–2.0%	874.0	113.0	12.9%	469.0	166.0	35.4%	1,781.2	11.2	0.6%
Southern	**24,587.0**	**2,036.0**	**8.3%**	3,662.0	–177.0	–4.8%	2,915.0	175.0	6.0%	2,569.0	363.0	14.1%	15,441.0	1,675.0	10.8%
Exelon	**26,422.3**	**3,350.3**	**12.7%**	3,416.0	407.0	11.9%	2,444.0	121.0	5.0%	2,592.0	744.0	28.7%	17,970.3	2,078.3	11.6%
Dominion Resources	**19,240.0**	**2,468.1**	**12.8%**	2,745.5	–26.5	–1.0%	1,748.0	–11.0	–0.6%	2,571.0	317.0	12.3%	12,175.5	2,188.6	18.0%
Scana	**5,275.0**	**808.0**	**15.3%**	1,082.0	382.0	35.3%	790.0	38.0	4.8%	677.0	161.0	23.8%	2,726.0	227.0	8.3%
Public Service Enterprise Group	**18,001.9**	**2,935.9**	**16.3%**	2,595.5	240.5	9.3%	2,398.0	335.0	14.0%	2,013.0	487.0	24.2%	10,995.4	1,873.4	17.0%
UGI	**2,600.5**	**436.2**	**16.8%**	388.5	89.0	22.9%	475.3	90.5	19.0%	321.1	43.9	13.7%	1,415.6	212.8	15.0%
Utilities, gas and electric	**269,367.1**	**8,216.5**	**3.1%**	**39,364.1**	**706.4**	**1.8%**	**37,104.2**	**499.8**	**1.3%**	**31,954.8**	**1,590.3**	**5.0%**	**160,943.9**	**5,420.0**	**3.4%**
ALL INDUSTRIES	**$3,810,577**	**$806,942**	**21.2%**	**$551,698**	**$141,281**	**25.6%**	**$584,814**	**$134,763**	**23.0%**	**$524,346**	**$111,138**	**21.2%**	**$2,149,719**	**$419,759**	**19.5%**

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (by 8-year tax rate)															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Pepco Holdings	**3,022.0**	**–843.0**	**–27.9%**	435.0	–3.0	–0.7%	406.0	–137.0	–33.7%	438.0	–128.0	–29.2%	1,743.0	–575.0	–33.0%
PG&E Corp.	**10,843.0**	**–1,569.0**	**–14.5%**	850.0	–89.0	–10.5%	1,836.0	–84.0	–4.6%	1,122.0	–218.0	–19.4%	7,035.0	–1,178.0	–16.7%
Wisconsin Energy	**5,894.3**	**–591.6**	**–10.0%**	961.6	–97.4	–10.1%	872.3	–44.1	–5.1%	839.9	–50.2	–6.0%	3,220.5	–399.9	–12.4%
NiSource	**4,399.1**	**–352.2**	**–8.0%**	333.9	—	—	829.8	—	—	762.4	–15.9	–2.1%	2,473.0	–336.3	–13.6%
International Paper	**5,010.0**	**–386.0**	**–7.7%**	1,135.0	62.0	5.5%	556.0	175.0	31.5%	489.0	–697.0	–142.5%	2,830.0	74.0	2.6%
FirstEnergy	**8,842.0**	**–465.0**	**–5.3%**	863.0	1.0	0.1%	243.0	–132.0	–54.3%	500.0	–118.0	–23.6%	7,236.0	–216.0	–3.0%
Priceline.com	**697.6**	**–30.9**	**–4.4%**	29.0	4.3	14.8%	73.5	–9.0	–12.3%	38.1	–9.4	–24.6%	557.0	–16.8	–3.0%
Atmos Energy	**2,826.3**	**–114.2**	**–4.0%**	503.5	—	—	471.3	—	—	365.1	—	—	1,486.4	–114.2	–7.7%
General Electric	**40,057.1**	**–1,369.0**	**–3.4%**	14.9	1,549.0	nm	5,826.1	51.0	0.9%	6,463.5	85.0	1.3%	27,752.5	–3,054.0	–11.0%
American Electric Power	**17,170.4**	**–463.7**	**–2.7%**	2,608.4	107.3	4.1%	2,465.0	51.0	2.1%	2,081.0	–45.0	–2.2%	10,016.0	–577.0	–5.8%
Ryder System	**2,044.6**	**–54.9**	**–2.7%**	402.5	0.8	0.2%	269.6	–0.8	–0.3%	299.4	–4.0	–1.3%	1,073.1	–50.9	–4.7%
Duke Energy	**19,767.5**	**–422.0**	**–2.1%**	3,840.0	—	—	3,544.0	—	—	3,357.0	–123.0	–3.7%	9,026.5	–299.0	–3.3%
NextEra Energy	**21,518.0**	**–313.0**	**–1.5%**	3,959.0	10.0	0.3%	3,674.0	—	—	2,452.0	–145.0	–5.9%	11,433.0	–178.0	–1.6%
Xcel Energy	**10,290.6**	**–111.4**	**–1.1%**	1,524.9	–36.1	–2.4%	1,535.9	–73.2	–4.8%	1,424.5	–46.2	–3.2%	5,805.3	44.1	0.8%
Ameren	**7,243.0**	**–48.0**	**–0.7%**	946.0	–2.0	–0.2%	1,001.0	–37.0	–3.7%	804.0	–118.0	–14.7%	4,492.0	109.0	2.4%
CMS Energy	**4,666.0**	**–26.0**	**–0.6%**	772.0	—	—	703.0	—	—	720.0	—	—	2,471.0	–26.0	–1.1%
Sempra Energy	**7,000.0**	**–34.0**	**–0.5%**	1,135.2	–49.0	–4.3%	941.5	–10.0	–1.1%	882.6	–70.0	–7.9%	4,040.7	95.0	2.4%
Eversource Energy	**6,703.2**	**–11.1**	**–0.2%**	1,381.9	–1.7	–0.1%	1,272.5	–3.5	–0.3%	1,229.1	13.3	1.1%	2,819.7	–19.3	–0.7%
Cablevision Systems	**2,455.1**	**8.6**	**0.4%**	327.8	0.1	0.0%	422.4	5.8	1.4%	196.7	–1.2	–0.6%	1,508.2	3.8	0.3%
Reinsurance Group of America	**3,774.3**	**14.1**	**0.4%**	493.3	–1.4	–0.3%	768.9	21.5	2.8%	473.2	–52.0	–11.0%	2,038.9	45.9	2.3%
Consolidated Edison	**12,329.0**	**103.0**	**0.8%**	1,760.0	–86.0	–4.9%	1,601.0	–9.0	–0.6%	1,387.0	285.0	20.5%	7,581.0	–87.0	–1.1%
Corning	**7,458.0**	**71.0**	**1.0%**	406.0	40.0	9.9%	2,352.0	38.0	1.6%	1,262.0	3.0	0.2%	3,438.0	–10.0	–0.3%
PPL	**7,106.0**	**87.0**	**1.2%**	943.0	–26.0	–2.8%	1,127.0	43.0	3.8%	195.0	–75.0	–38.5%	4,841.0	145.0	3.0%
Oneok	**3,976.2**	**49.0**	**1.2%**	384.7	13.2	3.4%	467.5	10.2	2.2%	427.1	–1.2	–0.3%	2,696.9	26.8	1.0%
Devon Energy	**21,692.3**	**368.3**	**1.7%**	1,861.4	–235.6	–12.7%	4,297.5	154.5	3.6%	1,784.7	69.7	3.9%	13,748.6	379.6	2.8%
DTE Energy	**7,478.0**	**253.0**	**3.4%**	954.0	–3.0	–0.3%	1,251.0	–16.0	–1.3%	906.0	74.0	8.2%	4,367.0	198.0	4.5%
Westrock	**3,056.1**	**134.3**	**4.4%**	603.0	23.3	3.9%	652.6	7.4	1.1%	613.8	–13.3	–2.2%	1,186.6	116.8	9.8%
Interpublic Group	**2,360.9**	**122.8**	**5.2%**	432.5	109.4	25.3%	365.2	–5.8	–1.6%	258.3	46.9	18.2%	1,304.9	–27.6	–2.1%
CBS	**13,044.7**	**698.5**	**5.4%**	1,974.4	154.2	7.8%	1,790.0	–235.0	–13.1%	2,451.6	272.6	11.1%	6,828.7	506.7	7.4%
Boeing	**40,026.7**	**2,146.7**	**5.4%**	6,828.0	1,966.0	28.8%	6,779.7	581.7	8.6%	5,946.0	–199.0	–3.3%	20,473.0	–202.1	–1.0%
State Street Corp.	**10,310.2**	**565.2**	**5.5%**	1,025.1	–5.9	–0.6%	1,097.5	–0.5	–0.0%	1,486.7	109.7	7.4%	6,701.0	462.0	6.9%
Williams	**8,943.9**	**516.0**	**5.8%**	86.7	—	—	3,267.0	–9.0	–0.3%	721.4	–17.0	–2.4%	4,868.7	542.0	11.1%
Qualcomm	**20,581.7**	**1,269.7**	**6.2%**	2,993.0	–166.0	–5.5%	3,213.0	–98.0	–3.1%	3,798.0	108.0	2.8%	10,577.7	1,425.7	13.5%
Principal Financial	**7,790.0**	**514.4**	**6.6%**	1,406.1	169.9	12.1%	1,474.5	99.3	6.7%	1,090.2	–9.8	–0.9%	3,819.2	255.0	6.7%
Entergy	**12,461.7**	**824.0**	**6.6%**	1,147.0	77.2	6.7%	1,685.7	90.1	5.3%	1,277.1	88.3	6.9%	8,351.9	568.4	6.8%
Spectra Energy	**6,511.0**	**455.0**	**7.0%**	359.0	—	—	904.0	1.0	0.1%	934.0	–32.0	–3.4%	4,314.0	486.0	11.3%
Constellation Brands	**5,590.6**	**414.3**	**7.4%**	599.3	–57.3	–9.6%	475.0	130.5	27.5%	2,043.6	87.6	4.3%	2,472.7	253.5	10.3%
International Business Machines	**64,728.0**	**4,849.0**	**7.5%**	5,787.0	–321.0	–5.5%	6,968.0	1,134.0	16.3%	6,679.0	1,406.0	21.1%	45,294.0	2,630.0	5.8%
AGL Resources	**3,680.2**	**279.2**	**7.6%**	556.0	–11.0	–2.0%	874.0	113.0	12.9%	469.0	166.0	35.4%	1,781.2	11.2	0.6%
Time Warner Cable	**20,926.0**	**1,632.0**	**7.8%**	2,896.9	367.9	12.7%	3,174.4	246.4	7.8%	2,964.1	554.1	18.7%	11,890.6	463.6	3.9%
Windstream	**2,793.5**	**220.8**	**7.9%**	21.4	9.1	42.5%	76.2	0.8	1.0%	227.5	–27.0	–11.9%	2,468.4	237.9	9.6%
AT&T	**141,623.7**	**11,500.4**	**8.1%**	18,953.0	2,496.0	13.2%	17,311.4	1,609.0	9.3%	19,271.7	3,043.0	15.8%	86,087.7	4,352.4	5.1%
PNC Financial Services Group	**32,952.7**	**2,724.7**	**8.3%**	5,343.0	903.0	16.9%	5,272.8	1,060.8	20.1%	5,128.0	98.0	1.9%	17,208.9	662.9	3.9%
Southern	**24,587.0**	**2,036.0**	**8.3%**	3,662.0	–177.0	–4.8%	2,915.0	175.0	6.0%	2,569.0	363.0	14.1%	15,441.0	1,675.0	10.8%
CenturyLink	**8,606.8**	**725.1**	**8.4%**	1,212.0	28.0	2.3%	1,072.0	18.0	1.7%	1,215.0	1.0	0.1%	5,107.8	678.1	13.3%
Community Health Systems	**2,683.5**	**237.1**	**8.8%**	303.0	7.0	2.3%	228.0	–29.0	–12.7%	226.3	9.1	4.0%	1,926.2	250.0	13.0%
Verizon Communications	**81,518.0**	**7,401.0**	**9.1%**	23,840.0	5,476.0	23.0%	15,193.0	2,657.0	17.5%	12,282.0	–197.0	–1.6%	30,203.0	–535.0	–1.8%
MDU Resources	**2,953.7**	**277.3**	**9.4%**	175.8	59.5	33.8%	406.6	28.8	7.1%	410.9	45.5	11.1%	1,960.3	143.4	7.3%
United Technologies	**24,421.2**	**2,546.2**	**10.4%**	2,819.0	264.0	9.4%	4,240.8	263.8	6.2%	3,622.9	520.9	14.4%	13,738.5	1,497.5	10.9%
Air Products & Chemicals	**4,117.4**	**439.5**	**10.7%**	727.7	149.7	20.6%	548.0	–6.2	–1.1%	428.5	66.2	15.4%	2,413.2	229.8	9.5%
Amazon.com	**6,237.5**	**674.5**	**10.8%**	1,959.6	116.6	5.9%	228.0	209.0	91.7%	672.5	34.5	5.1%	3,367.4	314.4	9.3%
Levi Strauss	**945.8**	**102.6**	**10.8%**	171.5	2.1	1.2%	61.0	14.8	24.2%	82.7	10.0	12.1%	630.7	75.7	12.0%
Celanese	**2,857.3**	**326.3**	**11.4%**	221.8	18.8	8.5%	520.2	94.2	18.1%	789.1	61.1	7.7%	1,326.3	152.3	11.5%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (by 8-year tax rate)															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Loews	**11,055.2**	**1,276.2**	**11.5%**	366.0	79.0	21.6%	1,305.0	370.0	28.4%	1,751.0	171.0	9.8%	7,633.2	656.2	8.6%
Arthur Gallagher	**1,630.0**	**190.8**	**11.7%**	294.4	43.9	14.9%	244.5	38.8	15.9%	218.5	29.0	13.3%	872.6	79.1	9.1%
ABM Industries	**696.0**	**84.2**	**12.1%**	57.2	1.8	3.1%	110.1	32.0	29.1%	97.7	15.3	15.7%	431.0	35.0	8.1%
Exelon	**26,422.3**	**3,350.3**	**12.7%**	3,416.0	407.0	11.9%	2,444.0	121.0	5.0%	2,592.0	744.0	28.7%	17,970.3	2,078.3	11.6%
Dominion Resources	**19,240.0**	**2,468.1**	**12.8%**	2,745.5	–26.5	–1.0%	1,748.0	–11.0	–0.6%	2,571.0	317.0	12.3%	12,175.5	2,188.6	18.0%
FedEx	**16,977.2**	**2,246.0**	**13.2%**	2,895.8	510.5	17.6%	2,339.9	752.8	32.2%	2,839.4	587.6	20.7%	8,902.0	395.1	4.4%
Darden Restaurants	**3,545.2**	**471.7**	**13.3%**	450.9	74.6	16.5%	191.1	–27.9	–14.6%	185.7	30.5	16.4%	2,717.5	394.5	14.5%
Time Warner	**31,048.4**	**4,147.2**	**13.4%**	4,372.9	719.1	16.4%	4,615.5	–26.0	–0.6%	4,911.9	328.0	6.7%	17,148.0	3,126.1	18.2%
Mosaic	**6,814.1**	**912.7**	**13.4%**	668.9	61.9	9.3%	301.1	46.0	15.3%	223.3	–25.0	–11.2%	5,620.8	829.8	14.8%
DISH Network	**11,458.2**	**1,554.5**	**13.6%**	1,114.1	145.0	13.0%	1,254.6	180.3	14.4%	1,130.3	162.7	14.4%	7,959.1	1,066.4	13.4%
Netflix	**1,494.2**	**203.1**	**13.6%**	97.2	–27.9	–28.7%	325.1	7.1	2.2%	158.1	–9.0	–5.7%	913.8	232.9	25.5%
Exxon Mobil	**60,481.7**	**8,226.7**	**13.6%**	159.3	–1.7	–1.0%	9,598.9	1,360.9	14.2%	9,357.3	1,033.3	11.0%	41,366.2	5,834.2	14.1%
Eastman Chemical	**5,134.0**	**723.0**	**14.1%**	596.0	87.0	14.6%	621.0	64.0	10.3%	1,407.0	143.0	10.2%	2,510.0	429.0	17.1%
Trinity Industries	**4,122.1**	**593.9**	**14.4%**	1,223.8	260.2	21.3%	1,036.2	302.5	29.2%	559.0	134.8	24.1%	1,303.1	–103.6	–7.9%
Casey's General Stores	**1,629.4**	**242.1**	**14.9%**	340.2	56.0	16.5%	275.6	46.6	16.9%	201.2	42.6	21.2%	812.4	96.9	11.9%
Honeywell International	**16,519.5**	**2,460.5**	**14.9%**	3,297.0	719.0	21.8%	3,318.6	661.6	19.9%	2,927.8	553.8	18.9%	6,976.0	526.0	7.5%
Scana	**5,275.0**	**808.0**	**15.3%**	1,082.0	382.0	35.3%	790.0	38.0	4.8%	677.0	161.0	23.8%	2,726.0	227.0	8.3%
Consol Energy	**3,550.3**	**544.9**	**15.3%**	330.1	21.4	6.5%	175.7	13.5	7.7%	57.4	4.3	7.5%	2,987.1	505.8	16.9%
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	**114,769.5**	**17,956.3**	**15.6%**	22,414.7	3,160.0	14.1%	20,331.0	1,273.4	6.3%	12,486.0	–1,429.3	–11.4%	59,537.9	14,952.2	25.1%
Twenty-First Century Fox	**39,722.0**	**6,273.0**	**15.8%**	3,485.6	466.0	13.4%	9,720.0	891.0	9.2%	5,226.9	1,178.0	22.5%	21,289.5	3,738.0	17.6%
Public Service Enterprise Group	**18,001.9**	**2,935.9**	**16.3%**	2,595.5	240.5	9.3%	2,398.0	335.0	14.0%	2,013.0	487.0	24.2%	10,995.4	1,873.4	17.0%
Facebook	**14,787.9**	**2,439.9**	**16.5%**	2,802.0	1,474.0	52.6%	4,918.0	260.0	5.3%	3,197.0	614.0	19.2%	3,870.9	91.9	2.4%
UGI	**2,600.5**	**436.2**	**16.8%**	388.5	89.0	22.9%	475.3	90.5	19.0%	321.1	43.9	13.7%	1,415.6	212.8	15.0%
CSX	**21,006.5**	**3,530.5**	**16.8%**	3,043.7	615.7	20.2%	2,954.5	726.5	24.6%	2,837.2	660.2	23.3%	12,171.0	1,528.0	12.6%
Wesco International	**2,092.8**	**352.8**	**16.9%**	284.6	44.5	15.6%	320.8	64.8	20.2%	334.0	45.7	13.7%	1,153.5	197.8	17.1%
Praxair	**6,142.3**	**1,036.3**	**16.9%**	950.3	189.3	19.9%	974.4	265.4	27.2%	871.0	56.0	6.4%	3,346.7	525.7	15.7%
Kimberly-Clark	**10,685.7**	**1,803.7**	**16.9%**	401.4	192.4	47.9%	1,529.4	319.4	20.9%	1,662.7	308.7	18.6%	7,092.2	983.2	13.9%
Eli Lilly	**15,117.5**	**2,571.0**	**17.0%**	1,169.3	660.5	56.5%	1,206.5	168.9	14.0%	2,705.0	259.1	9.6%	10,036.8	1,482.5	14.8%
Andersons	**796.0**	**135.4**	**17.0%**	33.9	–4.3	–12.7%	156.0	31.1	19.9%	135.9	11.0	8.1%	470.2	97.7	20.8%
Sonic Automotive	**799.9**	**137.9**	**17.2%**	138.7	36.2	26.1%	156.0	36.9	23.6%	123.4	33.4	27.0%	381.9	31.4	8.2%
Rockwell Collins	**6,315.0**	**1,134.0**	**18.0%**	826.2	158.2	19.2%	751.0	105.0	14.0%	745.6	143.6	19.3%	3,992.1	727.1	18.2%
Wells Fargo	**185,024.8**	**33,330.6**	**18.0%**	31,044.4	10,447.4	33.7%	31,475.4	6,946.4	22.1%	29,375.9	4,376.9	14.9%	93,129.1	11,559.9	12.4%
R.R. Donnelley & Sons	**1,610.8**	**290.4**	**18.0%**	225.7	112.5	49.9%	5.8	49.9	859.7%	65.6	–15.3	–23.3%	1,313.7	143.3	10.9%
Phillips-Van Heusen	**984.5**	**177.9**	**18.1%**	91.9	2.3	2.5%	34.0	–44.5	–130.9%	46.3	85.2	184.0%	812.4	135.0	16.6%
Ball	**1,952.8**	**354.8**	**18.2%**	43.1	8.5	19.7%	265.0	36.3	13.7%	241.4	37.4	15.5%	1,403.3	272.6	19.4%
Joy Global	**3,474.3**	**633.1**	**18.2%**	313.1	23.5	7.5%	288.2	80.5	27.9%	525.1	125.6	23.9%	2,347.9	403.5	17.2%
Flowserve	**1,590.0**	**290.8**	**18.3%**	213.6	56.4	26.4%	225.0	55.2	24.5%	225.4	53.3	23.7%	926.0	125.9	13.6%
Du Pont	**8,678.0**	**1,602.0**	**18.5%**	1,390.0	218.0	15.7%	2,718.0	778.0	28.6%	939.0	160.0	17.0%	3,631.0	446.0	12.3%
Nike	**10,279.0**	**1,911.9**	**18.6%**	933.6	71.6	7.7%	1,924.7	415.7	21.6%	2,984.8	149.8	5.0%	4,435.8	1,274.7	28.7%
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation	**3,831.1**	**712.7**	**18.6%**	716.9	167.9	23.4%	657.9	147.9	22.5%	540.5	101.6	18.8%	1,915.8	295.2	15.4%
SpartanNash	**432.3**	**82.2**	**19.0%**	97.3	30.4	31.2%	89.8	26.4	29.4%	1.6	3.7	235.7%	243.6	21.7	8.9%
Travelers Cos.	**30,729.0**	**5,870.5**	**19.1%**	4,621.0	1,098.0	23.8%	4,898.9	1,168.9	23.9%	4,804.0	1,014.0	21.1%	16,405.1	2,589.6	15.8%
L-3 Communications	**7,613.8**	**1,461.6**	**19.2%**	481.6	38.5	8.0%	758.9	72.9	9.6%	855.7	181.7	21.2%	5,517.5	1,168.5	21.2%
Norfolk Southern	**20,455.9**	**4,069.9**	**19.9%**	2,383.4	493.4	20.7%	3,029.4	698.4	23.1%	2,873.6	663.6	23.1%	12,169.5	2,214.5	18.2%
Sherwin-Williams	**7,294.6**	**1,467.2**	**20.1%**	1,488.7	325.5	21.9%	1,208.2	251.5	20.8%	1,052.9	190.7	18.1%	3,544.9	699.5	19.7%
Group 1 Automotive	**1,068.0**	**215.2**	**20.2%**	245.0	65.2	26.6%	175.2	48.1	27.4%	177.8	42.3	23.8%	469.9	59.6	12.7%
Coca-Cola	**23,845.9**	**4,853.8**	**20.4%**	1,694.8	711.0	42.0%	1,560.3	867.0	55.6%	2,385.4	713.0	29.9%	18,205.5	2,562.8	14.1%
Raytheon	**21,037.0**	**4,335.8**	**20.6%**	2,482.0	718.1	28.9%	2,868.0	798.1	27.8%	2,612.0	709.8	27.2%	13,075.0	2,109.7	16.1%
General Mills	**15,295.4**	**3,155.5**	**20.6%**	1,895.0	412.0	21.7%	1,665.4	331.0	19.9%	2,144.4	469.4	21.9%	9,590.6	1,943.1	20.3%
J.B. Hunt Transport Services	**3,542.2**	**731.1**	**20.6%**	670.1	149.6	22.3%	587.8	117.0	19.9%	538.6	126.1	23.4%	1,745.7	338.4	19.4%
Danaher	**9,287.2**	**1,918.9**	**20.7%**	1,386.3	395.8	28.6%	1,408.3	250.4	17.8%	1,640.6	252.0	15.4%	4,852.0	1,020.7	21.0%
BB&T Corp.	**18,531.0**	**3,837.0**	**20.7%**	2,810.0	585.0	20.8%	2,617.0	551.0	21.1%	2,812.0	1,004.0	35.7%	10,292.0	1,697.0	16.5%
Union Pacific	**44,615.8**	**9,282.8**	**20.8%**	7,456.7	1,849.7	24.8%	8,124.4	1,931.4	23.8%	6,862.1	1,675.1	24.4%	22,172.6	3,826.6	17.3%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (by 8-year tax rate)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Monsanto	**15,236.3**	**3,241.4**	**21.3%**	2,155.2	638.6	29.6%	2,383.5	588.5	24.7%	2,346.7	366.7	15.6%	8,351.0	1,647.6	19.7%
Alleghany Corporation	**3,297.4**	**702.2**	**21.3%**	373.6	93.3	25.0%	628.9	115.4	18.3%	611.4	68.4	11.2%	1,683.5	425.1	25.3%
McKesson	**11,703.1**	**2,496.0**	**21.3%**	2,407.1	658.0	27.3%	1,803.0	453.0	25.1%	1,453.0	484.0	33.3%	6,040.0	901.0	14.9%
Amphenol	**1,293.8**	**279.6**	**21.6%**	137.2	25.0	18.3%	167.0	33.1	19.8%	156.4	25.1	16.0%	833.2	196.4	23.6%
Fifth Third Bancorp	**11,009.0**	**2,387.0**	**21.7%**	2,208.0	662.0	30.0%	1,702.0	424.0	24.9%	2,295.0	494.0	21.5%	4,804.0	807.0	16.8%
Airgas	**3,689.3**	**800.8**	**21.7%**	514.0	137.4	26.7%	557.5	150.5	27.0%	522.3	173.0	33.1%	2,095.4	339.8	16.2%
Insight Enterprises	**577.2**	**126.8**	**22.0%**	88.0	23.9	27.1%	86.5	26.9	31.0%	93.0	27.0	29.1%	309.7	49.1	15.8%
Northrop Grumman	**21,383.0**	**4,712.0**	**22.0%**	2,706.0	207.0	7.6%	2,897.0	620.0	21.4%	2,751.0	760.0	27.6%	13,029.0	3,125.0	24.0%
Paccar	**5,453.3**	**1,210.6**	**22.2%**	1,579.1	521.8	33.0%	1,284.0	482.4	37.6%	848.8	191.4	22.5%	1,741.4	15.0	0.9%
Procter & Gamble	**66,989.5**	**14,931.0**	**22.3%**	8,564.0	1,673.0	19.5%	8,611.0	2,272.0	26.4%	8,768.0	1,606.0	18.3%	41,046.5	9,380.0	22.9%
NVR	**2,653.0**	**591.6**	**22.3%**	571.1	161.6	28.3%	426.3	140.4	32.9%	391.9	120.6	30.8%	1,263.7	169.0	13.4%
Ecolab	**4,649.3**	**1,040.2**	**22.4%**	734.9	185.5	25.2%	905.6	256.3	28.3%	710.2	249.1	35.1%	2,298.7	349.4	15.2%
Kellogg	**8,748.3**	**1,971.6**	**22.5%**	497.5	200.4	40.3%	487.4	291.9	59.9%	2,085.3	282.2	13.5%	5,678.1	1,197.1	21.1%
Dover	**4,584.5**	**1,038.3**	**22.6%**	518.7	114.6	22.1%	783.9	219.4	28.0%	759.6	133.9	17.6%	2,522.4	570.3	22.6%
Core-Mark Holding	**426.4**	**97.5**	**22.9%**	78.2	17.6	22.5%	61.5	19.7	32.0%	62.2	17.0	27.3%	224.6	43.3	19.3%
American Express	**41,674.7**	**9,577.2**	**23.0%**	6,427.2	2,092.1	32.6%	7,749.9	2,091.3	27.0%	6,157.6	1,660.5	27.0%	21,340.0	3,733.2	17.5%
DaVita	**6,359.3**	**1,475.5**	**23.2%**	745.6	160.0	21.5%	1,146.5	150.9	13.2%	938.8	304.3	32.4%	3,528.5	860.4	24.4%
WR Berkley	**4,411.7**	**1,023.6**	**23.2%**	687.6	177.7	25.8%	906.3	254.7	28.1%	593.5	112.3	18.9%	2,224.3	478.9	21.5%
Campbell Soup	**7,279.7**	**1,696.7**	**23.3%**	820.0	241.0	29.4%	967.2	241.2	24.9%	793.1	258.1	32.5%	4,699.3	956.3	20.3%
Viacom	**18,261.4**	**4,260.4**	**23.3%**	1,989.4	368.4	18.5%	2,816.5	979.5	34.8%	3,033.8	320.8	10.6%	10,421.7	2,591.7	24.9%
Pitney Bowes	**3,408.7**	**796.2**	**23.4%**	485.9	115.6	23.8%	360.5	71.7	19.9%	281.3	78.3	27.8%	2,281.0	530.7	23.3%
Domtar	**1,437.8**	**339.7**	**23.6%**	24.5	59.5	243.1%	81.4	15.4	18.9%	35.5	–14.5	–41.0%	1,296.5	279.4	21.5%
Southwest Airlines	**8,459.0**	**2,006.0**	**23.7%**	3,365.0	1,292.0	38.4%	1,787.0	203.0	11.4%	1,165.0	355.0	30.5%	2,142.0	156.0	7.3%
Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.	**953.3**	**227.5**	**23.9%**	264.0	81.1	30.7%	176.6	40.7	23.0%	161.6	41.3	25.6%	351.1	64.4	18.3%
Comcast	**64,879.2**	**15,535.8**	**23.9%**	12,146.8	2,976.8	24.5%	11,961.8	2,171.2	18.2%	10,016.2	3,013.5	30.1%	30,754.3	7,374.3	24.0%
Rockwell Automation	**3,270.8**	**785.1**	**24.0%**	645.6	228.3	35.4%	602.6	194.7	32.3%	503.5	138.1	27.4%	1,519.1	224.0	14.7%
Goldman Sachs Group	**50,210.4**	**12,118.9**	**24.1%**	3,455.0	709.0	20.5%	6,782.9	1,261.3	18.6%	6,446.0	2,508.0	38.9%	33,526.5	7,640.7	22.8%
Precision Castparts	**12,428.8**	**3,001.2**	**24.1%**	1,015.9	265.9	26.2%	2,112.2	515.2	24.4%	2,158.7	491.8	22.8%	7,142.0	1,728.3	24.2%
Parker Hannifin	**5,369.8**	**1,300.5**	**24.2%**	650.3	226.3	34.8%	758.6	166.4	21.9%	1,160.4	349.5	30.1%	2,800.5	558.3	19.9%
Kroger	**16,218.4**	**3,945.6**	**24.3%**	3,073.8	642.8	20.9%	2,599.0	804.0	30.9%	2,245.5	611.5	27.2%	8,300.0	1,887.3	22.7%
Thermo Fisher Scientific	**6,560.5**	**1,609.8**	**24.5%**	851.7	128.8	15.1%	1,129.6	390.4	34.6%	909.5	204.0	22.4%	3,669.7	886.6	24.2%
HCA Holdings	**19,116.4**	**4,696.2**	**24.6%**	3,461.7	1,064.7	30.8%	2,243.6	805.2	35.9%	2,884.3	733.5	25.4%	10,526.8	2,092.8	19.9%
3M	**23,794.4**	**5,860.6**	**24.6%**	4,349.7	1,210.6	27.8%	3,735.9	964.9	25.8%	3,118.9	871.9	28.0%	12,589.9	2,813.1	22.3%
U.S. Bancorp	**49,331.0**	**12,191.0**	**24.7%**	7,590.0	1,956.0	25.8%	7,502.0	1,888.0	25.2%	7,527.0	1,885.0	25.0%	26,712.0	6,462.0	24.2%
VF	**4,955.5**	**1,229.4**	**24.8%**	779.2	147.8	19.0%	603.0	152.3	25.3%	721.3	199.0	27.6%	2,852.0	730.3	25.6%
ConAgra Foods	**7,200.8**	**1,793.4**	**24.9%**	700.7	295.8	42.2%	895.2	281.6	31.4%	1,064.7	360.5	33.9%	4,540.2	855.6	18.8%
Lockheed Martin	**35,509.0**	**8,880.6**	**25.0%**	4,966.0	1,817.0	36.6%	5,369.0	2,020.0	37.6%	4,252.0	1,204.0	28.3%	20,922.0	3,839.6	18.4%
Waste Management	**10,547.4**	**2,642.9**	**25.1%**	936.7	179.6	19.2%	1,804.1	409.9	22.7%	959.9	380.7	39.7%	6,846.7	1,672.8	24.4%
MasterCard	**16,648.7**	**4,178.9**	**25.1%**	3,359.3	642.3	19.1%	3,225.3	932.3	28.9%	2,966.3	994.3	33.5%	7,097.8	1,610.0	22.7%
Arrow Electronics	**2,593.8**	**656.9**	**25.3%**	264.6	77.6	29.3%	334.0	96.0	28.7%	312.4	79.2	25.4%	1,682.8	404.0	24.0%
Harris	**5,877.6**	**1,492.5**	**25.4%**	1,090.6	–27.0	–2.5%	443.0	150.0	33.9%	723.1	213.0	29.5%	3,620.9	1,156.5	31.9%
Packaging Corp. of America	**2,868.0**	**732.4**	**25.5%**	645.0	200.1	31.0%	583.3	175.0	30.0%	404.0	123.2	30.5%	1,235.7	234.1	18.9%
SAIC	**4,074.0**	**1,043.1**	**25.6%**	171.0	42.7	25.0%	697.0	63.5	9.1%	171.0	40.0	23.4%	3,035.0	896.8	29.5%
Alliant Techsystems	**2,954.1**	**763.2**	**25.8%**	265.0	27.2	10.2%	143.0	36.8	25.8%	503.5	146.9	29.2%	2,042.5	552.4	27.0%
Yum Brands	**3,226.4**	**835.4**	**25.9%**	451.7	245.7	54.4%	506.0	215.0	42.5%	449.6	122.6	27.3%	1,819.1	252.1	13.9%
Staples	**6,160.8**	**1,616.5**	**26.2%**	460.9	49.9	10.8%	508.8	116.8	23.0%	844.8	191.1	22.6%	4,346.4	1,258.7	29.0%
Polo Ralph Lauren	**4,046.2**	**1,065.1**	**26.3%**	278.0	78.0	28.1%	586.4	154.4	26.3%	664.9	182.9	27.5%	2,516.9	649.8	25.8%
Archer Daniels Midland	**11,180.0**	**2,950.0**	**26.4%**	1,138.0	270.0	23.7%	2,167.0	641.0	29.6%	1,495.0	348.0	23.3%	6,380.0	1,691.0	26.5%
General Dynamics	**24,720.3**	**6,674.2**	**27.0%**	3,511.3	777.3	22.1%	3,278.4	787.4	24.0%	3,223.0	838.0	26.0%	14,707.7	4,271.5	29.0%
Alliance Data Systems	**3,299.6**	**892.5**	**27.0%**	784.1	305.6	39.0%	691.6	196.4	28.4%	533.5	174.3	32.7%	1,290.4	216.3	16.8%
Reliance Steel & Aluminum	**3,446.6**	**948.4**	**27.5%**	425.5	129.5	30.4%	463.3	153.2	33.1%	433.5	120.5	27.8%	2,124.2	545.2	25.7%
Walt Disney	**62,566.8**	**17,217.1**	**27.5%**	12,184.9	3,923.1	32.2%	10,835.2	2,721.1	25.1%	8,531.6	2,185.3	25.6%	31,015.0	8,387.5	27.0%
Anixter International	**1,271.5**	**350.1**	**27.5%**	160.2	58.3	36.4%	184.3	33.3	18.1%	181.4	35.6	19.6%	745.7	222.9	29.9%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (by 8-year tax rate)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Omnicom Group	4,753.9	1,312.1	27.6%	716.4	319.8	44.6%	638.2	331.6	52.0%	542.8	215.0	39.6%	2,856.4	445.7	15.6%
Capital One Financial	31,122.5	8,602.2	27.6%	6,157.5	1,991.0	32.3%	6,022.5	1,934.0	32.1%	5,322.8	1,360.0	25.6%	13,619.7	3,317.2	24.4%
AutoNation	3,881.3	1,074.2	27.7%	691.7	220.2	31.8%	653.2	206.0	31.5%	577.2	181.4	31.4%	1,959.2	466.6	23.8%
LKQ Corporation	2,470.8	688.5	27.9%	455.4	126.5	27.8%	439.7	130.2	29.6%	343.6	100.0	29.1%	1,232.2	331.8	26.9%
Intel	77,498.3	21,603.3	27.9%	8,787.5	2,696.5	30.7%	11,548.1	3,273.1	28.3%	9,314.5	2,689.5	28.9%	47,848.2	12,944.2	27.1%
United Parcel Service	39,442.2	11,005.1	27.9%	6,260.0	1,634.0	26.1%	4,593.5	932.0	20.3%	5,835.0	2,181.0	37.4%	22,753.7	6,258.1	27.5%
Tutor Perini	1,065.1	298.1	28.0%	70.2	5.3	7.6%	159.5	44.4	27.9%	118.9	28.1	23.6%	716.5	220.3	30.7%
Clorox	5,579.7	1,569.0	28.1%	877.8	211.8	24.1%	808.3	230.3	28.5%	724.9	221.9	30.6%	3,168.7	905.0	28.6%
PepsiCo	26,393.4	7,432.8	28.2%	2,821.9	1,033.0	36.6%	2,382.1	1,269.7	53.3%	2,968.7	995.2	33.5%	18,220.7	4,134.9	22.7%
PPG Industries	4,135.5	1,169.0	28.3%	801.2	158.0	19.7%	328.5	128.0	39.0%	505.4	153.0	30.3%	2,500.3	730.0	29.2%
Cigna	14,436.6	4,091.2	28.3%	2,888.9	1,048.7	36.3%	2,907.5	1,052.3	36.2%	902.7	363.0	40.2%	7,737.5	1,627.2	21.0%
Macy's	12,315.0	3,496.0	28.4%	1,611.4	510.4	31.7%	2,302.4	731.4	31.8%	2,191.8	816.8	37.3%	6,209.4	1,437.4	23.1%
Quanta Services	2,248.8	639.9	28.5%	258.3	85.3	33.0%	286.7	72.9	25.4%	485.6	170.9	35.2%	1,218.3	310.8	25.5%
Cardinal Health	11,266.5	3,221.3	28.6%	1,981.7	583.7	29.5%	1,659.0	381.0	23.0%	1,620.7	488.7	30.2%	6,005.1	1,767.9	29.4%
H&R Block	5,122.1	1,469.1	28.7%	538.5	167.2	31.1%	648.0	245.5	37.9%	718.0	195.3	27.2%	3,217.6	861.1	26.8%
Dick's Sporting Goods	3,103.4	891.5	28.7%	505.0	158.5	31.4%	527.8	177.6	33.7%	523.0	133.8	25.6%	1,547.6	421.6	27.2%
Advance Auto Parts	4,471.8	1,288.8	28.8%	670.6	232.0	34.6%	703.9	196.1	27.9%	568.7	189.3	33.3%	2,528.7	671.4	26.6%
O'Reilly Automotive	6,781.6	1,956.1	28.8%	1,424.0	452.4	31.8%	1,187.4	358.6	30.2%	1,025.8	322.8	31.5%	3,144.3	822.2	26.1%
Costco Wholesale	13,832.0	4,020.0	29.1%	2,457.9	694.9	28.3%	2,052.5	626.5	30.5%	1,971.6	521.6	26.5%	7,350.0	2,177.0	29.6%
Merck	41,404.3	12,039.0	29.1%	2,117.0	732.0	34.6%	15,355.0	7,136.0	46.5%	3,646.0	568.0	15.6%	20,286.3	3,603.0	17.8%
Hormel Foods	5,508.0	1,604.3	29.1%	979.2	280.6	28.7%	861.4	244.1	28.3%	750.5	212.0	28.2%	2,916.9	867.6	29.7%
Oracle	39,856.5	11,643.2	29.2%	3,783.5	1,198.5	31.7%	4,952.5	1,951.2	39.4%	5,103.3	1,406.3	27.6%	26,017.3	7,087.3	27.2%
Genuine Parts	6,818.6	1,993.7	29.2%	920.5	303.6	33.0%	1,248.8	209.9	16.8%	245.3	292.3	119.2%	4,404.0	1,187.9	27.0%
Limited Brands	8,945.8	2,621.7	29.3%	1,583.1	495.1	31.3%	1,422.4	418.4	29.4%	1,231.2	377.2	30.6%	4,709.0	1,330.9	28.3%
Harley-Davidson	6,562.2	1,928.5	29.4%	1,078.8	360.9	33.5%	1,179.1	385.4	32.7%	1,006.5	265.5	26.4%	3,297.8	916.7	27.8%
Illinois Tool Works	11,211.9	3,297.2	29.4%	1,597.5	486.5	30.5%	1,624.7	385.7	23.7%	1,384.2	390.2	28.2%	6,605.6	2,034.8	30.8%
Bemis	1,658.7	488.0	29.4%	252.4	70.2	27.8%	244.1	82.0	33.6%	222.2	65.8	29.6%	939.9	269.9	28.7%
TJX	16,952.0	4,994.3	29.5%	2,905.1	938.6	32.3%	2,779.6	818.1	29.4%	2,584.2	747.5	28.9%	8,683.1	2,490.1	28.7%
Publix Super Markets	17,348.9	5,113.1	29.5%	2,831.7	758.1	26.8%	2,491.9	754.2	30.3%	2,380.5	725.5	30.5%	9,644.9	2,875.4	29.8%
Target	32,087.0	9,476.0	29.5%	4,285.0	1,652.0	38.6%	3,276.0	1,074.0	32.8%	3,836.0	1,213.0	31.6%	20,690.0	5,537.0	26.8%
AutoZone	10,429.1	3,103.9	29.8%	1,643.0	482.5	29.4%	1,499.8	497.3	33.2%	1,451.4	411.6	28.4%	5,834.8	1,712.5	29.4%
Hershey	7,623.5	2,271.2	29.8%	1,313.9	388.5	29.6%	1,277.7	341.4	26.7%	1,212.6	332.6	27.4%	3,819.3	1,208.6	31.6%
Universal Health Services	5,156.0	1,546.6	30.0%	1,003.9	324.6	32.3%	837.7	220.1	26.3%	794.4	239.9	30.2%	2,520.0	762.0	30.2%
Automatic Data Processing	14,398.8	4,342.2	30.2%	1,963.7	522.4	26.6%	1,863.8	535.0	28.7%	1,899.6	653.2	34.4%	8,671.6	2,631.6	30.3%
Texas Instruments	16,387.1	4,954.1	30.2%	3,218.0	1,034.0	32.1%	2,684.0	820.0	30.6%	1,507.0	215.0	14.3%	8,978.1	2,885.1	32.1%
Henry Schein	3,130.8	946.9	30.2%	533.8	161.1	30.2%	492.8	147.0	29.8%	467.8	132.5	28.3%	1,636.4	506.3	30.9%
AmerisourceBergen	6,112.5	1,863.0	30.5%	29.7	238.0	800.3%	562.6	258.7	46.0%	762.7	225.4	29.5%	4,757.4	1,140.9	24.0%
United Natural Foods	1,073.1	327.4	30.5%	213.8	58.6	27.4%	188.9	64.8	34.3%	153.7	42.5	27.6%	516.8	161.5	31.3%
Dollar General	9,156.1	2,799.4	30.6%	1,764.6	578.8	32.8%	1,596.2	533.0	33.4%	1,527.2	505.1	33.1%	4,268.1	1,182.5	27.7%
Laboratory Corp. of America	6,109.1	1,873.3	30.7%	562.1	207.5	36.9%	729.5	228.7	31.4%	816.2	222.5	27.3%	4,001.3	1,214.6	30.4%
Quest Diagnostics	7,867.4	2,423.5	30.8%	1,021.9	226.9	22.2%	766.0	204.0	26.6%	1,236.7	413.7	33.5%	4,842.8	1,578.9	32.6%
Deere	19,584.2	6,074.7	31.0%	1,809.2	361.7	20.0%	3,149.6	1,191.5	37.8%	4,043.2	1,363.1	33.7%	10,582.2	3,158.4	29.8%
Wal-Mart Stores	139,743.0	43,480.0	31.1%	16,063.0	5,562.0	34.6%	17,800.0	6,165.0	34.6%	18,693.0	6,377.0	34.1%	87,187.0	25,376.0	29.1%
Big Lots	2,098.8	655.6	31.2%	216.4	72.3	33.4%	209.7	71.1	33.9%	171.8	81.1	47.2%	1,500.9	431.1	28.7%
Emcor Group	1,782.7	558.1	31.3%	243.8	93.0	38.2%	253.9	74.0	29.1%	217.2	56.6	26.1%	1,067.8	334.5	31.3%
W.W. Grainger	7,481.0	2,343.3	31.3%	1,158.8	389.8	33.6%	1,258.2	409.7	32.6%	1,135.4	349.0	30.7%	3,928.6	1,194.8	30.4%
Owens & Minor	1,357.5	425.8	31.4%	156.1	60.2	38.6%	145.4	51.7	35.5%	181.9	57.7	31.7%	874.0	256.1	29.3%
Fiserv	6,274.9	1,975.9	31.5%	988.6	283.6	28.7%	970.1	316.1	32.6%	816.9	280.9	34.4%	3,499.3	1,095.3	31.3%
Unum Group	5,982.4	1,897.4	31.7%	690.4	280.5	40.6%	67.3	128.4	190.7%	980.9	277.9	28.3%	4,243.8	1,210.6	28.5%
Nordstrom	7,628.0	2,432.0	31.9%	966.6	189.6	19.6%	1,138.8	378.8	33.3%	1,129.0	360.0	31.9%	4,393.6	1,503.6	34.2%
Tractor Supply Company	3,025.8	971.0	32.1%	634.9	202.9	32.0%	565.7	195.8	34.6%	502.5	139.1	27.7%	1,322.7	433.3	32.8%
CF Industries Holdings	11,741.6	3,772.2	32.1%	964.5	256.9	26.6%	1,956.0	638.0	32.6%	2,031.0	630.3	31.0%	6,790.0	2,247.0	33.1%
Dollar Tree	5,347.1	1,726.3	32.3%	433.8	116.3	26.8%	905.8	321.4	35.5%	908.5	296.5	32.6%	3,099.0	992.1	32.0%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (by 8-year tax rate)															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Aetna	**22,564.1**	**7,290.8**	**32.3%**	4,133.0	1,753.1	42.4%	3,423.0	1,198.8	35.0%	2,899.2	832.9	28.7%	12,108.8	3,505.9	29.0%
CarMax	**5,085.8**	**1,644.3**	**32.3%**	970.3	297.5	30.7%	930.9	287.7	30.9%	762.5	264.4	34.7%	2,422.0	794.6	32.8%
Walgreen	**26,280.0**	**8,503.0**	**32.4%**	2,604.0	846.0	32.5%	3,277.0	1,207.0	36.8%	3,343.0	1,122.0	33.6%	17,056.0	5,328.0	31.2%
GameStop	**4,163.8**	**1,351.3**	**32.5%**	538.0	175.1	32.5%	541.8	153.7	28.4%	469.2	147.9	31.5%	2,614.8	874.6	33.4%
Visa	**30,063.9**	**9,774.0**	**32.5%**	6,628.5	1,921.5	29.0%	7,369.6	2,278.6	30.9%	1,681.8	506.8	30.1%	14,384.0	5,067.0	35.2%
Kohl's	**11,619.8**	**3,792.8**	**32.6%**	1,024.7	388.7	37.9%	1,313.5	397.5	30.3%	1,359.5	466.5	34.3%	7,922.0	2,540.0	32.1%
Gap	**12,003.9**	**3,947.8**	**32.9%**	1,380.8	394.8	28.6%	1,787.6	515.6	28.8%	1,761.7	569.7	32.3%	7,073.8	2,467.7	34.9%
Discover Financial Services	**22,538.1**	**7,459.6**	**33.1%**	3,469.0	1,245.0	35.9%	3,527.0	1,215.0	34.4%	3,833.0	1,059.0	27.6%	11,709.1	3,940.6	33.7%
Bed Bath & Beyond	**10,123.0**	**3,357.6**	**33.2%**	1,289.2	380.5	29.5%	1,441.9	492.1	34.1%	1,552.2	499.0	32.1%	5,839.7	1,986.0	34.0%
Home Depot	**48,671.9**	**16,154.9**	**33.2%**	9,741.0	3,228.0	33.1%	8,844.0	2,884.0	32.6%	7,424.0	2,503.0	33.7%	22,662.9	7,539.9	33.3%
HollyFrontier	**7,065.7**	**2,348.4**	**33.2%**	1,074.8	480.4	44.7%	382.5	292.8	76.6%	1,120.7	267.9	23.9%	4,487.7	1,307.2	29.1%
Charles Schwab	**12,806.6**	**4,257.5**	**33.2%**	2,180.0	740.0	33.9%	2,043.0	747.0	36.6%	1,648.0	598.0	36.3%	6,935.6	2,172.5	31.3%
CVR Energy	**2,547.6**	**849.3**	**33.3%**	239.6	75.0	31.3%	255.0	76.2	29.9%	532.9	265.9	49.9%	1,520.2	432.2	28.4%
CA	**5,733.2**	**1,913.2**	**33.4%**	679.7	281.7	41.4%	700.5	281.5	40.2%	667.0	185.0	27.7%	3,685.9	1,164.9	31.6%
Ross Stores	**8,667.6**	**2,893.2**	**33.4%**	1,582.0	462.7	29.2%	1,453.9	474.7	32.6%	1,312.9	464.0	35.3%	4,318.7	1,491.8	34.5%
Tech Data	**961.3**	**321.8**	**33.5%**	189.3	71.3	37.7%	98.7	32.4	32.8%	121.5	41.3	34.0%	551.8	176.8	32.0%
Discovery Communications, Inc.	**7,031.6**	**2,355.6**	**33.5%**	1,226.1	296.1	24.1%	1,192.2	504.2	42.3%	1,043.6	296.6	28.4%	3,569.7	1,258.7	35.3%
Graybar Electric	**879.7**	**295.7**	**33.6%**	135.1	46.2	34.2%	129.4	44.7	34.6%	120.8	47.8	39.6%	494.4	157.0	31.8%
Emerson Electric	**14,422.1**	**4,860.0**	**33.7%**	2,815.0	904.0	32.1%	2,037.0	742.0	36.4%	1,664.0	704.0	42.3%	7,906.1	2,510.0	31.7%
J.M. Smucker	**5,449.9**	**1,841.4**	**33.8%**	922.7	340.3	36.9%	483.8	142.9	29.5%	805.8	259.4	32.2%	3,237.6	1,098.8	33.9%
LifePoint Health	**1,859.7**	**632.8**	**34.0%**	294.6	122.8	41.7%	201.6	47.2	23.4%	202.3	94.0	46.5%	1,161.2	368.8	31.8%
Apollo Group	**5,755.6**	**1,968.2**	**34.2%**	119.0	46.5	39.1%	350.0	113.9	32.6%	521.0	171.7	33.0%	4,765.6	1,636.1	34.3%
Synnex	**1,220.6**	**418.9**	**34.3%**	183.6	58.7	32.0%	184.6	77.4	41.9%	190.1	74.3	39.1%	662.3	208.5	31.5%
C.H. Robinson Worldwide	**4,907.6**	**1,689.2**	**34.4%**	654.1	252.7	38.6%	611.6	218.2	35.7%	549.6	157.8	28.7%	3,092.3	1,060.4	34.3%
WellPoint	**35,117.2**	**12,167.0**	**34.6%**	4,514.6	1,917.4	42.5%	4,310.3	1,591.0	36.9%	3,762.3	1,201.5	31.9%	22,530.0	7,457.1	33.1%
Jacobs Engineering Group	**2,524.1**	**876.3**	**34.7%**	267.5	71.8	26.9%	269.9	103.6	38.4%	328.6	124.0	37.7%	1,658.2	577.0	34.8%
CVS Caremark	**49,704.8**	**17,274.8**	**34.8%**	8,083.0	2,960.0	36.6%	7,201.3	2,493.3	34.6%	7,101.7	2,571.7	36.2%	27,318.8	9,249.8	33.9%
Whole Foods Market	**4,399.5**	**1,532.5**	**34.8%**	807.9	300.9	37.2%	857.6	351.6	41.0%	815.4	290.4	35.6%	1,918.6	589.7	30.7%
Altria Group	**47,468.0**	**16,583.0**	**34.9%**	7,627.0	2,516.0	33.0%	7,283.0	2,350.0	32.3%	6,506.0	2,066.0	31.8%	26,052.0	9,651.0	37.0%
Biogen Idec	**13,335.9**	**4,713.8**	**35.3%**	3,361.6	1,149.4	34.2%	2,508.9	1,079.8	43.0%	1,867.3	640.1	34.3%	5,598.1	1,844.4	32.9%
Cognizant Technology Solutions	**2,869.6**	**1,015.7**	**35.4%**	679.1	258.7	38.1%	540.2	187.8	34.8%	495.0	193.7	39.1%	1,155.2	375.5	32.5%
United Stationers	**1,314.4**	**465.3**	**35.4%**	115.0	67.3	58.5%	186.4	72.3	38.8%	190.2	66.9	35.2%	822.9	258.7	31.4%
Raymond James Financial	**3,800.3**	**1,354.2**	**35.6%**	755.4	273.1	36.1%	687.3	254.4	37.0%	503.0	180.7	35.9%	1,854.5	646.1	34.8%
UnitedHealth Group	**61,900.0**	**22,194.9**	**35.9%**	9,950.0	4,155.0	41.8%	9,385.0	3,883.0	41.4%	8,678.0	3,004.0	34.6%	33,887.0	11,152.9	32.9%
Coach, Inc.	**6,293.4**	**2,263.6**	**36.0%**	330.1	153.2	46.4%	325.2	147.5	45.4%	760.2	273.9	36.0%	4,877.8	1,689.0	34.6%
American Financial Group	**4,698.8**	**1,710.1**	**36.4%**	641.0	216.0	33.7%	571.0	265.0	46.4%	654.0	308.0	47.1%	2,832.8	921.1	32.5%
Best Buy	**9,702.4**	**3,536.1**	**36.4%**	1,251.5	347.0	27.7%	1,078.0	354.0	32.8%	590.0	306.0	51.9%	6,782.9	2,529.1	37.3%
McDonald's	**21,379.6**	**7,808.0**	**36.5%**	2,467.1	1,030.0	41.8%	2,545.8	1,066.2	41.9%	2,753.7	1,161.6	42.2%	13,612.9	4,550.1	33.4%
Reynolds American	**20,619.0**	**7,599.4**	**36.9%**	5,846.6	3,298.9	56.4%	2,039.6	799.1	39.2%	2,609.6	551.4	21.1%	10,123.3	2,950.0	29.1%
Franklin Resources	**11,753.6**	**4,354.9**	**37.1%**	1,945.2	724.8	37.3%	2,080.5	793.5	38.1%	1,830.8	682.8	37.3%	5,897.1	2,153.8	36.5%
Lowe's	**26,542.3**	**9,843.4**	**37.1%**	4,171.0	1,688.0	40.5%	4,055.0	1,475.0	36.4%	3,470.0	1,342.0	38.7%	14,846.3	5,338.4	36.0%
Health Net	**1,685.9**	**630.0**	**37.4%**	433.6	253.9	58.6%	215.2	85.9	39.9%	257.6	78.5	30.5%	779.5	211.8	27.2%
Humana	**14,530.4**	**5,689.7**	**39.2%**	2,343.6	1,054.6	45.0%	2,091.1	996.1	47.6%	1,869.4	588.4	31.5%	8,226.3	3,050.6	37.1%
Express Scripts	**17,907.7**	**7,109.0**	**39.7%**	3,700.2	1,673.9	45.2%	2,915.9	1,238.1	42.5%	2,872.7	1,448.1	50.4%	8,419.0	2,749.0	32.7%
Centene	**2,010.5**	**836.6**	**41.6%**	691.3	311.3	45.0%	454.3	209.3	46.1%	263.5	115.6	43.9%	601.4	200.4	33.3%
Molina Healthcare	**888.8**	**420.8**	**47.3%**	315.4	165.4	52.4%	132.8	69.6	52.4%	80.8	65.6	81.1%	359.8	120.3	33.4%
ALL 258 COMPANIES	**$ 3,810,577**	**$ 806,942**	**21.2%**	**$ 551,698**	**$ 141,281**	**25.6%**	**$ 584,814**	**$ 134,763**	**23.0%**	**$ 524,346**	**$ 111,138**	**21.2%**	**$ 2,149,719**	**$ 419,759**	**19.5%**

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
3M	**23,794.4**	**5,860.6**	**24.6%**	4,349.7	1,210.6	27.8%	3,735.9	964.9	25.8%	3,118.9	871.9	28.0%	12,589.9	2,813.1	22.3%
ABM Industries	**696.0**	**84.2**	**12.1%**	57.2	1.8	3.1%	110.1	32.0	29.1%	97.7	15.3	15.7%	431.0	35.0	8.1%
Advance Auto Parts	**4,471.8**	**1,288.8**	**28.8%**	670.6	232.0	34.6%	703.9	196.1	27.9%	568.7	189.3	33.3%	2,528.7	671.4	26.6%
Aetna	**22,564.1**	**7,290.8**	**32.3%**	4,133.0	1,753.1	42.4%	3,423.0	1,198.8	35.0%	2,899.2	832.9	28.7%	12,108.8	3,505.9	29.0%
AGL Resources	**3,680.2**	**279.2**	**7.6%**	556.0	–11.0	–2.0%	874.0	113.0	12.9%	469.0	166.0	35.4%	1,781.2	11.2	0.6%
Air Products & Chemicals	**4,117.4**	**439.5**	**10.7%**	727.7	149.7	20.6%	548.0	–6.2	–1.1%	428.5	66.2	15.4%	2,413.2	229.8	9.5%
Airgas	**3,689.3**	**800.8**	**21.7%**	514.0	137.4	26.7%	557.5	150.5	27.0%	522.3	173.0	33.1%	2,095.4	339.8	16.2%
Alleghany Corporation	**3,297.4**	**702.2**	**21.3%**	373.6	93.3	25.0%	628.9	115.4	18.3%	611.4	68.4	11.2%	1,683.5	425.1	25.3%
Alliance Data Systems	**3,299.6**	**892.5**	**27.0%**	784.1	305.6	39.0%	691.6	196.4	28.4%	533.5	174.3	32.7%	1,290.4	216.3	16.8%
Alliant Techsystems	**2,954.1**	**763.2**	**25.8%**	265.0	27.2	10.2%	143.0	36.8	25.8%	503.5	146.9	29.2%	2,042.5	552.4	27.0%
Altria Group	**47,468.0**	**16,583.0**	**34.9%**	7,627.0	2,516.0	33.0%	7,283.0	2,350.0	32.3%	6,506.0	2,066.0	31.8%	26,052.0	9,651.0	37.0%
Amazon.com	**6,237.5**	**674.5**	**10.8%**	1,969.6	116.6	5.9%	228.0	209.0	91.7%	672.5	34.5	5.1%	3,367.4	314.4	9.3%
Ameren	**7,243.0**	**–48.0**	**–0.7%**	946.0	–2.0	–0.2%	1,001.0	–37.0	–3.7%	804.0	–118.0	–14.7%	4,492.0	109.0	2.4%
American Electric Power	**17,170.4**	**–463.7**	**–2.7%**	2,608.4	107.3	4.1%	2,465.0	51.0	2.1%	2,081.0	–45.0	–2.2%	10,016.0	–577.0	–5.8%
American Express	**41,674.7**	**9,577.2**	**23.0%**	6,427.2	2,092.1	32.6%	7,749.9	2,091.3	27.0%	6,157.6	1,660.5	27.0%	21,340.0	3,733.2	17.5%
American Financial Group	**4,698.8**	**1,710.1**	**36.4%**	641.0	216.0	33.7%	571.0	265.0	46.4%	654.0	308.0	47.1%	2,832.8	921.1	32.5%
AmerisourceBergen	**6,112.5**	**1,863.0**	**30.5%**	29.7	238.0	800.3%	562.6	258.7	46.0%	762.7	225.4	29.5%	4,757.4	1,140.9	24.0%
Amphenol	**1,293.8**	**279.6**	**21.6%**	137.2	25.0	18.3%	167.0	33.1	19.8%	156.4	25.1	16.0%	833.2	196.4	23.6%
Andersons	**796.0**	**135.4**	**17.0%**	33.9	–4.3	–12.7%	156.0	31.1	19.9%	135.9	11.0	8.1%	470.2	97.7	20.8%
Anixter International	**1,271.5**	**350.1**	**27.5%**	160.2	58.3	36.4%	184.3	33.3	18.1%	181.4	35.6	19.6%	745.7	222.9	29.9%
Apollo Group	**5,755.6**	**1,968.2**	**34.2%**	119.0	46.5	39.1%	350.0	113.9	32.6%	521.0	171.7	33.0%	4,765.6	1,636.1	34.3%
Archer Daniels Midland	**11,180.0**	**2,950.0**	**26.4%**	1,138.0	270.0	23.7%	2,167.0	641.0	29.6%	1,495.0	348.0	23.3%	6,380.0	1,691.0	26.5%
Arrow Electronics	**2,593.8**	**656.9**	**25.3%**	264.6	77.6	29.3%	334.0	96.0	28.7%	312.4	79.2	25.4%	1,682.8	404.0	24.0%
Arthur Gallagher	**1,630.0**	**190.8**	**11.7%**	294.4	43.9	14.9%	244.5	38.8	15.9%	218.5	29.0	13.3%	872.6	79.1	9.1%
Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.	**953.3**	**227.5**	**23.9%**	264.0	81.1	30.7%	176.6	40.7	23.0%	161.6	41.3	25.6%	351.1	64.4	18.3%
AT&T	**141,623.7**	**11,500.4**	**8.1%**	18,953.0	2,496.0	13.2%	17,311.4	1,609.0	9.3%	19,271.7	3,043.0	15.8%	86,087.7	4,352.4	5.1%
Atmos Energy	**2,826.3**	**–114.2**	**–4.0%**	503.5	—	—	471.3	—	—	365.1	—	—	1,486.4	–114.2	–7.7%
Automatic Data Processing	**14,398.8**	**4,342.2**	**30.2%**	1,963.7	522.4	26.6%	1,863.8	535.0	28.7%	1,899.6	653.2	34.4%	8,671.6	2,631.6	30.3%
AutoNation	**3,881.3**	**1,074.2**	**27.7%**	691.7	220.2	31.8%	653.2	206.0	31.5%	577.2	181.4	31.4%	1,959.2	466.6	23.8%
AutoZone	**10,429.1**	**3,103.9**	**29.8%**	1,643.0	482.5	29.4%	1,499.8	497.3	33.2%	1,451.4	411.6	28.4%	5,834.8	1,712.5	29.4%
Ball	**1,952.8**	**354.8**	**18.2%**	43.1	8.5	19.7%	265.0	36.3	13.7%	241.4	37.4	15.5%	1,403.3	272.6	19.4%
BB&T Corp.	**18,531.0**	**3,837.0**	**20.7%**	2,810.0	585.0	20.8%	2,617.0	551.0	21.1%	2,812.0	1,004.0	35.7%	10,292.0	1,697.0	16.5%
Bed Bath & Beyond	**10,123.0**	**3,357.6**	**33.2%**	1,289.2	380.5	29.5%	1,441.9	492.1	34.1%	1,552.2	499.0	32.1%	5,839.7	1,986.0	34.0%
Bemis	**1,658.7**	**488.0**	**29.4%**	252.4	70.2	27.8%	244.1	82.0	33.6%	222.2	65.8	29.6%	939.9	269.9	28.7%
Best Buy	**9,702.4**	**3,536.1**	**36.4%**	1,251.5	347.0	27.7%	1,078.0	354.0	32.8%	590.0	306.0	51.9%	6,782.9	2,529.1	37.3%
Big Lots	**2,098.8**	**655.6**	**31.2%**	216.4	72.3	33.4%	209.7	71.1	33.9%	171.8	81.1	47.2%	1,500.9	431.1	28.7%
Biogen Idec	**13,335.9**	**4,713.8**	**35.3%**	3,361.6	1,149.4	34.2%	2,508.9	1,079.8	43.0%	1,867.3	640.1	34.3%	5,598.1	1,844.4	32.9%
Boeing	**40,026.7**	**2,146.7**	**5.4%**	6,828.0	1,966.0	28.8%	6,779.7	581.7	8.6%	5,946.0	–199.0	–3.3%	20,473.0	–202.1	–1.0%
C.H. Robinson Worldwide	**4,907.6**	**1,689.2**	**34.4%**	654.1	252.7	38.6%	611.6	218.2	35.7%	549.6	157.8	28.7%	3,092.3	1,060.4	34.3%
CA	**5,733.2**	**1,913.2**	**33.4%**	679.7	281.7	41.4%	700.5	281.5	40.2%	667.0	185.0	27.7%	3,685.9	1,164.9	31.6%
Cablevision Systems	**2,455.1**	**8.6**	**0.4%**	327.8	0.1	0.0%	422.4	5.8	1.4%	196.7	–1.2	–0.6%	1,508.2	3.8	0.3%
Campbell Soup	**7,279.7**	**1,696.7**	**23.3%**	820.0	241.0	29.4%	967.2	241.2	24.9%	793.1	258.1	32.5%	4,699.3	956.3	20.3%
Capital One Financial	**31,122.5**	**8,602.2**	**27.6%**	6,157.5	1,991.0	32.3%	6,022.5	1,934.0	32.1%	5,322.8	1,360.0	25.6%	13,619.7	3,317.2	24.4%
Cardinal Health	**11,266.5**	**3,221.3**	**28.6%**	1,981.7	583.7	29.5%	1,659.0	381.0	23.0%	1,620.7	488.7	30.2%	6,005.1	1,767.9	29.4%
CarMax	**5,085.8**	**1,644.3**	**32.3%**	970.3	297.5	30.7%	930.9	287.7	30.9%	762.5	264.4	34.7%	2,422.0	794.6	32.8%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Casey's General Stores	**1,629.4**	**242.1**	**14.9%**	340.2	56.0	16.5%	275.6	46.6	16.9%	201.2	42.6	21.2%	812.4	96.9	11.9%
CBS	**13,044.7**	**698.5**	**5.4%**	1,974.4	154.2	7.8%	1,790.0	–235.0	–13.1%	2,451.6	272.6	11.1%	6,828.7	506.7	7.4%
Celanese	**2,857.3**	**326.3**	**11.4%**	221.8	18.8	8.5%	520.2	94.2	18.1%	789.1	61.1	7.7%	1,326.3	152.3	11.5%
Centene	**2,010.5**	**836.6**	**41.6%**	691.3	311.3	45.0%	454.3	209.3	46.1%	263.5	115.6	43.9%	601.4	200.4	33.3%
CenturyLink	**8,606.8**	**725.1**	**8.4%**	1,212.0	28.0	2.3%	1,072.0	18.0	1.7%	1,215.0	1.0	0.1%	5,107.8	678.1	13.3%
CF Industries Holdings	**11,741.6**	**3,772.2**	**32.1%**	964.5	256.9	26.6%	1,956.0	638.0	32.6%	2,031.0	630.3	31.0%	6,790.0	2,247.0	33.1%
Charles Schwab	**12,806.6**	**4,257.5**	**33.2%**	2,180.0	740.0	33.9%	2,043.0	747.0	36.6%	1,648.0	598.0	36.3%	6,935.6	2,172.5	31.3%
Cigna	**14,436.6**	**4,091.2**	**28.3%**	2,888.9	1,048.7	36.3%	2,907.5	1,052.3	36.2%	902.7	363.0	40.2%	7,737.5	1,627.2	21.0%
Clorox	**5,579.7**	**1,569.0**	**28.1%**	877.8	211.8	24.1%	808.3	230.3	28.5%	724.9	221.9	30.6%	3,168.7	905.0	28.6%
CMS Energy	**4,666.0**	**–26.0**	**–0.6%**	772.0	—	—	703.0	—	—	720.0	—	—	2,471.0	–26.0	–1.1%
Coach, Inc.	**6,293.4**	**2,263.6**	**36.0%**	330.1	153.2	46.4%	325.2	147.5	45.4%	760.2	273.9	36.0%	4,877.8	1,689.0	34.6%
Coca-Cola	**23,845.9**	**4,853.8**	**20.4%**	1,694.8	711.0	42.0%	1,560.3	867.0	55.6%	2,385.4	713.0	29.9%	18,205.5	2,562.8	14.1%
Cognizant Technology Solutions	**2,869.6**	**1,015.7**	**35.4%**	679.1	258.7	38.1%	540.2	187.8	34.8%	495.0	193.7	39.1%	1,155.2	375.5	32.5%
Comcast	**64,879.2**	**15,535.8**	**23.9%**	12,146.8	2,976.8	24.5%	11,961.8	2,171.2	18.2%	10,016.2	3,013.5	30.1%	30,754.3	7,374.3	24.0%
Community Health Systems	**2,683.5**	**237.1**	**8.8%**	303.0	7.0	2.3%	228.0	–29.0	–12.7%	226.3	9.1	4.0%	1,926.2	250.0	13.0%
ConAgra Foods	**7,200.8**	**1,793.4**	**24.9%**	700.7	295.8	42.2%	895.2	281.6	31.4%	1,064.7	360.5	33.9%	4,540.2	855.6	18.8%
Consol Energy	**3,550.3**	**544.9**	**15.3%**	330.1	21.4	6.5%	175.7	13.5	7.7%	57.4	4.3	7.5%	2,987.1	505.8	16.9%
Consolidated Edison	**12,329.0**	**103.0**	**0.8%**	1,760.0	–86.0	–4.9%	1,601.0	–9.0	–0.6%	1,387.0	285.0	20.5%	7,581.0	–87.0	–1.1%
Constellation Brands	**5,590.6**	**414.3**	**7.4%**	599.3	–57.3	–9.6%	475.0	130.5	27.5%	2,043.6	87.6	4.3%	2,472.7	253.5	10.3%
Core-Mark Holding	**426.4**	**97.5**	**22.9%**	78.2	17.6	22.5%	61.5	19.7	32.0%	62.2	17.0	27.3%	224.6	43.3	19.3%
Corning	**7,458.0**	**71.0**	**1.0%**	406.0	40.0	9.9%	2,352.0	38.0	1.6%	1,262.0	3.0	0.2%	3,438.0	–10.0	–0.3%
Costco Wholesale	**13,832.0**	**4,020.0**	**29.1%**	2,457.9	694.9	28.3%	2,052.5	626.5	30.5%	1,971.6	521.6	26.5%	7,350.0	2,177.0	29.6%
CSX	**21,006.5**	**3,530.5**	**16.8%**	3,043.7	615.7	20.2%	2,954.5	726.5	24.6%	2,837.2	660.2	23.3%	12,171.0	1,528.0	12.6%
CVR Energy	**2,547.6**	**849.3**	**33.3%**	239.6	75.0	31.3%	255.0	76.2	29.9%	532.9	265.9	49.9%	1,520.2	432.2	28.4%
CVS Caremark	**49,704.8**	**17,274.8**	**34.8%**	8,083.0	2,960.0	36.6%	7,201.3	2,493.3	34.6%	7,101.7	2,571.7	36.2%	27,318.8	9,249.8	33.9%
Danaher	**9,287.2**	**1,918.9**	**20.7%**	1,386.3	395.8	28.6%	1,408.3	250.4	17.8%	1,640.6	252.0	15.4%	4,852.0	1,020.7	21.0%
Darden Restaurants	**3,545.2**	**471.7**	**13.3%**	450.9	74.6	16.5%	191.1	–27.9	–14.6%	185.7	30.5	16.4%	2,717.5	394.5	14.5%
DaVita	**6,359.3**	**1,475.5**	**23.2%**	745.6	160.0	21.5%	1,146.5	150.9	13.2%	938.8	304.3	32.4%	3,528.5	860.4	24.4%
Deere	**19,584.2**	**6,074.7**	**31.0%**	1,809.2	361.7	20.0%	3,149.6	1,191.5	37.8%	4,043.2	1,363.1	33.7%	10,582.2	3,158.4	29.8%
Devon Energy	**21,692.3**	**368.3**	**1.7%**	1,861.4	–235.6	–12.7%	4,297.5	154.5	3.6%	1,784.7	69.7	3.9%	13,748.6	379.6	2.8%
Dick's Sporting Goods	**3,103.4**	**891.5**	**28.7%**	505.0	158.5	31.4%	527.8	177.6	33.7%	523.0	133.8	25.6%	1,547.6	421.6	27.2%
Discover Financial Services	**22,538.1**	**7,459.6**	**33.1%**	3,469.0	1,245.0	35.9%	3,527.0	1,215.0	34.4%	3,833.0	1,059.0	27.6%	11,709.1	3,940.6	33.7%
Discovery Communications, Inc.	**7,031.6**	**2,355.6**	**33.5%**	1,226.1	296.1	24.1%	1,192.2	504.2	42.3%	1,043.6	296.6	28.4%	3,569.7	1,258.7	35.3%
DISH Network	**11,458.2**	**1,554.5**	**13.6%**	1,114.1	145.0	13.0%	1,254.6	180.3	14.4%	1,130.3	162.7	14.4%	7,959.1	1,066.4	13.4%
Dollar General	**9,156.1**	**2,799.4**	**30.6%**	1,764.6	578.8	32.8%	1,596.2	533.0	33.4%	1,527.2	505.1	33.1%	4,268.1	1,182.5	27.7%
Dollar Tree	**5,347.1**	**1,726.3**	**32.3%**	433.8	116.3	26.8%	905.8	321.4	35.5%	908.5	296.5	32.6%	3,099.0	992.1	32.0%
Dominion Resources	**19,240.0**	**2,468.1**	**12.8%**	2,745.5	–26.5	–1.0%	1,748.0	–11.0	–0.6%	2,571.0	317.0	12.3%	12,175.5	2,188.6	18.0%
Domtar	**1,437.8**	**339.7**	**23.6%**	24.5	59.5	243.1%	81.4	15.4	18.9%	35.5	–14.5	–41.0%	1,296.5	279.4	21.5%
Dover	**4,584.5**	**1,038.3**	**22.6%**	518.7	114.6	22.1%	783.9	219.4	28.0%	759.6	133.9	17.6%	2,522.4	570.3	22.6%
DTE Energy	**7,478.0**	**253.0**	**3.4%**	954.0	–3.0	–0.3%	1,251.0	–16.0	–1.3%	906.0	74.0	8.2%	4,367.0	198.0	4.5%
Duke Energy	**19,767.5**	**–422.0**	**–2.1%**	3,840.0	—	—	3,544.0	—	—	3,357.0	–123.0	–3.7%	9,026.5	–299.0	–3.3%
DuPont	**8,678.0**	**1,602.0**	**18.5%**	1,390.0	218.0	15.7%	2,718.0	778.0	28.6%	939.0	160.0	17.0%	3,631.0	446.0	12.3%
Eastman Chemical	**5,134.0**	**723.0**	**14.1%**	596.0	87.0	14.6%	621.0	64.0	10.3%	1,407.0	143.0	10.2%	2,510.0	429.0	17.1%
Ecolab	**4,649.3**	**1,040.2**	**22.4%**	734.9	185.5	25.2%	905.6	256.3	28.3%	710.2	249.1	35.1%	2,298.7	349.4	15.2%
Eli Lilly	**15,117.5**	**2,571.0**	**17.0%**	1,169.3	660.5	56.5%	1,206.5	168.9	14.0%	2,705.0	259.1	9.6%	10,036.8	1,482.5	14.8%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Emcor Group	**1,782.7**	**558.1**	**31.3%**	243.8	93.0	38.2%	253.9	74.0	29.1%	217.2	56.6	26.1%	1,067.8	334.5	31.3%
Emerson Electric	**14,422.1**	**4,860.0**	**33.7%**	2,815.0	904.0	32.1%	2,037.0	742.0	36.4%	1,664.0	704.0	42.3%	7,906.1	2,510.0	31.7%
Entergy	**12,461.7**	**824.0**	**6.6%**	1,147.0	77.2	6.7%	1,685.7	90.1	5.3%	1,277.1	88.3	6.9%	8,351.9	568.4	6.8%
Eversource Energy	**6,703.2**	**–11.1**	**–0.2%**	1,381.9	–1.7	–0.1%	1,272.5	–3.5	–0.3%	1,229.1	13.3	1.1%	2,819.7	–19.3	–0.7%
Exelon	**26,422.3**	**3,350.3**	**12.7%**	3,416.0	407.0	11.9%	2,444.0	121.0	5.0%	2,592.0	744.0	28.7%	17,970.3	2,078.3	11.6%
Express Scripts	**17,907.7**	**7,109.0**	**39.7%**	3,700.2	1,673.9	45.2%	2,915.9	1,238.1	42.5%	2,872.7	1,448.1	50.4%	8,419.0	2,749.0	32.7%
Exxon Mobil	**60,481.7**	**8,226.7**	**13.6%**	159.3	–1.7	–1.0%	9,598.9	1,360.9	14.2%	9,357.3	1,033.3	11.0%	41,366.2	5,834.2	14.1%
Facebook	**14,787.9**	**2,439.9**	**16.5%**	2,802.0	1,474.0	52.6%	4,918.0	260.0	5.3%	3,197.0	614.0	19.2%	3,870.9	91.9	2.4%
FedEx	**16,977.2**	**2,246.0**	**13.2%**	2,895.8	510.5	17.6%	2,339.9	752.8	32.2%	2,839.4	587.6	20.7%	8,902.0	395.1	4.4%
Fifth Third Bancorp	**11,009.0**	**2,387.0**	**21.7%**	2,208.0	662.0	30.0%	1,702.0	424.0	24.9%	2,295.0	494.0	21.5%	4,804.0	807.0	16.8%
FirstEnergy	**8,842.0**	**–465.0**	**–5.3%**	863.0	1.0	0.1%	243.0	–132.0	–54.3%	500.0	–118.0	–23.6%	7,236.0	–216.0	–3.0%
Fiserv	**6,274.9**	**1,975.9**	**31.5%**	988.6	283.6	28.7%	970.1	316.1	32.6%	816.9	280.9	34.4%	3,499.3	1,095.3	31.3%
Flowserve	**1,590.0**	**290.8**	**18.3%**	213.6	56.4	26.4%	225.0	55.2	24.5%	225.4	53.3	23.7%	926.0	125.9	13.6%
Franklin Resources	**11,753.6**	**4,354.9**	**37.1%**	1,945.2	724.8	37.3%	2,080.5	793.5	38.1%	1,830.8	682.8	37.3%	5,897.1	2,153.8	36.5%
GameStop	**4,163.8**	**1,351.3**	**32.5%**	538.0	175.1	32.5%	541.8	153.7	28.4%	469.2	147.9	31.5%	2,614.8	874.6	33.4%
Gap	**12,003.9**	**3,947.8**	**32.9%**	1,380.8	394.8	28.6%	1,787.6	515.6	28.8%	1,761.7	569.7	32.3%	7,073.8	2,467.7	34.9%
General Dynamics	**24,720.3**	**6,674.2**	**27.0%**	3,511.3	777.3	nm	3,278.4	787.4	24.0%	3,223.0	838.0	26.0%	14,707.7	4,271.5	29.0%
General Electric	**40,057.1**	**–1,369.0**	**–3.4%**	14.9	1,549.0	10,373.0%	5,826.1	51.0	0.9%	6,463.5	85.0	1.3%	27,752.5	–3,054.0	–11.0%
General Mills	**15,295.4**	**3,155.5**	**20.6%**	1,895.0	412.0	21.7%	1,665.4	331.0	19.9%	2,144.4	469.4	21.9%	9,590.6	1,943.1	20.3%
Genuine Parts	**6,818.6**	**1,993.7**	**29.2%**	920.5	303.6	33.0%	1,248.8	209.9	16.8%	245.3	292.3	119.2%	4,404.0	1,187.9	27.0%
Goldman Sachs Group	**50,210.4**	**12,118.9**	**24.1%**	3,455.0	709.0	20.5%	6,782.9	1,261.3	18.6%	6,446.0	2,508.0	38.9%	33,526.5	7,640.7	22.8%
Graybar Electric	**879.7**	**295.7**	**33.6%**	135.1	46.2	34.2%	129.4	44.7	34.6%	120.8	47.8	39.6%	494.4	157.0	31.8%
Group 1 Automotive	**1,068.0**	**215.2**	**20.2%**	245.0	65.2	26.6%	175.2	48.1	27.4%	177.8	42.3	23.8%	469.9	59.6	12.7%
H&R Block	**5,122.1**	**1,469.1**	**28.7%**	538.5	167.2	31.1%	648.0	245.5	37.9%	718.0	195.3	27.2%	3,217.6	861.1	26.8%
Harley-Davidson	**6,562.2**	**1,928.5**	**29.4%**	1,078.8	360.9	33.5%	1,179.1	385.4	32.7%	1,006.5	265.5	26.4%	3,297.8	916.7	27.8%
Harris	**5,877.6**	**1,492.5**	**25.4%**	1,090.6	–27.0	–2.5%	443.0	150.0	33.9%	723.1	213.0	29.5%	3,620.9	1,156.5	31.9%
HCA Holdings	**19,116.4**	**4,696.2**	**24.6%**	3,461.7	1,064.7	30.8%	2,243.6	805.2	35.9%	2,884.3	733.5	25.4%	10,526.8	2,092.8	19.9%
Health Net	**1,685.9**	**630.0**	**37.4%**	433.6	253.9	58.6%	215.2	85.9	39.9%	257.6	78.5	30.5%	779.5	211.8	27.2%
Henry Schein	**3,130.8**	**946.9**	**30.2%**	533.8	161.1	30.2%	492.8	147.0	29.8%	467.8	132.5	28.3%	1,636.4	506.3	30.9%
Hershey	**7,623.5**	**2,271.2**	**29.8%**	1,313.9	388.5	29.6%	1,277.7	341.4	26.7%	1,212.6	332.6	27.4%	3,819.3	1,208.6	31.6%
HollyFrontier	**7,065.7**	**2,348.4**	**33.2%**	1,074.8	480.4	44.7%	382.5	292.8	76.6%	1,120.7	267.9	23.9%	4,487.7	1,307.2	29.1%
Home Depot	**48,671.9**	**16,154.9**	**33.2%**	9,741.0	3,228.0	33.1%	8,844.0	2,884.0	32.6%	7,424.0	2,503.0	33.7%	22,662.9	7,539.9	33.3%
Honeywell International	**16,519.5**	**2,460.5**	**14.9%**	3,297.0	719.0	21.8%	3,318.6	661.6	19.9%	2,927.8	553.8	18.9%	6,976.0	526.0	7.5%
Hormel Foods	**5,508.0**	**1,604.3**	**29.1%**	979.2	280.6	28.7%	861.4	244.1	28.3%	750.5	212.0	28.2%	2,916.9	867.6	29.7%
Humana	**14,530.4**	**5,689.7**	**39.2%**	2,343.6	1,054.6	45.0%	2,091.1	996.1	47.6%	1,869.4	588.4	31.5%	8,226.3	3,050.6	37.1%
Illinois Tool Works	**11,211.9**	**3,297.2**	**29.4%**	1,597.5	486.5	30.5%	1,624.7	385.7	23.7%	1,384.2	390.2	28.2%	6,605.6	2,034.8	30.8%
Insight Enterprises	**577.2**	**126.8**	**22.0%**	88.0	23.9	27.1%	86.5	26.9	31.0%	93.0	27.0	29.1%	309.7	49.1	15.8%
Intel	**77,498.3**	**21,603.3**	**27.9%**	8,787.5	2,696.5	30.7%	11,548.1	3,273.1	28.3%	9,314.5	2,689.5	28.9%	47,848.2	12,944.2	27.1%
International Business Machines	**64,728.0**	**4,849.0**	**7.5%**	5,787.0	–321.0	–5.5%	6,968.0	1,134.0	16.3%	6,679.0	1,406.0	21.1%	45,294.0	2,630.0	5.8%
International Paper	**5,010.0**	**–386.0**	**–7.7%**	1,135.0	62.0	5.5%	556.0	175.0	31.5%	489.0	–697.0	–142.5%	2,830.0	74.0	2.6%
Interpublic Group	**2,360.9**	**122.8**	**5.2%**	432.5	109.4	25.3%	365.2	–5.8	–1.6%	258.3	46.9	18.2%	1,304.9	–27.6	–2.1%
J.B. Hunt Transport Services	**3,542.2**	**731.1**	**20.6%**	670.1	149.6	22.3%	587.8	117.0	19.9%	538.6	126.1	23.4%	1,745.7	338.4	19.4%
J.M. Smucker	**5,449.9**	**1,841.4**	**33.8%**	922.7	340.3	36.9%	483.8	142.9	29.5%	805.8	259.4	32.2%	3,237.6	1,098.8	33.9%
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	**114,769.5**	**17,956.3**	**15.6%**	22,414.7	3,160.0	14.1%	20,331.0	1,273.4	6.3%	12,486.0	–1,429.3	–11.4%	59,537.9	14,952.2	25.1%
Jacobs Engineering Group	**2,524.1**	**876.3**	**34.7%**	267.5	71.8	26.9%	269.9	103.6	38.4%	328.6	124.0	37.7%	1,658.2	577.0	34.8%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)															
$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Joy Global	**3,474.3**	**633.1**	**18.2%**	313.1	23.5	7.5%	288.2	80.5	27.9%	525.1	125.6	23.9%	2,347.9	403.5	17.2%
Kellogg	**8,748.3**	**1,971.6**	**22.5%**	497.5	200.4	40.3%	487.4	291.9	59.9%	2,085.3	282.2	13.5%	5,678.1	1,197.1	21.1%
Kimberly-Clark	**10,685.7**	**1,803.7**	**16.9%**	401.4	192.4	47.9%	1,529.4	319.4	20.9%	1,662.7	308.7	18.6%	7,092.2	983.2	13.9%
Kohl's	**11,619.8**	**3,792.8**	**32.6%**	1,024.7	388.7	37.9%	1,313.5	397.5	30.3%	1,359.5	466.5	34.3%	7,922.0	2,540.0	32.1%
Kroger	**16,218.4**	**3,945.6**	**24.3%**	3,073.8	642.8	20.9%	2,599.0	804.0	30.9%	2,245.5	611.5	27.2%	8,300.0	1,887.3	22.7%
L-3 Communications	**7,613.8**	**1,461.6**	**19.2%**	481.6	38.5	8.0%	758.9	72.9	9.6%	855.7	181.7	21.2%	5,517.5	1,168.5	21.2%
Laboratory Corp. of America	**6,109.1**	**1,873.3**	**30.7%**	562.1	207.5	36.9%	729.5	228.7	31.4%	816.2	222.5	27.3%	4,001.3	1,214.6	30.4%
Levi Strauss	**945.8**	**102.6**	**10.8%**	171.5	2.1	1.2%	61.0	14.8	24.2%	82.7	10.0	12.1%	630.7	75.7	12.0%
LifePoint Health	**1,859.7**	**632.8**	**34.0%**	294.6	122.8	41.7%	201.6	47.2	23.4%	202.3	94.0	46.5%	1,161.2	368.8	31.8%
Limited Brands	**8,945.8**	**2,621.7**	**29.3%**	1,583.1	495.1	31.3%	1,422.4	418.4	29.4%	1,231.2	377.2	30.6%	4,709.0	1,330.9	28.3%
LKQ Corporation	**2,470.8**	**688.5**	**27.9%**	455.4	126.5	27.8%	439.7	130.2	29.6%	343.6	100.0	29.1%	1,232.2	331.8	26.9%
Lockheed Martin	**35,509.0**	**8,880.6**	**25.0%**	4,966.0	1,817.0	36.6%	5,369.0	2,020.0	37.6%	4,252.0	1,204.0	28.3%	20,922.0	3,839.6	18.4%
Loews	**11,055.2**	**1,276.2**	**11.5%**	366.0	79.0	21.6%	1,305.0	370.0	28.4%	1,751.0	171.0	9.8%	7,633.2	656.2	8.6%
Lowe's	**26,542.3**	**9,843.4**	**37.1%**	4,171.0	1,688.0	40.5%	4,055.0	1,475.0	36.4%	3,470.0	1,342.0	38.7%	14,846.3	5,338.4	36.0%
Macy's	**12,315.0**	**3,496.0**	**28.4%**	1,611.4	510.4	31.7%	2,302.4	731.4	31.8%	2,191.8	816.8	37.3%	6,209.4	1,437.4	23.1%
MasterCard	**16,648.7**	**4,178.9**	**25.1%**	3,359.3	642.3	19.1%	3,225.3	932.3	28.9%	2,966.3	994.3	33.5%	7,097.8	1,610.0	22.7%
McDonald's	**21,379.6**	**7,808.0**	**36.5%**	2,467.1	1,030.0	41.8%	2,545.8	1,066.2	41.9%	2,753.7	1,161.6	42.2%	13,612.9	4,550.1	33.4%
McKesson	**11,703.1**	**2,496.0**	**21.3%**	2,407.1	658.0	27.3%	1,803.0	453.0	25.1%	1,453.0	484.0	33.3%	6,040.0	901.0	14.9%
MDU Resources	**2,953.7**	**277.3**	**9.4%**	175.8	59.5	33.8%	406.6	28.8	7.1%	410.9	45.5	11.1%	1,960.3	143.4	7.3%
Merck	**41,404.3**	**12,039.0**	**29.1%**	2,117.0	732.0	34.6%	15,355.0	7,136.0	46.5%	3,646.0	568.0	15.6%	20,286.3	3,603.0	17.8%
Molina Healthcare	**888.8**	**420.8**	**47.3%**	315.4	165.4	52.4%	132.8	69.6	52.4%	80.8	65.6	81.1%	359.8	120.3	33.4%
Monsanto	**15,236.3**	**3,241.4**	**21.3%**	2,155.2	638.6	29.6%	2,383.5	588.5	24.7%	2,346.7	366.7	15.6%	8,351.0	1,647.6	19.7%
Mosaic	**6,814.1**	**912.7**	**13.4%**	668.9	61.9	9.3%	301.1	46.0	15.3%	223.3	–25.0	–11.2%	5,620.8	829.8	14.8%
Netflix	**1,494.2**	**203.1**	**13.6%**	97.2	–27.9	–28.7%	325.1	7.1	2.2%	158.1	–9.0	–5.7%	913.8	232.9	25.5%
NextEra Energy	**21,518.0**	**–313.0**	**–1.5%**	3,959.0	10.0	0.3%	3,674.0	—	—	2,452.0	–145.0	–5.9%	11,433.0	–178.0	–1.6%
Nike	**10,279.0**	**1,911.9**	**18.6%**	933.6	71.6	7.7%	1,924.7	415.7	21.6%	2,984.8	149.8	5.0%	4,435.8	1,274.7	28.7%
NiSource	**4,399.1**	**–352.2**	**–8.0%**	333.9	—	—	829.8	—	—	762.4	–15.9	–2.1%	2,473.0	–336.3	–13.6%
Nordstrom	**7,628.0**	**2,432.0**	**31.9%**	966.6	189.6	19.6%	1,138.8	378.8	33.3%	1,129.0	360.0	31.9%	4,393.6	1,503.6	34.2%
Norfolk Southern	**20,455.9**	**4,069.9**	**19.9%**	2,383.4	493.4	20.7%	3,029.4	698.4	23.1%	2,873.6	663.6	23.1%	12,169.5	2,214.5	18.2%
Northrop Grumman	**21,383.0**	**4,712.0**	**22.0%**	2,706.0	207.0	7.6%	2,897.0	620.0	21.4%	2,751.0	760.0	27.6%	13,029.0	3,125.0	24.0%
NVR	**2,653.0**	**591.6**	**22.3%**	571.1	161.6	28.3%	426.3	140.4	32.9%	391.9	120.6	30.8%	1,263.7	169.0	13.4%
Omnicom Group	**4,753.9**	**1,312.1**	**27.6%**	716.4	319.8	44.6%	638.2	331.6	52.0%	542.8	215.0	39.6%	2,856.4	445.7	15.6%
Oneok	**3,976.2**	**49.0**	**1.2%**	384.7	13.2	3.4%	467.5	10.2	2.2%	427.1	–1.2	–0.3%	2,696.9	26.8	1.0%
Oracle	**39,856.5**	**11,643.2**	**29.2%**	3,783.5	1,198.5	31.7%	4,952.5	1,951.2	39.4%	5,103.3	1,406.3	27.6%	26,017.3	7,087.3	27.2%
O'Reilly Automotive	**6,781.6**	**1,956.1**	**28.8%**	1,424.0	452.4	31.8%	1,187.4	358.6	30.2%	1,025.8	322.8	31.5%	3,144.3	822.2	26.1%
Owens & Minor	**1,357.5**	**425.8**	**31.4%**	156.1	60.2	38.6%	145.4	51.7	35.5%	181.9	57.7	31.7%	874.0	256.1	29.3%
Paccar	**5,453.3**	**1,210.6**	**22.2%**	1,579.1	521.8	33.0%	1,284.0	482.4	37.6%	848.8	191.4	22.5%	1,741.4	15.0	0.9%
Packaging Corp. of America	**2,868.0**	**732.4**	**25.5%**	645.0	200.1	31.0%	583.3	175.0	30.0%	404.0	123.2	30.5%	1,235.7	234.1	18.9%
Parker Hannifin	**5,369.8**	**1,300.5**	**24.2%**	650.3	226.3	34.8%	758.6	166.4	21.9%	1,160.4	349.5	30.1%	2,800.5	558.3	19.9%
Pepco Holdings	**3,022.0**	**–843.0**	**–27.9%**	435.0	–3.0	–0.7%	406.0	–137.0	–33.7%	438.0	–128.0	–29.2%	1,743.0	–575.0	–33.0%
PepsiCo	**26,393.4**	**7,432.8**	**28.2%**	2,821.9	1,033.0	36.6%	2,382.1	1,269.7	53.3%	2,968.7	995.2	33.5%	18,220.7	4,134.9	22.7%
PG&E Corp.	**10,843.0**	**–1,569.0**	**–14.5%**	850.0	–89.0	–10.5%	1,836.0	–84.0	–4.6%	1,122.0	–218.0	–19.4%	7,035.0	–1,178.0	–16.7%
Phillips-Van Heusen	**984.5**	**177.9**	**18.1%**	91.9	2.3	2.5%	34.0	–44.5	–130.9%	46.3	85.2	184.0%	812.4	135.0	16.6%
Pitney Bowes	**3,408.7**	**796.2**	**23.4%**	485.9	115.6	23.8%	360.5	71.7	19.9%	281.3	78.3	27.8%	2,281.0	530.7	23.3%
PNC Financial Services Group	**32,952.7**	**2,724.7**	**8.3%**	5,343.0	903.0	16.9%	5,272.8	1,060.8	20.1%	5,128.0	98.0	1.9%	17,208.9	662.9	3.9%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Polo Ralph Lauren	**4,046.2**	**1,065.1**	**26.3%**	278.0	78.0	28.1%	586.4	154.4	26.3%	664.9	182.9	27.5%	2,516.9	649.8	25.8%
PPG Industries	**4,135.5**	**1,169.0**	**28.3%**	801.2	158.0	19.7%	328.5	128.0	39.0%	505.4	153.0	30.3%	2,500.3	730.0	29.2%
PPL	**7,106.0**	**87.0**	**1.2%**	943.0	–26.0	–2.8%	1,127.0	43.0	3.8%	195.0	–75.0	–38.5%	4,841.0	145.0	3.0%
Praxair	**6,142.3**	**1,036.3**	**16.9%**	950.3	189.3	19.9%	974.4	265.4	27.2%	871.0	56.0	6.4%	3,346.7	525.7	15.7%
Precision Castparts	**12,428.8**	**3,001.2**	**24.1%**	1,015.9	265.9	26.2%	2,112.2	515.2	24.4%	2,158.7	491.8	22.8%	7,142.0	1,728.3	24.2%
Priceline.com	**697.6**	**–30.9**	**–4.4%**	29.0	4.3	14.8%	73.5	–9.0	–12.3%	38.1	–9.4	–24.6%	557.0	–16.8	–3.0%
Principal Financial	**7,790.0**	**514.4**	**6.6%**	1,406.1	169.9	12.1%	1,474.5	99.3	6.7%	1,090.2	–9.8	–0.9%	3,819.2	255.0	6.7%
Procter & Gamble	**66,989.5**	**14,931.0**	**22.3%**	8,564.0	1,673.0	19.5%	8,611.0	2,272.0	26.4%	8,768.0	1,606.0	18.3%	41,046.5	9,380.0	22.9%
Public Service Enterprise Group	**18,001.9**	**2,935.9**	**16.3%**	2,595.5	240.5	9.3%	2,398.0	335.0	14.0%	2,013.0	487.0	24.2%	10,995.4	1,873.4	17.0%
Publix Super Markets	**17,348.9**	**5,113.1**	**29.5%**	2,831.7	758.1	26.8%	2,491.9	754.2	30.3%	2,380.5	725.5	30.5%	9,644.9	2,875.4	29.8%
Qualcomm	**20,581.7**	**1,269.7**	**6.2%**	2,993.0	–166.0	–5.5%	3,213.0	–98.0	–3.1%	3,798.0	108.0	2.8%	10,577.7	1,425.7	13.5%
Quanta Services	**2,248.8**	**639.9**	**28.5%**	258.3	85.3	33.0%	286.7	72.9	25.4%	485.6	170.9	35.2%	1,218.3	310.8	25.5%
Quest Diagnostics	**7,867.4**	**2,423.5**	**30.8%**	1,021.9	226.9	22.2%	766.0	204.0	26.6%	1,236.7	413.7	33.5%	4,842.8	1,578.9	32.6%
RR Donnelley & Sons	**1,610.8**	**290.4**	**18.0%**	225.7	112.5	49.9%	5.8	49.9	859.7%	65.6	–15.3	–23.3%	1,313.7	143.3	10.9%
Raymond James Financial	**3,800.3**	**1,354.2**	**35.6%**	755.4	273.1	36.1%	687.3	254.4	37.0%	503.0	180.7	35.9%	1,854.5	646.1	34.8%
Raytheon	**21,037.0**	**4,335.8**	**20.6%**	2,482.0	718.1	28.9%	2,868.0	798.1	27.8%	2,612.0	709.8	27.2%	13,075.0	2,109.7	16.1%
Reinsurance Group of America	**3,774.3**	**14.1**	**0.4%**	493.3	–1.4	–0.3%	768.9	21.5	2.8%	473.2	–52.0	–11.0%	2,038.9	45.9	2.3%
Reliance Steel & Aluminum	**3,446.6**	**948.4**	**27.5%**	425.5	129.5	30.4%	463.3	153.2	33.1%	433.5	120.5	27.8%	2,124.2	545.2	25.7%
Reynolds American	**20,619.0**	**7,599.4**	**36.9%**	5,846.6	3,298.9	56.4%	2,039.6	799.1	39.2%	2,609.6	551.4	21.1%	10,123.3	2,950.0	29.1%
Rockwell Automation	**3,270.8**	**785.1**	**24.0%**	645.6	228.3	35.4%	602.6	194.7	32.3%	503.5	138.1	27.4%	1,519.1	224.0	14.7%
Rockwell Collins	**6,315.0**	**1,134.0**	**18.0%**	826.2	158.2	19.2%	751.0	105.0	14.0%	745.6	143.6	19.3%	3,992.1	727.1	18.2%
Ross Stores	**8,667.6**	**2,893.2**	**33.4%**	1,582.0	462.7	29.2%	1,453.9	474.7	32.6%	1,312.9	464.0	35.3%	4,318.7	1,491.8	34.5%
Ryder System	**2,044.6**	**–54.9**	**–2.7%**	402.5	0.8	0.2%	269.6	–0.8	–0.3%	299.4	–4.0	–1.3%	1,073.1	–50.9	–4.7%
SAIC	**4,074.0**	**1,043.1**	**25.6%**	171.0	42.7	25.0%	697.0	63.5	9.1%	171.0	40.0	23.4%	3,035.0	896.8	29.5%
Scana	**5,275.0**	**808.0**	**15.3%**	1,082.0	382.0	35.3%	790.0	38.0	4.8%	677.0	161.0	23.8%	2,726.0	227.0	8.3%
Sempra Energy	**7,000.0**	**–34.0**	**–0.5%**	1,135.2	–49.0	–4.3%	941.5	–10.0	–1.1%	882.6	–70.0	–7.9%	4,040.7	95.0	2.4%
Sherwin-Williams	**7,294.6**	**1,467.2**	**20.1%**	1,488.7	325.5	21.9%	1,208.2	251.5	20.8%	1,052.9	190.7	18.1%	3,544.9	699.5	19.7%
Sonic Automotive	**799.9**	**137.9**	**17.2%**	138.7	36.2	26.1%	156.0	36.9	23.6%	123.4	33.4	27.0%	381.9	31.4	8.2%
Southern	**24,587.0**	**2,036.0**	**8.3%**	3,662.0	–177.0	–4.8%	2,915.0	175.0	6.0%	2,569.0	363.0	14.1%	15,441.0	1,675.0	10.8%
Southwest Airlines	**8,459.0**	**2,006.0**	**23.7%**	3,365.0	1,292.0	38.4%	1,787.0	203.0	11.4%	1,165.0	355.0	30.5%	2,142.0	156.0	7.3%
SpartanNash	**432.3**	**82.2**	**19.0%**	97.3	30.4	31.2%	89.8	26.4	29.4%	1.6	3.7	235.7%	243.6	21.7	8.9%
Spectra Energy	**6,511.0**	**455.0**	**7.0%**	359.0	—	—	904.0	1.0	0.1%	934.0	–32.0	–3.4%	4,314.0	486.0	11.3%
Staples	**6,160.8**	**1,616.5**	**26.2%**	460.9	49.9	10.8%	508.8	116.8	23.0%	844.8	191.1	22.6%	4,346.4	1,258.7	29.0%
State Street Corp.	**10,310.2**	**565.2**	**5.5%**	1,025.1	–5.9	–0.6%	1,097.5	–0.5	–0.0%	1,486.7	109.7	7.4%	6,701.0	462.0	6.9%
Synnex	**1,220.6**	**418.9**	**34.3%**	183.6	58.7	32.0%	184.6	77.4	41.9%	190.1	74.3	39.1%	662.3	208.5	31.5%
Target	**32,087.0**	**9,476.0**	**29.5%**	4,285.0	1,652.0	38.6%	3,276.0	1,074.0	32.8%	3,836.0	1,213.0	31.6%	20,690.0	5,537.0	26.8%
Tech Data	**961.3**	**321.8**	**33.5%**	189.3	71.3	37.7%	98.7	32.4	32.8%	121.5	41.3	34.0%	551.8	176.8	32.0%
Texas Instruments	**16,387.1**	**4,954.1**	**30.2%**	3,218.0	1,034.0	32.1%	2,684.0	820.0	30.6%	1,507.0	215.0	14.3%	8,978.1	2,885.1	32.1%
Thermo Fisher Scientific	**6,560.5**	**1,609.8**	**24.5%**	851.7	128.8	15.1%	1,129.6	390.4	34.6%	909.5	204.0	22.4%	3,669.7	886.6	24.2%
Time Warner	**31,048.4**	**4,147.2**	**13.4%**	4,372.9	719.1	16.4%	4,615.5	–26.0	–0.6%	4,911.9	328.0	6.7%	17,148.0	3,126.1	18.2%
Time Warner Cable	**20,926.0**	**1,632.0**	**7.8%**	2,896.9	367.9	12.7%	3,174.4	246.4	7.8%	2,964.1	554.1	18.7%	11,890.6	463.6	3.9%
TJX	**16,952.0**	**4,994.3**	**29.5%**	2,905.1	938.6	32.3%	2,779.6	818.1	29.4%	2,584.2	747.5	28.9%	8,683.1	2,490.1	28.7%
Tractor Supply Company	**3,025.8**	**971.0**	**32.1%**	634.9	202.9	32.0%	565.7	195.8	34.6%	502.5	139.1	27.7%	1,322.7	433.3	32.8%
Travelers Cos.	**30,729.0**	**5,870.5**	**19.1%**	4,621.0	1,098.0	23.8%	4,898.9	1,168.9	23.9%	4,804.0	1,014.0	21.1%	16,405.1	2,589.6	15.8%
Trinity Industries	**4,122.1**	**593.9**	**14.4%**	1,223.8	260.2	21.3%	1,036.2	302.5	29.2%	559.0	134.8	24.1%	1,303.1	–103.6	–7.9%

Effective Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates on 258 Major Corporations, 2008–2015 (alphabetical)

$-millions	Eight-Year Totals			2015			2014			2013			2008-2012		
Company	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate	Profit	Tax	Rate
Tutor Perini	**1,065.1**	**298.1**	**28.0%**	70.2	5.3	7.6%	159.5	44.4	27.9%	118.9	28.1	23.6%	716.5	220.3	30.7%
Twenty-First Century Fox	**39,722.0**	**6,273.0**	**15.8%**	3,485.6	466.0	13.4%	9,720.0	891.0	9.2%	5,226.9	1,178.0	22.5%	21,289.5	3,738.0	17.6%
U.S. Bancorp	**49,331.0**	**12,191.0**	**24.7%**	7,590.0	1,956.0	25.8%	7,502.0	1,888.0	25.2%	7,527.0	1,885.0	25.0%	26,712.0	6,462.0	24.2%
UGI	**2,600.5**	**436.2**	**16.8%**	388.5	89.0	22.9%	475.3	90.5	19.0%	321.1	43.9	13.7%	1,415.6	212.8	15.0%
Union Pacific	**44,615.8**	**9,282.8**	**20.8%**	7,456.7	1,849.7	24.8%	8,124.4	1,931.4	23.8%	6,862.1	1,675.1	24.4%	22,172.6	3,826.6	17.3%
United Natural Foods	**1,073.1**	**327.4**	**30.5%**	213.8	58.6	27.4%	188.9	64.8	34.3%	153.7	42.5	27.6%	516.8	161.5	31.3%
United Parcel Service	**39,442.2**	**11,005.1**	**27.9%**	6,260.0	1,634.0	26.1%	4,593.5	932.0	20.3%	5,835.0	2,181.0	37.4%	22,753.7	6,258.1	27.5%
United Stationers	**1,314.4**	**465.3**	**35.4%**	115.0	67.3	58.5%	186.4	72.3	38.8%	190.2	66.9	35.2%	822.9	258.7	31.4%
United Technologies	**24,421.2**	**2,546.2**	**10.4%**	2,819.0	264.0	9.4%	4,240.8	263.8	6.2%	3,622.9	520.9	14.4%	13,738.5	1,497.5	10.9%
UnitedHealth Group	**61,900.0**	**22,194.9**	**35.9%**	9,950.0	4,155.0	41.8%	9,385.0	3,883.0	41.4%	8,678.0	3,004.0	34.6%	33,887.0	11,152.9	32.9%
Universal Health Services	**5,156.0**	**1,546.6**	**30.0%**	1,003.9	324.6	32.3%	837.7	220.1	26.3%	794.4	239.9	30.2%	2,520.0	762.0	30.2%
Unum Group	**5,982.4**	**1,897.4**	**31.7%**	690.4	280.5	40.6%	67.3	128.4	190.7%	980.9	277.9	28.3%	4,243.8	1,210.6	28.5%
Verizon Communications	**81,518.0**	**7,401.0**	**9.1%**	23,840.0	5,476.0	23.0%	15,193.0	2,657.0	17.5%	12,282.0	–197.0	–1.6%	30,203.0	–535.0	–1.8%
VF	**4,955.5**	**1,229.4**	**24.8%**	779.2	147.8	19.0%	603.0	152.3	25.3%	721.3	199.0	27.6%	2,852.0	730.3	25.6%
Viacom	**18,261.4**	**4,260.4**	**23.3%**	1,989.4	368.4	18.5%	2,816.5	979.5	34.8%	3,033.8	320.8	10.6%	10,421.7	2,591.7	24.9%
Visa	**30,063.9**	**9,774.0**	**32.5%**	6,628.5	1,921.5	29.0%	7,369.6	2,278.6	30.9%	1,681.8	506.8	30.1%	14,384.0	5,067.0	35.2%
W.R. Berkley	**4,411.7**	**1,023.6**	**23.2%**	687.6	177.7	25.8%	906.3	254.7	28.1%	593.5	112.3	18.9%	2,224.3	478.9	21.5%
W.W. Grainger	**7,481.0**	**2,343.3**	**31.3%**	1,158.8	389.8	33.6%	1,258.2	409.7	32.6%	1,135.4	349.0	30.7%	3,928.6	1,194.8	30.4%
Walgreen	**26,280.0**	**8,503.0**	**32.4%**	2,604.0	846.0	32.5%	3,277.0	1,207.0	36.8%	3,343.0	1,122.0	33.6%	17,056.0	5,328.0	31.2%
Wal-Mart Stores	**139,743.0**	**43,480.0**	**31.1%**	16,063.0	5,562.0	34.6%	17,800.0	6,165.0	34.6%	18,693.0	6,377.0	34.1%	87,187.0	25,376.0	29.1%
Walt Disney	**62,566.8**	**17,217.1**	**27.5%**	12,184.9	3,923.1	32.2%	10,835.2	2,721.1	25.1%	8,531.6	2,185.3	25.6%	31,015.0	8,387.5	27.0%
Waste Management	**10,547.4**	**2,642.9**	**25.1%**	936.7	179.6	19.2%	1,804.1	409.9	22.7%	959.9	380.7	39.7%	6,846.7	1,672.8	24.4%
WellPoint	**35,117.2**	**12,167.0**	**34.6%**	4,514.6	1,917.4	42.5%	4,310.3	1,591.0	36.9%	3,762.3	1,201.5	31.9%	22,530.0	7,457.1	33.1%
Wells Fargo	**185,024.8**	**33,330.6**	**18.0%**	31,044.4	10,447.4	33.7%	31,475.4	6,946.4	22.1%	29,375.9	4,376.9	14.9%	93,129.1	11,559.9	12.4%
Wesco International	**2,092.8**	**352.8**	**16.9%**	284.6	44.5	15.6%	320.8	64.8	20.2%	334.0	45.7	13.7%	1,153.5	197.8	17.1%
Westrock	**3,056.1**	**134.3**	**4.4%**	603.0	23.3	3.9%	652.6	7.4	1.1%	613.8	–13.3	–2.2%	1,186.6	116.8	9.8%
Whole Foods Market	**4,399.5**	**1,532.5**	**34.8%**	807.9	300.9	37.2%	857.6	351.6	41.0%	815.4	290.4	35.6%	1,918.6	589.7	30.7%
Williams	**8,943.9**	**516.0**	**5.8%**	86.7	—	—	3,267.0	–9.0	–0.3%	721.4	–17.0	–2.4%	4,868.7	542.0	11.1%
Windstream	**2,793.5**	**220.8**	**7.9%**	21.4	9.1	42.5%	76.2	0.8	1.0%	227.5	–27.0	–11.9%	2,468.4	237.9	9.6%
Wisconsin Energy	**5,894.3**	**–591.6**	**–10.0%**	961.6	–97.4	–10.1%	872.3	–44.1	–5.1%	839.9	–50.2	–6.0%	3,220.5	–399.9	–12.4%
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation	**3,831.1**	**712.7**	**18.6%**	716.9	167.9	23.4%	657.9	147.9	22.5%	540.5	101.6	18.8%	1,915.8	295.2	15.4%
Xcel Energy	**10,290.6**	**–111.4**	**–1.1%**	1,524.9	–36.1	–2.4%	1,535.9	–73.2	–4.8%	1,424.5	–46.2	–3.2%	5,805.3	44.1	0.8%
Yum Brands	**3,226.4**	**835.4**	**25.9%**	451.7	245.7	54.4%	506.0	215.0	42.5%	449.6	122.6	27.3%	1,819.1	252.1	13.9%
ALL 258 COMPANIES	**$3,810,577**	**$806,942**	**21.2%**	**$551,698**	**$141,281**	**25.6%**	**$584,814**	**$134,763**	**23.0%**	**$524,346**	**$111,138**	**21.2%**	**$2,149,719**	**$419,759**	**19.5%**

U.S. Profits & U.S. Federal Income Taxes versus Foreign Profits & Foreign Income Taxes, 2008-15 for companies with foreign pretax profits at least 10% of total worldwide pretax profits, $-million

	US profits & federal+state income taxes			Foreign profits & for. income taxes			US rate
Company	US profit	US tax	US rate	For. profit	For. tax	For. rate	– For rate
Wal-Mart Stores	$ 145,059	$48,796	33.6%	$42,692	$ 11,562	27.1%	+6.6%
General Electric	40,375	–1,051	–2.6%	85,495	27,726	32.4%	–35.0%
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	121,544	24,731	20.3%	59,592	12,935	21.7%	–1.4%
McKesson	11,973	2,766	23.1%	4,811	576	12.0%	+11.1%
International Business Machines	66,753	6,874	10.3%	86,183	21,639	25.1%	–14.8%
Cardinal Health	11,680	3,635	31.1%	1,665	214	12.8%	+18.3%
Procter & Gamble	69,017	16,959	24.6%	45,244	11,087	24.5%	+0.1%
Costco Wholesale	14,518	4,706	32.4%	6,009	2,084	34.7%	–2.3%
Archer Daniels Midland	11,354	3,124	27.5%	6,946	1,296	18.7%	+8.9%
PepsiCo	27,277	8,316	30.5%	38,450	6,186	16.1%	+14.4%
United Technologies	24,736	2,861	11.6%	32,680	9,739	29.8%	–18.2%
United Parcel Service	40,460	12,023	29.7%	5,053	1,379	27.3%	+2.4%
Merck	41,650	12,285	29.5%	31,351	6,657	21.2%	+8.3%
Goldman Sachs Group	52,859	14,767	27.9%	33,364	8,620	25.8%	+2.1%
Intel	77,712	21,817	28.1%	27,001	5,076	18.8%	+9.3%
FedEx	17,460	2,729	15.6%	4,559	1,578	34.6%	–19.0%
Honeywell International	16,778	2,719	16.2%	16,837	3,652	21.7%	–5.5%
DuPont	8,763	1,687	19.3%	17,991	4,017	22.3%	–3.1%
General Dynamics	24,803	6,757	27.2%	3,889	1,056	27.2%	+0.1%
American Express	42,973	10,876	25.3%	6,647	3,376	50.8%	–25.5%
Oracle	41,953	13,740	32.8%	50,561	8,306	16.4%	+16.3%
3M	24,214	6,280	25.9%	24,123	6,456	26.8%	–0.8%
Deere	20,217	6,707	33.2%	9,837	3,495	35.5%	–2.4%
International Paper	4,914	–482	–9.8%	3,200	728	22.8%	–32.6%
Staples	6,457	1,912	29.6%	2,043	544	26.6%	+3.0%
Tech Data	977	338	34.6%	1,090	263	24.2%	+10.4%
McDonald's	22,508	8,936	39.7%	35,361	8,001	22.6%	+17.1%
Eli Lilly	15,350	2,804	18.3%	17,662	4,591	26.0%	–7.7%
TJX	17,980	6,022	33.5%	3,603	1,012	28.1%	+5.4%
Emerson Electric	14,853	5,291	35.6%	12,183	3,600	29.5%	+6.1%
Cigna	14,667	4,322	29.5%	2,015	565	28.0%	+1.4%
Kimberly-Clark	11,031	2,149	19.5%	7,522	2,677	35.6%	–16.1%
Nike	10,650	2,283	21.4%	15,295	3,470	22.7%	–1.3%
Arrow Electronics	2,703	766	28.3%	2,142	543	25.4%	+3.0%
Illinois Tool Works	11,681	3,766	32.2%	8,163	1,974	24.2%	+8.1%
L-3 Communications	7,863	1,711	21.8%	1,553	359	23.1%	–1.4%
General Mills	15,563	3,423	22.0%	2,906	759	26.1%	–4.1%
Gap	12,411	4,355	35.1%	1,778	691	38.9%	–3.8%
Duke Energy	19,889	–300	–1.5%	4,021	980	24.4%	–25.9%
CBS	13,379	1,033	7.7%	2,209	494	22.4%	–14.7%
Texas Instruments	16,412	4,979	30.3%	8,371	1,201	14.3%	+16.0%
Viacom	18,795	4,794	25.5%	3,579	1,270	35.5%	–10.0%
PPG Industries	4,303	1,337	31.1%	5,633	1,492	26.5%	+4.6%
Omnicom Group	4,900	1,459	29.8%	6,923	2,199	31.8%	–2.0%
Kellogg	8,991	2,214	24.6%	3,380	960	28.4%	–3.8%
Yum Brands	3,281	890	27.1%	9,607	2,360	24.6%	+2.6%
Genuine Parts	7,141	2,316	32.4%	913	252	27.6%	+4.9%

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Company	US profit	US tax	US rate	For. profit	For. tax	For. rate	– For rate
Thermo Fisher Scientific	6,707	1,756	26.2%	4,252	1,429	33.6%	–7.4%
Devon Energy	21,763	439	2.0%	3,526	886	25.1%	–23.1%
Monsanto	15,487	3,492	22.5%	7,932	2,346	29.6%	–7.0%
Paccar	5,642	1,400	24.8%	6,054	1,542	25.5%	–0.7%
Unum Group	6,517	1,897	29.1%	1,436	302	21.0%	+8.1%
Praxair	6,268	1,162	18.5%	10,444	2,683	25.7%	–7.2%
R.R. Donnelley & Sons	1,662	342	20.6%	1,132	368	32.5%	–11.9%
Parker Hannifin	5,542	1,473	26.6%	4,384	1,259	28.7%	–2.1%
Jacobs Engineering Group	2,691	1,043	38.8%	1,727	399	23.1%	+15.6%
State Street Corp.	10,920	1,175	10.8%	9,277	2,026	21.8%	–11.1%
Gamestop	4,299	1,486	34.6%	562	253	45.1%	–10.5%
Air Products & Chemicals	4,186	508	12.1%	5,770	1,431	24.8%	–12.7%
Sempra Energy	7,020	–14	–0.2%	3,711	868	23.4%	–23.6%
Automatic Data Processing	14,786	4,730	32.0%	1,739	544	31.3%	+0.7%
PPL	7,199	180	2.5%	5,875	747	12.7%	–10.2%
Synnex	1,301	499	38.4%	455	126	27.7%	+10.6%
Reinsurance Group of America	3,774	14	0.4%	2,104	501	23.8%	–23.4%
Visa	31,393	11,103	35.4%	7,762	1,510	19.5%	+15.9%
Ball	2,033	435	21.4%	2,383	639	26.8%	–5.4%
Sherwin-Williams	7,557	1,730	22.9%	1,026	338	33.0%	–10.1%
VF	5,125	1,399	27.3%	4,735	677	14.3%	+13.0%
Campbell Soup	7,465	1,882	25.2%	1,087	428	39.4%	–14.2%
Henry Schein	3,310	1,127	34.0%	1,042	263	25.2%	+8.8%
Dover	4,635	1,089	23.5%	3,093	734	23.7%	–0.3%
Mosaic	7,036	1,135	16.1%	7,979	1,684	21.1%	–5.0%
Eastman Chemical	5,236	825	15.8%	1,519	237	15.6%	+0.2%
Corning	7,532	145	1.9%	13,986	1,942	13.9%	–12.0%
Interpublic Group	2,419	181	7.5%	1,922	679	35.3%	–27.8%
Ecolab	4,784	1,175	24.6%	3,241	1,148	35.4%	–10.9%
Celanese	2,945	414	14.1%	2,727	675	24.8%	–10.7%
Franklin Resources	12,311	4,912	39.9%	8,063	909	11.3%	+28.6%
UGI	2,774	610	22.0%	557	228	40.9%	–18.9%
Precision Castparts	12,705	3,277	25.8%	2,105	487	23.1%	+2.7%
MasterCard	16,816	4,346	25.8%	9,672	2,951	30.5%	–4.7%
Clorox	5,758	1,747	30.3%	932	319	34.2%	–3.9%
Anixter International	1,315	394	29.9%	573	212	37.0%	–7.0%
Pitney Bowes	3,542	929	26.2%	844	335	39.7%	–13.5%
Ryder System	2,093	–7	–0.3%	406	65	16.1%	–16.4%
Spectra Energy	6,587	531	8.1%	4,239	489	11.5%	–3.5%
Polo Ralph Lauren	4,273	1,292	30.2%	2,569	564	21.9%	+8.3%
Bemis	1,713	542	31.7%	742	238	32.0%	–0.4%
Rockwell Automation	3,285	799	24.3%	3,418	528	15.4%	+8.9%
Insight Enterprises	590	139	23.6%	282	103	36.3%	–12.7%
Biogen Idec	13,567	4,945	36.4%	4,967	398	8.0%	+28.4%
Phillips-Van Heusen	1,013	206	20.4%	1,858	301	16.2%	+4.2%
Cognizant Technology Solutions	3,102	1,248	40.2%	7,261	1,497	20.6%	+19.6%
Levi Strauss	919	87	9.5%	1,061	335	31.5%	–22.1%

U.S. Profits & U.S. Federal Income Taxes versus Foreign Profits & Foreign Income Taxes, 2008-15 for companies with foreign pretax profits at least 10% of total worldwide pretax profits, $-million

	US profits & federal+state income taxes			Foreign profits & for. income taxes			US rate
Company	US profit	US tax	US rate	For. profit	For. tax	For. rate	– For rate
CA	6,002	2,182	36.4%	3,318	607	18.3%	+18.1%
Flowserve	1,622	323	19.9%	3,134	865	27.6%	–7.7%
Westrock	3,117	195	6.3%	476	91	19.2%	–13.0%
Quanta Services	2,346	737	31.4%	382	133	34.8%	–3.4%
Joy Global	3,540	699	19.7%	1,765	558	31.6%	–11.9%
Priceline.com	758	29	3.9%	12,270	2,317	18.9%	–15.0%
Alleghany Corporation	3,270	724	22.1%	918	232	25.3%	–3.2%
Coach, Inc.	6,650	2,621	39.4%	2,166	58	2.7%	+36.7%
Discovery Communications, Inc.	7,410	2,734	36.9%	3,429	939	27.4%	+9.5%
LKQ Corporation	2,595	813	31.3%	503	107	21.4%	+10.0%
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation	3,956	838	21.2%	1,538	375	24.4%	–3.2%
Alliance Data Systems	3,441	1,034	30.1%	1,513	473	31.3%	–1.2%
Amphenol	1,268	254	20.0%	4,792	1,136	23.7%	–3.7%
Totals for 107 companies	**$ 1,576,404**	**$ 383,825**	**24.3%**	**$ 1,010,763**	**$ 246,209**	**24.4%**	**–0.0%**
64 with lower US rate (60%)	**$ 754,370**	**$ 130,312**	**17.3%**	**$ 568,543**	**$ 151,937**	**26.7%**	**–9.4%**
43 with lower foreign rate (40%)	**822,034**	**253,513**	**30.8%**	**442,220**	**94,272**	**21.3%**	**+9.5%**
% that average foreign effective tax rate exceeds average US tax rate (107 cos.):							**+0%**

COMPANY-BY-COMPANY NOTES

3M: The high tax rate in 2008 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes. Restructuring charges were taken in 2008 and 2009. Pretax profits for each year were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2008 and decreased them in 2010 and 2009. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $630.4 million and $189.3 million, respectively. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $616 million from 2008 to 2015.

ABM Industries: The company's fiscal years end in October of the years listed. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Advance Auto Parts: Deferred taxes explain most of the company's small tax breaks in each year, driven largely by accelerated depreciation. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $92 million from 2008 to 2015.

Aetna: The company's high tax rates in 2015 and 2014 reflect the nondeductible Health Insurers Fee, and the low rate in 2010 is explained by deferred taxes. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $322 million from 2008 to 2015.

AGL Resources: The low tax rates in most years are explained by deferred taxes, primarily related to accelerated depreciation. The high rate in 2013 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Air Products and Chemicals: The company's fiscal year ends in September of the year listed. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $74 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $268 million from 2008 to 2015.

Airgas: The company's fiscal years end in March following the years listed. Deferral, primarily due to accelerated depreciation, explains most of the company's tax breaks. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $28 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $133 million from 2008 to 2015.

Alleghany Corporation: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment.

Alliance Data Systems: The high tax rate in 2015 reflects an increase in deferred tax assets. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $131 million from 2008 to 2015.

Alliant Techsystems: Reported pretax profits in 2008 and 2014 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $71.2 million and $35.5 million, respectively. Excess benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $18.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Altria Group: The high tax rates in 2011 and 2012 reflect a turnaround in deferred tax. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $1.086 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Amazon: Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes for 2008 through 2011. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $74.6 million from 2013 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.217 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Ameren: Reported pretax profits in 2012 and 2010 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks in each year, driven largely by accelerated depreciation.

American Electric Power: Deferred taxes, driven primarily by accelerated depreciation, explain most of the company's low rates.

American Express: Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments in all eight years. Reported pretax profits in 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $319 million from 2008 to 2015.

American Financial Group: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The high tax rates in 2008, 2013 and 2014 are related to deferred tax assets.

AmerisourceBergen: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $275.6 million from 2008 to 2015.

Amphenol: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $149.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Andersons: Reported pretax profits in 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment of goodwill. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $8.6 million from 2008 to 2015.

Anixter International: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $34.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Anthem: The company was previously known as Wellpoint. The company recorded restructuring charges in 2011 and 2012. Pretax income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring payments, which had the effect of increasing income in 2011 and 2012 and decreasing income in 2013. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $297 million from 2008 to 2015.

Apollo Group: The company's fiscal years end in August of the years listed. Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments for 2011 through 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $50.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Archer Daniels Midland: The company's fiscal years end in June following the years listed for 2008 through 2011. Data for 2012 was for the transition period from June through December, and fiscal years 2013 through 2015 end in December.

Arrow Electronics: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $33.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Asbury Automotive Group: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $20 million from 2008 to 2015.

AT&T: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $14.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Atmos Energy: The company's fiscal years end in September of the years listed. Most of the company's tax breaks were due to deferrals related to depreciation.

Automatic Data Processing: The company's fiscal years end in June following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2012 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $165.4 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $180.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Autonation: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment of goodwill and franchise rights. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $91.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Autozone: The company's fiscal years end in August of the years listed. Most of the company's tax savings were due to deferred taxes associated with inventory valuation and accelerated depreciation. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $277 million from 2008 to 2015.

Ball: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $45 million and $48 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $100 million from 2008 to 2015.

BB&T: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. The study adjusted U.S. pretax income by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of increasing pretax income in 2010, 2009 and 2008 and decreasing it in 2011 and 2012.

Bed Bath & Beyond: The company's fiscal year ends in February following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $67 million from 2008 to 2015.

Bemis: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $42 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $9.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Best Buy: The company's fiscal year ends in January following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 million from 2008 to 2015.

Big Lots: The company's fiscal year ends in January following the years listed. The company's tax rates reflect small savings from deferred taxes, mostly due to accelerated depreciation. The high rate in 2013 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $36 million from 2008 to 2015. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit and other employment credits reduced federal and state taxes by $12 million from 2008 to 2015.

Biogen Idec: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in most years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Income was also adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments between 2010 and 2012. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $320.6 million from 2013 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $397.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Boeing: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $330.5 million from 2013 to 2015. The research and experimentation credit reduced taxes by $1.36 billion from 2008 to 2015. . Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $604 million from 2008 to 2015.

C.H. Robinson: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $106 million from 2008 to 2015.

CA: The company's fiscal years end in March following the years listed. The high rate in 2008 reflects a turnaround in deferred taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $133 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 million from 2008 to 2015.

Cablevision Systems: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $14.6 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7.3 million from 2013 to 2015.

Campbell Soup: The company's fiscal years end in August of the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $160.1 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $87 million from 2013 to 2015.

Capital One: Reported pretax profits were adjusted for the timing of payments for credit losses. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's low tax rate in 2010, and accumulating deferred tax assets explain the company's high rates in 2008 and 2015.

Cardinal Health: The company's fiscal years end in June following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2012 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments. U.S. taxes on foreign profits were subtracted from reported tax in 2009 through 2012. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $68 million from 2013 to 2015.

CarMax: The company's fiscal years end in February following the years listed. The high rate in 2008 reflects a turnaround in deferred taxes related to "partnership basis" and "stock compensation." Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $152 million from 2008 to 2015.

Casey's General Stores: The company's fiscal year ends in April following the years listed. Deferral, driven mainly by accelerated depreciation, explains most of the tax breaks in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

CBS: Reported pretax profits in 2008, 2009 and 2015 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill and intangible asset impairments. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $676.7 from 2008 to 2015.

Celanese: Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes. The company's income tax note did not distinguish between federal and state taxes, so the study estimated the federal and state share of current U.S. taxes.

Centene: Reported pretax profits in 2012 and 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The company's high rates in 2008 and 2013 through 2015 are likely driven by a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $69.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

CenturyLink: Reported pretax profits in 2013 was adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The company maintains an allowance for doubtful accounts. The study adjusted U.S. and foreign pretax income by replacing the company's provision for doubtful accounts with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of decreasing pretax profits in 2008 and increasing them in all other years. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in 2010 through 2012. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $17.2 million from 2008 to 2010.

CF Industries Holdings: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $215.8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $141.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Charles Schwab: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $61 million from 2008 to 2010.

Cigna: Pretax income was adjusted to reflect the timing of charges for GMDB contracts in all eight years. Income was also adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments for all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $111 million from 2008 to 2015.

Clorox: Reported pretax profits in 2010 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The company's fiscal years end in June of the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $147.6 from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $150 million from 2008 to 2015.

CMS Energy: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $3.0 and $9.0 million in 2010 and 2009.

Coach: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $176.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Coca-Cola: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment charge. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in 2010 and 2009. Income was also adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments for 2012 through 2015.

Cognizant Technology Solutions: Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes. The high tax rate in 2012 reflects a turnaround of deferred tax. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $295.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Comcast: The company reports noncontrolling interest income from 2010 to 2015. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $953.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Community Health Systems: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 million from 2008 to 2013.

ConAgra Foods: Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments for 2013 through 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $122 million from 2008 to 2015.

Consol Energy: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Reported pretax profits in 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment charge. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $54.4 million from

2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $63.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Consolidated Edison: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $15.4 million in 2013.

Constellation Brands: The company's fiscal years end in February following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $393 million from 2008 to 2015, and $203 million in 2015 alone.

Core-Mark Holding: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Corning: Deferral explains most of the company's low tax rates.

Costco Wholesale: The company's fiscal year ends in August of the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $393 million from 2008 to 2015.

CSX: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $211 million from 2008 to 2015.

CVR Energy: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment charge. The company reports noncontrolling interest income from 2011 to 2015. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $63.7 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $2.1 million in 2011.

CVS Caremark: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $444 million from 2008 to 2015.

Danaher: Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments in all eight years.

Darden Restaurants: The company's fiscal years end in May following the years listed. Unspecified "federal income tax credits" reduced taxes by $419 million from 2008 to 2015. Deferred taxes, predominantly accelerated depreciation, explain the remainder of the company's low tax rate in 2009. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $138 million from 2008 to 2015.

DaVita: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Reported pretax profits in 2011 and 2015 were adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and other intangible assets. Deferred taxes, predominantly accelerated depreciation, account for most of the company's tax breaks in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $213.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Deere: The company's fiscal years end in October of the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments. Wind energy production tax credits reduced taxes by $30 million, $26 million, and $14 million in 2010, 2009 and 2008. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $152 million from 2008 to 2013. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $320.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Devon Energy: The study reversed impairments for the carrying value of oil and gas properties and goodwill in 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $94 million from 2008 to 2015.

Dick's Sporting Goods: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $171.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Discover Financial Services: The company's high rate in 2008 reflects a turnaround of deferred federal income taxes.

Discovery Communications: The company's high rates in 2009, 2012 and 2014 reflect turnarounds of deferred federal income taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $266.8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $171 million from 2010 to 2015.

Dish Network: Reported pretax profits in 2010 November 1, 2011 and 2009 were adjusted for litigation settlements. Deferred taxes reduced the company's tax rate in most years.

Dollar General: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $197.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Dollar Tree: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The company's high tax rates in 2010 and 2014 reflect turnarounds of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $76.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Dominion Resources: Restructuring charges were taken in 2010. Pretax profits were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2010. The study reversed impairments for the carrying value of oil and gas properties in 2009, 2010 and 2015. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $20.1, $54.3 and $13.1 million in 2010, 2009 and 2008. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $36.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Domtar: Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes. Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $48 million from 2008 to 2015.

Dover: Deferred taxes explain most of the company's low tax rate in 2010. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $136.9 from 2008 to 2015. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $30.1 from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $88.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

DTE Energy: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $49 million from 2008 to 2013.

Duke Energy: The company's results for 2012 were adjusted to include half of the income and tax of Progress Energy, which it acquired midway through the year. Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2010 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $18.0 million in 2008.

Dupont: Deferred taxes explain the negative tax rate in 2010 and the high rate in 2011. Accelerated depreciation is the primary factor in these tax deferrals. Favorable tax settlements reduced Dupont's taxes in 2008, 2010 and 2012. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $183.9 million from 2011 to 2015.

Eastman Chemical: The company's low tax rates are due primarily to deferred taxes, mainly accelerated depreciation. General business credits explain most of the low rates in 2008. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $90 million from 2008 to 2015.

Ecolab: Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $180.9 million from 2008 to 2015. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $45.3 million from 2011 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $246.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Eli Lilly: Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2008 were adjusted by moving the cost of a litigation settlement to 2009, the year it was paid, from 2008, the year it was booked. Deferral explains the company's low tax rates in 2008 and 2010, and an accumulation of deferred tax assets explains the high rate in 2015.

Emcor Group: Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2010 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $30.4 million from 2010 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $30.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Emerson Electric: Reported profits in 2012 and 2011 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The company's fiscal years end in September of the years listed. A turnaround of deferred taxes explains the company's high tax rate in 2010 and 2012. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $297.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Entergy: Reported pretax profits for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash asset impairment.

Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Deferred taxes explain their low tax rates in most years, driven mainly by accelerated depreciation.

Exelon: Deferred taxes explain most of the company's low rates. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts over the eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $227.8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $71 million from 2008 to 2012.

Express Scripts: The company maintains an allowance for doubtful accounts. The study adjusted U.S. and foreign pretax income by replacing the company's provision for doubtful accounts with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of decreasing pretax profits in 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2015 and increasing them in all other years. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks from 2008 to 2011, and deferred tax assets explain the high rates from 2012 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $382.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Exxon Mobil: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.15 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Eversource Energy: The company changed its name from Northeast Utilities in 2015. Accelerated depreciation provided the company with substantial tax savings in each year. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $26.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Facebook: The high tax rate in 2015 is explained by an accumulation of deferred tax assets. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $295.2 million from 2010 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $5.78 billion from 2010 to 2015.

FedEx: The company's fiscal year ends in May following the years listed. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $191 million from 2008 to 2015.

Fifth Third Bancorp: The study adjusted U.S. pretax income by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of increasing pretax income in 2009 and 2008 and decreasing it in 2010 through 2015. Reported profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge.

First Energy: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts over the eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $26 million from 2008 to 2011.

Fiserv: Because the company does not disclose foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign income based on reported current foreign income taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $109.4 million from 2012 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $69 million from 2008 to 2015.

Flowserve: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $66.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Franklin Resources: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $122.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Gamestop: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $77.6 million from 2008 to 2015. The high tax rate in 2012 is explained by an accumulation of deferred tax assets.

Gap: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The company's high tax rate in 2009 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes related to accelerated depreciation. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $190 million from 2008 to 2015.

General Dynamics: Reported profits in 2012 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $469.5 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $290 million from 2008 to 2015.

General Electric: The study adjusted U.S. pretax income by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of reducing income in 2010 through 2012 and increasing it 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2014.

General Mills: The company's fiscal years end in May following the years listed. Deferred taxes explain much of the low rate the company paid in 2010. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $353 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $713 million from 2008 to 2015. Restructuring charges were taken in most years between 2008 and 2015. Pretax profits for each year were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2008, 2011 and 2014 and decreased them in all other years. Pretax income in 2014 was adjusted upward for a non-cash impairment of intangible assets.

Genuine Parts: Because the company did not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income for 2008 and 2009, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Pretax profits were adjusted for expenses booked but not yet recognized for taxes. This adjustment decreased pretax profits in 2009, 2013 and 2015 and increased pretax profits in all other years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $56.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Goldman Sachs Group: The high tax rates in 2012 and 2013 reflect a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $2.876 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Graybar Electric: Deferral, primarily due to accelerated depreciation, explains the company's relatively low tax rate in 2010.

Group 1 Automotive: Reported pretax profits in 2008, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of franchise rights. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12 million from 2008 to 2015.

H&R Block: The company's fiscal years end in April following the years listed. The study adjusted U.S. pretax income to replace provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. The company's low tax rate in 2009 is primarily due to deferred taxes, and the high rates in 2012 and 2014 reflect a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $11.2 million from 2008 to 2012.

Harley-Davidson: Restructuring charges were taken in each year between 2008 and 2013. Pretax profits for each year were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2008, 2009 and 2011 and decreased them in 2010, 2012 and 2013. Reported pretax profits in 2009 were also adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $122.9 million and $36.8 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $58.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Harris: The company's fiscal years end in June or July of the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2015 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $136.6 million and $74.4 million, respectively.

HCA Holdings: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income for 2008 through 2010, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The company maintains an allowance for doubtful accounts. The study adjusted U.S. and foreign pretax income by replacing the company's provision for doubtful accounts with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of decreasing pretax profits in 2010 and 2014 and increasing them in all other years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $833 million from 2008 to 2015.

Health Net: Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2010 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $16.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Henry Schein: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $69.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Hershey: The company's relatively high tax rates in 2008 through 2010 are driven by a turnaround of deferred taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $189.3 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $181.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

HollyFrontier: The company was formerly known as Holly. The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $168.6 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $33.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Home Depot: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The company's high tax rate in 2008 is due to a turnaround of deferred taxes.

Honeywell International: Deferred taxes explain most of the company's low tax rates in most years. A turnaround of deferred tax explains the high rate in 2011. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $448 million from 2008 to 2015.

Hormel Foods: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. The company's fiscal years end in October of the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $136.9 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $116.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Humana: The company's high tax rates in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2015 are due to turnarounds of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $89.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Illinois Tool Works: Reported pretax profits in 2009 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. A turnaround of deferred taxes explains the company's high tax rate in 2009, and a turnaround of deferred tax also increases the 2010 rate. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $248.6 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $118 million from 2008 to 2015.

Insight Enterprises: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Deferred taxes explain the negative tax rate in 2009, and explain most of the company's tax breaks in 2010. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Intel: A turnaround of deferred taxes explains the company's high tax rate in 2008. Deferred taxes, primarily accelerated depreciation, explain most of the company's tax breaks in 2009. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $2.08 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $613 million from 2008 to 2015.

International Business Machines (IBM): Deferred taxes saved the company substantial amounts in most years, in part due to accelerated depreciation tax breaks.

International Paper: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Deferred taxes explain the company's negative tax rates in 2010 and 2011. The negative rate in 2013 is explained by a settlement of tax audits. The company's high tax rate in 2008 is due to a turnaround of deferred taxes. Alternative fuel mixture credits reduced taxes by $133 million in 2009. Cellulosic bio-fuel credits reduced taxes by $40 million in 2010. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $109 million from 2008 to 2015.

Interpublic: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $54.6 million from 2010 to 2015.

J.B. Hunt Transport Services: Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $124.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

J.M. Smucker: The company's fiscal years end in April following the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $169 million from 2008 to 2015.

Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $35.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.: The study adjusted U.S. and foreign pretax income by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. This had the effect of increasing pretax income in 2009 and 2008 and decreasing it in 2010 through 2015. The negative rate in 2013 is explained by deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.86 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Jacobs Engineering Group: The company's fiscal years end in October of the years listed. The company's high tax rate in 2010 is due to a turnaround of deferred taxes, driven primarily by accelerated depreciation. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $60.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Joy Global: Reported pretax profits in 2013 and 2015 were adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and trademarks. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $72.9 million from 2009 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $68.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Kellogg: Restructuring charges were taken in 2013 through 2015. Pretax profits for each year were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2013 and 2014 and decreased them in 2015. The high rates in 2012, 2014 and 2015 are explained by turnarounds of deferred taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $160.8 from 2009 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $90 million from 2008 to 2015.

Kimberly-Clark: The high rate in 2015 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $212 million from 2008 to 2015.

Kohl's: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The high rates in 2012 and 2015 are explained by turnarounds of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $16 million from 2009 to 2015.

Kroger: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2009 and 2010 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairments. The high rate in 2010 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $87.8 from 2011 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $200 million from 2008 to 2015.

L-3 Communications: Reported pretax profits in 2015 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $126.9 million and $178.6 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $73 million from 2008 to 2015.

Laboratory Corp. of America: The high rate in 2015 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $70.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Levi Strauss: The company's fiscal years end in November of the years listed. The company's high tax rate in 2009 is driven by a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $4 million from 2012 to 2015.

Limited Brands: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $334.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

LKQ Corp: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $111.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Lockheed Martin: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. More than 75 percent of the company's worldwide sales were to the U.S. government in each year. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in 2008 through 2011. The high tax rates in 2014 and 2015 are explained by deferred tax assets. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $704 million and $390 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $21.0 and $92.0 million in 2009 and 2008.

Loews: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Reported pretax profits in 2008 and 2013 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges. Reported pretax profits in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013 were adjusted for an impairment of natural gas and oil properties. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $11.7 million in 2008. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7 million from 2008 to 2010.

Lowe's: The high tax rates in most years are explained by deferred tax assets. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.0 and $1.0 million in 2010 and 2008.

Macy's: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted for a goodwill impairment. Accelerated deprecation reduced the company's taxes in 2008. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $185 million from 2010 to 2015.

Mastercard: Reported pretax profits in each of the eight years were adjusted to move the cost of litigation settlements to the years when the money was actually spent. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $346 million from 2008 to 2015.

McDonalds: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $795.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

McKesson: The company's fiscal years end in March following the years listed. Pretax income was adjusted to reflect the timing of charges for litigation settlements.

MDU Resources: Reported pretax profits in 2012, 2009, and 2008 were adjusted for an impairment of natural gas and oil properties. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $10 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12.2 million from 2008 to 2015.

Merck: The company recorded restructuring charges in 2010, 2009 and 2008. The study adjusted U.S. pretax profits for the current effect of those charges, which increased reported U.S. profits in 2008 through 2011 and reduced them in 2012. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks in 2009 and 2008.

Molina Healthcare: Reported pretax profits in 2011 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $18.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Monsanto: The company's fiscal years end in August of the years listed. The company recorded restructuring charges in 2009, 2010 and 2015. The study adjusted U.S. pretax profits for the current effect of those charges, which increased reported U.S. profits in 2009 and 2015, and reduced them in 2010 through 2012. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $414 million and $182 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $557 million from 2008 to 2015.

Mosaic: The company's fiscal years end in May following the years listed from 2008 to 2012. The data for 2013 represents the transition period from June through December, and the company's 2014 and 2015 fiscal years end in December. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $23 million from 2008 to 2010. Percentage depletion reduces the company's taxes in each year.

Netflix: The high tax rate in 2012 is explained by deferred tax assets. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $80.2 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $381.9 million from 2008 to 2015. The negative rates in 2013 and 2015 are explained by these excess tax benefits from stock options.

NextEra Energy: Deferred tax benefits explain most of the company's tax benefits.

Nike: The company's fiscal years end in May following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $965.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

NiSource: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $1.2 and $1.8 million in 2009 and 2008.

Nordstrom: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The high tax rates in 2008 and 2009 are explained by deferred tax assets. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $133 million from 2008 to 2015.

Norfolk Southern: Accelerated depreciation provided the company with substantial tax savings in each year. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $300 million from 2008 to 2015.

Northrop Grumman: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $293 million and $261 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $361 million from 2008 to 2015.

NVR: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $271 million from 2008 to 2015.

Omnicom Group: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $267.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Oneok: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Reported pretax income in 2012 was adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Deferred taxes explain most of the company's tax breaks in all eight years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $21 million from 2011 to 2013.

Oracle: The company's fiscal years end in May following the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $1.233 billion from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.475 billion from 2008 to 2015.

O'Reilly Automotive: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $235.6 million from 2008 to 2015.

Owens & Minor: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $13.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Paccar: The high tax rate in 2014 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $108.3 million from 2012 to 2015. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $17.4 million from 2008 to 2011. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $7.1 and $3.8 million in 2009 and 2008.

Packaging Corp. of America: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $77.8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $33.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Parker Hannifin: The company's fiscal years end in June of the years listed. Reported pretax income was adjusted upward in 2013 for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $105.2 million and $95.9 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $210.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

Pepco Holdings: Accelerated depreciation provided the company with substantial tax savings in most years. The company recorded restructuring charges in 2010. The study adjusted U.S. pretax profits for the current effect of those charges, which increased reported U.S. profits in 2010 and decreased profits in 2011.

Pepsico: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $814 million from 2008 to 2015.

PG&E Corp: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years.

Pitney Bowes: The company recorded restructuring charges in all eight years. The study adjusted U.S. pretax profits for the current effect of those charges, which increased reported U.S. profits in 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2014 and decreased them in 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2015.

PNC Financial Services Group: The study adjusted U.S. and foreign pretax income to replace provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. Pretax income in 2012 was adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $114 million from 2008 to 2015.

Polo Ralph Lauren: The company's fiscal years end in March following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $212.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

PPG Industries: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income.

PPL: Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $31 million from 2008 to 2010.

Praxair: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $337 million from 2008 to 2015.

Precision Castparts: For 2008 to 2014, the company's fiscal years end in March following the years listed. The numbers for 2015 are for the transition period from April 2015 through January 2016. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $302.7 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $169.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Priceline.com: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $181.1 million from 2008 to 2015.

Principal Financial: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $52.6 million from 2008 to 2015.

Procter & Gamble: The company's fiscal years end in June following the years listed. Reported pretax profits in 2012 and 2011 were adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment.

Public Service Enterprise Group: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $103 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $11 million from 2008 to 2015.

Publix Super Markets: The company enjoyed small deferred tax benefits, primarily from accelerated depreciation, in 2009 through 2011 and in 2015.

Qualcomm: The high tax rate in 2010 is explained by deferred tax assets. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $440 million from 2012 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.497 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Quanta Services: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in 2009 through 2015. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Reported pretax income in 2015 was adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $43.8 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $10.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Quest Diagnostics: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Deferred taxes reduced the company's tax rate slightly in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $26.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

R.R. Donnelley & Sons: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments in all eight years. The study adjusted reported pretax income upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges in each year from 2008 through 2012 and in 2014. A turnaround of deferred taxes explains the high rate in 2009. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $38.2 million from 2009 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $2.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Raytheon: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $406.4 million and $221.1 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $224 million from 2008 to 2015.

Reinsurance Group of America: Deferred taxes explain the company's low rates in most years. The high rate in 2009 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $12.6 million from 2008 to 2015.

Reliance Steel & Aluminum: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income for 2008, the study estimated foreign pretax income in that year based on reported current foreign income taxes. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $48 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $15.7 million from 2008 to

2015. Pretax income in 2013 and 2015 was adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of indefinite-lived intangible assets.

Reynolds American: Reported pretax profits in 2008 through 2013 were adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and trademarks. Income was adjusted to reflect the timing of restructuring charge payments in all eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $495 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $89 million from 2008 to 2015.

Rockwell Automation: The company's fiscal years end in September of the years listed The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $63 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $154 million from 2008 to 2015.

Rockwell Collins: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $120.2 million and $192.8 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $71 million from 2008 to 2015.

Ross Stores: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $173.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Ryder System: Accelerated depreciation explains most of the company's tax breaks in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $13.7 million from 2008 to 2015.

SAIC: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $22 million and $42 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $116 million from 2008 to 2015.

Scana: Deferred taxes, primarily accelerated depreciation, explain the low rates in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $56 million from 2008 to 2015.

Sempra Energy: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. Deferred taxes, primarily accelerated depreciation, explain the low rates in most years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $52 million in 2015.

Sherwin-Williams: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $158.9 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $362.9 from 2008 to 2015.

Sonic Automotive: Reported pretax profits in 2008 were adjusted for a goodwill impairment.

Southern: The company's low rates primarily reflects deferred taxes. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $18.2 and $10.9 million in 2009 and 2008.

Southwest Airlines: The company's low rates in most years primarily reflect deferred taxes. Accelerated depreciation was the most common source of deferred tax savings in each year. The high rate in 2015 is explained by a turnaround of deferred taxes.

Spartan Nash: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $0.8 million from 2011 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $5.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Spectra Energy: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The company's low rates primarily reflect deferred taxes. Accelerated depreciation was the most important source of deferred tax savings in most years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $25 million from 2008 to 2012.

Staples: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The company's high tax rate in 2009 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes, mostly related to accelerated depreciation. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $24 million from 2008 to 2015.

State Street: The company's high tax rate in 2008 reflects a turnaround of deferred taxes, mostly related to accelerated depreciation. Deferred taxes were primarily responsible for the company's low rate in 2009. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $186 million from 2012 to 2015.

Synnex: The company's fiscal year ends in November of the years listed. A turnaround of deferred taxes explains the company's high tax rate in 2008. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $44 million from 2008 to 2015.

Target: The company's fiscal years end in February following the years listed. Deferred taxes, primarily accelerated depreciation, explains virtually all of Target's tax breaks from 2008 to 2012.

Tech Data: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $11.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Texas Instruments: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction and the research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes from 2008 to 2015 by $477 million and $459 million, respectively. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $365 million from 2008 to 2015.

Thermo Fisher Scientific: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $236.5 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $243.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Time Warner: The company recorded restructuring charges in all eight years, and the study made adjustments to pretax income each year to reflect the timing of payments. The study also adjusted 2008 income upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $848 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $625 million from 2008 to 2015.

Time Warner Cable: The study adjusted 2008 income upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $474 million from 2008 to 2015.

TJX: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. The company reduced its tax rate by deferring taxes in each year. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $415.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Tractor Supply Company: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $147.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Travelers Cos.: Because the company did not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income for 2008, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $243.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Tutor Perini: The study adjusted 2012 and 2008 income upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and other intangible assets. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $14.9 million from 2011 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $2.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

Twenty-First Century Fox: The company was formerly known as News Corporation. Reported profits in 2008 and 2011 were adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges. The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $372.7 million from 2012 to 2015.

U.S. Bancorp: Pretax income was adjusted in each year by replacing the company's non-cash "provision for credit losses" with actual "charge-offs, net of recoveries." This adjustment increased pretax income in 2008 through 2010, and reduced income in 2011 through 2015. The company reports noncontrolling interest income in each year. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income / loss. The Company has investments in Variable Interest Entities (VIEs) that generate low-income housing tax credits and rehabilitation tax credits. As stated in its tax footnote, "the Company's investments in these entities are designed to generate a return primarily through the realization of federal and state income tax credits over specified time periods." The company realized federal and state income tax credits related to these investments of $8.774 billion from 2008 to 2015.

UGI: Most of the company's tax breaks come through tax savings from accelerated depreciation and book / tax differences in regulatory assets. The company reports a noncontrolling interest loss in 2012 and noncontrolling interest income in all other years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income / loss. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $46.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Union Pacific: Accelerated depreciation accounts for much of the company's tax breaks. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $554 million from 2008 to 2015.

United Natural Foods: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $13.9 million from 2008 to 2015.

United Parcel Service: Pretax income in 2012 was adjusted upwards for a mark-to-market charge. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts from 2008 to 2012. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $18 million from 2008 to 2012.

United Stationers: Pretax profits for 2010 and 2011 were adjusted for the actual utilization of the company's restructuring reserves, which increased pretax profits in 2010 and decreased them in 2011. Pretax income in 2015 was adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and other intangible assets. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $19.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

United Technologies: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $606 million from 2008 to 2015.

UnitedHealth Group: Pretax income for 2010 was adjusted upward for a non-cash goodwill impairment charge. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $127.1 million from 2008 to 2010.

Unum: Pretax income was adjusted for claim reserves in each of the eight years. This increased pretax income in 2009 through 2012 and reduced it in 2008 and 2013 through 2015.

Verizon Communications: The company reports noncontrolling interest income in all eight years. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income. From 2010 to 2015, we disregarded non-cash charges that Verizon booked to reflect reduced assumptions about the future return on its pension and other retirement plans. Verizon itself disregards these non-cash charges in its Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA presentation, because they distort its real financial results. In its 2010 report, the company changed its accounting method for pensions, and retroactively restated its pretax profits for 2009 and 2008. The restatement had little effect for 2009. For 2008, our report uses the profits actually reported in the company's 2008 report. Accelerated depreciation and amortization comprised most of the company's tax subsidies. In 2008 and again in 2010, the company divested substantial assets using a technique known as a "reverse Morris trust" transaction, saving an estimated $1.5 billion in federal and state income taxes.

VF: Pretax income for 2009, 2010, 2014 and 2015 was adjusted upward for non-cash impairments of goodwill and other intangible assets. The relatively high tax rate in 2010 compared to the prior two years is explained by the turnaround of amortization deductions, the accrual of compensation not yet deductible, and an increase in net operating losses not yet utilized. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $287.4 million from 2008 to 2015.

Viacom: The company's fiscal years end in September of the years listed. Before 2010, the fiscal years ended in December, so fiscal year 2010 has only 9 months for Viacom. The company's comparatively high tax rates in 2010 and 2014 reflect a turnaround of deferred taxes related to accelerated depreciation. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $595 million from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $274 million from 2011 to 2015.

Visa: Pretax income was adjusted in all eight years to reflect the timing of payments related to litigation charges. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $264 million in 2014, $191 million of which was related to prior fiscal years. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $358 million from 2009 to 2015.

W.R. Berkley: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Reported total current income taxes were adjusted in order to separate federal and state taxes. The lower rate in 2010 was primarily a result of unrealized investment gains that were recorded for book purposes but are not yet taxable and the deductibility of loss reserves that were recorded as book expenses in prior years.

W.W. Grainger: Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $289.5 million from 2008 to 2015.

Walgreens: The company's fiscal years end in August of the years listed. Accelerated depreciation and book / tax differences in accounting for inventory significantly reduced the company's rate in 2009.

Wal-Mart: The company's fiscal years end in January following the years listed. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in 2008 through 2011.

Walt Disney: The company's fiscal years end in October of the years listed. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $1.481 billion from 2008 to 2015. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.145 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Waste Management: Reported pretax income was adjusted upward in 2013 through 2015 for non-cash impairments to goodwill and the carrying value of oil and gas properties. The company's biggest tax subsidy is related to the accelerated depreciation of property, plant, and equipment. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $69 million from 2008 to 2015.

WEC Energy Group: The company was formerly known as Wisconsin Energy. Accelerated depreciation saved the company substantial amounts in all eight years. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $54 million from 2008 to 2012.

Wells Fargo: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Pretax income was adjusted by replacing the company's non-cash "provision for loan losses" with actual "charge-offs, net of recoveries." This adjustment reduced pretax profits in 2010 through 2015 and increased them in 2008 and 2009. Accelerated depreciation saved the company significant amounts between 2008 and 2012. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $1.72 billion from 2008 to 2015.

Wesco International: The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $5 million from 2008 to 2012. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $42.3 million from 2008 to 2015.

Westrock: The company's fiscal years end in September of the years listed. Westrock is the product of a 2015 merger between Meadwestvaco and Rock-Tenn. Accelerated depreciation explains most of the company's low tax rates. The Domestic Production Activities Deduction reduced taxes by $20 million and $3 million in 2015 and 2014. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $66 million from 2008 to 2015.

Whole Foods Market: Because the company does not disclose U.S. and foreign pretax income, the study estimated foreign pretax income based on reported current foreign income taxes. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $138.8 million from 2008 to 2015.

Williams: The company reports noncontrolling interest income from 2008 to 2014 and a noncontrolling interest loss in 2015. Pretax income was adjusted to exclude this income / loss. Reported pretax profits in 2010 and 2015 were adjusted upward for noncash goodwill impairment charges. The study also reversed non-cash impairments for the carrying value of oil and gas properties in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

Windstream: The company's low tax rate in most years is almost entirely driven by the accelerated depreciation write-offs they enjoy on their property, plant, and equipment. The research and experimentation tax credit reduced taxes by $18.9 million from 2013 to 2015. From 2011 to 2015, we disregarded non-cash charges that the company booked to reflect reduced assumptions about the future return on its pension and other retirement plans.

Wyndham Worldwide: Pretax income for 2008 was adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges. The study adjusted U.S. pretax income by replacing the company's provision for loan losses with actual charges net of recoveries. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $131 million from 2008 to 2015.

Xcel Energy: The company's low tax rates are almost entirely driven by the accelerated depreciation write-offs they enjoy on their property, plant, and equipment.

Yum Brands: Pretax income for 2009 was adjusted upward for non-cash goodwill impairment charges. Excess tax benefits from stock options reduced federal and state taxes by $472 million from 2008 to 2015.

BY LI A TUC ER

Consumer Watchdog

August 2016

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



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Governor Jerry Brown paints himself a foe of climate change. But an exhaustive review of company donations, publicly released emails and documents at PUCPapers.org, court filings, and media reports show that fossil fuel and fossil fuel-reliant companies have supported Brown in close proximity to actions that he and his Administration have taken on their behalf. Twenty-six energy companies with business before the state greased the skids via $9.85 million in political donations to Brown's gubernatorial campaigns, ballot initiatives, favorite causes such as the Oakland Military Institute and Oakland School for the Arts, and the California Democratic Party since Brown's run for office in 2010, according to campaign reports.

The three major investor-owned utilities, Edison International, parent of Southern California Edison (SCE), Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Sempra, parent of Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), contributed nearly $6 million of the total. The three utilities and Chevron also made the biggest donations of any energy companies to the State Democratic Party. Donations were often made within days or weeks of winning government favors. The evidence points to Brown and his operatives using the Democratic Party as a political slush fund to receive contributions in amounts greater than permitted to his candidate committee, and masking money from unpopular energy entities.

The timing of donations suggests that the Brown Administration used the Democratic Party as a pass-through to Brown committees as reward for legislative or regulatory action on behalf of these companies. For example, at the end of December 2013, three months after weakened fracking legislation was chaptered, Chevron donated $350,000 to the Democratic Party. One week later, the party donated $300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chevron donated $54,400 to the campaign that day—the maximum amount allowed. Weeks later, Brown came out against an oil severance tax, or well-head tax, that would have produced billions for the state's coffers. Chevron had long opposed the tax.

These 26 companies have found support in the Brown Administration by virtue of Brown's own staffers. Brown's executive secretary Nancy McFadden, and his former cabinet secretary Dana Williamson, both held high-level positions at Pacific Gas & Electric. The Democratic Party paid them both for consulting and fund-raising services, while they worked for Brown. McFadden and Williamson worked for the Party at various times between June 5, 2013 and March 25, 2016, Democratic Party spending records show. Between 2011 and 2014, the energy companies gave $4.4 million to the California Democratic Party, while the Democratic Party donated $4.7 million to Brown's relection.

This review helps explain how the Brown Administration, despite its public posture hostile to the oil industry, privately aided oil companies at key junctures while receiving major oil industry contributions. Brown quashed the oil severance tax as Democratic Party support built for it. He rejected a fracking moratorium. He refused a Senate compromise with Assembly moderates on the climate change bill, SB 350, to slash petroleum use in cars. Brown turned SB 350 instead into a Christmas tree for utilities by granting them billions in new business and entrée into a vast, largely unregulated regional grid. Utilities responded in kind with big contributions. In this pay-to-play environment, ratepayers also got the short end of the stick. Under Brown, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has granted the three biggest investor-owned utilities in the state more than a combined $130 billion in rate hikes approved from 2011 through 2015, according to PUC 748 annual reports. California tops the nation in excess electricity generating capacity. In the last few years, energy regulators have approved billing Southern California ratepayers alone at least $10 billion over the next two decades for four natural gas-fired power plants at Otay Mesa, Carlsbad, Huntington Beach, and Alamitos, locking the state into fossil-fuel natural gas instead of embracing renewable alternatives like rooftop solar and battery storage to avoid building new plants.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Energy Companies Have Given Big Dollars and Received Big Favors

• Southern California Edison donated $130,000 to the California Democratic Party on the same day former PUC President Michael Peevey cut a secret deal with an SCE executive in a Warsaw, Poland hotel room to make ratepayers, not shareholders, cover 70 percent of the $4.7 billion cost to close the fatally flawed San Onofre nuclear plant. Peevey is now under criminal investigation for conspiring to obstruct justice by illegally engaging in and concealing *ex parte* communications, and inappropriately interfering with the San Onofre settlement process by pushing SCE to fund $25 million of greenhouse gas research at UCLA in exchange for the deal.[1] In the media's glare, the case has been reopened. But Brown backed the dirty deal, telling Edison's CEO personally, according to an email by the CEO uncovered by the Public Records Act, that the Governor was willing to tell the media that SCE was acting responsibly and had done all the right things in closing San Onofre. Brown praised Peevey subsequently in a taped interview with the *Mercury News* where he called Peevey "a very effective leader" who "gets things done."[2]

• Emails from PG&E's former top lobbyist Brian Cherry to his boss claim that Brown personally intervened with a PUC Commissioner to persuade him to approve a natural-gas fired power plant called Oakley for the utility. In a January 1, 2013 email, Cherry described a New Year's Eve dinner with Peevey where the pair shared "a dram or two of Johnnie Walker Blue Label." According to Cherry, Peevey reminded him "how he and Governor Brown used every ounce of persuasion to get [PUC Commissioner Mark] Ferron to change his mind and vote for Oakley...Jerry's direct plea was decisive."[3] PG&E donated $20,000 to the California Democratic Party the day after the PUC voted for the project. An appeals court would later strike the PUC decision down because the utility had not proved the plant's necessity.

• PG&E's vice president Nancy McFadden was named Brown's executive secretary. PG&E gave $25,000 to the Democratic Party days before Brown's election. While Cherry and Peevey fed names to McFadden to appoint the critical swing-vote commissioner in February 2011 to the PUC who could cast pro-utility votes, PG&E donated $75,000 to the Party. The same day that Brown appointed ex-banker Mark Ferron to the commission, PG&E donated another $41,500. The appointment bolstered PG&E's sagging stock price and also lifted the value of up to one million dollars in PG&E stock options held by Nancy McFadden.

• Lawmakers sent Brown a package of six PUC reform bills in 2015 which would have increased oversight, transparency and accountability at the PUC, and received unanimous, bipartisan support. Brown vetoed the reform bills on October 12, 2015. One week later, PG&E donated $50,000 to the Democratic Party. In December, PG&E donated another $175,000 to the Party.

• Brown's climate change bill, SB 350, gave utilities a monopoly on electric vehicle infrastructure and large-scale renewable energy projects to the disadvantage of rooftop solar, which was never added to the state's renewable portfolio standard. Three weeks after an eleventh hour amendment setting the stage for utilities to have access to a regional grid, PG&E donated $80,000 to the Democratic Party. The utility donated another $50,000 two weeks after the bill was chaptered. Stock prices of California's three investor-owned utilities increased by at least 14 percent within two months.

• Occidental Petroleum's attorney, former Governor Gray Davis, successfully pressured Brown to fire two oil and gas regulators who wanted oil companies to prove their wells wouldn't contaminate groundwater under federal law before getting waste injection permits, and had overhauled well safety to the disliking of oil companies. They had tried to enforce requirements for injection wells after a Chevron worker was killed when he fell into a sinkhole filled with oil waste. Two months later, Brown's new oil and gas supervisor granted Occidental a permit to frack in Kern County without an environmental review to protect aquifers, violating EPA standards. Four days after that, Occidental contributed $250,000 to Prop 30, Brown's effort to raise taxes. The same day of the contribution, Brown bragged about expedited permitting in Sacramento where he reaffirmed his support of all forms of energy development. "There are going to be screw-ups. There are going to be bankruptcies. There will be indictments and there will be deaths. But we're going to keep going," he said.[4] Occidental made a second $250,000 donation to Prop 30 seven months later.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Sempra donated $115,000 to the California Democratic Party a week before PUC President Michael Picker reversed a negative PUC decision and approved an SDG&E gas-fired power plant in Carlsbad. Chevron, which produces and sells natural gas in California, contributed $215,000 the day before the approval. The Carlsbad plant was approved without first considering renewable resources and energy storage. Former PUC President Peevey had long been working to pave the way for the plant, emails show. He had encouraged Sempra to lobby the city of Carlsbad aggressively. On January, 17, 2014, Peevey wrote Sempra's CEO about James Avery, SDG&E's chief development officer. "I just want you to know that Jim Avery did an outstanding job of managing the situation in Carlsbad, getting the city to support a new plant, etc. And he did it quickly. A tough assignment, very well done. My best."[5]

• Power plant developer NRG wasn't a Brown donor until the company cut a sweetheart deal with the PUC to settle its case against NRG for electricity price manipulation, touted as a win by the Governor's office.[6] The company agreed to spend $100 million out of a $120 million fine to install electric vehicle charging stations. The release quoted Peevey saying that the deal would "launch a virtuous circle" in which Californians would get comfortable driving EVs, while companies would invest in building the state's needed electric vehicle infrastructure.[7] "It will create jobs in California, help clean our air, and support attainment of our greenhouse gas reduction goals," the release said. Brown simultaneously issued an executive order to reach the state's goal of 1.5 million zero-emission vehicles on California roads by 2025. The punishment looked a lot like a no bid contract. Two months later, NRGbegan donations to Brown, his causes, and his party that would come to $105,000. A lawsuit against the PUC, filed by electric charging station competitor Ecotality, called the deal illegal because it awarded a monopoly to an out-of-state company. As of 2015, NRG had not reached benchmarks for the work that was supposed to constitute their fine, and the PUC has not taken action.

• Brown's sister has profited from his policies toward Sempra, parent of SoCalGas and SDG&E. Sempra invited Kathleen Brown onto Sempra's board of directors in June 2013, after the utilities had enjoyed two and a half years of favorable treatment under her brother's governorship. Sempra paid Kathleen Brown a total of $691,300 in stock and cash for her work from 2013 through 2015. Brown's Administration has taken extraordinary steps to keep open Sempra's biggest natural gas storage asset in the West, Aliso Canyon, following the biggest methane gas leak from a well blowout in US history. Months into the efforts to stop the leak, Brown issued an executive order keeping any investigation of the causes and whether it could or should be shut down secret.[8] During Brown's Administration, Sempra's stock has risen 116 percent, the most by far of the three investor-owned utilities.

• Brown's sister Kathleen holds $749,000 worth of stock in real estate and oil company Forestar Group—which owns 700 acres next to Porter Ranch where it plans to build a luxury home community, and another 1,000 acres of oil and gas interests in California. She was on the board of directors, but stepped down one month after Brown issued his declaration of emergency at Aliso Canyon, which ensured secrecy around the investigation, and the true threat of the wells to the real estate value in the area.[9] She now sits on the board of Renew Financial, a funder of renewable energy projects that stands to gain from new utility business spurred by legislation (SB 350) that increases renewables to 50 percent of California's electricity generation by 2030.

• In 2012, 16 energy companies donated $1.2 million to Prop 30, Brown's initiative to raise taxes. A large chunk of that sum came from just two companies, Occidental and California oil and gas producer Aera Energy. The passage of Prop 30 in November 2012 cemented Brown's national reputation as a budget-balancing governor after the election, likely saving the Brown Administration from presiding over persistent state budget problems and economic turmoil. Fracking legislation was introduced barely a month later, and the Brown Administration helped to dramatically scale it back.

• On May 24, 2013, Chevron donated $135,000 to the California Democratic Party. That same day, lawmakers exempted an common method of well stimulation from the fracking legislation. After the bill passed with an amendment dropping a moratorium on permits, Occidental gave $100,000 to one of Brown's favorite causes, the Oakland Military Institute. Brown signed the weakened bill. On December 23, 2013, Chevron donated $350,000 to the Democratic Party. On December 30, the Democratic Party donated $300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chevron donated the maximum to Brown's campaign, $54,400, on the same day. In early 2014, Brown then came out publicly to oppose a proposed oil severance tax.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Brown has protected the oil and gas industry and its fossil fuel-reliant clients via a coterie of regulators and key staff. Many of them walked through the revolving door of government to business and back again. Some feathered their nests during California's energy crisis, and some continue to do favors for one another. Current PUC Commissioner Liane Randolph was previously appointed by Brown as general counsel at the Natural Resources Agency, where she delivered ultimatums to the two oil well regulators ultimately fired by Brown for refusing oil company demands for weakened well safety standards. Previously, Randolph was an attorney at Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, where her clients included Chevron and the Western States Petroleum Association. Former PUC President Michael Peevey, currently under criminal investigation for secret backroom dealing with the utilities and rigging of proceedings that cost ratepayers billions, was a trusted Brown Administration confidante. The PUC in particular has shielded companies from tough regulation and public investigations that assign blame and responsibility for disasters and near disasters, and that hold companies and their executives responsible.

These key regulators have allowed utilities to raise connection fees and lower payments to customers who generate their own solar power, and have endorsed building new fossil fuel power plants even without proven need, eschewing renewable alternatives. Regulators have been willing to overlook utility negligence in accidents that put profits ahead of safety. They have protected utilities from fines that could have been much bigger, permitted more natural gas plants than necessary, and have scuttled or suppressed public investigations into disasters and near disasters.

* * *

HIGHLIGHTS TIMELINE

ACTION	DONATION
Brown appoints ex-PG&E Vice President Nancy McFadden as Executive Secretary - 1/5/11	2/17/11 PG&E $75,000 → California Democratic Party
On the same day, PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry succeeds in convincing McFadden and Brown to appoint pro-business ex-energy Trader Mark Ferron to the PUC - 3/22/11	3/22/11 PG&E $42,500 → California Democratic Party
Former Governor Gray Davis, now at Occidental Petroleum, pressures Brown into firing two oil and gas regulators who wouldn't grant injection well permits quickly enough. - 11/3/11	1/13/12 OXY $250,000 → Prop 30
	1/25/12 OXY Occidental Petroleum $100,000 → Oakland Military Institute
NRG & PUC negotiate penalty for electricity price manipulation. The company agrees to spend $100 million of the $120 million fine to build EV charging stations - 3/23/12	5/31/12 - NRG begins donations to Brown's interests, ultimately giving $105,000 in total to Brown & his projects. nrg
On the same day, PUC President Peevey cuts a deal with SCE executives in Warsaw, Poland, to force ratepayers to cover 70% of th $4.7 billion cost of closing the San Onofre nuclear plant. - 3/26/13	3/26/13 SoCal Edison $130,000 → California Democratic Party
Oil Severance tax is shelved in suspense file - 5/20/13	
Legislators exempted crucial fracking methods from SB 4, a bill meant to regulate fracking - 5/24/13	5/24/13 Chevron $135,000 → California Democratic Party
SoCal Edison announces closure of San Onofre - 6/7/13	6/4/13 SoCal Edison $25,000 → California Democratic Party
Fracking regulatory bill SB 4 drops portion about a moratorium on fracking - 6/18/13	7/2/13 OXY $27,200 → Brown for Governor
SB 4 is signed by Brown - 9/20/13	10/9/13 OXY Occidental Petroleum $100,000 → Oakland Military Institute
	12/23/13 Chevron $350,000 → California Democratic Party
	12/30/13 California Democratic Party $300,000 → Brown for Governor
	Same Day Chevron $54,400 → Brown for Governor
Brown Comes out against Oil Severance Tax - 1/9/14	
Amendment is added to SB 350 giving utilities access to a 'regional grid', allowing for more projects & profits - 9/4/15	9/29/15 PG&E $80,000 → California Democratic Party
Brown vetoes six PUC reform bills - 10/12/15	10/19/15 PG&E $50,000 → California Democratic Party
Three utilities' stock increases by at least 14% within two months of the passage of SB 350 - 10/22/15	12/10/15 PG&E $175,000 → California Democratic Party

FULL REPORT



» Pat and Jerry Brown

All in the Family

The Brown family has long been connected to fossil fuels and utilities. Some portion of the Brown family's wealth comes from Indonesian oil. It began with Jerry Brown's father, **Governor "Pat" Brown**, who after stepping down from office in 1967 helped Indonesian generals who had overthrown Sukarno, the dictator who had nationalized Royal Dutch Shell's oil holdings. Brown reportedly organized a consortium of banks to lend $12 billion to the military junta.[10]

The generals gave Brown control of a California oil trading company and half-ownership of a Hong Kong office. The offices earned a fee for each barrel traded, or as the Sacramento Bee's Dan Walters put it, got "a little taste, as they might say in the Mafia." When Chevron built an El Segundo refinery to bring in Alaskan crude during Jerry Brown's first administration, the state's Air Resources Board, run by Brown's former campaign manager, passed an air-quality standard for sulfur that Chevron couldn't quite meet with Alaskan crude, but that Indonesian oil could. That move helped secured the Brown family's oil wealth. The Brown family had ties with the utility industry too. Brown's late sister, Cynthia Kelly, wasmarried to Joe Kelly, a long-time top PG&E attorney![11]

While Jerry Brown served as Governor in the 1970s and 80s, his father "Pat" also worked for Sempra's predecessor, Pacific Gas & Electric and Pacific Lighting, to sell Californians on the alleged need for LNG from Indonesia, according to the *Ventura County Star*.[12]

Brown's fascination with fossil fuels is still evident. In 2014, he inappropriately directed his Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources to map any oil or gas that might underlie his own family ranch and quickly received a 51- page report plus personalized satellite-imaged oil and gas drilling map for the area. Brown's State Oil & Gas Supervisor, Steve Bohlen, had made the mistake of emailing the report to Brown, creating an official record. When Brown found out, he threatened to fire Steve Bohlen, according to a lawsuit against the state filed by the R. Rex Parris law firm on behalf of Kern County farmers over rushing through waste injection permits for oil companies. Bohlen wound up resigning.[13]

While there are no oil or gas prospects under Brown's ranch, he does have one investment that could grow in value thanks to a fossil fuel. Brown's Statement of Economic Interests reveals a real es - tate investment in Edgewater Park Plaza, worth between $100,000 and $1 million, that Brown shares in East Oakland with Phil Tagami, a friend and one of Brown's longtime financial supporters. Tagami won significant business with the city of Oakland when Brown was mayor. Now, Tagami's real estate company, California Capital and Investment Group (CCIG), which owns Edgewater, stands to make significant profit from a plan to ship coal out of the former Oakland Army Base. CCIG is developing part of the former base and has plans to lease a new terminal to a company that wants to ship coal from Utah to Asian markets. Brown has refused to answer local lawmaker and environmentalists' calls that he oppose the deal that would release coal dust along the East Bay transportation route, polluting the air and threatening public health.

Little Sister

Perhaps the most problematic family connection to the utility and oil business today is Jerry Brown's sister **Kathleen Brown**. In 2013, she left Goldman Sachs' Chicago office, where she chaired regional investment banking, for a Los Angeles partnership in the lobbying and law firm of Manatt Phelps & Phillips. Manatt represents energy companies among others. When Brown joined Manatt, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that Kathleen Brown was especially interested in the energy sector because it was undergoing "transformational change."[15]

That year Sempra, parent of Southern California Gas and San Diego Gas & Electric, invited her onto its board. Sempra wanted Kathleen Brown for "her extensive experience in both the public and private financial sectors, as well as in-depth knowledge of California government processes," according to its 2015 proxy statement. Brown sits on Sempra's environmental, health, safety and technology committee, as well as its corporate governance committee, and LNG joint venture and financing committee. Sempra paid Brown a total of $691,000 in a combination of stock, cash, and other remuneration for her directorship between 2013 and 2015, according to SEC filings.[16]

The environmental committee on which Brown sits would be responsible for pin-pointing the reasons for the well blowout at SoCalGas's Aliso Canyon storage facility. She has reason to want to defend SoCalGas, given her position and sizeable Sempra investment. Her brother issued a carefully worded declaration assuring the public that a PUC "investigation" was underway and that oil and gas regulators would perform a technical review of what went wrong. However, the review will release only the results to the public, effectively sealing evidence in the investigation from the public. No information about the review has yet been released.

It has become imperative for the Administration to justify keeping Aliso open, not for reasons of energy reliability but for commercial priorities. Aliso Canyon markets itself as a place for big companies that buy natural gas when the price is right to store it there for a fee.[17] But the Administration has played the "reliability" card. Southern California Edison and other companies maintained that "the loss of natural gas to those [power] stations could ultimately lead to supply shortages and possibly electricity blackouts."[18] Energy regulators produced a biased report, largely authored by Southern California Gas, stating that the state couldn't do without Aliso Canyon and could experience up to 14 days of blackouts this summer without it.

The study left out that California has excess natural gas storage capacity, according to the Energy Information Administration, while utilities themselves report that natural gas usage is


» Kathleen Brown

in steady modest decline.[19] The report also left out other gas storage facilities that could substitute, and understated existing pipeline capacity to bring in gas on demand.[20]

At a California Senate hearing in May on Aliso Canyon, utility executives themselves began to back-pedal on the veracity of the report's threat of blackouts. A Southern California Edison executive said, "the natural gas pipeline network in the LA basin was sufficient to meet demand" as long as the right amounts of gas were ordered at the right time, the *Los Angeles Times* reported.[21]

At the same time, one subject regulators don't want to discuss is culpability for poor maintenance of wells at Aliso Canyon that led to the well blowout. Governor Brown ensured that Sempra's dirty laundry about its safety culture will never be aired. The only agency that can launch a formal public investigation is the PUC. Brown's declaration about the PUC investigation served to give regulators cover, with no timeline or obligation to inform the public whether any SoCalGas negligence played a role in the disaster. The PUC has declined to even accept a petition from Consumer Watchdog and the law offices of Aguirre & Severson to open a public investigation into the causes of the Aliso Canyon blowout, a violation of the California Constitution that guarantees the public the right to petition.[22] By law, the PUC must accept a public petition and rule either for or against a public investigation. They are doing neither.

Meantime, Sempra's stock has risen 116 percent under the Brown Administration, according to Bloomberg.

Kathleen Brown has one more investment that makes the situation even more fraught. As of mid-2015, Kathleen Brown held $749,000 worth of stock in a real estate and oil company called Forestar Group, according to Bloomberg. She became a company director in 2007, resigning in 2016. Forestar Group's 2014 annual report specifically targeted increased regulation as a threat to royalties earned from its oil-rich land due to the impact on "the timing and cost of extractive activities." Forestar, which owns 1,000 acres of oil and gas interests in California, also owns 700 acres of land next to Aliso Canyon and is planning a 285-acre luxury home community called "Hidden Creeks Estates" near Porter Ranch, the community most affected by the well blow out at Aliso Canyon. Forestar would have an interest in promoting the idea that the natural gas storage field, studded with wells as old as a century, is perfectly safe for natural gas injections, in order to preserve and maximize the value of its investment.

Kathleen Brown resigned from that company's board a month after Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency at Porter Ranch in January 2016. She now sits on the board of Renew Financial, a funder of renewable energy projects that stands to gain from new utility business spurred by Governor Brown's signature on legislation (SB 350) that increases renewables to 50 percent of California's electricity generation by 2030.

> **"There are going to be screw-ups. There are going to be bankruptcies. There will be indictments and there will be deaths. But we're going to keep going."**
>
> *- Brown on fracking and waste injection permits*

Stacking the PUC

When Brown took office in 2010, it wasn't clear what he would do with the PUC. But he inherited a PUC President, **Michael Peevey**, who had been serving since he was appointed by Governor Gray Davis. Brown kept Peevey on; he had known him for years. He admired Peevey, comparing him to **John Bryson**, Brown's PUC president during his first administration.[23] Bryson, who went on to become Chairman, CEO and President of Edison International, SCE's parent, was one of the principal architects of the electricity deregulation disaster two decades ago.[24]

Peevey too was a cheerleader. Peevey had become an electricity broker after leaving Edison, leading the charge for deregulation in 1995, and had made millions of dollars off of it. According to an investor research analysis that year by Bernstein Research, "Brown is a close friend of commission president Michael Peevey, who has endorsed Brown's candidacy for Governor."[25] In fact, right before starting his career at Edison, Peevey had worked from 1973 to 1983 as president of the California Coalition for Environment and Economic Balance, a non profit that Pat Brown had founded to make "environmental and economic balance a reality," according to its mission statement.[26]

Peevey's CCEEB leadership overlapped with Jerry Brown's first and second terms as California Governor. Under Peevey, in 1979, oil and gas companies and utilities, and later investment banks, funded an offshoot called the California Foundation for the Environment and Economy (CFEE). The foundation made a name for itself taking PUC officials like Peevey, state politicians, and utility executives on free domestic and foreign junkets where they could rub shoulders and cut deals about which ratepayers knew nothing and that were not necessarily in their interests.[27]

Wall Street analysts at Bernstein Research expected no change in the "current leadership and policies of the Commission" under Brown. Industry was clearly excited about Peevey's friendship with Brown. A 1977 photo of Brown with PG&E employees at The Geysers, the company's controversial geothermal field, showed just how far back that friendship went. It was forwarded to the PUC's executive director Paul Clanon in 2010. "This is a classic! Paul—please forward to Peevey. Thanks," read the email from PG&E's lobbyist Brian Cherry.[28]

With Peevey in place, Brown appointed two commissioners that were viewed as consumer-friendly. Wall Street was speculating wildly about who Brown would appoint and if they would be environmental advocates. In mid-January 2011, Brian Cherry was already forwarding Peevey PG&E's own investment analysis warning that Wall Street banks were fretting that Brown's picks might not maintain a "balance" between the need for regulatory oversight while still allowing utilities to earn a reasonable rate of return. Peevey's advice to Cherry in an email was: "You should find a way to get this info to Brown as he makes his decisions on Commissioners ASAP. Probably best coming from a non- utility source, such as investment banker(s)." In response Cherry wrote Peevey: "Done."[29]

Nevertheless, on January 25, 2011, Brown appointed Michael Florio, a former senior attorney for The Utility Reform Network, and Catherine Sandoval, a law school professor. The day after the appointments, on January 26, 2011, PG&E's investment analyst reported continued UBS and Deutsche Bank speculation on California utilities, including whether Peevey would remain president and if the third commissioner Brown picked would make the PUC far too consumer-oriented to the detriment of investors.

On January 27, 2011 the senior investment analyst at PG&E reported JP Morgan had downgraded PG&E and Edison stock from a "buy" to "hold."

Nancy McFadden, whom Brown had hired as his Executive Secretary in charge of appointments, legislation, and policy from PG&E where she was executive vice president, had her own interest in the price of PG&E stock. She joined Brown's staff with a $1 million cash bonus from PG&E and up to $1 million in PG&E stock options. The utility, a big Democratic Party donor, had given $25,000 to the Democratic Party days before his election.

When PG&E's stock was downgraded following the Florio and Sandoval appointments, Peevey advised Cherry, "This information should go to the Governor's Office, probably best to Nancy McF. Jerry has to be made aware that actions have consequences and the economy is best off with a stable utility sector."[30]

Emails produced by the Public Utilities Commission through Public Records Act requests show Cherry and Peevey calling McFadden the utility's "back door route" on PUC appointments.[31] Evidence shows that McFadden intervened in the decision on whom to appoint to the CPUC, though public officials are prohibited from using their official positions for personal financial benefit. Cherry wrote Peevey, "Nancy asks if you have any names you would recommend. You can call her directly if you like."[32]

In March 2011 Jerry Brown appointed a long-time investment banker, **Mark Ferron**, formerly of Deutsche Bank, to the PUC. A pro-utility majority on the commission was assured. PG&E's sagging stock jumped, benefitting McFadden as much as it did PG&E.

A conflict of interest complaint filed in early 2016 by Consumer Watchdog with the Fair Political Practices Commission about McFadden's improper involvement in the appointment fell outside the statute of limitations, although McFadden is being investigated for her failure to fully disclose her stock holdings in PG&E.

McFadden herself was a product of the revolving door, first working as a senior advisor to Governor Gray Davis, before taking a job at PG&E, and then working for Brown. She didn't land the Brown appointment as Executive Secretary by chance. In the Davis administration, McFadden worked under **Susan Kennedy**, a long-time political hand who had been executive director of the California Democratic Party. Kennedy was Davis's cabinet secretary and handled the worst of the California energy crisis by pushing legislators to arrange the sale of billions in bonds to buy power, and advocating to hike rates to save the utilities. McFadden was her protégé. After Davis appointed Kennedy to the PUC, McFadden left for PG&E. According to one insider, Kennedy had arranged for McFadden to get the job at PG&E in government relations.

In 2006, after three years as a PUC commissioner working alongside Michael Peevey, Kennedy became Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's chief of staff, then a consultant to McKinsey, Alston & Bird and other well-heeled outlets, and started her own consulting firms, Caliber Strategies, and SPK Consulting. PG&E would be a client. Brown's next picks for the PUC would also be influenced by Kennedy, via McFadden, to ensure that a majority of commissioners would continue to vote in the interests of industry.

As Peevey fomented scandal, Brown would appoint **Michael Picker**, a former aide and another product of the revolving door to the PUC, to replace Ferron in 2014. Picker's association with Jerry Brown and friendship with Susan Kennedy went way back; Kennedy told Jeff McDonald of the *San Diego Union Tribune* that Picker had been her "very first boss in politics" when she came to California a quarter of a century ago. [34] Picker served as deputy assistant for toxic substance control under Brown in 1981.

» Nancy McFadden

» MIchael Peevey

He would go on to be chief of staff for Sacramento Mayor Joe Serna Jr., and found Lincoln Crow Strategic Communications, a policy, media and campaign strategy group, in 2000. When Kennedy became Schwarzenegger's chief of staff, she hired Picker as an advisor on renewable energy, and passed him on as an advisor to the incoming Brown Administration.

Brown would make Picker PUC President once Peevey stepped down under a cloud of corruption at the end of 2014. Picker would continue to run the PUC in Peevey's image. Peevey, and then Picker, would push a building spree of fossil fuel-fired gas power plants. In 2013, Robert Weisenmiller, elevated by Brown to Chair of the California Energy Commission, maintained that natural gas was "the operational glue" of the California grid.[35]

The Ferron Factor

The appointment of ex-Deutsche Banker Mark Ferron to the PUC served as a vaccination against tough enforcement. Emails and other documents at PUCPapers.org reveal that Ferron was far more interested in delivering guaranteed, gold-plated rates of return to Wall Street and shareholders than he was in regulatory oversight.

Ferron and other commissioners and high-level staffers met with Wall Street analysts regularly and discussed pending business before the commission. In one such exchange, between a Morgan Stanley banker and Ferron on September 26, 2012, the banker confirmed a broad and detailed list of questions to pass along to all the commissioners who would meet with him for three hours.

Prior to that meeting, Ferron wrote Morgan Stanley that he had one "stipulation"—that he be put on the distribution list for research on California utilities.[36] The *quid pro quo* was the free provision of exclusive reports so Ferron could track Wall Street's view of the financial health of utilities in exchange for information on how the PUC was approaching specific rate and enforcement cases and other business.

Among the questions, Morgan Stanley wanted to know what the "hold up" was for a Southern California Edison rate hike, where the "various" investigations into PG&E's deadly San Bruno explosion stood, and if regulators were planning to come to settlement.[37]

In a memorandum to other commissioners on October 3, 2012, Ferron made the case that holding SCE and PG&E responsible for these disasters would affect investor perception of California as an "unfriendly place."[39] He claimed that this would lead to a higher "risk premium" on borrowed money for utilities, which would "cost ratepayers multiple billions in added expense."

Morgan Stanley's analysis of the California visit, emailed to a select group on October 4, 2012, said, "The key takeaway from our meeting with all the Commissioner offices at the CPUC is that regulation will remain balanced." Ferron and others had evidently signaled that PG&E would not face excessive fines for its lethal San Bruno pipeline explosion. "A settlement relating to the San Bruno explosion is progressing" Morgan Stanley wrote. "We believe our $500mn fine estimate remains appropriate."

On the San Onofre scandal, the PUC appears to have told Wall Street not to fret. "Conversely, a San Onofre investigation is likely, but the CPUC appears to be reserving judgment on the cause/recovery. As a result we do not expect a near-term EPS [earnings per share] hit to EIX/SRE [Edison International/SCE]" the analysis continued.[38] A PUC administrative law judge would go on to cancel the last phase of the public investigation into who was responsible for the radioactive steam leak that permanently shuttered the facility.

Ferron reinforced the tradition Peevey had begun in appeasing Wall Street. In a 2010 email, Brian Cherry praised Peevey's performance in a videoconference and Q&A with a Morgan Stanley analyst. Peevey had told bankers that he had no plans to "shrink" generous rates of return, and that low fuel prices meant utilities had extra money to engage in "asset development initiatives." No ratepayer refunds were in the offing. Cherry wrote in an email to Peevey, "Looks like your interview got rave reviews."[40]

Peevey initiated Michael Picker into the ways of Wall Street as well, asking bankers to arrange a trip to New York for him. In June 2014, Picker went on a personal Wall Street road show, complete with a banker-supplied sedan, for a "full day of 1x1 meetings + intimate group meeting."[41] On the list were ten investment companies, including Goldman Sachs and Prudential. Picker continued to meet with bankers like UBS in Sacramento. In August 2014, Picker wrote an email expressing "my deep gratitude" to



» Michael Picker

» Mark Ferron

UBS honcho Julien Dumoulin-Smith, "whose many research products already reach my inbox in great profusion daily."

Dumoulin-Smith would later write, "It's been described that you are cut from a different cloth from other CPUC folks. I tend to agree." He thanked Picker for his "insight," calling it a "refreshing change from a lot of folks we meet with." Experts, including the National Consumer Law Center's Charlie Harak in an interview given to the *San Diego Union Tribune,* say there is no reason for regulators to meet with investors or rating agency analysts, unless it's to extract inside information.

A cache of Public Records Act emails and other documents available at PUCPapers.org show that Picker met with Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, UBS, and Credit Suisse representatives at West Coast spots like San Francisco's acclaimed Vietnamese restaurant, the Slanted Door. While Picker championed California utilities, PG&E, Sempra, and SCE donated heavily to the California Democratic Party. Sempra donated $65,000 to the party in May 2014, and Southern California Edison donated $130,000 in May and June, as Peevey made arrangements for Picker's visit to Wall Street. PG&E made a $25,000 donation to the Oakland School for the Arts on July 3, a week after Picker's visit, and donations to the party totaling $435,000 between July and October.

Brown's "Hands"

Publicly released emails confirm that Brown remains loyal to old aides and associates, and tolerates their corruption. Michael Peevey, under criminal investigation for his deal to require 70 percent of the cost of closing San Onofre to be paid by ratepayers, in exchange for a generous SCE grant to UCLA, was well known for *quid pro quos*. A favorite tactic was trading PUC support in regulatory matters for utility contributions to 'nonprofit' organizations set up by Peevey and the utilities to fund extra-curricular PUC activities. According to Senator Jerry Hill, Peevey had approved the spending of a total of $160 million in ratepayer money to create seven 'non-profits,' including the California Clean Energy Fund on whose board Peevey sat with PG&E appointees.[43] Peevey had demanded that the utility contribute $30 million to the Fund as a condition of his support for PG&E's bankruptcy reorganization plan.

When Peevey decided to create a "PUC Foundation" that would raise money ostensibly for educational purposes, he demanded money from utilities to attend the fundraiser. PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E each bought a $20,000 table for the night of January 27, 2011. Brown had planned to attend. But as soon as *San Francisco Chronicle* columnists Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross panned the fundraiser as a way to create a slush fund to "pay for activities not covered by agency coffers," Brown was out.[44]

"Brown is not coming," Peevey emailed that afternoon to his friend, PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry. "Too much stuff in the Chron—Matier and Ross, editorial. Ugh."[45]

While he wouldn't be seen with Peevey in public that January night in 2011, Brown praised him to the *San Jose Mercury News* editorial board in a taped video interview in August 2014. "I would say he's a very effective leader, he gets things done."

PUC Director of Policy and Planning, Marzia Zafar, recommended that PG&E's senior director of regulatory relations read the article and watch the video, according to an email from the PUCPapers.org. "The article in this weekend's *San Jose Mercury News* features Gov. Brown talking about how great Pres. Peevey is but you have to watch the video to get a sense of Gov. Brown's confidence in Pres. Peevey," she said. "The video is the best. He says that he has to go back all the way to his first term in the late 70s to find an equally effective leader for the PUC."[46]

Brown's hands would show up at a goodbye dinner for Peevey in February 2015. Susan Kennedy, Peevey's former fellow commissioner who had told him that she had been so "proud to be your wingman,"[47] handled invitations and rsvps. Michael Picker, Peevey's successor at the PUC, was the official sponsor, who would report that various organizations paid at least $55,000 in sponsorships for the dinner.[48]

The invitation read, "You're invited to join us in honoring Mike Peevey. A lifetime of service to the people of California."[49] By then his own staff, outraged by his facilitation of PG&E judge shopping in a rate case and lax regulation of PG&E prior to the San Bruno disaster, described Peevey as "something like an untouchable mob boss."[50] Brown would defend him to the last.

Brown's sister Kathleen, Robert Weisenmiller, chair of the California Energy Commission, Michael Picker who had assumed Peevey's position as PUC President, and about 200 other friends and energy industry contacts did attend the 250-dollar-a-plate dinner. Peevey was disgraced in public, but privately he was still very much in with the circle of Brown insiders who controlled the PUC.

Deregulation

A few of Brown's hands in attendance had profited from the energy crisis. In fact, Peevey himself was one of the chief architects of California's deregulation disaster. After leaving Edison, he founded New Energy Ventures in 1995. The electricity broker got paid by clients for a portion of what was saved on their energy bills. Unisource Energy, parent of Tuscon Electric Power, invested $40 million in the venture, and guaranteed another $26 million in debt.[51]

Shortly after Governor Pete Wilson signed deregulation legislation in 1996, Peevey complained that "the flood gates have not opened as much as I had hoped" when it came to commercial customers peeling away from utilities to buy power from him.[52]

By 1997, he was touting cheap coal and nuclear power, as well as hydropower, to customers. He boasted about selling power from Quebec to a Rhode Island utility. "This historic sale and purchase signals the end of regulated monopolies in the electricity marketplace and the beginning of customer choice, competition and lower energy prices," he said.[53]

In 1999, he and his partners sold the firm for about $100 million to AES, the global power company that would feature in federal investigations of collusion to drive up power prices during the California electricity crisis. Peevey and his wife, Carol Liu, then just elected to the state Assembly, had investments in AES, Enron and Unisource. They would sell more than $200,000 in PG&E and Edison International stock in 2000—just in time to avoid the worst of the crisis.[54]

In 2001, Governor Gray Davis turned to Peevey to help craft a way out of the crisis. Traders selling on the spot market had spiked electricity prices so much that the legislature passed a law putting the state in charge of buying power for SCE and PG&E, which were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Davis would assign Peevey to sort through and choose the bidders vying to sell power to the state, ultimately signing long-term power contracts for $43 billion.[55]

Utilities were allowed to bill customers $20 billion for "stranded assets," meaning assets like nuclear plants they were unable to sell off prior to the energy crisis. Meanwhile, energy marauders gouged consumers in 2000 and 2001 for at least an extra $40 billion beyond the marginal cost of generating power, according to a 2003 report by the Public Policy Institute of California.[56]

Then, in 2002, Davis made Peevey president of the PUC—to reconsolidate utility control over power generation. One of his first acts would be to saddle ratepayers with an additional $8.2 billion to bring PG&E out of bankruptcy.

Robert Weisenmiller, Former California Energy Commission advisor during Brown's first administration, founded MRW & Associates in 1986 to provide energy consulting to businesses, including utilities. Peevey consulted Weisenmiller on exemptions to get his clients out of paying a so-called "competitive transition charge" to pay for utilities' unmarketable assets, even if customers switched to different providers. "It's become kind of a parlor game to guess who the … exemptions are meant for and who else might try to use them for their own advantage," Weisenmiller quipped to the *Public Utilities Fortnightly* newsletter in 1996.[57]

Mark Ferron, too, made money off the energy crisis. He worked for Deutsche Bank's London office from 1996-2009, the last several years as Chief Operating Officer overseeing all operations, including energy investments. Deutsche Bank had been snagged in California's electricity crisis, from its lobbyists expressing interest in 2001 in buying California's grid to its Deutsche Bank Energy Trading division paying a $1.6 million fine in 2009 to settle allegations of California market manipulation. After leaving Deutsche Bank he had settled in Mill Valley, California. Ferron founded the Silicon Valley Social Venture Fund that calls itself a "donor network" contributing its financial, intellectual, and human capital to "make a difference" in Silicon Valley and beyond.[58] Ferron had also donated $25,900 to Jerry Brown's 2010 campaign, according to state records.

Insiders would go on to award contracts to favorites, and bilk ratepayers. In 2012, the state settled a case over price manipulation during the energy crisis with power plant developer NRG that looked a lot more like a sweetheart contract than a punishment[8]. The company agreed to spend $100 million out of a $120 million fine to install electric vehicle charging stations. The release from the Governor's Office quoted Peevey saying that the deal would "launch a virtuous circle" in which Californians would get comfortable driving EVs, while companies would invest in building the state's needed electric vehicle infrastructure. "It will create jobs in California, help clean our air, and support attainment of our greenhouse gas reduction goals," the release said.

NRG had never donated a dime to Brown, his causes, or the Democratic Party. That changed within two months of the settlement. The company would go on to donate a total of $105,000. Electric charging competitor Ecotality was so incensed that it filed a lawsuit against the PUC, calling the deal illegal because it awarded a monopoly to an out- of-state company. As of 2015, NRG still hasn't delivered on the work it promised. And under PUC President Michael Picker, the company has not been held accountable.

Picker has continued in Peevey's footsteps. Under Picker, the PUC approved a spate of natural gas power plants for SCE when a boom in solar energy and other renewables and an oversupply of natural gas has raised serious questions about the state's need for them, especially when power plant capacity is currently underutilized.[59] At the same time as SCE got its wish for new power plants, Kennedy was awarded a $100 million contract to install storage batteries for the utility. She had chatted up Picker in emails about the technology she was developing. Companies like hers, she wrote, "are the pioneers who will bring these technologies to market by offering them to conservative utilities as a grid service."[60]

Her company, Advanced Microgrid Solutions, had star power, but little else. The company was cofounded with Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, a previous chair of the CEC who had worked for PG&E for two decades. The company had no track record or projects in the works, according to SCE testimony given before a PUC law judge in 2015 on procurement plans. "We looked at the personnel as to whether or not they had the expertise to do what they said they would do," said SCE's Colin Cushnie, vice president of

BROWN'S HANDS: AN INSIDER NETWORK



consumerwatchdog.org

"I would say he's a very effective leader, he gets things done..."

- Jerry Brown praises Michael Peevey, under criminal investigation for improper dealings with the utilities

energy procurement and management at SCE. "And in total, they were deemed to be sufficient to be able to make contracts."[61]

Lubricating Big Oil For Big Bucks

At the beginning of his administration, Brown appointed oil and gas regulators who were admired by environmentalists for their diligence. That soon changed under pressure from the industry. Gray Davis had served as Jerry Brown's chief of staff in the 1970s and 80s. As Occidental's counsel in 2011, Davis pressured Brown to give the oil industry a break. According to depositions and declarations in the RICO lawsuit against oil companies, Brown, and the state, California oil and gas regulators were prevented by Brown's operatives from stopping oil waste injections into unprotected aquifers. The regulators repeatedly warned that Brown's orders to skip provisions of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and to dole out oil and gas injection permits to oil companies without sufficient review would violate both state and federal laws protecting groundwater.

In a declaration signed by Derek Chernow, former acting director and chief deputy director of the California Department of Conservation, Chernow described how he lost his job trying to protect that groundwater.[62] "I understood that one of my job duties was to ensure and improve California's compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act. This is a Federal law that requires protection of groundwater from underground injections of waste water from oil production processes. This water…is so dirty, it cannot be used for hydraulic fracturing and must be disposed of in a manner that prevents it from migrating into fresh water."

The need to protect groundwater became more urgent in 2011 when oil companies upped their requests for injection well permits. The US Environmental Protection Agency had advised Chernow and his state oil and gas supervisor, Elena Miller, that the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) had no authority under state law to issue gas waste injection permits under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The California Independent Petroleum Association then sponsored a bill introduced by Senator Michael Rubio—later hired as Chevron's director of California governmental affairs—to give DOGGR that authority. Chernow and Miller required wells to be remediated prior to injections, and the US EPA, which had audited California to ensure full compliance with federal rules on protecting water, agreed. Oil companies didn't want to hear that. They started pressuring Miller for permits up front, with no testing, surveying or required environmental documentation.

In early October 2011, Chernow described a weekly meeting with Secretary John Laird of the California Natural Resources Agency. "During the meeting, Laird took a call from Governor Brown," he wrote. "Laird finished the call and, when he hung up, he told me the Governor just received a call from Gray Davis who served as counsel for Occidental. Occidental wanted Governor Brown to fire me and the State Oil & Gas supervisor because of the alleged delays in permitting."

Later that month, Brown's office requested documentation about Occidental's waste gas disposal wells, operations, and permitting process, which Chernow supplied, stating in an email that he would be "willing to follow any direction as required…" On October 19, media reports appeared in which Occidental complained of being hurt by a hold up in permits. Chernow reported that Governor Brown's office and his energy advisor, **Cliff Rechtschaffen**, scheduled a meeting with him around October 28, 2011.

Future PUC Commissioner **Liane Randolph**, then deputy secretary and general counsel at the California Natural Resources Agency, attended the meeting where Rechtschaffen told the group that the Governor "wanted to do things a different way."[63] He turned the meeting over to Randolph. "Randolph slid a piece of paper over to Miller and Chernow," the RICO complaint said. The document, called the "Temporary Assistance Program," looked a lot like what the petroleum industry wanted. It proposed that regulators approve injection well permits without complete engineering studies or well casing diagrams. That meant oil companies would be allowed to inject contaminated wastewater underground before any remediation of damaged well casings. "During the meeting Rechtschaffen stated that DOGGR must immediately fast track permit approval," Chernow stated in his declaration.

Chernow sent a memo to the Brown Administration about the proposal. He explained that the proposal violated both state and federal rules requiring complete review before injections started. Environmentalists, he said, "will argue, correctly, that the laws...are intended to prevent damage before it occurs."

In a meeting on November 2 attended by Miller, Chernow, Liane Randolph and natural resources undersecretary Janelle Beland, and which Rechtschaffen joined by phone, "Rechtschaffen started yelling—he was angry about the memorandum...He further yelled at them that they had their orders," the lawsuit said. Miller told Rechtschaffen that the proposal violated the Safe Water Drinking Act, and that the EPA had agreed that the proposal, passed on to them by Chernow, was modeled on the Western States Petroleum Association proposal that DOGGR had already rejected.

"Rechtschaffen told Miller and Chernow this was an order from Governor Brown. He also notified Miller that she must make a public statement about the policy change," the lawsuit said. After Rechtschaffen hung up, "Randolph tried to reassure them and said it was their job to assume the Governor has a higher purpose. Randolph also told them that they were to do what the Governor sees fit even if they don't know the reason."

The next day, November 3, Chernow was fired. Ultimately, the oil industry was allowed to drill more than 2,400 injection wells for the disposal of its toxic waste into the state's protected aquifers. They included aquifers with water clean enough to drink or use for crop irrigation, according to the *Sacramento Bee*.[64] An *Associated Press* analysis found that 46 percent of those injection wells either got permits or began injections under Governor Jerry Brown.[65]

After Chernow was fired, Brown assigned Rechtschaffen to temporarily take over Chernow's job.

Two months later in January 2012, Brown's new oil and gas supervisor granted Occidental a permit to frack in Kern County without an environmental review that should have protected aquifers. Four days after that, Occidental contributed $250,000 to Prop 30, Brown's ballot initiative to raise taxes. It made a second $250,000 donation to Prop 30 seven months later. Thousands of aquifers were ultimately polluted. The Administration has submitted an application to the US EPA for an exemption for fracking and waste disposal into aquifers in San Luis Obispo's Arroyo Grande oilfield and is preparing another for the Round Mountain oil field in Kern.[66]

Fracked Up

Oil money also shaped California's efforts to enact legislation to regulate fracking in the state and shut down plans to enact an oil extraction tax.

Hopes had run high that Governor Brown would accept an outright ban on fracking in California. Not only did Brown oppose such a ban, disappointing environmentalists, but his office reportedly significantly weakened legislation regulating fracking. The involvement of Brown's executive secretary Nancy McFadden, who held stock in Linn Energy, a company that would benefit from less oversight, is the subject of a pending Fair Political Practices Commission complaint filed by Consumer Watchdog.

Introduced at the end of 2012 by Sen. Fran Pavley, SB 4 would have regulated fracking through permitting, monitoring of environmental effects, and public disclosure of fracking chemicals. March 2013 amendments included language to place a moratorium on fracking until the practice could be studied and deemed safe for the environment. The Western States Petroleum Association, Occidental, Chevron and other oil companies swung into action.


» Brian Cherry

"Jerry's plea was decisive...."

-former PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry, now under criminal investigation, on Brown's lobbying of a PUC Commissioner to approve a billion-dollar natural gas-fired power plant that a judge would later determine was unnecessary.

Oil companies did not want the legislation to expand to include lucrative and long-standing cyclic steam and steam flooding extraction techniques. Sources in the Capitol report that Brown Administration officials, including McFadden, sought amendments to weaken the bill.

By May 24, 2013, Senate amendments specifically exempted steam injection from the bill. Chevron donated $135,000 to the California Democratic Party that same day. On June 8, the moratorium on fracking permits was dropped. Occidental gave the Governor $27,200 on June 29. After the bill was signed by the governor on September 20 Occidental gave another $100,000 to the Oakland Military Institute on October 9. Between the bill's introduction and its chaptering, energy companies had donated more than $700,000 to Brown's campaign.

McFadden reported holdings valued up to $100,000 in Linn Energy when she began working for Brown, a company that would acquire Berry Petroleum and its 3,000 California fracking wells.

Severance Down

Save California, every other major oil producing state has a well-head, or oil severance, tax. SB 241 would have imposed an oil severance tax in California. The bill passed a Senate committee in May 2013 but was placed on the Senate Appropriations "suspense file" on May 20. If the measure had been enacted, it would have generated revenue gains of $814 billion in 2013-14 and $1.5 billion in 2014-15. SB 241 was shelved just four days before Chevron's $135,000 donation to the Democratic Party.

In December 2013, three months after weakened fracking legislation was chaptered, Chevron donated $350,000 to the Democratic Party. One week later, the Party donated another $300,000 to Brown for Governor 2014, while Chevron donated $54,400 to the campaign that day—the maximum amount allowed. Brown then came out against the oil severance tax in January 2014, just as Democratic support was building for a revived legislative and potential ballot measure campaign to enact a version of SB 241. "I don't think this is the year for new taxes," he said after he released his proposed 2014-2015 budget.[67] "When I went up and down the state campaigning for Proposition 30, I said it was temporary and it is going to be temporary. I just think we need everything we can to live within our means before going back again to try and get more taxes."

A Change in Climate: SB 350

SB 350 was introduced in February 2015. It doubled energy efficiency in buildings, and increased the state's renewable energy requirement to half of the state's electricity by 2030. It also proposed to slash in half the amount of petroleum to be used in cars.

There was a lot for utilities to like. It gave them billions in new business updating the grid for electric vehicles and providing charging stations, and carte blanche for new renewable projects and transmission lines. It also allowed rooftop solar to be excluded from the new renewable energy standard. And an amendment in the last days of session opened the door to a regional Western grid where utilities could import and export electricity with little regulation.

SCE donated $130,000 to the California Democratic Party two weeks after SB 350 was introduced in February 2015. Within weeks of the September 2015 amendment to the bill authorizing California's integration into a larger Western grid, PG&E donated $80,000 to the California Democratic Party.

The oil industry spent millions lobbying to prevent a reduction in the use of petroleum in cars, but Senate pro Tempore Kevin de Leon fashioned a compromise with moderates in the Assembly that included checks and balances on the Air Resources Board.[68] It was Brown's eleventh hour decision to reject De Leon's compromise. Brown summed it

» Susan Kennedy

up like this: "No company wants to see its business cut 50% just because some governor of California says, 'Hey, that's what we're going to do.'"[69] That left lobbyists and staffers close to the deal disappointed, calling the decision inexplicable and wrong-headed. At the signing of the scaled-back bill, Brown said he planned to use his executive power through the Air Resources Board to keep rolling the ball forward, but a subsequent court decision raised questions about his ability to do so. Addressing lawmakers on why he did not want to add any limits on ARB, he said, "I love the Legislature but I don't want to entrust you with too much power."[70]

But the bill Brown signed was a Christmas tree for the utilities. A regional Western grid has been a long-held goal of the utilities, dating back to electricity deregulation. In 1996, PG&E vice president Jim Macias talked of "tremendous advantages of having interconnection of states."

The idea of a Western grid was a casualty of the failure of deregulation, but Brown revived it in last-minute amendments to SB 350 that created a study and road ahead for the concept. A California Independent System Operator (CAISO) study supporting the concept was released in July 2016. Governor Brown was pushing legislation to establish the Western grid in the last month of the legislative session in August 2016, but was forced to pull back in the face of legislative opposition.

The Western grid is a dream for utilities. Utilities would be able to continue to justify their traditional business model of building large power plants and other infrastructure paid for by ratepayers, while discouraging wide installation of rooftop solar and the adoption of smaller-scale battery storage technology that could avoid the need for new gas- fired power plants. The shift to a Western grid also opens California up to the import of cheap but dirty coal-fired power, the pricing of which would be largely opaque to ratepayers. Berkshire Hathaway's PacifiCorp, a giant power producer running plants in six western states, is entering the market. A half a dozen other utilities are also lining up. According to its own factsheet, 62 percent of the power PacifiCorp generates comes from coal.[72]

One of the regulators who is backing this regionalization is Mark Ferron. After he stepped down from the PUC for health reasons in 2014, Brown reappointed him to the CAISO that manages California's electricity grid. It has sponsored about 190 transmission development projects since 2006 worth about $7.5 billion –virtually all of them to the financial benefit of investor-owned utilities that typically realize their highest guaranteed profit on transmission lines. According to a presentation that Ferron gave in March 2016, "west-wide coordination enables increased reduction in carbon emissions" and "consumers across the region will save millions of dollars per year."[73]

» Robert Weisenmiller

Utility Favors

One of the biggest problems facing the Brown Administration in 2011 was what to do about PG&E in the wake of the lethal San Bruno explosion that had killed eight and levelled a neighborhood the year before. Brown himself apparently wanted to mitigate the damage. Emails released in 2015 by the City of San Bruno showed that Governor Brown's office choreographed statements by Peevey and Commissioner Mike Florio about the public investigation into San Bruno.

The Governor's staff knew in advance about a pending statement from Florio, seen as more pro-ratepayer than others, and Peevey about the commission's consideration of a fine against the utility in January 2012, according to Jeff McDonald of the *San Diego Union Tribune*. "...Peevey and Florio are expected to issue a joint press release today stating their intent to work jointly to resolve the pending San Bruno and other investigations," wrote then PG&E vice president Thomas Bottorff to PG&E's chairman Anthony Earley. "Peevey will not be ceding control of the [investigation] to

> **"Occidental wanted Governor Brown to fire me and the State Oil & Gas Supervisor..."**
> *- Former Department of Conservation official Derek Chernow*

Florio," the email said. "The Governor's Office is aware of and approved the joint statement."[74]

Susan Kennedy too was working to help PG&E. PG&E was a client of Kennedy's Caliber Strategies. A March 2012 email from Kennedy to PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry indicated she had spoken with Peevey about the San Bruno explosion. "Peevey liked the idea of an independent forensic analysis," her email said. "New CPSD [Consumer Protection and Safety Division] director might present an opportunity to dump Overland," she wrote. Overland was an independent consultant who had audited the utility after the explosion. It discovered that ratepayer money was used to pad executive bonuses and pay shareholders instead of for safety. [75] Kennedy did not succeed in dumping Overland, but it was clear that Kennedy was working to shield PG&E from scandal.[76] Under the Brown Administration, PG&E was let off the hook for the diversion of ratepayer money.[77]

In May 2013, PUC staff recommended that PG&E pay $2.25 billion for failing to maintain its gas main in San Bruno. Behind the scenes, that fine was knocked down to $1.6 billion in 2015. PG&E was allowed to use most of the "fine" to pay for the very upgrades that customers had ostensibly financed through their rates for decades, but that the PUC and PG&E had never tracked.[78]

The PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates, customers' only representation within the PUC, had said customers shouldn't pay a dime "given PG&E's mismanagement of its pipeline system and that customers have already paid for the costs of such pipeline maintenance and upgrades." Michael Picker defended the fine. "The purpose of a fine is to deter behavior," he told the *Los Angeles Times's* Ivan Penn in response to a question about the fine's size. "It's not revenge. We didn't want to fine them just to punish them."[79]
Brown also appears to have played an instrumental role in helping Peevey muscle PUC votes for fossil fuel projects that weren't necessarily needed. PG&E wanted to build the Oakley gas-fired plant, but Mark Ferron didn't think it was needed. According to a January 1, 2013 email from former PG&E lobbyist Brian Cherry to his boss, Cherry and Peevey spent New Year's Eve sipping Johnny Walker Blue Label. Cherry wrote, "he reminded me how he and Governor Brown used every ounce of persuasion to get [commissioner Mark] Ferron to change his mind and vote for Oakley...Jerry's direct plea ...was decisive. Peevey suggested that Tony [Earley, PG&E CEO] call the Governor personally and thank him." [80] A day after the PUC voted yes, PG&E sent a $20,000 check to the California Democratic Party.

In February 2014, an appeals court judge threw out the PUC decision on Oakley. The judge said that PG&E had not proven that a plant in Contra Costa County was needed. CAISO claimed that the plant would be needed by 2020 to back up wind and solar plants, but supplied no evidence to the judge. On top of that, no one from CAISO would testify in court.[81]

Brown also pushed for power plant operator AES to renovate two natural gas-fired power plants in Huntington Beach for SCE, approved by the PUC, over the objections of J.P. Morgan, which controlled the rights to the plant's output. "Any attempt by JPMorgan Venture to stand in the way of this important contract should be soundly rejected," Brown wrote to the FERC on November 28, 2012.[82] SCE had donated $50,000 to the Democratic Party on November 6, 2012.

The evidence of Brown's intervention in the approval of unnecessary, polluting natural gas power plants and the continued flow of utility money into the coffers of the California Democratic Party and his own causes, raises troubling questions about whether Brown has intervened elsewhere. On March 7, 2015, an administrative law judge at the PUC ruled against an updated $2 billion natural gas power plant at Carlsbad for SDG&E. Instead the judge said SDG&E could buy more power from wind and solar sources.[83] On May 21, the PUC reversed that decision, which is now in litigation.[84] Sempra made large donations totaling $115,000 to the California Democratic Party a week before the PUC reversal. Could Governor Brown have intervened there too?

Reliability for Decades To Come

In March 2013, Michael Peevey struck a secret deal in a Warsaw hotel room to put $3.3 billion worth of the $4.7 billion cost to close down defective nuclear generators at San Onofre onto ratepayers. He pressured SCE to give UCLA a $25 million grant to study global warming as part of the deal. The PUC gave SCE a wrist slap -- later fining Edison $16.7 million for failing to report the private talks.

On June 6, 2013 Edison International CEO Ted Craver turned to Jerry Brown to defend the settlement and Peevey's



actions. Senator Barbara Boxer had evidence that Edison may have lied to federal regulators about what it knew of the faulty equipment before it was turned on, and she was demanding a criminal investigation.[85] Craver reached Brown by phone as the Governor was meeting with President Obama at Rancho Mirage. Afterwards, Craver emailed his board that Brown had "indicated a willingness" to tell the media that he thought the company was acting responsibly and focused on the right things, Craver wrote. "He said what we were doing seemed right under the circumstances, good to reduce uncertainty..." Craver described Brown taking a "swipe" at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for "bungling the process which was going to cause harm to California." Craverwrote that Brown "fished for whether we were going to blast NRC or Boxer; I said, 'No,' I didn't see any mileage in that."[86]

In a statement released the next day, Brown directed energy regulators to come up with a long-term plan ensuring electricity "reliability for decades to come" in the wake of San Onofre's closure.[87] In October 2013, Robert Weisenmiller told Marc Lifsher of the *Los Angeles Times* "that Brown cornered him in August and bluntly warned him to 'make sure the lights don't go out down there' in Southern California."[88]

An industry publication, *California Current* got a hold of a draft copy of the long-term plan and published it in

September 2013. The plan indicated that SDG&E's proposal for the Pio Pico natural gas power plant in Otay Mesa and the Carlsbad plant was as good as approved. A reporter spilling the beans like that bothered regulators. *California Current* "makes it sound like Pio Pico and Carlsbad are done deals...," wrote CEC advisor Kevin Barker to top regulators at the PUC, and the CAISO.[89] "It'll be good to reiterate that these are options during the [energy policy] presentation and that it says timely decision for Pio Pico, not approval."

In March of 2013 the PUC had rejected approval of the Pio Pico plant on grounds that it would not be needed until at least 2018, and that would leave room for enough renewable energy to come on line. Peevey went to work to reverse that decision. In February, 2014 the PUC approved Pio Pico after Peevey pushed it through with help from Weisenmiller, who wrote a letter supporting the project at Peevey's request.[90]

The CEC is responsible for environmental permitting of large thermal plants, forecasting state energy demand, promoting energy efficiency standards, renewable energy, and renewable transportation technologies. It is not responsible for determining the need for power plants. Weisenmiller's letter was inappropriate. But all the regulatory agencies were working in tandem to satisfy Brown's apparent appetite for natural gas power plants to fill the void left by the shuttering of San Onofre, despite the fact that the state is required to up its energy from renewable sources to 50 percent by 2030.

By November 2013, the PUC would approve four new natural gas power plants for SCE, and another for SCE in Oxnard in May 2016. Each of those projects cost roughly $1.5 to $2 billion a piece and ratepayers will pay for them. The fundamental question remains whether these investments are really needed, or whether the state could have relied more heavily on solar power, including rooftop generation. In just the last three years, California's share of solar power production has jumped from under one percent to 6.7 percent in 2015, according to California's Independent System Operator. That doesn't count rooftop solar and smaller commercial installations. Battery storage is a technology ripe for utilizing to store renewable energy, and leaps in energy efficiency, and new time-of-use rates, can also shave demand.[91]

Instead, under the Brown Administration, the amount of power that California generates from natural gas rose from 45 percent to 60 percent between 2011 and 2015, largely justified by the decision to close San Onofre. Ironically, the CAISO estimates that a crash in natural gas prices means that the amount of money utilities can make off of selling electricity from natural gas power plants is substantially below their fixed costs.[92]

New gas-fired capacity "does not appear to be needed at this time," the CAISO wrote in a May report. The bad news is that Southern Californians will be paying at least $10 billion for the next 20 years for new natural gas plants whether they are needed or not.

Worse, ratepayers are also picking up the tab for duds. In the wake of the energy crisis, the California legislature and regulators suspended a requirement that utilities must justify what they build as "useful and in use" before ratepayers pay to jumpstart new power plants. Under Peevey, and then Picker, building new natural gas-fired power plants without having to prove demand became a convenient way to pad the pockets of utility shareholders.

The *Los Angeles Times* has reported that Californians are paying billions of dollars for the now-shuttered San Onofre plant, tens of millions for an Edison coal plant in Nevada that was found to be in violation of the Clean Air Act and closed, and more for never-completed PG&E transmission lines after partners pulled out or permits were denied. An upgrade at Aliso Canyon will cost SoCalGas customers another $200 million, whether the natural gas storage facility is shuttered as area residents want, or not.[93]

Brown's Secrets

Even as Brown has broadened the use of fossil fuels, he has tried to keep details of crooked deals under wraps. PUC President Michael Picker declined to reopen the San Onofre settlement despite the fact that a public investigation into the causes of the San Onofre leak was abruptly cancelled by a PUC administrative law judge, and despite the absence of a PUC determination on whether SCE acted reasonably in deploying defective steam generators in the first place. "I can't say I find a basis in the record to do that," Picker told the *Los Angeles Times'* Ivan Penn at the end of 2015. "I don't think it's the greatest settlement, but on balance it's a fair and reasonable settlement."[94] Under legal pressure and intense media scrutiny, the PUC was forced to reverse itself and reopen the case.

But the PUC still refuses to release dozens of emails on the subject between Picker and the Governor's office, according to attorney Mike Aguirre who has sued to get them. Brown has so far authorized the PUC to spend $12.3 million on outside counsel to prevent the emails release.[95] It is unclear whether Brown even has the power to approve such spending. According to the California Department of General Services, the PUC signed contracts with private law firms that they were not permitted to execute, among a host of other problems. The audit by DGS found that the PUC didn't maintain required paperwork and paid vendors even when the work was not performed to specifications, according to the *Los Angeles Times.* The report "referenced more serious issues that were not made publicly available," the *Times* wrote.[96]

On October 12, 2015, Brown vetoed six bills meant to reform the PUC by making it easier to sue the commission, appointing an inspector general within the State Auditor's Office to oversee the PUC, and by requiring legislative review if the agency hired outside counsel for criminal investigations. He called many of the reforms "unworkable." They were no doubt unworkable for utilities. A week after the veto, PG&E donated $50,000 to the California Democratic Party. Two months later, it donated another $175,000 to the Party.[97]

Now, Brown is working with legislators on a proposal to revamp the agency that critics say is more cosmetic than substantive. The plan targets low-hanging fruit, strengthening *ex parte* rules and subjecting Public Records Act denials to judicial review. But more substantive reforms from the 2015 legislation, including Superior Court review of PUC decisions, are not included. Nothing in the proposed reforms would flip the PUC's priorities so ratepayers no longer take a backseat to investors.[98]

BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS

CONCLUSION

While Governor Brown has taken oil and gas companies to task over climate change, his Administration has helped oil companies that have contributed to his campaigns at key junctures: compromising well safety that led to the methane leak at Aliso by the firing of tough well regulators, stopping momentum for a well-head tax, permitting fracking to continue in the state, and deciding to abandon legislative reforms that could have reduced petroleum usage in the state. The oil and gas companies have funneled major contributions to Brown, often through the Democratic Party, in return for the favoritism his Administration has shown them.

With regards to utilities, the corruption so well documented under former PUC President Michael Peevey, who is now under criminal investigation for his coziness with utilities, has continued through the Brown Administration, just in more surreptitious ways. Brown, his appointees and aides have protected the old guard at the PUC, the proliferation of fossil fuel powered natural gas plants, and utility investors. Utilities have responded in kind with large, well-timed donations.

Twenty six energy companies that have contributed to Brown and his causes have shaped a legacy that is one of a governor who has time and again chosen the interests of dirty energy companies and their investors over the environment and the consumer.

APPENDIX A - ENERGY COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS - TOTAL

2009 - 2016

	Prop 30	Props 1&2	Brown 2010	Brown 2014	California Democratic Party	Oakland Military Institute	Oakland School for the Arts	Governor's 2011 Inaugural Committee	California State Protocol Foundation	TOTALS
Aera Energy	$300,000.00	$250,000.00								$550,000.00
AES						$15,000.00				$15,000.00
Anschutz Entertainment Group						$10,000.00				$10,000.00
Berkshire Hathaway Energy				$5000.00						$5,000.00
Berry Petroleum	$50,000.00									$50,000.00
Breitburn Operating	$29,750.00									$29,750.00
CA Independent Petroleum Association	$9,918.00	$100,000.00			$5,917.77	$5,000.00				$120,835.77
Calpine Corporation					$50,000.00	$6,000.00				$56,000.00
Chevron				$54,400.00	$1,337,500.00	$65,000.00	$25,000.00	$5,000.00		$1,486,900.00
Clean Energy			$25,900.00		$32,400.00	$100,000.00	$60,000.00			$218,300.00
ConocoPhillips	$50,000.00				$100,000.00					$150,000.00
ExxonMobil				$20,000.00						$20,000.00
Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas	$100,000.00									$100,000.00
Macpherson Oil	$50,000.00									$50,000.00
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips							$5,000.00			$5,000.00
Naftex Operating Co	$10,000.00									$10,000.00
NRG				$30,000.00	$25,000.00	$10,000.00	$20,000.00		$25,000.00	$110,000.00
Oberon Fuels	$1,000.00									$1,000.00
Occidental (Subsidiaries and Associates)	$500,000.00		$94,950.00	$27,200.00	$217,400.00	$235,000.00				$1,074,550.00
Paci f ic Coast Energy	$5,250.00									$5,250.00
PG&E (Subsidiaries and Associates)	$25,000.00		$112,145.00	$54,200.00	$2,574,924.00	$75,000.00	$125,000.00			$2,966,269.00
Sempra			$32,400.00	$53,200	$1,294,000.00					$1,379,600.00
Signal Hill Petroleum	$20,000.00									$20,000.00
SoCalEdison/Edison (Subsidiaries and Associates)			$58,500.00	$54,400.00	$1,500,195.00					$1,613,095.00
Sun Edison	$10,000.00									$10,000.00
Tesoro				$25,000.00						$25,000.00
Vaquero Energy	$35,000.00									$35,000.00
VENOCO	$25,000.00									$25,000.00
World Oil								$5,000.00		$5,000.00

APPENDIX B -

TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
4/3/09	$45,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/29/09	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron
5/2/09	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	ConocoPhillips
5/2/09	$30,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
5/12/09-5/13/09	$43,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
6/9/09	$30,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
8/31/09	$2,500.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron
11/20/09	$8,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Multiple Occidental Employees
11/20/09	$9,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
12/14/09	$1,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Senior Vice President - Thomas E Bottorff
12/29/09	$10,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E
12/31/09	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
1/5/10	$40,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
2/19/10 - 2/24/10	$3,500.00	Brown For Governor 2010	Multiple PG&E Executives and Vice Presidents
3/1/10	$1,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Senior Vice President - Rand L Rosenberg
3/10/10	$5,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Civic Action Committee
3/10/10	$4,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Southern California Edison - Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson
3/10/10	$8,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Multiple Occidental Employees
3/10/10	$22,160.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Multiple PG&E Executives, Vice Presidents , and Employees
3/10/10	$6,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
3/10/10	$2,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/10/10	$12,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E CEO and Chairman - Peter A Darbee
3/10/10	$250.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Political Affairs Manager - Dana Williamson
3/10/10	$6,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Sempra
3/15/10	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/16/10	$1,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Vice President - Brian Cherry
3/29/10	$2,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Southern California Edison - Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson
3/30/10	$75,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
4/7/10	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs
4/7/10	$35,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
4/9/10	$60,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/12/10	$5,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Business Executive - Robert Adler
4/13/10	$40,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/22/10	$1,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	SoCalEdison Employees
4/29/10	$10,679.87	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E
4/29/10	$4,320.13	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E
5/19/10	$1,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental Chairman & Chief Executive - Ray R. Irani
5/21/10	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs
5/21/10	$3,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
5/21/10	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
5/21/10	$45,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison

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Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
5/28/10	$4,100.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
5/28/10	$10,900.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
6/7/10	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	SoCalEdison
7/15/10 - 7/23/10	$3,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	SoCalEdison Employees
7/23/10	$2,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Employees
7/26/10	$2,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	SoCalEdison CEO
7/29/10	$1,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Southern California Edison - Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson
7/29/10 - 8/6/10	$4,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	SoCalEdison Employees
8/18/10	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
8/26/10	$75,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/1/10	$21,800.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Occidental
9/1/10	$5,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E- Director, Workforce Development - Van Ton-Quinlivan
9/2/10 - 9/3/10	$1,150.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Multiple Occidental Employees
9/3/10	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	ConocoPhillips
9/8/10	$125,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/8/10	$100,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/25/10	$2,500.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E- SVP Public Affairs - Nancy E. Mcfadden
9/26/10	$10,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E- Director, Workforce Development - Van Ton-Quinlivan
9/27/10	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
10/11/10	$10,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Former Executive - Daniel D Richard
10/13/10	$2,000.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Edison International Southern California Edison - Chairman and CEO - John E. Bryson
10/16/10	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
10/16/10	$22,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
10/20/10 - 10/25/10	$3,015.00	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E Employees
10/21/10	$15,220.13	Brown for Governor 2010	PG&E
10/26/10	$25,900	Brown for Governor 2010	Clean Energy
10/28/10	$25,900.00	Brown for Governor 2010	Sempra
10/28/2010 - 10/29/10	$32,400.00	California Democratic Party	Clean Energy
10/29/10	$7,400.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
10/30/10	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
11/2/10	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
1/5/11		**BROWN APPOINTS PG&E's MCFADDEN AS EXEC SECY**	
1/6/11	$5,000.00	Governor's 2011 Inaugural Committee	World Oil
1/18/11		**Cherry Fingers McF as "Back Door Route" to PUC Appts.**	
1/27/11		**Cherry Advises Peevey to Call McF with Names**	
1/28/11	$25,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
2/17/11	$75,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/9/11	$10,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Chevron
3/16/11	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/21/11	$25,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Occidental
3/22/11	$6,500.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/22/11	$35,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/22/11		**BROWN APPOINTS EX-BANKER FERRON TO PUC**	

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TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
3/25/11	$5,000.00	Governor's 2011 Inaugural Committee	Chevron
4/11/11	$25,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	PG&E
4/12/11	$40,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/12/11	$45,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/25/11	$5,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	Chevron
4/25/11	$25,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	PG&E
5/6/11	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs
5/6/11	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs
5/10/11	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
5/13/11	$25,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	Clean Energy
5/20/11	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
5/27/11	$1,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
6/1/11	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/13/11	$15,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
7/26/11	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/10/11	$383.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/10/11	$678.50	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/15/11	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	ConocoPhillips
9/15/11	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/30/11	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
11/3/11		**OIL REGULATORS FIRED**	
12/12/11	$35,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
12/16/11	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
1/13/12	$250,000.00	Prop 30	Occidental
1/13/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
1/19/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
1/25/12	$100,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Occidental
1/27/12	$75,000.00	Prop 30	Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas
1/30/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
2/3/12	$10,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
2/6/12	$80,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
2/6/12	$60,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
2/10/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	PG&E
2/10/12	$195.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
2/20/12	$10,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Chevron
2/27/12	$6,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/9/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	ConocoPhillips
3/9/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
3/12/12	$30,000.00	California Democratic Party	ConocoPhillips
3/12/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
3/15/12	$25,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	PG&E
3/16/12	$60,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/17/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	CONOCO Phillips
3/17/12	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/17/12	$5,000.00	Prop 30	Sun Edison

APPENDIX B -

TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
3/17/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	Vaquero Energy
3/23/12		**NRG GETS SWEETHEART EV ELECTRIFICATION DEAL**	
3/23/12		**NRG SETTLES CA PRICE MANIPULATION SUIT**	
3/26/12	$5,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	Chevron
3/27/12	$125,000.00	Prop 30	Aera Energy
3/28/12	$100,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
3/29/12	$5,469.00	Prop 30	CA Independent Petroleum Association
4/11/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	VENOCO
4/17/12	$45,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/19/12	$21,250.00	Prop 30	Breitburn Operating
4/19/12	$3,750.00	Prop 30	Paci f ic Coast Energy
5/2/12	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
5/11/12	$25,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	PG&E
5/16/12	$100,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron
5/16/12	$15,000.00	California Democratic Party	ConocoPhillips
5/19/12	$35,000.00	Prop 30	Berry Petroleum
5/31/12	$5,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	NRG
6/5/12	$10,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	Clean Energy
6/20/12	$75,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/26/12	$112.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
6/26/12	$150,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
6/30/12	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
7/17/12	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
7/26/12	$225,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
7/26/12	$15,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
7/26/12	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
8/16/12	$250,000.00	Prop 30	Occidental
8/17/12	$20,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
8/21/12	$5,000.00	California Democratic Party	Calpine Corporation
8/24/12	$10,000.00	Prop 30	Signal Hill Petroleum
8/30/12	$125,000.00	Prop 30	Aera Energy
9/24/12	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	Sempra
9/27/12	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	Tesoro
10/2/12	$1,000.00	Prop 30	Oberon Fuels
10/8/12	$100,000.00	Brown: Yes on Props 1 & 2	CA Independent Petroleum Association
10/10/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	NRG
10/10/12	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
10/19/12	$25,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
10/22/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	Macpherson Oil
10/26/12	$1,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	Sempra
10/29/12	$4,449.00	Prop 30	CA Independent Petroleum Association
10/29/12	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
10/29/12	$30,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
10/30/12	$8,500.00	Prop 30	Breitburn Operating
10/30/12	$25,000.00	Prop 30	Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas

APPENDIX B -

TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
10/30/12	*$25,000.00*	Prop 30	Macpherson Oil
10/30/12	*$10,000.00*	Prop 30	Naftex Operating Co
10/30/12	*$1,500.00*	Prop 30	Pacific Coast Energy
10/30/12	*$10,000.00*	Prop 30	Vaquero Energy
11/2/12	*$10,000.00*	Prop 30	Signal Hill Petroleum
11/5/12	*$15,000.00*	Prop 30	Berry Petroleum
11/5/12	*$15,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
11/6/12	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
11/20/12	*$40,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
12/3/12		**SB 4 FRACKING BILL INTRODUCED**	
12/19/12	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Occidental
12/20/12		**PUC APPROVES OAKLEY GAS PLANT FOR PGE**	
12/21/12	*$20,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
12/27/12	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	NRG
1/4/13	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Calpine Corporation
1/18/13	*$25,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
2/19/13	*$7,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/12/13	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Occidental
3/20/13	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/22/13		**PUC REJECTS SDG&E PIO PICO PLANT AT OTAY MESA**	
3/26/13	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/26/13	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/26/13		**PEEVEY/SCE SECRET DEAL ON SAN ONOFRE**	
4/5/13	*$25,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Chevron
4/15/13	*$5,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	Chevron
4/24/13	*$25,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	Clean Energy
5/20/13		**SB 241 OIL TAX GOES INTO SUSPENSE FILE**	
5/8/13	*$25,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	PG&E
5/24/13	*$135,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Chevron
5/24/13		**SB 4 EXEMPTS CYCLIC STEAM FROM REGS**	
6/4/13	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/6/13		**BROWN TELLS SCE HE WILL SUPPORT CROOKED DEAL**	
6/7/13	*$5,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	NRG
6/7/13	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
6/7/13	*$25,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	PG&E
6/7/13		**BROWN DIRECTS REGULATORS TO ENSURE ELECTRIC POWER "RELIABILITY FOR DECADES TO COME"**	
6/7/13		**SCE ANNOUNCES CLOSURE OF SAN ONOFRE**	
6/18/13		**SB4 DROPS MORATORIUM ON PERMITS**	
6/25/13	*$10,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/27/13	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
6/27/13	*$10,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
6/29/13	*$5,000.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	NRG
6/29/13	*$27,200.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	Occidental
7/2/13	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
7/29/13	*$125,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E

APPENDIX B -

TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
8/9/13	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	PG&E
9/19/13	$25,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	SoCalEdison
9/20/13		**SB 4 CHAPTERED**	
10/9/13	$100,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Occidental
11/1/13	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
11/6/13	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
11/11/13	$10,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	ExxonMobil
11/14/13	$80,500.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
11/21/13	$2,000.00	Brown for Governor 2014	PG&E
12/11/13	$5,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Occidental
12/23/13	$350,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron
12/30/13	$27,200.00	Brown for Governor 2014	Chevron
12/30/13	$27,200.00	Brown for Governor 2014	Chevron
12/30/13	$27,200.00	Brown for Governor 2014	SoCalEdison
12/30/13	$2,200.00	Brown for Governor 2014	SoCalEdison
1/9/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
1/21/14	$5,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	AES
1/21/14	$5,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
1/29/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
2/5/14		**PUC APPROVES SDGE/CALPINE PLANT AT OTAY MESA**	
2/6/14		**APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS PUC OAKLEY DECISION**	
3/13/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/13/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/13/14		**PUC TELLS SCE/SDGE REPLACE SAN ONOFRE POWER**	
3/17/14	$60,000.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
3/17/14	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Occidental
3/26/14	$105,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron
4/8/14	$50,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/9/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
4/15/14	$15,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
4/25/14	$5,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	NRG
4/28/14	$5,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Calpine Corporation
5/6/14		**PUC PREZ PEEVEY SETS UP WALL ST VISIT FOR PICKER**	
5/7/14	$27,200.00	Brown for Governor 2014	PG&E
5/8/14	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	Sempra
5/13/14	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
5/20/14	$5,917.77	California Democratic Party	CA Independent Petroleum Association
6/11/14	$10,000.00	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
6/20/14	$65,000.00	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/23/14		**PICKER TALKS UP UTILITIES TO WALL ST INVESTORS**	
7/3/14	$25,000.00	Oakland School for the Arts	PG&E
7/21/14	$30,000.00	California Democratic Party	Chevron Policy Govt. & Public Affairs
7/28/14	$70,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
7/28/14	$125,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E
8/13/14	$10,000.00	California Democratic Party	PG&E

APPENDIX B -

TIMELINE OF ENERGY INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS & FAVORS

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
9/2/14	*$5,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/10/14	*$150,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/25/14	*$5,000.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	Berkshire Hathaway Energy
9/26/14	*$25,000.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	NRG
10/8/14	*$10,000.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	ExxonMobil
10/10/14	*$250,000.00*	Props 1 & 2	Aera Energy
10/15/14	*$75,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
10/21/14	*$27,200.00*	Brown for Governor 2014	Sempra
10/22/14	*$5,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
10/22/14	*$100,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
10/24/14	*$40,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
1/15/15	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	NRG
1/26/15	*$1,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Calpine Corporation
2/2/15	*$25,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Clean Energy
2/4/15	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	CA Independent Petroleum Association
2/4/15	*$10,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Chevron
2/11/15	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	AES
2/24/15		**SB 350 CLIMATE CHANGE BILL INTRODUCED**	
3/2/15	*$5,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	Chevron
3/6/15	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/6/15	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
3/6/15		**PUC PROPOSES DENYING SDGE CARLSBAD PLANT**	
3/30/15	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/2/15	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/7/15	*$215,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Chevron
4/8/15		**PICKER ISSUES CONDITIONAL APPROVAL ON CARLSBAD**	
5/7/15	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
5/12/15	*$5,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	NRG
5/21/15		**PUC APPROVES CARLSBAD PLANT FOR SDGE/NRG**	
5/27/15	*$25,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	PG&E
6/5/15	*$35,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
6/17/15	*$10,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
6/17/15	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
8/6/15	*$20,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Calpine Corporation
9/4/15		**REGIONAL ISO WRITTEN INTO SB 350**	
9/11/15		**LEGISLATORS STRIKE SB 350 SLASHING OIL IN HALF**	
9/29/15	*$5,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
9/29/15	*$75,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
10/7/15		**SB 350 CHAPTERED**	
10/12/15		**BROWN VETOES SIX BILLS TO REFORM PUC**	
10/19/15	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
10/23/15		**SOCALGAS ALISO CANYON BLOWOUT DISCOVERED**	
11/19/15		**PUC APPROVES NEW NATGAS PLANTS FOR SCE**	
		AT ALAMITOS, HUNGTINGTON BEACH, STANTON	
12/10/15	*$175,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E

APPENDIX B - ENERGY COMPANY CONTRIBUTIONS - INDIVIDUAL

Date of contribution	Amount	Recipient	Donated By
12/23/15	*$75,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
12/29/15	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
1/6/16		**BROWN DECLARES ALISO CANYON STATE OF EMERGENCY**	
1/17/16	*$25,000.00*	California State Protocol Foundation	NRG
2/1/16	*$10,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	Chevron
2/15/16	*$5,000.00*	Oakland Military Institute	AES
3/2/16	*$5,000.00*	Oakland School for the Arts	Chevron
3/11/16	*$25,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/25/16	*$21,750.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
3/25/16	*$100,000.00*	California Democratic Party	PG&E
4/21/16	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/21/16	*$65,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Sempra
4/25/16	*$150,000.00*	California Democratic Party	Chevron
5/20/16	*$50,000.00*	California Democratic Party	SoCalEdison
5/26/16		**PUC APPROVES SCE/NRG OXNARD PLANT**	
	$10,076,549.40		

BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS

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BROWN'S DIRTY HANDS

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Backgrounder

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Immigration to the United States and World-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions

By Leon Kolankiewicz and Steven A. Camarota

The findings of this study indicate that future levels of immigration will have a significant impact on efforts to reduce global CO_2 emissions. Immigration to the United States significantly increases world-wide CO_2 emissions because it transfers population from lower-polluting parts of the world to the United States, which is a higher-polluting country. On average immigrants increase their emissions four-fold by coming to America.

Among the findings:

- The estimated CO_2 emissions of the average immigrant (legal or illegal) in the United States are 18 percent less than those of the average native-born American.
- However, immigrants in the United States produce an estimated four times more CO_2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin.
- U.S. immigrants produce an estimated 637 million metric tons of CO_2 emissions annually — equal to Great Britain and Sweden combined.
- The estimated 637 tons of CO_2 U.S. immigrants produce annually is 482 million tons more than they would have produced had they remained in their home countries.
- If the 482 million ton increase in global CO_2 emissions caused by immigration to the United States were a separate country, it would rank 10th in the world in emissions.
- The impact of immigration to the United States on global emissions is equal to approximately 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO_2 emissions since 1980.
- Of the CO_2 emissions caused by immigrants, 83 percent is estimated to come from legal immigrants and 17 percent from illegal immigrants.
- Legal immigrants have a much larger impact because they have higher incomes and resulting emissions, and they are more numerous than illegal immigrants.
- The above figures do not include the impact of children born to immigrants in the United States. If they were included, the impact would be much higher.
- Assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 30 million new legal and illegal immigrants are expected to settle in the United States in the next 20 years.
- In recent years, increases in U.S. CO_2 emissions have been driven entirely by population increases as per capita emissions have stabilized.

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Introduction

The small body of research on immigration's environmental impact in the United States has tended to focus on the effects of the population growth induced by immigrants and their U.S.-born offspring on the U.S. environment alone.[1] In contrast, the present study attempts to quantify the direct contribution of immigrants in the United States to growing U.S. and global carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions. Since American emissions per capita are much higher than almost all of the immigrant-sending countries, immigration to the United States has significant implications for world-wide emissions.

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the most important of which is CO_2, raise the concentration of these gases in the earth's atmosphere. Most scientists think this increase is causing average global temperatures to rise. There is concern that warming in turn may trigger far-reaching, long-term effects on the Earth's climate and biosphere, and consequently, on human civilization.[2] Thus, the impact of U.S. immigration on annual CO_2 emissions is an important research question.

U.S. Population Growth Drives Increasing CO_2 Emissions

The large population and comparative prosperity of the United States are underpinned by the consumption of fossil fuels on a prodigious scale. In one year alone (2006), Americans burned 1.1 billion tons of coal, 7.6 billion barrels of petroleum, and 21.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.[3]

A fundamental consequence of the combustion of coal, oil, and natural gas to generate electricity, run cars, and heat homes is the release of CO_2 into the atmosphere.[4] Total U.S. emissions of CO_2 have been the highest in the world for many years — until just recently. It now appears that in 2006 China surpassed the United States in annual CO_2 emissions.[5] However, the United States still leads the world's largest economies in per capita emissions. China's annual per capita CO_2 emissions in 2005 were just four tons, below the global average and only one-fifth of America's per capita emissions of 20 tons.[6]

In recent years U.S. per capita CO_2 emissions have held steady and the rise in overall U.S. emissions is entirely due to population growth. The link between population and CO_2 emissions is shown in a 2002 study that found GHG emissions in the United States from fossil fuel combustion grew by almost 13 percent from 1990 to 2000. Over the same time period, the U.S. population grew by an almost identical amount. This is powerful direct evidence that increases in U.S. CO_2 emissions are driven by population increases as per capita emissions have stabilized.[7] Adding more people to the United States, at least recently, has meant a proportional increase in emissions.

Comparing U.S. Emissions to Immigrant-Sending Countries

Research by the Center for Immigration Studies, the Pew Hispanic Center, and the Census Bureau shows that new immigration and births to immigrants are the determinate factors in future U.S. population growth. Immigration is now the driving force behind continued U.S. population growth, accounting directly (immigration itself) and indirectly (through births to immigrants) for at least three-quarters of our annual increase of three million residents. The Center for Immigration Studies has projected that if the current level of (legal and illegal) immigration continues, the U.S. population will grow from 300 million in 2007 to 468 million by 2060. Longer-range projections done by the Census Bureau show a U.S. population by 2100 of between 571 million and 1.18 billion using the Bureau's middle or high range immigration scenario.[8] The U.S. population would grow some even without immigration, but there is no question that immigration is the primary reason the U.S. population continues to increase by about three million each year.

Of course, if immigrants had remained in their home counties they would still have produced some CO_2, but as we will see, their output would have been a great deal less because immigration represents a large-scale population transfer from the less consuming, less industrialized, and less CO_2 emitting parts of the world to one of the highest consuming, most industrialized, high CO_2 emitting parts of the world — the United States. Table 1 compares per capita CO_2 emissions in the United States with per capita CO_2 emissions in the top-25 immigrant-sending countries.

Table 1 shows extreme variability in per capita CO_2 emission rates from country to country. More developed countries of origin — such as Canada, European countries, and Japan — have higher annual per capita CO_2 emissions, though with the exception of Canada, even the industrialized countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and Italy all have much lower per capita emissions than the United States. Less-developed countries from Asia and Latin America, which are the primary immigrant-sending counties, have much lower annual per capita CO_2 emissions than does the United

States. The most extreme example, Haiti, has a per capita CO_2 emissions rate of barely more than 1/100 that of the United States. In contrast, Canada's per capita CO_2 emissions are comparable to America's, which is not surprising considering the similarly large size and advanced level of development of this neighboring North American country.

Table 1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita from Fossil Fuel Consumption: Comparison Between U.S. and Top-25 Countries of Origin of Immigrants in the U.S.

Country	Annual CO_2 Emissions per Capita (Metric Tons per Person, 2005)[a]	U.S. CO_2 Emissions per Capita/Sending Country CO_2 Emissions per Capita (2005)
United States	**20.14**	**1.0 x**
Mexico	3.75	5.4 x
China[b]	4.07	4.9 x
India	1.07	18.8 x
Philippines	0.89	22.6 x
Vietnam	0.96	21.0 x
El Salvador	0.92	21.9 x
Cuba	2.91	6.9 x
Former USSR[c]	11.88	1.7 x
Korea	10.27	2.0 x
Dominican Republic	1.95	10.3 x
Canada	19.24	1.0 x
Guatemala	0.90	22.4 x
Colombia	1.36	14.8 x
United Kingdom	9.55	2.1 x
Jamaica	4.22	4.8 x
Germany	10.24	2.0 x
Haiti	0.21	96.0 x
Honduras	0.99	20.3 x
Poland	7.38	2.7 x
Italy	8.35	2.4 x
Ecuador	1.79	11.3 x
Iran	6.96	2.9 x
Peru	1.12	18.0 x
Brazil	1.94	10.4 x
Japan	9.65	2.1 x

Notes: Top-25 countries of origin of immigrant population in the United States, as listed in "Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-Born Population."[9] Countries of origin are listed in order of the size of their immigrant population in the United States. Per capita CO_2 emissions from U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 2007.[10]

[a] See endnote 10.

[b] Does not include Taiwan or Hong Kong.

[c] Includes Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and other former Soviet states.

What is most important about the table is that it shows that almost all of the top immigrant-sending countries to the United States have dramatically lower CO_2 emissions per capita. By and large, people who migrate to the United States aspire to improve their material standard of living, and as noted above, this generally entails a higher level of energy consumption and, thus, CO_2 emissions. If Table 1 indicated that U.S. CO_2 emissions per capita were lower or even the same as the primary immigrant-sending countries, it is likely that immigration to the United States would have little or no effect on world-wide GHG emissions, although total U.S. emissions would still rise dramatically. But, in fact, the United States has much higher per capita CO_2 emissions — five times higher — than the world average (20 vs. four metric tons annually). As a result, immigration to the United States has significant implications for world-wide CO_2 emissions.

Methodology for Estimating Immigrant CO_2 Emissions

One obstacle to estimating annual immigrant and native-born per capita CO_2 emission rates is that there are no data that disaggregate rates of these two population cohorts. For that matter, there are also no data that break down per capita CO_2 emission rates along other important categories of the United States, such as by urban vs. suburban vs. rural, rich vs. poor, apartment dwellers vs. homeowners, or by ethnic/racial origin. One way around this absence of data is to use annual income as a surrogate for annual CO_2 emissions. Thereis a strong positive correlation between income and CO_2 emissions, especially those associated with fossil fuel consumption; that is, an increase in income is associated with an increase, though not necessarily a proportionate increase, in carbon emissions.[11] Higher-income Americans simply tend to consume more fossil energy than lower-income Americans, such as by driving instead of taking the bus, longer commutes to larger homes in distant suburbs (large, detached dwellings that take more energy to heat and cool), consuming more goods and services with substantial energy "embodied" in their manufacture production and delivery, taking more airline flights, etc.

Rather than assuming that all immigrants in the United States have the same annual per capita CO_2 emissions as native-born Americans or the average for the United States as a whole, this study postulates a broad correlation between a person's annual income and his or her annual CO_2 emissions. This premise is explored and supported by Table 2, which lists the per capita income and per capita CO_2 emissions for each of the 25 countries

Table 2. Comparison of per Capita Incomes and per Capita CO_2 Emissions Between U.S. and Top-25 Countries of Origin of Immigrants in the U.S.

Country	Purchasing Power Parity: Gross National Income per Capita (Dollars, 2005)[a]	U.S. per Capita Purchasing Power Parity/Sending Country per Capita Purchasing Power Parity	U.S. CO_2 Emissions per Capita/Sending Country CO_2 Emissions per Papita (2005)
United States	**$41,950**	**1.0 x**	**1.0 x**
Mexico	$10,030	4.2 x	5.4 x
China[b]	$6,600	6.4 x	4.9 x
India	$3,460	12.1 x	18.8 x
Philippines	$5,300	7.9 x	22.6 x
Vietnam	$3,010	13.9 x	21.0 x
El Salvador	$5,120	18.4 x	21.9 x
Cuba	$5,200 [c]	8.1 x	6.9 x
Former USSR[d]	$10,640	3.9 x	1.7 x
Korea	$21,850	1.9 x	2.0 x
Dominican Republic	$7,150	5.9 x	10.3 x
Canada	$32,220	1.3 x	1.0 x
Guatemala	$4,410	9.5 x	22.4 x
Colombia	$7,420	5.7 x	14.8 x
United Kingdom	$32,690	1.3 x	2.1 x
Jamaica	$4,110	10.2 x	4.8 x
Germany	$29,210	1.4 x	2.0 x
Haiti	$1,840	22.8 x	96.0 x
Honduras	$2,900	14.5 x	20.3 x
Poland	$13,490	3.1 x	2.7 x
Italy	$28,840	1.5 x	2.4 x
Ecuador	$4,070	10.3 x	11.3 x
Iran	$8,050	5.2 x	2.9 x
Peru	$5,830	7.2 x	18.0 x
Brazil	$8,230	5.1 x	10.4 x
Japan	$31,410	1.3 x	2.1 x

Notes: * Per capita income data from World Bank, 2007.[13]
[a] Purchasing power parity is the true exchange rate of different currencies based on differences in standard of living and overall pricing among different nations.
[b] Does not include Taiwan or Hong Kong.
[c] Exact figure not tabulated or provided by Cuban government. Gross national income per capita estimated by the World Bank (2007) to be global lower middle-income ($876–$3,465). For this analysis, the midpoint of this range was used, and then multiplied by 2.4, which was the average factor of increase between gross national per capita income and purchasing power parity for all Latin American countries in the table with a gross national income per capita below $3,465.
[d] Includes Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and other former Soviet states.

listed in Table 1. This comparison is useful because it depicts the correlation between per capita income and per capita CO_2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption in countries from three continents. Figure 1 (p. 6) is a scatter plot, in which for all countries except Haiti (a statistical outlier), per capita income ratios (X or horizontal axis) are plotted against per capita CO_2 emissions ratios (Y or vertical axis). In country after country, as per capita income increases, per capita CO_2 emissions increase as well, although not always in lockstep. In this study then, the same relationship is assumed to hold for different populations of immigrants in the United States.

That carbon dioxide emissions are a function of income means that they do not conform to a pattern that environmental economists have observed with other pollutants and "negative externalities." As national

Table 3. Estimated per Capita Income and CO_2 Emissions by Immigrants' Countries of Origin

	Number of Immigrants in U.S. (1,000s)	Average Annual Income in U.S.	Immigrant Income Relative to Average U.S. Income (Not Native Income)	Per Capita CO_2 Emissions in Country of Origin (Tons)	Per Capita CO_2 Emissions in U.S. (tons)
Average U.S.		**$35,038**	**100 %**	**20.14**	**20.14**
Mexico	11,671	$18,636	53.2 %	3.75	10.71
China[a]	2,007	$37,943	108.3 %	5.90	21.81
India	1,704	$50,466	144.0 %	1.07	29.01
Philippines	1,665	$35,389	101.0 %	0.89	20.34
Vietnam	999	$34,867	99.5 %	0.96	20.04
El Salvador	998	$20,509	58.5 %	0.92	11.79
Cuba	980	$27,835	79.4 %	2.91	16.00
Former USSR[b]	973	$35,007	99.9 %	9.02	20.12
Korea	906	$35,733	102.0 %	10.27	20.54
Dominican Republic	856	$18,582	53.0 %	1.95	10.68
Canada	699	$52,015	148.5 %	19.24	29.90
Guatemala	681	$18,115	51.7 %	0.90	10.41
Colombia	669	$27,251	77.8 %	1.36	15.66
United Kingdom	590	$50,791	145.0 %	9.55	29.19
Jamaica	550	$32,054	91.5 %	4.22	18.43
Germany	514	$38,815	110.8 %	10.24	22.31
Haiti	514	$31,264	89.2 %	0.21	17.97
Honduras	439	$19,766	56.4 %	0.99	11.36
Poland	427	$30,073	85.8 %	7.38	17.29
Italy	418	$30,734	87.7 %	8.35	17.67
Ecuador	411	$27,348	78.1 %	1.79	15.72
Iran	371	$48,358	138.0 %	6.96	27.80
Peru	354	$31,163	88.9 %	1.12	17.91
Brazil	338	$30,657	87.5 %	1.94	17.62
Japan	286	$41,448	118.3 %	9.65	23.82
All other countries[c]	7,260	$36,816	105.1 %	4.19	21.16
All Immigrants	37,280	$29,692	84.7 %	4.19	17.10

Notes: [a] Includes immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong, apportioned according to their relative frequency in the United States.
[b] Includes immigrants from Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and all other republics formerly in the Soviet Union, apportioned according to their relative frequency in the United States.
[c] Includes all immigrants from other countries not specifically listed in the top-25 countries, broken down (and apportioned according to their relative frequency) by the following regions: Europe, South Asia, East-Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central America, Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceana.
Source of "Number of immigrants" and "Average income in U.S." columns: Center for Immigration Studies analysis of March 2007 Current Population Survey (CPS). Income figures reflect total income for persons 18 years of age and older.

economies' incomes and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase at first, pollution and environmental blight often increase initially but later decrease as incomes continue to grow. When graphed, this relationship takes the form of an inverted or upside-down "U." Because of its similarity to the pattern of inequality and income first articulated by Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets, this pattern of pollution and income has been dubbed the "Environmental Kuznets Curve" (EKC). However, while any number of air and water pollutants and aesthetic/ecological assaults, ranging from rampant deforestation to litter, display this pattern, peak pollution levels occur at different income levels for different pollutants, societies, and time periods.[12]

The EKC explains societies' behavior when applied to toxic contaminants that are a visible nuisance and health threat to large numbers of people, such as lead, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide polluting the air, or raw sewage and industrial effluent defiling water bodies. It is less applicable in the case of pollutants or damage that are hidden, dispersed, or cumulative, like from carbon dioxide emissions or extravagant energy use.

Table 3 (p. 5) uses the average annual per capita incomes of immigrants in the United States to estimate immigrants' CO_2 emissions in 2007. These emissions are compared to per capita emissions in the immigrant's home country. The first column lists each immigrant home country in descending order, from the country with the highest number of immigrants in the United States (Mexico) to the country in 25th place (Japan). After Japan, an entry for "all other countries" is listed, referring to the more than 100 countries that collectively account for about a fifth of immigrants to U.S. shores.[14]

The second column in Table 3 lists the number of immigrants in the United States from the country identified in the first column as of 2007.[15] The figures in this column *do not include* children born to immigrants in the United States. The third column displays the average annual income of immigrants in the United States from each country. The fourth column compares this income to the average U.S. income in 2007; a figure above 100 percent (like Canada) means immigrants from the country in question earn more on average than Americans do; a figure below 100 percent (like Honduras) means they have a lower annual income than Americans on average.

The fifth column is per capita CO_2 emissions in the immigrants' countries of origin, while the sixth and final column is the estimated annual per capita CO_2 emissions in the United States based on the countries' average annual incomes. Comparing columns five and six shows the estimated increase in CO_2 emissions that occurred by the act of immigrating to and living in the United States. There is clearly great variation in the income and CO_2 output of immigrants in the United States. For example, Mexican immigrants are estimated to produce only about half as much CO_2 as the average person in the United States. However, this is still more than double the output of the average person in Mexico. Canadian immigrants on the other hand produce almost 50 percent more in CO_2 emissions as the average person in the United States.

The final row of Table 3 shows that the average per capita CO_2 emissions for all immigrants in the United States was 4.19 metric tons in their sending countries. In the United States, those same immigrants had estimated emissions of 17.1 tons, about four times as high as the average per capita emissions in their countries of origin. Thus, the 37.3 million legal and illegal immigrants now living in the United States in 2007 produced about four times as

Figure 1. Income vs. CO_2 Emissions



much CO_2 as they would have had they stayed in their home countries.

Table 4 shows by how many times immigrants in the United States increased their per capita CO_2 emissions relative to average annual per capita emissions in their countries of origin. It is a measure of just how much emissions have increased because of immigration to the United States.

It should be noted that native-born Americans have a slightly higher annual per capita income ($36,008) than the overall average in the United States ($35,038) shown in Table 3. This is because the overall American average includes both native-born and foreign-born Americans' incomes and the inclusion of immigrants pulls the national average down somewhat. Thus, while Table 3 shows that immigrants on average produce about 85 percent as much CO_2 as the average person (immigrant or native-born) living in the United States, compared to just native-born Americans they produce 82 percent as much.

Overall, the more than 37 million immigrants (legal and illegal) living in the United States account for an estimated 637 million metric tons of CO_2 emissions each year or 10.7 percent of the U.S. total of 5,957 million metric tons. This is somewhat below their total share of the total population because of their lower average income. Based on estimates developed by the Center for Immigration Studies we estimate that of the 637 million tons of CO_2 emitted by immigrants, 83 percent is from legal immigrants and 17 percent is from illegal immigrants. Although about 30 percent of the 37.3 million immigrants living in the United States in March 2007 are estimated to be illegal aliens, they have much lower average incomes than legal immigrants.[16] For this reason illegal immigrants produce a smaller share of CO_2 emissions than legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants also produce significantly less than native-born Americans.

Table 4. Factor of Increase in CO_2 Emissions

Country	Estimated per Capita CO_2 Emissions of Immigrants in U.S. / per Capita CO2 Emissions of Countries of Origin
Mexico	2.9 x
China	3.7 x
India	27.1 x
Philippines	22.9 x
Vietnam	20.9 x
El Salvador	12. x
Cuba	5.5 x
Former USSR	2.2 x
Korea	2.0 x
Dominican Republic	5.5 x
Canada	1.6 x
Guatemala	11.6 x
Colombia	11.5 x
United Kingdom	3.1 x
Jamaica	4.4 x
Germany	2.2 x
Haiti	85.6 x
Honduras	11.5 x
Poland	2.3 x
Italy	2.1 x
Ecuador	8.8 x
Iran	4.0 x
Peru	16.0 x
Brazil	9.1 x
Japan	2.5 x
All other countries	5.1 x
All immigrants	4.1 x

Impact of U.S. Immigration on Global Emissions

It is instructive to put the estimated output of immigrants into context. The estimated 637 million tons of CO_2 emissions generated by immigrants is roughly equal to the annual CO_2 emissions of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela combined (the three largest emitting countries in South America). It is also equal to the CO_2 emissions of Great Britain and Sweden together. If immigrants in the United States were a separate country, they would rank seventh in world CO_2 emissions, behind China, the United States, Russia, Japan, India, and Germany.

Of course, if immigrants had stayed in their home countries, they also would have produced greenhouse gases. If the current stock of immigrants in the United States had stayed in their countries of origin rather than migrating to the United States, their estimated annual CO_2 emissions would have been only 155 metric tons, assuming these immigrants had the average level of CO_2 emissions for a person living in their home countries. This is 482 million tons less than the estimated 637 tons they will produce in the United States. This 482 million ton increase represents the impact of immigration on global emissions. It is equal to approximately 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO_2 emissions since 1980.[17] If the 482 million ton increase in global CO_2 emissions caused by immigration to the United States were a separate country, it would rank 10th in the world. Immigration to the United States thus has significant implications for global greenhouse gas emissions. And it is the total output that matters to CO_2 concentrations in the atmosphere, because CO_2 emitted anywhere is dispersed everywhere.

It should be noted that Tables 3 and 4 are based on the assumption that immigrants in the United States would have emitted CO_2 at rates like the average person in their country of origin if they had remained there. However, in certain cases, particularly Asian countries, this assumption may understate immigrants' actual emission rates if they had stayed in their home countries because immigrants in the United States from several Asian countries are more educated than is the average person in their home countries. Higher education levels should result in higher incomes and higher CO_2 emissions in their home countries. This would mean that the immigrant-induced increase in global emissions would be lower than estimated above. However, there is a strong reason to believe that even if CO_2 emissions were higher for immigrants from these countries it would not significantly change the above estimates.

If we assume that immigrants from India would have produced three times the CO_2 emissions as the average person in that country and that those from China, the Philippines, and Vietnam would have doubled, it changes the underlying findings only slightly.[18] Even making this assumption of much higher emissions in their home countries would still mean that immigrants overall would produce 3.7 times as much CO_2 in the United States as they would have in their home counties. This is very similar to the 4.1-fold increase found in Table 4. It must be remembered that highly educated immigrants from Asia account for a modest share of all immigrants in this country. It also should be remembered that immigrants from the largest sending country, Mexico, have very similar education levels to the average person in that country. Moreover, even if their emissions were much higher in their home countries, their output would still be much less than in the United States.

Assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 30 million new legal and illegal immigrants are likely to settle in the United States in the next 20 years.[19] Primarily because of immigration (new immigrants plus their descendents), the U.S. population is projected to grow by more than 20 percent over this time period, or by at least 60 million.[20] Even if per capita CO_2 emissions could be reduced by 20 percent in the United States over the next 20 years, total annual U.S. CO_2 emissions would remain the same. Total emissions are what matters for the global environment. Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include some understanding of how immigration and population growth contribute to greenhouse gas emissions.

Conclusion

Overall, our findings indicate that the average immigrant (legal or illegal) in the United States produces somewhat less CO_2 than the average native-born American. However, immigrants in the United States produce about four times more CO_2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin. The estimated 637 metric tons of CO_2 U.S. immigrants produce is 482 million tons more than they would have produced had they remained in their home countries. This 482 million ton increase represents about 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO_2 emissions since 1980. These figures do not include the impact of children born to immigrants in the United States. If they were included, the impact would be even higher.

When it comes to dealing with global warming, environmentalists in the United States have generally chosen to adopt what might be described as piecemeal efforts to oppose new sources of fossil fuel-based energy, such as the construction of new coal-fired power plants. They have also supported energy conservation/efficiency (e.g., compact fluorescent light bulbs) and more use of renewable sources like wind and solar energy. But they have assiduously avoided the underlying issue of growing energy demand driven by immigration-fueled population growth. In response to concerns over immigrant-induced population growth, some American environmentalists have even argued that it does not matter where on the Earth people live because the world's environment is so interconnected. This analysis has shown that when it comes to CO_2 emissions it matters a great deal where people live. Per capita CO_2 emissions are dramatically higher in the United States than in almost every immigrant-sending country. Large-scale immigration to the United States therefore has enormous implications for world-wide CO_2 emissions.

Some may be tempted to see this analysis as "blaming immigrants" for what are really America's failures. It is certainly reasonable to argue that Americans could do much more to reduce per capita emissions. And it is certainly not our intention to imply that immigrants are particularly responsible for global warming. As we report in this study, immigrants produce somewhat less CO_2 on average than native-born Americans. But to simply dismiss the large role that continuing high levels of immigration play in increasing U.S. and worldwide CO_2 emissions is not only intellectually dishonest, it is also counter-productive. One must acknowledge a problem before a solution can be found. The effect of immigration is certainly not trivial. If immigrants in the United States were their own country, they would rank seventh in the world in annual CO_2 output, ahead of such countries as Canada, France, and Great Britain.

Unless there is a change in immigration policy, 30 million (legal and illegal) immigrants are likely to settle in the United States over the next 20 years. One can still argue for high levels of immigration for any number of reasons. However, one cannot make the argument for high immigration without at least understanding what it means for global efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.

Some involved in the global warming issue have recognized immigration's importance. Chief U.S. climate negotiator and special representative for the United States, Harlan Watson, has acknowledged high immigration to the United States is thwarting efforts to slow its rising GHG emissions. "It's simple arithmetic," said Watson. "If you look at mid-century, Europe will be at 1990 levels of population while ours will be nearing 60 percent above 1990 levels. So population does matter."[21] This research confirms Watson's observation.

Endnotes

[1] R. Beck, L. Kolankiewicz, and S.A. Camarota.2003. *Outsmarting Smart Growth: Population Growth, Immigration, and the Problem of Sprawl*. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. Available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/sprawl.html.

[2] Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. 2001. *Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions*. National Academies Press: Washington, DC; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007. *Climate Change 2007: ThePhysical Science Basis — Summary for Policymakers*. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.

[3] Coal: Fred Freme, Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2007. *U.S. Coal Supply and Demand — 2006 Review*. April. Accessed online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/feature.html; Petroleum: EIA. 2007. *Petroleum Products Consumption*. Accessed online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/infosheets/petroleumproductsconsumption.html; Natural gas: EIA. 2008. *Natural gas total consumption MMcf.* Accessed online at: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2A.htm.

[4] Pilot projects to capture and sequester carbon dioxide — thus circumventing its release to the atmosphere — are now underway, but whether "carbon capture and sequestration" on a huge scale will ever prove technically feasible and economically viable is highly uncertain at this juncture.

[5] Bloomberg News. 2007. "China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions." *International Herald Tribune* June 20. Accessed 3-19-08 online at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/20/business/emit.php.

[6] U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2007. *International Energy Annual 2005*. Table H1co2: World Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005. Posted October 1, 2007. Accessed 2-5-08 online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls

[7] For more discussion of this issue see L. Kolankiewicz. 2002. *Population Growth — The Neglected Dimension of America's Persistent Energy/Environmental Problems.* October. NumbersUSA Education and Research Foundation. Available online at http://www.numbersusa.com/about/books.html.

[8] The Center for Immigration Studies projections are in *100 Million More: Projecting the Impact of Immigration On the U.S. Population, 2007 to 2060*, which can be found at: www.cis.org/articles/2007/back707.html. A recent Pew Hispanic Center report estimated that 82 percent of population growth between 2005 and 2050 will be from immigrants and their descendents. The report, *U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050,* can be found at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/85.pdf. The last time the Census Bureau did population projections under different immigration scenarios was in 2000. Table F of the methodology section of that report shows the impact of different immigration scenarios on U.S. population size. See "Methodology and Assumptions for the Population Projections of the United States: 1999 to 2100": U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Working Paper No. 38. Issued January 13, 2000.

Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natproj.html.

[9] S.A. Camarota. 2007. "Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-Born Population." Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies *Backgrounder*. November.

[10] Energy Information Administration. 2007. *International Energy Annual 2005*. Table H1co2: World Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005. Posted October 1, 2007. Accessed 2-5-08 online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls.

[11] U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2008. *Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report*. Report No.: DOE/EIA-0573(2006). http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html, released November 28, 2007: "In the longer run, residential [carbon] emissions are affected by population growth and income;" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2007. Vol. 104, No. 24. Published online May 22, 2007. http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/104/24/10288: "Nearly constant or slightly increasing trends in the carbon intensity of energy [emissions/energy] have been recently observed in both developed and developing regions;" Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy. 1992. *Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base*. National Academies Press: Washington, DC. From Appendix N, Population Growth and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: "Annual CO_2 emissions are calculated from population and income projections. It is assumed that CO_2 emissions increase proportionately with population for all income levels. For low income levels (i.e., multiples below five), it is assumed that CO_2 emissions additionally increase proportionately with per capita income growth. For higher incomes, CO_2 emissions increase less than proportionately with per capita income growth (i.e., at 0.8 for income multiples between five and 10, 0.7 for multiples between 10 and 30, and 0.6 for higher multiples)."

[12] New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition. Accessed May 1, 2008 at: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/aml6/pdfs&zips/PalgraveEKC.pdf .

[13] World Bank. 2007. *World Development Indicators 2007*. Table 1.1: Size of the economy. Accessed 02-04-08 online at http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/RESOURCES/table1_1.pdf.

[14] Includes all immigrants from other countries not specifically listed in the top-25 countries, broken down (and apportioned according to their relative frequency) by the following regions: Europe, South Asia, East-Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central America, Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceana.

[15] The figures are from the March 2007 Current Population Survey collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. The numbers are for all persons from each country. The income figures are based on the total income of persons 18 and older. Most researchers think about 90 percent of illegal immigrants respond to the Survey. Thus the figures in the table represent the total income of immigrants and natives.

[16] Based on the March 2007 Current Population Survey, which is the primary data source used in this study for immigrants, we estimate that the average annual income of illegal immigrants over age 18 was $17,497. We also estimate that the average annual income for legal immigrants 18 and older was $34,473. In effect, illegal immigrants account for 18 percent of the aggregate income earned by all immigrants and legal immigrants account for 82 percent of the aggregate income. For more discussion of the characteristics of the illegal immigrants see "Immigrants in the United States 2007: A Profile of America's Foreign-born Population," available at www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.html.

[17] The March 2007 Current Population Survey shows that the vast majority of immigrants in the United States arrived in 1980 or later. Global CO_2 emissions from fuel consumption and flaring were 18,331 million metric tons in 1980. Global emissions in 2005 were 28,193 million metric tons. Thus, annual world output of CO_2 increased by 9,862 million metric tons during this quarter-century, or 54 percent. The estimated increase in immigrants' CO_2 emissions in the United States over what they would have been in their countries of origin is 482 million metric tons.

[18] Iran is another country whose immigrants in the United States are much more educated than the average person in Iran. We do not adjust their assumed output for the following reason: Iran has relatively high per capita emissions for a developing country mainly

because of the flaring of natural gas associated with its oil industry. However, much of the oil Iran produces is consumed outside of Iran. Thus the actual per capita output actually attributable to fossil fuel consumption by the people of Iran is less than is implied by their per capita numbers found in Tables 3 and 4. So it makes little sense to adjust their figures upward in the way we do India, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Of course, this means that immigration from Iran to the United States represents an even larger impact on world-wide CO_2 emissions because emissions caused by the consumption of the people of that country are actually lower than implied by the tables.

[19] In recent years the Current Population Survey and the American Community Survey, both collected by the Census Bureau, have indicated that about 1.5 million new immigrants settle in the country each year. There is some undercount in these surveys of recently arrived immigrants, and therefore it is more likely that 1.6 million new immigrants arrive each year. The Pew Hispanic Center assumes a 5.2 percent undercount in the overall immigrant population. This is based research by Passel, Van Hook, and Bean as part of a Census Bureau contract through Sabre Systems. But even assuming only 1.5 million new arrivals would still place the total number of new arrivals over 20 years at 30 million — 1.5 x 30. It is also worth noting that immigration to the United States, both legal and illegal, has been steadily increasing for 40 years. If that long-standing trend continues, then significantly more than 30 million new immigrants will arrive in the United States, assuming no change in policy.

[20] Projections by the Census Bureau, the Center for Immigration Studies, and the Pew Hispanic Center all show that the U.S. population grows by about 1 percent each year. Thus, over a 20 year period, population growth is very roughly 20 percent. The Center for Immigration Studies projections can be found at, www.cis.org/articles/2007/back707.html. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates can be found at: http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/85.pdf. The Census projections can be found at: http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/.

[21] Doyle, Allister. Aug 30, 2007. Reuters News Service. http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL30472039.html .

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Backgrounder

Immigration to the United States and World-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions

By Steven A. Camarota and Leon Kolankiewicz

The findings of this study indicate that future levels of immigration will have a significant impact on efforts to reduce global CO_2 emissions. Immigration to the United States significantly increases world-wide CO_2 emissions because it transfers population from lower-polluting parts of the world to the United States, which is a higher-polluting country. On average immigrants increase their emissions four-fold by coming to America.

Among the findings:

- The estimated CO_2 emissions of the average immigrant (legal or illegal) in the United States are 18 percent less than those of the average native-born American.
- However, immigrants in the United States produce an estimated four times more CO_2 in the United States as they would have in their countries of origin.

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