

which the Committee will review materials containing the names of applicant institutions and principal investigators and privileged information contained in declined proposals. This meeting will also include a review of peer review documentation pertaining to applicants. Any non-exempt materials that may be discussed at this meeting (proposals that have been awarded) will be inextricably intertwined with the discussion of exempt materials and no further separation is practical. These matters are within exemptions (4) and (6) of 5 U.S.C. 552b (c), the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Authority to Close Meeting: This determination was made by the Committee Management Officer pursuant to provisions of Section 10 (d) of P.L. 92-463. The Committee Management Officer was delegated the authority to make such determinations by the Director, National Science Foundation, on July 6, 1979.

Summary Minutes: May be obtained from Contact Person.

Dated: June 17, 1986.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-368]

Arkansas Power and Light Co.; Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 issued to Arkansas Power and Light Company (the licensee), for operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, located in Pope County, Arkansas.

The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (T.S.) 3/4.10, "Special Test Exceptions—Shutdown Margin," in accordance with the licensee's application for amendment dated June 9, 1986. T.S. 3.10.1 allows the shutdown margin to be reduced to less than the normal operating shutdown margin requirements during the performance of low power physics tests, provided that certain conditions are met. As one of these conditions, Surveillance Requirement 4.10.1.2 requires that all control element assemblies (CEA's) not fully inserted in the core be demonstrated to be capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing shutdown margin to less than the normal operating

requirements. The proposed change will allow this surveillance to be performed within seven days prior to the tests instead of within 24 hours prior to the tests. This will enable low power physics testing to be completed without an additional trip to verify CEA insertability.

Low power physics tests are performed to verify core physics predictions. One of the test sequences measures CEA worths and may involve the reduction of shutdown margin as permitted by T.S. 3.10.1. Prior to initial criticality for performance of the low power physics tests, rod drop testing is performed to demonstrate CEA insertability. The reactor is brought critical and stabilized at the test plateau (approximately 10% power). The preferred sequence for low power physics testing has CEA worth measurements made last. Since approximately five days would have elapsed from when the hot rod drop test were performed, the reactor would have to be tripped again to demonstrate CEA insertion capability and satisfy the current 24 hour criteria. The proposed change would eliminate the necessity for an additional trip during low power physics testing by requiring CEA insertability to be verified within seven days prior to reducing shutdown margin instead of within 24 hours.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment follows:

Criterion 1

The previously analyzed accidents which potentially could be affected by the proposed change are those which involve overcooling of the reactor coolant system (RCS). Because of the negative moderation temperature coefficient, cooldown results in a reactivity increase. Because of this, a post trip return to power may be

experienced during events involving overcooling of the RCS if insufficient negative reactivity is inserted via the CEA's. Since shut down margin must be reduced during measurement of CEA worths, Surveillance Requirement 4.10.1.2 provides added assurance that the maximum amount of negative reactivity is available for insertion should a reactor trip occur. The proposed change may reduce the degree of assurance provided by this surveillance by extending the surveillance time period. However, the impact of the proposed change on the probability of the previously analyzed accidents are insignificant based on the fact that the geometry of the components involved (fuel assembly, CEA, extension shaft, control element drive mechanism, upper guide structure) will not change over the 7 day time period. Additionally, extending the surveillance time period to 7 days will not cause a significant increase in the probability of a stuck CEA due to an electrical malfunction since the CEAs insert as a result of gravitational force after a removal of power. Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly increase the probability of previously evaluated accidents. In addition, the proposed change has no effect on the consequences of overcooling events since it does not affect the amount by which shutdown margin may be reduced.

Criterion 2

There is no possibility of a new or different kind of accident occurring since the existing FSAR accident analysis already assumes a hypothetical stuck CEA and the proposed change does not result in any change to the facility.

Criterion 3

The affected Specification 3/4.10.1 provides that a minimum amount of CEA worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for CEA worth measurement, and will, therefore, preserve the existing margin of safety.

Therefore, since the application for amendment appears to satisfy the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.92, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not