

powerful friends in industry must also have helped, as did his ability to show that he had faithfully fought for the fatherland in the First World War.⁷

The Reich Anticancer Committee, suitably aryanized, appeared to support the Nazification of German cancer research. In its first annual report after the *Machtergreifung* the committee declared itself eager to embrace the new regime:

The year 1933 was a decisive one for the war against cancer: the national socialist revolution (*Umwälzung*) has created entirely new opportunities for sweeping measures in an area that until now has been rather limited. . . . The energetic and unanimous engagement (*Einsatz*) of the medical profession has shown that new avenues have opened for the struggle against cancer in the new Germany.⁸

The *Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung* sounded similar themes,⁹ and the newly formed *Monatsschrift* announced its desire to provide anticancer activists with new "weapons" to continue their struggle. No stone was to be left unturned.¹⁰

The Central Committee (Zentralkomitee) was dissolved in December of 1933; all cancer research within the borders of the Reich was henceforth to be coordinated by the more activist and nationalist Reich Anticancer Committee. The elevation of this latter organization after 1933 signaled an effort to unify the heretofore scattered forces of the German anticancer effort; it also signaled a move to favor practical measures such as early detection over basic research initiatives.¹¹ The Reich Committee had emphasized since its inception the value of preventive medicine (especially early detection), and post-1933 policies strengthened this emphasis. Women over forty were urged to have an annual exam, and the prevention-oriented cancer exhibit prepared at Dresden's Hygiene Museum traveled all over Germany, attracting more than half a million visitors.¹²

The expulsion of Jews and communists, in other words, was only part of the *Gleichschaltung* (unification and purification) of German cancer research. Nazi ideologues also emphasized the need for a shift from "scientific abstractions" to more practical approaches. The *Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung* announced that it

would henceforth publish less in the areas of basic biochemistry, tissue culture, and animal experimentation, and more on clinical observation, human tumor pathology, and statistics, consistent with Liek's critique of *Mäusedoktoren* ("mouse doctors"—by which he meant vivisectionists or laboratory cancer specialists more generally). The journal cautioned against an excessive focus on laboratory methods that "lose themselves in fruitless details" (a veiled antisemitic reference); the new focus was to be more statistical, allowing a better understanding of the distribution of cancer by race, social status, occupation, and the environmental factors that give rise to cancer in the first place.¹³

One surprising aspect of the Nazi turn in German science is that many Jewish scholars continued to be cited in German cancer journals. It is not yet clear how we should interpret this: it may suggest that German fascism was less "total" than is sometimes imagined (the system was polycentric, and sometimes "leaky"); it may also indicate that scientific citation did not have the significance that we today attach to it. There are scholars today who worry about the unreflective citation of "Nazi data" (Mengele's work on the genetics of cleft palate is still cited);¹⁴ our present-day concerns with criminal scientific citation, however, may simply reflect the status we have invested in displays of debt and credit.

No one will ever be able to say what the loss of Jewish scientific talent meant for the course of German science. From a moral point of view, of course, the loss of talent is nothing compared to the loss of life. A thousand laments for Einstein sound hollow against the silence of the millions of lesser-knowns who perished.

It is also possible, though, as already noted, that the expulsion of Jewish scientists did relatively little to slow the German campaign against cancer—at least in the short run. If this is so, it is because basic science was not mainly what was needed in the war on cancer. It was already known that tobacco, soot, tar, asbestos, and radiation were causes of cancer, and that prevention of exposure to such agents could prevent a sizable fraction of all cancers. Successful anticancer campaigns seemed to require political and public health muscle more than scientific subtleties. That was not true in every instance—little was known about the molecular basis of