FILE NAME: WR Grace (WRG)

DATE: Unknown

DOC#: WRG012

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: 0000 Book Excerpt - Secret Agenda - excerpts from Chapter 8: CIA Dirty Tricks notes and Chapter 10: Spies, Spooks, and LSD

person here first, ask questions later. Because of that, there was a potential for an even greater internal security risk with these cases than with Paperclip, which at least provided some semblance of military custody. In addition to hard-core Nazis, National Interest cases included former members of the Communist party and the Italian Fascist party.

One German was an accused Nazi spy who, though brought to the United States to work for a New York optical company, promptly disappeared once he arrived. This should have come as no surprise, considering Goerz Langfeld's track record. Langfeld had lived in America in the late 1930s and worked for Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York. The FBI suspected that Langfeld and several top U.S. businessmen were meeting with a notorious Nazi spy, who later was convicted of espionage. Langfeld left America in 1941, and reports of his wartime activities are conflicting. Langfeld claimed on one form that he had gone to Tokyo as a "tourist." On another he said he had returned to Nazi Germany and joined the Luftwaffe. Yet another story was that he had worked for the German Naval headquarters in Berlin. One thing is certain: in late 1945 Army CIC agents thought he looked suspicious and threw him in jail. He was caught wearing a British uniform, brandishing a gun, and carrying falsified papers, including identity cards under several names. Langfeld escaped soon after his arrest and, under yet another alias, obtained a job at the Office of Military Government for Bavaria's film division. By the time he was brought to the United States in 1952 his records revealed that he had used at least five different aliases.[11]

Even convicted Nazi war criminals were accepted under the project. Otto Ambros's case is by far the most brazen example of how National Interest circumvented U.S. immigration laws. The fact that W. R. Grace and Company, headed by J. Peter Grace, employed Ambros as a consultant for decades is well known. But newly declassified JIOA and U.S. Army documents shed new light on this sordid affair.[12]

During the war, Ambros was a director of I. G. Farben, the chemical company that owned a firm that manufactured

Zyklon B, the gas used to kill millions of Jews in the camps. Ambros took part in the decision to use Zyklon B in the gas chambers and personally selected Auschwitz as the site of an I. G. Farben factory, which he later managed, because Auschwitz concentration camp prisoners could be used as slaves in the factory. Nuremberg trial witnesses recalled the deplorable conditions under which Auschwitz prisoners were forced to work at Ambros's I. G. Farben Auschwitz plant. "Thrashings, ill-treatment of the worst kind, even direct killings were the fashion," testified Rudolf Vitek, both a physician and an Auschwitz inmate. "The murderous work speed was responsible for the fact that while working many prisoners suddenly stretched out flat, turned blue, gasped for breath and died like beasts."[13]

I. G. Farben also manufactured nerve gas that was used in poison gas experiments on Auschwitz prisoners. These experiments, conducted in secret laboratories at I. G. Farben factories, were used to determine how fast nerve gas would kill Allied soldiers. The helpless victims of these experiments died instantly. According to British intelligence, Ambros and other I. G. Farben officials "justified the experiments not only on the grounds that the inmates of concentration camps would have been killed anyway by the Nazis, but also . . . that the experiments had a humanitarian aspect in that the lives of countless German workers were saved."[14]

Ambros was found guilty of slavery and mass murder at Nuremberg, but he was sentenced to a mere eight years' imprisonment. Chief prosecutor Josiah DuBois regarded the sentence as "light enough to please a chicken thief" and was so outraged that he wrote a scathing book about the men he called *The Devil's Chemists*. The JIOA had no such qualms and kept Ambros's name on JIOA hiring lists—even during his imprisonment. These lists were significant, since they contained the names of German scientists who had been cleared for employment under various JIOA and British projects. In addition, these Germans' families received benefits, including food supplements, not available to average German citizens.[15]

In 1951, General Clay's successor, the High Commissioner of Germany (HICOG), John McCloy, released from prison many convicted Nazi war criminals, including Ambros. The Nazi chemist immediately was hired as a consultant by Grace, Dow Chemical, and other American companies, as well as the U.S. Army Chemical Corps under a consultancy project that was run administratively in Germany by HICOG—conveniently the same agency whose chief had just set Ambros free. The full details of Ambros's consultancy with the U.S. military are unknown. The *effect* of that work, however, is abundantly clear. During the time that Ambros was a consultant, the chemical corps, using Auschwitz documents as a guide, conducted the same type of poison gas experiments that had been done in the secret I. G. Farben laboratories. This time, however, the experiments were conducted at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and the unfortunate guinea pigs were more than seven thousand American soldiers.[16]

In the 1950s Grace repeatedly tried to get the State Department to issue Ambros a visa but was turned down because he was a convicted Nazi war criminal. Then National Interest entered the picture, as it provided a way to bring otherwise excludable individuals to the United States under the attorney general's waiver provision. According to State sources, the Justice Department approved Ambros's entry and he visited the United States at least three times.[17]

The CIA's tremendous influence on National Interest and Paperclip has been ignored prior to this book. The CIA was formed as a separate intelligence agency as a result of the National Security Act of 1947. A year later, the Office of Policy Coordination began operating as the CIA's covert action arm, headed by Frank Wisner, formerly chief of OSS operations in the Balkans during World War II. Wisner's OPC operated out of the State Department, which proved highly advantageous to the intelligence agents running Paperclip. His considerable influence in the State Department meant a more favorable climate, particularly since Samuel Klaus and other Paperclip detractors had been forced out of the picture. In addition,

Wisner handled the CIA investigations of individuals brought to America under all JIOA projects. Considering the well-publicized facts surrounding the CIA's own use of Nazi war criminals, it should not be surprising that the CIA name checks reported "no derogatory information."[18]

Wisner also helped the JIOA obtain visas for Paperclip scientists. For example, in February 1948 Director of Intelligence Stephen Chamberlin met with Wisner to discuss JIOA's problems with Klaus and the Visa Department. Chamberlin told Wisner that around 350 Germans were still living in the United States under military custody, but they could not become permanent residents without State Department approval. "This condition has resulted in an unfavorable reaction on specialists' morale," Chamberlin said. He asked Wisner to accelerate the visas and to support JIOA's efforts to change Paperclip policy to enable the Germans to get visas before their arrival in America.[19]

Less than a month later the State Department notified the JIOA that it would accelerate its processing of visas in the Paperclip cases. The new director of the Visa Department, Herve L'Heureux, also issued instructions to consuls in Germany that only major Nazi leaders would be barred from obtaining visas. By 1949 Paperclip scientists began to obtain visas prior to their arrival in the United States.[20]

The National Interest project provided a way to slip military or CIA intelligence assets into the country. The CIA group involved defectors or individuals who possessed information of significant intelligence value. JIOA officers passed on the names of the CIA group to the attorney general for final approval. "We just did the paperwork," recalled retired U.S. Army Colonel Bernard Geehan, who served on the JIOA from 1953 to 1957. But that approval process was crucial, because the law was designed to admit people who otherwise would be inadmissible. As one CIA attorney admitted in 1979, the provision allowing the CIA to bring a hundred persons to the United States waived all grounds of exclusion, so theoretically, drug traffickers or persons convicted of serious crimes could

for Armageddon amid the chill of the cold war not only by relying on Nazis here at home for their evil experiments but also by tapping the twisted minds of those still living in Germany. As mentioned earlier, U.S. laws governing the American zone of Germany forbade the Germans from doing research on chemical warfare. But that did not stop the Army Chemical Corps or the High Commissioner of Germany, the U.S. organization that replaced OMGUS, from hiring chemical warfare experts as "consultants" or funding German industries to produce chemical warfare materials for the United States.[32]

West Germany came under severe criticism when evidence surfaced in 1989 that German chemical companies had been helping Libya build a chemical warfare plant. In particular, a column written by influential *New York Times* columnist William Safire refering to "Auschwitz-in-the-Sand" ominously cited the reemergence of "the German problem." But neither Safire nor anyone else mentioned that it was the U.S. government who had put the German chemical warfare experts back to work soon after World War II, under the banner of the American flag.[33]

The U.S. agencies' employment of German scientists living in the American zone was an enormous operation. At one point HICOG's scientific director, Carl Nordstrom, had at least 150 Germans working for him as consultants. They offered advice or gave U.S. agencies information about their wartime research. At the same time, the Army Chemical Corps employed some thirty German chemical warfare experts to conduct secret nerve gas research for the Chemical Division of EUCOM. Many of these scientists met with Hoffmann when he traveled to Germany seeking information about psychochemicals or other new chemical discoveries. Others, like convicted Nazi war criminal Otto Ambros, were flown to the United States to work as consultants under National Interest for American corporations such as Ambros's employer, the W. R. Grace Company.[34]

Former SS Brigadier General Walter Schieber was among

the more notorious individuals on the U.S. payroll. One army officer called him "the prototype of an ardent and convinced Nazi who used the Party to further his own ambitions." Nevertheless, he worked for more than a decade for the Chemical Division at EUCOM, where he was given access to highly classified information about U.S. chemical warfare activities. At one point he even helped the division make nerve gas.[35]

Schieber, a chemist, had been in charge of the Nazi Armaments Supply office under Albert Speer during the war. He supervised the seizure of arms factories in France and other Nazi-occupied countries, and later in the war oversaw the Nazi's chemical warfare program. Thousands of civilians were forcibly brought to Nazi Germany to work as slave laborers in armaments factories under Schieber's control. In 1945 he was jailed as a war crimes suspect.[36]

Speer was convicted at Nuremberg and sentenced to twenty years in prison, but Schieber saved his skin by serving as a star witness at the Nuremberg trials and writing chemical warfare reports for the U.S. Army while he was still in jail. By 1947 U.S. intelligence agents had decided that Schieber's knowledge of chemical warfare was more important than his Nazi past. "Several obstacles were overcome by American authorities before Schieber's scientific knowledge could be exploited," one Army CIC agent noted. One of those obstacles was removed when U.S. intelligence officers got him released from prison. Within a short time Schieber was making DM 1,000 a month working for the Chemical Division at EUCOM.[37]

Air Force Colonel Donald Putt tried to bring Schieber to Wright-Patterson under Paperclip, but his scheme was squelched by an Army CIC investigation of Schieber's involvement with shady characters all over Europe. Schieber had French contacts who had offered him $50,000 for Nazi nerve gas formulas contained in documents he kept in his house. Some of his Swiss friends were arms smugglers who supplied weapons to SS officers on the run. And Schieber's frequent business dealings with Soviet officials in the eastern zone raised

Nevertheless, disturbing questions did surface about Hubertus Strughold's Nazi past amid charges that government agencies and highly placed political officials were protecting him. While the Air Force touted him as the "father of American space medicine," Strughold was publicly identified as one of thirty-seven war crimes suspects who were under investigation by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). His name was included on the list because of a letter written in 1958 by one Julian Bach to the editor of the *Saturday Review* concerning the Dachau experiments. But the 1958 investigation that followed quickly turned into a joke. INS made a discreet check with none other than the Air Force—the same military branch that helped cover up Strughold's past in the first place—and then dropped the investigation after being told that Strughold already had been "appropriately investigated."[5]

Soon after Strughold's name surfaced again in 1974, Holtzman received conflicting reports from INS when she inquired about the status of his case. In one instance, Holtzman obtained an INS status report noting that a regional INS office had been directed to cancel its investigation. Later, INS Director Chapman told Holtzman that the investigation into Strughold's background was still ongoing.[6]

A controversy ensued when INS closed the case following an inquiry on Strughold's behalf by his Texas congressman, Henry Gonzales, who complained to Chapman that Strughold's name had been released as a person under investigation. Gonzales said he had been informed by an "interested individual" that Strughold's background already had been thoroughly checked. "If he did have a suspect past," Gonzales wrote, "I do not believe he would have ever pursued his profession, let alone submit to extensive investigations required for the sensitive jobs that he held for our government." A few days later, Chapman reported back that inquiries to the military and other federal agencies had disclosed "no derogatory information" and therefore the INS considered the case closed.[7]

Then Strughold claimed in a New York newspaper that he had never even heard of the Dachau experiments until *after* World War II. That claim was disputed in a magazine article by journalist Charles Allen, which gave details of Strughold's attendance at a conference in 1942 at which the freezing experiments on Dachau prisoners were clearly revealed, causing a sensation among the scientists at the conference. After that revelation, U.S. immigration official Henry Wagner admitted to *The New York Times* that there was no evidence in Strughold's file that he had ever been asked directly whether he had known of the Dachau experiments on human beings.[8]

A General Accounting Office investigation in 1978 could have blown the lid off the entire Nazi issue, including Paperclip. The GAO is the investigating arm of Congress, and it has the authority to obtain documents and question witnesses. But the GAO allowed itself to be duped by government agencies instead of using its authority to conduct a thorough probe. The investigation focused on whether there had been a widespread government conspiracy to obstruct investigations of Nazi war criminals living in America. Although the GAO revealed that some government agencies had employed or utilized Nazis, the agency concluded that there had been no conspiracy to obstruct justice.[9]

But later the GAO was shocked to learn that government agencies had indeed deliberately withheld information from GAO investigators. As a result the GAO conducted another investigation in 1985. But that report was an outright whitewash. The GAO was informed of some of the major findings in this book, and the *Bulletin* article revealing the original JIOA coverup already had been published in April of that year. But GAO investigators said they were not interested in seeing the materials. The GAO's 1985 report not only ignored the published evidence, but it contained glaring errors, such as stating that Paperclip had ended in 1947(!), and parroted all of the false myths that have been trotted out through the decades. GAO investigator John Tipton later admitted in an interview that research for the report had been "superficial."[10]

pointment of industrialist J. Peter Grace to chair a budget advisory committee, because of Grace's links to convicted Nazi war criminal Otto Ambros. Grace's chemical company had been employing Ambros as a technical advisor since his release from prison in Nuremberg in 1951. In the midst of bad publicity and an investigation by Congressman Tom Lantos of California, a Holocaust survivor, both Grace and Dow Chemical claimed that Ambros was no longer working for them. Ambros, however, admitted in an interview in 1986 that he is working for somebody in the United States, but he refused to say who. "I'm still working for U.S. companies but they don't want me to talk," he said. "There has been too much trouble with the press." Ambros said he works as a chemist developing new plastics and chemicals.[28]

Some of President George Bush's activities also raise serious questions about the OSI's fate under his administration. During Bush's 1988 presidential campaign several members of a volunteer ethnic coalition in Bush's campaign were exposed as Holocaust revisionists or members of Nazi or Fascist groups. Cochairman Jerome Brentar admitted that as a postwar officer in the International Refugee Organization in Germany he had helped hundreds of Nazis to emigrate to the United States, "whether [they were] in the Waffen SS or in the Wehrmacht." Other coalition members included Florian Galdau, a Romanian Orthodox priest who is the New York chief of the still-existing Iron Guard, Romania's pro-Nazi movement; Radi Slavoff, leader of a Bulgarian group formed by wartime members of the Nazi-aligned Bulgarian Legion; and former members of the Latvian SS and P-2 Lodge, an illegal Italian group that plotted to overthrow the Italian government in 1970 and install a dictator.[29]

In addition, on July 20, 1988, Bush attended a dinner in Detroit sponsored by the Captive Nations Committee and the American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, some of whose members are longtime agitators against OSI because of OSI's cases against East European Nazi collaborators. Even if Bush was unaware of their anti-OSI stance before the dinner,

he certainly was made aware of it when outspoken OSI critic Bohdan Fedorak stated the groups' strong opposition to OSI in his introduction to Bush. "I'm sure that there was nothing derogatory in that type of remark," Fedorak said in an interview. "Otherwise, I'm sure that we would have heard it either from him [Bush] or from other people." According to Fedorak, Bush said nothing in the OSI's defense in his remarks at the banquet.[30]

Bush's background as a former CIA director poses a potential conflict should the OSI decide to deport a Paperclip scientist or other Nazi who had been on the CIA's payroll. The CIA's history certainly shows the agency's well-known propensity for protecting its own. In 1980, for instance, the OSI was forced to dismiss a denaturalization complaint against alleged Nazi war criminal Tscherim Soobzokov as a result of documents that suddenly appeared in his files *after* the OSI filed charges in 1979. The OSI complaint had charged that Soobzokov had concealed his membership in various Nazi organizations, including the Waffen SS, when he applied for a visa to enter the United States. The OSI was forced to dismiss its case when a "V-30 personal data form" and an "operations memorandum"—ostensibly showing that Soobzokov *had* disclosed what he was charged with concealing—mysteriously appeared in the CIA's files and in Soobzokov's possession. Interestingly, the State Department—the agency responsible for issuing Soobzokov's visa—had no record in its files of either document. Furthermore, when OSI attorneys initially reviewed the CIA's files on Soobzokov, no evidence of these materials had been found.[31]

"Given all this, some may conclude that the CIA may have manufactured this evidence to protect Soobzokov, long rumored to have been an employee of the Agency," Elizabeth Holtzman told her congressional colleagues in 1980.[32]

In looking at the whole story of Paperclip today, the project's most ominous legacy lies in the cold war philosophy of the intelligence officers who guided the project through the decades. Central to that Machiavellian belief is that the end jus-

CHAPTER 8: CIA DIRTY TRICKS IN THE "NATIONAL INTEREST"

1. CIA-OPC cases are in State/National Interest Cases (NIC), JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

2. Procedures for admittance notes that the ninth proviso is used if they are "inadmissible" under U.S. law. See JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to Navy, Air and Army Chiefs of Procurement, JIOA memo 2758, 16 November 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. The CIA "hundred persons act" is sec. 7 of the CIA act of 20 June 1949, 50 USC 403h.

3. Rodal, "Nazi War Criminals in Canada," chap. 7 and notes.

4. For an example of JIOA's sales pitch see JIOA Director Daniel E. Ellis to Dr. Ernest Hollis, U.S. Office of Education, 31 January 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. Company lists are in JIOA post-1952 administrative files (declassified per author's FOIA request), RG 330, NARS.

5. JIOA Director to Chief, Special Procurement Section, Intelligence Division, 17 October 1949, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC.

6. Most CIA-OPC cases were "sponsored" by State, but the military did sponsor some of them—for example, Air Force cases involving Soviet defectors. See NIC files, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

7. Memo, John Russell, U.S. Office of Education, to College and University Administrators, 28 March 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

8. Robert Rice, University of North Carolina, to Colonel Laurin Williams, WDGS, 13 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC; and report by Wilhelm Krauledat, Intelligence Branch, U.S. Army, 26 July 1947, in Adolf von Hoermann's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS.

9. Leonard Alberts's Nazi memberships: see Berlin Document Center report, 2 September 1947; and counterespionage activities, Humphries's quote, and other reports, especially a summary of the investigation from Bechtel Corporation records—all in Alberts's IRR dossier EZO12128, RG 319, NARS, or his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS.

10. Ibid.

11. For fake ID cards and other information on Langfeld see Goerz Langfeld INSCOM dossier XE208037; "Hitler's Agent Ensconced in Westchester," *New York Herald Tribune*, 1 August 1940 identifies Langfeld as being seen at the home of Nazi agent.

12. For a summary of Grace-Ambros history see Joe Conason, "The Corporate State of Grace," *Village Voice*, 12 April 1983.

13. *Krauch*; and Nuremberg document NI-4830.

14. British report and quotes are in Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, *Elimination of German Resources for War*, pt. 10, p. 1276.

15. Josiah DuBois, *The Devil's Chemists* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). See also Joseph Borkin, *The Crime and Punishment of IG Farben* (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1979); references to JIOA objectives lists are in Otto Ambros INSCOM dossier XE021877; and W. R. Grace on JIOA company lists are in JIOA post-1952 administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

16. For lists of Edgewood Arsenal contracts with W. R. Grace and dozens of other companies and universities see "Index to Classified Edgewood Arsenal Records," in U.S. Army custody, WNRC.

17. Hunt, "Nazi Coverup."

18. Example of Wisner CIA report is in Herbert Axster's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. CIA-OPC complicity with Nazi war criminals is discussed in Loftus, *Belarus Secret*, and Simpson, *Blowback*. OPC history: in Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, no. 94-755.

19. Memo, General Stephen Chamberlin to Frank Wisner, 18 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC.

20. Regarding State accelerating visas see JIOA Director Bosquet Wev to Navy, Army, Air Intelligence Divisions, JIOA memo 891, 17 March 1948, in G-2 Paperclip files, 014.33, RG 319, WNRC. For results of the meeting with H. L'Heureux see JIOA Deputy Director C. Welte to JIOA Director, 1 June 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 014.32 Research, RG 319, WNRC.

21. For discussions of the second clause in National Interest policy, involving aliens other than Germans employed in civilian agencies, "in consideration of exceptional services," see JIC 282/38, JIC memo 285; further discussion on defining the second part of the policy clause is in CCS 334 (G12-44) S. 10—both in RG 218, NARS. Author interview with retired Army Colonel Bernard Geehan. For CIA counsel's comments on CIA hundred persons act see House Committee on the Judiciary, *Efficiency of the INS*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 31 October 1979.

22. "Mikolajczyk Got Secret Unit's Aid," *The New York Times*, 4 November 1947.

23. For Poles: regarding Jan Kolendo see JIOA Director R. D. Wentworth to H. L'Heureux, JIOA memo 3038, 27 July 1949, and regarding Lieutenant General Izydor Modelski see JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to L'Heureux, JIOA memo 3857, 22 September 1949, both in JIOA administrative files, State/NIC, RG 330, NARS. For Italians, especially Secondo Campini, see Brigadier General Walter Agee to JIOA, 3 May 1950, JIOA

James Riley, U.S. Immigration, 19 June 1952, in JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

40. Multhopp's Nazi party membership and biography are from Agent Report, signed by Sergeant Cornelius Walsh, 22 December 1949, in Hans Multhopp's INSCOM dossier; and "Martin Company Claims Plane Can Fly From Pentagon," *Washington Post*, 14 April 1964.

41. On Glenn Martin, Republic Aviation, Kurt Tank, and the ABMA recruiter see memo, Colonel Harlan Holman to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 29 August 1957, in ACSI post-1952 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC (declassified per author's FOIA request).

CHAPTER 10: SPIES, SPOOKS, AND LSD

1. Seymour Hersh, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal* (New York: Doubleday, 1969).

2. Taylor and Johnson, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research."

3. Author interview with James Stanley.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Author interview with Seymour Silver.

7. Captain Seth Palagi, "Report of Denazification Procedure," 29 October 1947; and *OMGUS Security Report*, 25 December 1947—both in the Kurt Rahr JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS.

8. Lieutenant F. E. Van Sickle, "Memorandum for Post Intelligence," 23 March 1948; Trurnit accusation: CSGID to EUCOM, cable WAR-87364, 30 September 1947—both in the Kurt Rahr JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS.

9. Colonel John Wood, *Security Report by Employing Agency*, 29 March 1948, in the Hans Trurnit INSCOM dossier D184062; and Silver interview.

10. Theodor Wagner-Jauregg's background is from his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS; and Silver interview.

11. Information on Friederich Hoffmann: INSCOM dossier 215327144.

12. "The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone, European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947," Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps, Headquarters, EUCOM; and Silver interview.

13. J. H. Wills and I. A. DeArmon, *Medical Laboratory Special Report No. 54* (Army Chemical Center, November 1954).

14. "The Army's Human Guinea Pigs," *Freedom*, August 1979.

15. Ibid.

16. National Research Council, *Possible Long-Term Health Effects of*

Short-Term Exposure to Chemical Agents, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984); see vol. 2, p. 36, for mustard experiments. Tabun reference: in L. Wilson Greene, "Psychochemicial Warfare, A New Concept of War," Army Chemical Center report, August 1949.

17. Greene, "Psychochemical Warfare."

18. John Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980).

19. Memo, Colonel Patrick Fokers to Major P. M. Wilson, FIAT, 14 September 1948, in Walter Reppe INSCOM dossier D60608.

20. Interrogation of Karl Tauboeck, September 20 and 21, 1945, M1019, RG 238, NARS; and Tauboeck INSCOM dossier XE187079.

21. Ibid. Tauboeck's CIA connection is from CIA Inspector General Report, 1951, in John Marks files, NSA.

22. Marks, *Manchurian Candidate*.

23. Ray Treichler's position at Edgewood is noted in "Edgewood Arsenal Quarterly Historical Report," 17 March 1958 and May 1958 (obtained under the FOIA). Hoffmann's CIA connections are in his INSCOM dossier; other individuals' CIA connections are noted in Marks, *Manchurian Candidate*.

24. Silver interview.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.; "Trip Reports," in Friederich Hoffmann's INSCOM dossier.

27. Friederich Hoffmann, William A. Mosher, and Richard Hively, "Isolation of Trans-Δ^6-Tetrahydrocannabinol From Marijuana," *Journal of the American Chemical Society*, 20 April 1966; author interview with James Moore; and Marks, *Manchurian Candidate*.

28. See "Bluebird/Artichoke" documents in G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC; and Van Sim, "Trip Report," February 1956 (obtained under the FOIA).

29. Lieutenant Colonel David McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study Report," U.S. Army Medical Department, 1980 (obtained under the FOIA).

30. Stanley interview.

31. Information on interrogation teams: in "Project Derby Hat" INSCOM dossier. On the Thornwell case see *Thornwell v. U.S.*, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C., 1979); and Thornwell INSCOM dossier HE05255.

32. Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 15 November 1949, G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC.

33. William Safire, "The German Problem," *The New York Times*, 2 January 1989.

34. JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 15 November 1949.

35. Army officer quote on Schieber and nerve gas reference are in Schieber INSCOM dossier D231194.

36. Schieber discusses his Armaments Supply Office activities in "Interview with Walter Schieber," Nuremberg doc. NO-1298, 8 February 1947, and Nuremberg doc. PS-104; arrest report is in Schieber INSCOM dossier.

37. Released from prison reference is in Agent Report I-421, 7970 CIC Group, 9 September 1949; Lieutenant Colonel Merellat Moses to 7970 CIC Group, 23 March 1948; and cable, Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Taylor to OMGUS, 26 April 1948—all in the Walter Schieber INSCOM dossier.

38. French attempt: Agent Report I-421, 9 September 1949; spy suspect and arms: Agent Report, 19 December 1949; CIC agent quote: Special CIC Agent Richard Scutt, Agent Report I-421, 14 December 1949—all in Walter Schieber INSCOM dossier.

39. Blauer information is from records of his daughter's lawsuit, *Barrett v. U.S.*, 660 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y., 1987) (hereafter cited as *Barrett*). Martin Lee and Bruce Shlain, *Acid Dreams* (New York: Grove Press, 1985), p. 38; Amedeo S. Marrazzi, "Trial of EA 1298 at New York State Psychiatric Institute," report to Edgewood's scientific director, 15 January 1953; report, Sidney Maltiz, Acting Principal Research Psychiatrist, New York State Psychiatric Institute, to Van Sim, 16 February 1956; and Van Sim, "Trip Report," February 1956—all in *Barrett*.

40. Statistics on experiments: from National Research Council, *Possible Long-Term Health Effects*.

41. Taylor and Johnson, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research."

42. Ibid.

43. National Research Council, *Possible Long-Term Health Effects*, vol. 2, pp. 52–53, 64, 65, and 67–68.

44. Ibid., p. 248 (dioxin), 135, 156, and 163. CS experiments: "Operation Black Magic," Edgewood Arsenal report, January–May 1959.

45. *Bonner v. U.S.*, CIV 81-16 3 (E.D.N.C., 1981) (hereafter cited as *Bonner*). A complete report of Bonner's experiment is contained in Stuart Karger, "Incapacitating Dose of CAR 302,668 in Man, and Efficacy of Physostigmine as an Antidote," Edgewood Arsenal Technical Memorandum 114-20, August 1968.

46. Jim Santori, "Private War of Ken Loeh," *Southern Illinoisan*, 20 December 1981.

47. Ibid.

48. Reference to grand mal seizures is in McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study," pp. 2 and 35; other effects are noted in National Research Council, *Possible Long-Term Health Effects*.

49. *Bonner*.

50. McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study" (suicide attempts), pp. 21 and 53.

51. For Army denials see *Loeh v. U.S.*, CIV 77-2065-B (S.D. Ill., 1977).

52. Stanley interview.

CHAPTER 11: PIPELINE TO THE ALAMAC HOTEL

1. Contract terms with Alamac Hotel is in "Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting," 26 February 1951, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. The Alamac Hotel is now a condominium complex.

2. Detailed statistical reports are in JIOA post-1952 administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

3. For a copy of a Project 63 flyer with contract information see State fiche, RG 59, NARS. Policy: JCS 1363/75, RG 218, NARS.

4. Special Projects Team reports are in ACSI post-1952 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC.

5. Author interview with retired Army Master Sergeant George Meidlein.

6. Information on Neumaier, Ulm, Lohninger, and other Austrians is in "Austrian Scientists," IRR dossier, RG 319, NARS.

7. Ernest Richter, Special Projects Team, trip report to ACSI, 16 April 1957, ACSI post-1952 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC.

8. Information on Krejci-Graf and Kress: see "Austrian Scientists."

9. Memo, Colonel Lewis Perry to ACSI, 6 July 1951, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS.

10. Ibid.

11. Houdremont was tried in Nuremberg, case 10, *U.S. v. Krupp et al.*, M896, RG 238, NARS. Quote is from Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 2 February 1951, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC.

12. Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 2 February 1951.

13. Ibid. On Kamptner see AC of S report, USFA Headquarters, 29 August 1950, in Kamptner INSCOM dossier XE271686.

14. Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 2 February 1951.

15. Blome information: Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists." Original Alsos interrogation: Kurt Blome INSCOM dossier XE001248.

16. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists." Blome court decision: *Brandt*.

17. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists." Fort Detrick interrogation: Blome's INSCOM dossier.

18. For copies of contracts see Kurt Blome's INSCOM dossier and his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS.

19. Memo, Dr. J. B. Koepfli to State Department, 6 April 1951. See